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Abstract 
British Foreign Office efforts during World War II to 
ensure the peaceful restoration of the King and his Govern- 
ment-in-Exile after Greece was liberated were frustrated 
by the King's refusal, with Churchill's support, to submit 
himself to a plebiscite. The United States refused to 
become involved (except for an unwarranted interference by 
Roosevelt) and generally disapproved of British policies. 
The return of the Government-in-Exile to Greece without a 
firm commitment by the King concerning his future resulted 
in a Communist-led revolt which was ended only by British 
military intervention and by Churchill finally forcing the 
King to accept a regency and the plebisicite. 
In post-war Greece, Britain continued to use her 
influence and support in an effort to establish stability in 
the face of serious economic difficulties and a right-wing 
reaction to the Communists, which led to a new civil war. 
Britain's own financial difficulties made it impossible to 
solve the economic problems or to bring order to political 
chaos. In autumn 1946, the United States perceived in the 
Greek situation a strategic, threat to its interests, but its 
capacity to assist Greece was severely limited by a hostile 
Congress and neo-isolationism. 
In early 1947, Britain's financial situation and its 
doubts as to the strategic value of Greece resulted in a 
sudden decision to abandon all aid. The American admini- 
stration was forced to resort to an idealogical crusade in 
order to obtain the funds necessary to prevent the fall of 
the Greek Government and a probable Communist-led victory in 
the new civil war. The proclamation of the American policy 
was the initial action of the Cold War, and a direct result 
of the policies which the British and Americans had been 
pursuing towards Greece since 1943. 
V 
Preface 
In April 1941, the British forces in Greece withdrew in 
the face of the German invasion, taking with them the 
remnants of the Greek Government in the face of German 
invasion. That government remained under British aupices 
during the war and was reinstated in Athens in September 
1944. The British rescued it from destruction by a Com- 
munist-led rebellion in December of that year, and tried 
against heavy odds to instill stability and well-being into 
a country which had known neither for many years. In the 
face of Britain's limited financial position, the political 
and economic weakness, of Greece, and what was perceived to 
be a Soviet threat, the United States in 1947 took over the 
task of rebuilding and maintaining Greece. 
This transition in a matter of six years was remark- 
able. Until at least 1945, the American Government wanted as 
little as possible to do with Greece; at best it saw the 
country as a British sphere of influence which should be 
respected as a matter of diplomacy; at worst it wanted to 
disassociate itself from what was felt to be British neo- 
colonialism in an area in which it then had little interest. 
A number of aspects of this transition have already 
been examined in detail, but from either the British or the 
American position, and usually for limited periods. John S. 
Vi 
Koliopoulos has provided the definitive study of British 
policy towards Greece up until the evacuation of 1941.1 
British policy is analysed by Procopis Papistratis for the 
period of the German occupation; ' by George M. Alexander, 
from April 1944 until early 1947; - and by Heinz Richter, 
from the Varkiza agreement of February 1945 until the 
plebiscite of September 1946.4 
The American involvement has been given far less 
attention. John 0. latrides has included a study of 
American war-time policies in analysing the December 1944 
revolt. Lawrence S. Wittner, in a work concerning American 
policies towards Greece for a longer period, provides only 
two chapters on the events prior to the Truman Doctrine.,, 
The monograph by Anne Karalekas on American policy in 1942- 
19457 is brief and incomplete. Terry M. Anderson, in his 
work on the origins of the new Anglo-American relationship 
which began in early 1947, has shown the importance of 
vii 
'Greece and the British Connection, 1936-1941 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1977). 
'British Policy towards Greece during' the Second World War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1982). 
'British Intervention in Greece (London: Merlin, 1986). 
SRevolt in Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1972). 
°'-American Intervention in Greece (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982). 
-'Britain, the United States, and Greece, 1942-1945 (New 
York: Garland, 1988). 
Greece in this development, and in so doing has shed con- 
siderable light on the policies of both. " With the 
exception of Anderson, these authors have focused their 
attention on the impact of either British or American 
policies on Greece. 
There are two main purposes of this study. The first 
is the examination of the process by which these two 
policies were developed and, especially, how they were 
related. Equally important is the analysis of how and why 
this development became the key factor in the initiation of 
the Cold War. A further objective is an evalation of the 
Anglo-American relationship during the period with regard to 
Greece. 
The formulation and evolution of policy towards Greece 
an the part of the two outside powers has been investigated 
in some depth, with emphasis on policy conflicts. While 
British and American attitudes for most of the period were 
divergent, disagreements within the ranks of each government 
were equally significant. On the British side at various 
times, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Office, the Treasury, 
and the military had differing policies on Greece; within 
American circles during the war years there was often a 
considerable variance between the views of the President and 
the State Department. An understanding of these internal 
conflicts is essential to an explanation of both how policy 
was developed and the difficulties in its implementation. 
viii 
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These conflicts involved incidents which require 
detailed analysis of causes and effects. Included are the 
effect of the visit of Greek resistance leaders to Cairo in 
August 1943; the interference by President Roosevelt in 
December 1943 which ruined a critical British initiative; 
the failure of the Americans to assist in the liberation of 
Greece; and the efforts by which King George 11, often 
supported by Churchill, was able time and time again to 
frustrate British attempts to establish stable government. 
In addition, considerable attention has been given to 
clarification of the actual process by which the British 
made the decision to withdraw aid from Greece, a matter 
misunderstood by a number of authorities. 
The detailed investigation of these problems, while 
significant in themselves, are essential to an understanding 
of the critical action by which Britain gave over its long- 
standing position in Greece to the Americans. They lead to 
discussion of the questions of why Bevin made this decision 
and whether this action was the cause of the Truman 
Doctrine, or the pretext for its adoption; in essence, what 
caused the Americans to accept responsiblity for Greece. 
If there is one issue examined which overshadows the 
others, it is that of whether the British decision was a 
based on a deliberate attempt to force the United States 
back into full participation in international affairs, after 
a period of post-war neo-isolationism. Other causes sug- 
gested for the British action include financial necessity, 
left-wing political presure, and strategic factors, but one 
ix 
school of thought holds that the major, if not the only, 
motivation for the British withdrawal from Greece was Ernest 
Bevin-s fervent desire to bring the United States to the 
defence of Europe in the face of a Soviet threat. If this 
is accepted, the British must either take the credit for 
bringing about the American actions which saved the Western 
world from Communism, or must bear the blame for initiating 
the Cold War. 
The study is based on the diplomatic records of the 
British and American governments, along with private papers 
of such participants as Anthony Eden, Ernest Bevin, Hugh 
Dalton, and Lord Francis-Williams. These records have been 
supplemented by autobiographies, memoirs and diaries of 
participants. 
Some explanation is required concerning the use and 
citation of American diplomatic records. Where possible, 
these are cited by reference to the printed material in the 
appropriate volume of Foreign Relations of the United 
States, rather than to the actual document in the National 
Archives. While a search was made for the originals of the 
printed records, it was the case in July 1984 that many of 
the original documents regarding Greece had never been 
returned to their normal files after the printed volumes 
were prepared. When the actual document was available, it 
was compared with the printed version. Only original 
documents which have not been printed, or which are imcom- 
plete in the printed volume, have been cited as being from 
the National Archives, and indicated by the abbreviation 
NARS. 
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A review of the references will show that there are 
more British than American sources cited. The major factor 
responsible is the fact that State Department files on 
Greece in the National Archives contain relatively little in 
the way of internal papers, that is, comments by desk 
officers on incoming telegrams, internal memoranda, corre- 
spondence between staff sections, and drafts of proposed 
messages and action papers. In contrast to Foreign Office 
files, which usually provide a full history of how even 
minor decisions came about, the State Department decimal 
files are usually limited to incoming telegrams and final 
copies of outgoing telegrams and action papers. 
There is also a relative lack of American diairies and 
useful memoirs, particularly for the wartime period. The 
memoirs of Cordell Hull, Joseph Grew, Admiral Leahy, and 
James Byrnes, and the diary of Edward Stettinius contain 
little of value on Greece. Only the published papers of 
Harry Hopkins provide a useful amount of source material on 
Greece for the wartime period. In the postwar period, the 
memoirs of Truman, Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, and 
Charles Bohlen, along with the informed account, The Fifteen 
Weeks, by Joseph M. Jones, are of value, but give far less 
attention to Greece than one would wish. The diaries of 
Lincoln MacVeagh, American Ambassador to Greece, are the one 
exception, in that they provide an almost day to day account 
of Greek affairs from November 1943 until early 1945. 
In contrast, there is an extensive range of British 
accounts by participants, beginning with Churchill's History 
xi 
of the Second World War, The memoirs of Eden, Macmillan, 
Dalton, Leeper, and the two commanders of the British 
Liaison Mission to Greece, E. C. W. Myers and C. M. 
MQC. rvºMQ" 
trýwr" Woodhouse; and the diaries and papers of Dalton, 
Alexander Cadogan, Pierson Dixon, and John Colville repre- 
sent the most useful of this category with regard to 
Greece. 
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Chapter I 
British and American Policies 
April 1941--August 1943 
1. The Problem of the King and the Government-in-Exile 
From the time the British Government evacuated King 
George II and his Cabinet from Greece in 1941, it was faced 
with the problem of making his Government-in-Exile a 
rallying point for Greeks at home and abroad in the 
furtherance of the war effort, as well as an instrument of 
maintaining their policy objectives in the post-war world. 
In the first years, it was the only institution representa- 
tive of occupied Greece. 
The Greek Government, eventually based in Cairo, ' 
consisted of the Greek King and a small cabinet hastily 
thrown together during the last days in Athens, after the 
suicide of Alexander Koryzis, the emergency successor of 
John Metaxas, dictator of Greece since 1936. The new Prime 
Minister was Emanuel Tsouderos, who had previously held 
only minor political office, although he had once been 
exiled for opposition to the Metaxas regime. He was a 
compromise leader who combined long-term republican 
"It was taken first to Crete, but had to be hastily moved 
to Egypt in the face of the German invasion. Part of the 
Government then went to England, and some to South 
Africa, with elements remaining in Egypt. It was finally 
established in Cairo in March 1943. 
1 
sympathies with a strong pro-British attitude and a view 
that the best future for Greece lay in loyalty to the 
monarchy as a rallying point for the distressed country. 2 
The critical problem for the British was the position 
of the King. For other governments-in-exile, such as the 
Norwegian and the Dutch, the monarch was a constitutional 
ruler on the British model, and a figure of importance 
almost exclusively as a symbol of resistance and national 
unity. The opposite was true of Greece, where twentieth- 
century politics were polarised between monarchism and 
republicanism. The main argument was between the con- 
servative elements in Greek society who were royalists and 
the liberals who wished for a republic. King George II had 
been exiled in 1923 when the republican followers of 
Eleftherios Venezelos came to power, and restored to the 
throne in 1935 when right-wing elements prevailed. It would 
have been, very difficult for any monarch of Greece to 
disassociate himself from the monarchist faction and act as 
an arbitrator between royalist and liberal. The con- 
servatives looked upon him as their protector and liberals 
saw him as their enemy. This point seems never to have been 
understood by either Winston Churchill or Franklin Roose- 
velt, and was to cause serious trouble for Greece during the 
entire war and early post-war periods. 
George II had little prestige in the eyes of many 
Greeks. He had been recalled to the throne in 1935 on the 
basis of a plebiscite which many observers felt to have been 
°`Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection, pp. 
148ff, 287-288. 
2 
rigged. While the elections of 1936 had shown an almost 
even split between royalists and republicans, a considerable 
amount of the support for right-wing parties seems to have 
represented self-interest in attempting to regain patronage 
and position lost to the republicans. The lack of a clear- 
cut mandate for either side led to the Metaxas dictatorship 
and the virtual cessation of parliamentary democracy. The 
King's reputation at home and abroad suffered badly from his 
acceptance of the dictatorship, with its apparent pro- 
fascist and pro-German attitudes. There is no reliable way 
of judging popular opinion, but it is suggested that a free 
election in 1939 or 1940 would have resulted in a republican 
victory. 
While some Greeks renewed their support of the King 
because of his determined and effective resistance to the 
Italian invasion, others saw him as pro-German, or at least 
responsible for the German occupation. These were ill- 
founded views, but easy to accept in time of trouble. To 
the left-wing in Greek politics, he was the symbol of evil, 
reaction, and capitalism. Even the military officer class 
was divided into republican and pro-royalist factions. The 
republican group of the army leadership attempted to over- 
throw the monarchy in 1922 and forced George II into exile 
in 1923. Most of these anti-royalist officers had been 
removed from active service in 1935, and were anxious to 
regain their lost positions within the Greek forces being 
formed outside Greece, or to establish themselves as leaders 
of the resistance movements in the occupied area. Even 
royalists were expressing the opinion as the King left 
3 
Greece in 1941 that he would never return. ' There was a 
general fear that his restoration would mean a return of a 
dictatorship, even though the offending portions of the 
Constitution had been removed, and, after a few months, the 
last of the Metaxas ministers were removed from the Cabinet. 
The feeling that the King should not return was 
particularly strong in occupied Greece. Intelligence 
reports filtering out to Cairo from the autumn of 1941 
onward emphasised the strong view that the King must go, or 
at least that the King should not return unless he submitted 
himself first to a plebiscite on the question. To the King 
and his followers this was nonsense; it was the talk of ill- 
informed persons or political enemies. To the British 
Government it was an embarrassment. The British were 
committed to the support of the King, at least for the 
duration of the war. 
-It had gone to the aid of the royalist 
government in the face of the German invasion, it had 
evacuated the King and his cabinet from Greece, and it had 
fully recognised the Government-in-Exile as the legitimate 
government of Greece. 
The difficulties inherent in Greek affairs which 
George II inherited were not helped by his background and 
personality. He appears to have been a most conscientious 
monarch, but one in whom traces of divine-right theory 
'A useful analysis of the King's position at this point is 
provided by Lincoln MacVeagh, the American Minister and 
later Ambassador to Greece, 1933-1941 and 1943-1948, in 
John 0. Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports (Princeton 
University Press, 1980) (hereinafter Iatrides, AacVeagh), 
pp. 376-378. 
4 
remained. He was convinced that it was his duty to serve 
the people of Greece as King, and equally positive that the 
people of Greece should recognise it. He might have been 
happy to serve as a constitutional monarch on the British or 
Scandanavian model, so long as the dignity of the crown was 
preserved, but this system could not be forced on the Greek 
political personality. Add to this a strong streak of 
stubbornness and of amour-propre, and the result was a very 
difficult proposition. - In defence of George II, it must be 
said that he never wavered from full support for the Allied 
cause, even in the darkest days of the war. He was the head 
of state, recognised as such by all the Allies. As such, he 
could hardly have been repudiated by Britain. 
An additional difficulty was the fact that the King and 
the Government-in-Exile had only a questionable title to the 
leadership of the Greek nation. The Government-in-Exile had 
no legitimacy based on elections. The few members of the 
new cabinet who remained from the previous administration 
were tarred with the brush of Metaxasism; the others were 
theoretically non-political, such as the service chiefs (in 
actuality usually royalist) or persons not previously in- 
volved in politics. There was almost no representation of 
the old political parties. The fundamental law under which 
F`The only detailed study of George II is that contained in 
The Royal House of Greece, by A. S. G. Lee (London: Ward 
Lock, 1948), which is uncritical at-best. An incisive 
appreciation is that of Lincoln MacVeagh, U. S. Minister 
in Athens, in a report to the State Department of 19 July 
1941, United States National Archives and Record Service, 
State Department Decimal Files (hereinafter NARS) 
868.00/1124. This is summarised in Iatrides, MacVeagh, a 
work which contains many more insights into George II-s 
character and personality. 
5 
the government operated was the Constitution of 1911, as 
modified by amendments in 1936 designed to give a legal 
basis for the restrictive measures of Metaxas. From the 
beginning of the exile, the government was under attack by 
Greeks living abroad as being unrepresentative of the 
wishes of the Greek people and a continuation of the 
dictatorship. Intelligence. reports indicated that there was 
a similar climate of opinion growing within occupied 
Greece. 
In the autumn of 1941, the British Foreign Office began 
studies of what became known as the 'Constitutional 
Question', i. e., the matter of getting rid of the Metaxas 
amendments to the Constitution and the problem of the 
establishment of the legitimacy of the Government-in-Exile. 
What seemed to be a simple matter of suggesting to Tsouderos 
that the King and Government announce that the Metaxas 
changes were now null and void turned into a long-running 
discussion of related problems, especially that of the 
future of the King. After some pressure from the British, 
the King made a formal declaration in February 1942 which 
removed the offending laws. - 
As the amount of opposition to the King became more 
evident, the British Foreign office began to see the 
advantage of a declaration that he would not return to 
Greece without a plebiscite, or, at least, would submit 
Ott 
,, 
qa-(ý C; c3ucL a proceclur. e a*-er he re. (ürned. 1 hero were 
`A detailed summary of the Foreign Office examination of 
the constitutional question is contained in the Confi- 
dential Print of 26 February 1942, in Public Record 
Office Class F0371, Foreign Office Political 
Correspondence (hereinafter F0371), 33167/R1362. 
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two difficulties in obtaining a declaration'of this sort. 
In the first place, the King did not want to bind himself to 
such an arrangement which might mean he would 'return to his 
travels" of 1924-1935. Secondly, as the records will 
demonstrate, Winston Churchill was adamant in the view that 
monarchy was the best form of government for Greece. 
The tragedy of the question of the King's future was 
that it was not settled until after the liberation of 
Greece, and a short, but costly, civil war. The issue gave 
the left wing in Greece a major cause with which to attract 
support, and to build a strong political and military 
movement dedicated to the overthrow of the King and the 
Government-in-Exile. If this had been successful, Greece 
would have been ruled by a pro-communist regime, possibly 
within the Soviet bloc. The British inability to settle 
this question early in the period created a dangerous 
situation which eventually had to be resolved by the use of 
major force and the loss of British as well as Greek lives. 
The United States contributed heavily to the British diffi- 
culties by their failure to give whole-hearted support to 
British policies, by their `hands-off' policy, and by their 
refusal to assist in the liberation of Greece. 
2. The American Attitude to Greece 
The United States had had no involvement of signifi- 
cance with the Greek Government-in-Exile up to this point. 
Greece and the Balkans in general were considered by the 
Americans to be outside their field of interest, a policy 
7 
based partially on an assumption that the United States had 
no long-range interests of importance in the area, and 
partially because the Americans accepted that the Balkans 
were a British sphere of interest. One of the unexplained 
facets of U. S. foreign policy in this period is the 
contradiction of the distaste for spheres of influence and 
the willingness to concede all influence in Greece to the 
British. 
The American attitude to Greek affairs was that of 
friendship with a country which had put up a fight against 
the Germans, and of military interest to the extent that 
Greece might be a centre of resistance to the Germans, or a 
source of intelligence. The Americans recognised the Greek 
Government-in-Exile as the legitimate government, but held 
no brief for the monarchy--not because of any specific 
objection to George II, but in terms of the general American 
belief in republicanism as a more effective form of 
government. 
The United States maintained diplomatic relations with 
the Greek Government-in-Exile in London through Anthony 
Drexel Biddle, who was accredited to it as Minister and 
later Ambassador. Most discussions between the two govern- 
ments took place between the Greek Legation (later 
Embassy) in Washington and the State Department. The 
detachment of the Americans is evident from the paucity of 
diplomatic correspondence or staff memoranda in the 1942 
8 
archives. - Americans in 1942 were content to allow the 
British to be responsible for the future of Greece, looking 
on only as detached observers. 
The Americans relied almost completely on British 
sources for knowledge of what was taking place in Greece and 
in the relationships between the British and the Greeks in 
exile. One of the few documents on Greece in State Depart- 
ment files for 1942 is a report by Foy Kohler7, who had been 
Third Secretary of the American Legation in Athens before it 
closed in 1941. This summarised information he had 
received on a visit to Cairo in January 1942, probably from 
officials of either the British Embassy or of the British 
Minister of State, Oliver Lyttleton. Kohler noted that 
local British officials were emphasising the dissatisfaction 
of the Greek people with the King and those ministers held 
over from the Metaxas regime, but that London had been 
disregarding their views. 
His own conclusions were that a pro-Allied government 
would be formed in Greece in the expected interregnum 
"There are no copies of diplomatic correspondence or of 
internal papers concerning the future of Greece or of 
British (or of American) policies towards Greece in 
Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter 
FRUS), 1942, Volume II, although other matters such as 
relief operations are covered. The State Department 
decimal files for Greece for 1941 and 1942 contain only a 
few scattered documents; those of any significance are 
cited infra. The other major source for U. S. policy 
towards Greece, Iatrides, MacVeagh, does not help for the 
early period, since MacVeagh left Greece in mid-1941 and 
did not return until late 1943. 
9Foy Kohler (1908-__), Legation Secretary, Athens, 1936- 
1941; Staff Officer, 1941-1944, and Assistant Chief, 
1944-1945, Division of Near East Affairs, State Depart- 
ment; Ambassador to Russia, 1962-1966. 
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between German retreat and Allied landings, and that this 
government would proclaim: a republic. He expected that the 
republic would have the full support of the Greek people who 
would demand that the Allies respect this development in 
accordance with the Atlantic Charter. His recommendation 
was that the Allies should avoid implying or making 
commitments regarding the continuance of the present regime 
after liberation. The official ýLlicä of the state 
went with regard to the retention of the King on the throne 
after the war was to urge a plebiscite or other means by 
which the Greek people could make their wishes known. Thi: 
seems also to have rjeen the policy of President Roosevelt in 
T 
the beginning, but it will be seen that he came to the 
defence of George II at a. critical point in Ang-lo-Greek 
relations. 
3. British Policy, April 1941-March 1943 
The first statement of British policy towards the king 
which has any substance arose after Tsouderos, on 8 October 
1941, made a speech in which he set forth the policies of 
his government concerning the constitutional position of 
Greece after liberation. Tsouderos promised -a regime of 
freedom- which would -permit of the equal participation of 
all in a form of public life which shall secure freedom of 
"Report of 28 January, NARS 868.0Q/1144. 
An example of State Department policy in this matter 
is the memorandum to the British Embassy of 2 July 1943 
in FRUS, 1943, IV, 1234. This and other pertinent 
statements of U. S. policy are discussed in detail infra, 
10 
the individual against any illegal action on the part of 
those who are in authority or their agents, but which at the 
same time shall secure the whole body social against any_ 
illegal and selfish action of individuals and shall impose 
the subjection of private interest to the interest of the 
community. ' (Underlining in ink on the Foreign Office minute 
quoting the speech. ) Pierson Dixon-10 in the Foreign Office, 
expressed doubts as to whether this amounted to a definite 
statement of an intention to restore full democratic govern- 
ment. Orme Sargent", in a following minute, stated: 'We 
have pledged ourselves to see the King and M. Tsouderos' 
Government through to the end. 'xz 
This view was confirmed by Churchill on 23 October 
1941, when he wrote to Eden with regard to minor complaints 
from the King: Our policy is to support the Greek King and 
Government, and not to allow them to be undermined or ill- 
used. - Eden, in reply, agreed and added, we are pledged to 
see them through to the end'. He also pointed out that, if 
the King and his government were to be welcomed back into 
`'Pierson Dixon (1904-1965), Southern Department of the 
Foreign Office, 1940-1943; accompanied Eden to Greece in 
March-April 1941; Principal Private Secretary to Eden, 
1943-1945; accompanied Eden and Churchill to Athens, 
December 1944, to Yalta, February 1945, and to Potsdam, 
July 1945; continued as Principal Private Secretary to 
Bevin until end of 1947; Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 
1948-1950. 
11Orme Sargent (1884-1962), Deputy Under Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, 1939-1946; Permanent Under Secretary, 
1946-1949. 
'Minutes, 24-25 October 1941, F0371/29909/R9277. 
Greece, Britain must work for a Greece united in their 
support. - 
Probably without any knowledge of these two statements, 
the Greek Prime Minister in October and November 1941 sent a 
series of memoranda to the Foreign Office culminating in a 
message of 7 November in which he asked that Britain commit 
herself to the restoration of the King and his government in 
Greece by force if necessary. The internal reaction of the 
Foreign Office was that Britain could not for one moment 
contemplate helping to restore the King by force, although 
the information then available to it suggested that even if 
the war ended at that moment, the King could not return 
except with armed support. " Neither Tsouderos nor the 
Foreign Office identified the forces in Greece which they 
expected would seek to prevent the return of the King; they 
appear to believe that general public opinion, both republi- 
can and royalist, would not accept George II. 
In early 1942, an emissary from Greece arrived in Cairo 
with a message from General Gonatas, who had been a leader 
of the revolt which removed George II from the throne in 
1924. Gonatas claimed to represent a new movement of 
politicians within Greece which included royalists, republi- 
cans, and left-wing leaders. According to him, both the 
puppet regime in Athens and the Tsouderos Government in 
London were seen by the Greek people as continuations of the 
Metaxas regime and therefore unacceptable. He denied the 
'Minutes, 29 October, F0371/29909/R9467. 
14Minute, 21 November, F0371/29910/R9987. 
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possibility that there was any support at all in Greece for 
the restoration of the King and voiced the suspicion that 
the Greek Army now being formed by the British in the Middle 
East would be used to impose the King by force. - 
The Foreign Office accepted this as evidence of the 
King's unpopularity, although it is difficult to understand 
why Gonatas should be expected to provide an unbiased 
account of general public opinion. Orme Sargent felt that 
the chances of George II regaining his throne were very 
slight. He was afraid that the British Government might 
have gone too far in hoping that the King could be restored, 
or that the Greek people might eventually rally to him. He 
emphasised that Britain should avoid any suggestion that 
they wished to force George II and Tsouderos on the Greek 
people. 
With Eden's approval, a message was sent back to 
Gonatas to the effect that His Majesty's Government 
officially recognised the Tsouderos Government as the legal 
government of Greece, and would give it full support. It 
was the British hope that the Greek people would rally round 
the King and his government for the period of the war, 
although nothing was said about his restoration upon libera- 
tion. It asked that the Greek people `avoid positions in 
respect of political questions which can only be settled 
after the liberation-., - 
lEMinister of State telegram 90,7 January, F0371/33160/ 
R174. 
leSargent-s minute and Eden's approval, 30-31 January, 
F0371/33167/R792; reply to Gonatas, Foreign office tele- 
gram 582,2 February, Ibid., R1362. 
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The substance of this message was disseminated to the 
Political Intelligence Department (for guidance of the BBC 
and other propaganda outlets) and to the various agencies 
involved in intelligence and subversive operations in 
Greece. It must therefore be considered to be the standing 
British policy in early 1942 with regard to the King and his 
government. It was a policy which pleased no one. It failed 
to offer strong support for the King or for Tsouderos, yet 
it made it clear that the British would maintain them in 
office during the occupation. For the time being this 
policy was not dangerous; no doubt it was the best approach 
to take an equivocal stand pending further developments. So 
long as there was no organised opposition to the King and 
his government, there should be little to fear. 
This ambiguous policy had to be reexamined in August 
1942 when Sir Michael Palairet presented his credentials as 
Ambassador to the King. &' In his speech, he stated: 
His Majesty's Government observe with satis- 
faction the various declarations by your Majesty 
and M. Tsouderos, in which it is plain that it is 
the policy of your Majesty's Government to leave 
it to them [the Greek people] freely to determine 
their future political conditions, when, after 
the war, your Majesty has resumed in your capital, 
your place on the throne of Greece. - 
In a letter to the head of the Special Operations 
Executive, - it was stated that the speech was approved by 
i7Palairet had been Minister to Greece since 1939; it was 
necessary to present new credentials when the Legation 
was made an Embassy. 
1°The Special Operations Executive, usually referred to as 
SOE, was the branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
responsible for subversive activities against the Axis in 
occupied territories. 
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the Foreign Office as a firm affirmation of British Govern- 
ment policy, which should be publicised fully. " The King and 
the Greek Government welcomed this speech, which they took 
to mean that the British Government intended to restore the 
King. 
There was a considerable reaction in Cairo. Panaghio- 
tis Kannellopoulos, who had been brought from Greece to join 
the Tsoudros Government as a representative of more liberal 
elements, protested at what seemed to be a definite promise 
to restore the King. ° Sargent pointed out to Churchill 
that republican Greeks assumed that this meant that the King 
would be restored regardless of the wishes of the Greek 
people. 23- The Foreign Office seems to have regretted its 
approval of Palairet-s speech, although it felt it useful to 
have reminded the Greeks that the British Government sup- 
ported the King. =22 
Perhaps as a result, the Foreign Office in October 1942 
developed a new statement of policy towards Greece. This 
differed little from that of January, except that it 
included: 
His Majesty's Government approve the various 
declarations by the King of Greece and the Greek 
Prime Minister in which it has been made plain that 
the Greek Government are not exercising dictatorial 
authority, and that it is the intention of the King 
and Government, who are acting as the trustees of 
1-"Speech and letter, 18-19 August, F0371/33202/R5438. 
24Minister of State telegram 1429,29 August; letters, 23 
and 26 August, F0371/33162/R5729 and R5766. 
'Memorandum, 6 March 1943, PREM 3 211/15. 
--2Draft message in F0371/33162/R5706, and generally in this 
piece. 
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the Greek people, to leave it to the Greek people 
freely to determine their future political con- 
ditions which we would hope would be on the basis 
of a democratic constitutional monarchy. 
There was also included a declaration that the British 
Government did not intend to restore the King by force, but 
expressed the view that the British felt that a monarchial 
regime was more likely to provide Greece with a stable 
government in the post-war world than "a republican regime 
which in the past failed to produce anything but weak and 
unreliable governments in Greece. 'a 
4. The American View of Initial British Policy 
A copy of this declaration was taken to Washington in 
autumn 1942 by Henry Hopkinson, the specialist on Greek 
affairs in the office of the British Minister of State in 
Cairo. Z4 This visit seems to have provided the State 
Department with its first briefing on British policy towards 
Greece, and resulted in a detailed study by the Division of 
Near Eastern Affairs. In a memorandum of 28 December 1942, 
the British statement was found to be in general accordance 
with American official attitudes with respect to continual 
support of the King and the Government-in-Exile as the legal 
government, and the declaration that the Greek people would 
"Statement, 12 October, F0371/37222/R2301. 
: 24The reasons for Hopkinson-s visit to Washington is not 
evident. The only mentions of it which have been located 
are in a file entitled -Brief for Mr Eade's Visit to 
Washington' dated March 1943 in F0371/37222/R2301, and a 
reference to it in the State Department memorandum of 28 
December 1942 discussed infra. 
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be allowed freely to determine their political future after 
the war. 
The Americans took a strong line with regard to the 
British predilection for a monarchial rather than a republi- 
can form of government for liberated Greece. They felt that 
the statement committed the British to a restoration of the 
Greek King by any means short of force, an attitude which 
would in practice deny the Greek people a free choice of 
their political system. It was specifically suggested that 
this violated the Atlantic Charter. 
The memorandum went on to claim that the British 
conclusions were based on a number of false premises. First 
of all, there were doubts that the British understood how 
little support the King had in Greece. The State Department 
view was that the King had gained little lasting prestige 
for his leadership during the Italian campaign and had lost 
two chances of improving his situation by his failure at the 
death of Metaxas and at the suicide of Koryzis to establish 
strong and representative governments. Instead he had 
retained a number of hated Metaxas ministers, supplemented 
by some of his own followers. While the Metaxist followers 
had since been purged, one liberal (Kannellopoulos) 
installed, and some statements made about renouncing 
dictatorship, there seemed little change in the King's real 
attitude. 
In particular, the Americans doubted that the Greek 
people would trust promises made by George II to act as a 
democratic constitutional monarch. He had given the most 
categorical assurances that he intended to reign in that way 
17 
when he returned to Greece in 1935, and almost immediately 
installed a dictatorship. Further, they took exception to 
the British view that a monarchial regime was more likely to 
furnish post-war Greece with a stable government than would 
a republican one. The Americans pointed to weakness under 
previous monarchial regimes and to major achievements of the 
Venezelos governments of 1924-1935. 
They also felt that an attempt to 'sell' the King to 
the Greek people was not only unlikely to meet with success, 
but would destroy any hopes of establishing the Greek unity 
which the British so definitely desired. The commentary 
showed a clear understanding of the point that the Crown 
had, in the past twenty-five years, represented not unity 
but bitter partisanhip in Greek politics. It went so far as 
to say that Greece had achieved unity only twice during that 
period--in opposition to the Italians in 1940, and in 
opposition to the King in the wake of events of the spring 
of 1941. 
The memorandum concluded with the recommendation that 
the U. S. attitude should be based on the principle that the 
Greek people should have an opportunity after the war to 
express their own political will, freely. This would not 
only be in accordance with general American policies, but 
would be in line with U. S. self-interest for the ingrained 
pro-American and pro-British sentiments of an entire people, 
which would thus be confirmed, are surely a sounder guar- 
antee of a Greece friendly and loyal to the democracies in 
the future than are the pledges of a dynasty'. 
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The high-minded sentiments of this memorandum were then 
tempered with a recognition of the practical difficulties. 
The Americans believed that some sort of anti-German local 
government would be organised in Greece during the occupa- 
tion, a government which would have full popular support, 
but would be overwhelmingly republican. If the King and his 
government were returned to Greece under the protection of 
Allied military forces, civil war, possibly beyond the 
control of the occupation army, was likely to result, a 
remarkedly prescient view in the light of the limited 
American knowledge of developments in Greece. 
The Allies could recognise this local government, but 
such an action would repudiate the Government-in-Exile 
which the U. S. and Britain were supporting as the legiti- 
mate power. The State Department suggested that an Allied 
occupation continue until conditions permitted an expression 
of the people's will. During this occupation, the local 
government might be used more effectively by the Allies if 
they were not bound by any system of national politics'. 
The last point does not explain what would happen to the 
Government-in-Exile. 
The memorandum was circulated to other officers of the 
State Department and generally approved, although consider- 
able stress was placed on the necessity of supporting 
existing Governments-in-Exile until liberation. There was 
agreement that the matter had to be discussed with the 
British, and the suggestion that the British might assume 
that the United States approved their policy in totes, unless 
the latter made its views clear. In early January 1943 
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instructions were given for the preparation of an 
Aide-Memoire to be sent to the Foreign Office, but there is 
no indication that this was done. -s 
In March, the Department prepared another memorandum, 
restating the points of the December study, for the use of 
Cordell Hull during the visit of Eden to Washington. There 
is no evidence that Greece was discussed at that level, but 
on 29 March Wallace Murray of the State Department took up 
the subject with William Strange of the Foreign Office, who 
had accompanied Eden. Murray asked two questions. First, 
did the British intend that the Greek people be allowed to 
express themselves regarding the restoration of the mon- 
archy? Second, should the King and the Government-in-Exile 
return to liberated Greece before the people had expressed 
their political will? Strang referred the questions to the 
Foreign Office for reply, a fortunate move, since by that 
time, probably unbeknown to Strang or Eden, a new and 
stronger policy statement had been formulated in London. c-{ 
"Memorandum of 28 December and comments thereto, NARS 
868.01/333-1/4. 
'Wallace Murray (1887-1965), Assistant Chief, 1925-1929 
and Chief, 1929-1942, Division of Near East Affairs, 
State Department; Advisor on Political Relations, State 
Department, 1944-1945. 
'William Strang (1893-1978), Assistant Secretary of State, 
Foreign Office, 1939-1943. 
2G"Nemorandum, 16 March, and note 9, FRUS, 1943, IV, 126- 
127; Strangs memorandum, 7 April, F0371/37195/R3210. 
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5. The Modified Policy of March 1943 
March 1943 was a period of change and turmoil in Greek 
affairs. The King and Tsouderos moved the seat of the 
Government-in-Exile to Cairo. At the same time, Reginald 
Leeper2'-ý was appointed Ambassador in succession to Palairet, 
and took up his post in Cairo. The stability of the 
Tsouderos government was threatened by a serious revolt in 
the Greek armed forces being trained by the-British in 
Syria. The revolt had its roots in the distrust by royalist 
officers of republicans who had been given posts of import- 
ance within the forces, and allegations that the army was 
being formed, not so much to fight the Axis, but to restore 
George II to Greece by force if necessary. 0° The rebellion 
led to the formation of a somewhat more broadly-based 
cabinet, still under Tsouderos, and an increased apprecia- 
tion among British officials of the extent of opposition to 
the King among Greeks. 
"Reginald (Rex) Leeper (1888-1868), an Australian who 
served during the First World War in the British 
Department of Information, specialising in matters 
pertaining to Russia; entered Foreign Service 1918, 
serving mainly in Eastern Europe; Political Intelligence 
Department, Foreign Office, 1938-1940; Assistant 
Secretary of State responsible for covert propaganda in 
what became the Political Warfare Executive; Ambassador 
to the Greek Government, 1943-1946; Ambassador to 
Argentina, 1946-1948. 
`1 
ý 
ý°The 1943 army revolt is discussed in detail by Papistra- 
tis, British Policy, pp. 74-85; and Hagen Fleischer, The 
" omalies" in the Greek Middle East Forces, 1941-1944, ' 
J urnal of the Hellenic Diaspora, V-3 (Fall 1978), pp. 
5- 6 
. 
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This opposition was highlighted by the reports which 
began to emanate from Greece from the Harling Mission of the 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) which had been dropped 
into Greece in September 1942. This first group was the 
nucleus of the large-scale infiltration of SOE agents, known 
as British Liaison Officers, and collectively as the British 
Liaison Mission-31 The specific purpose of the mission was 
the support and encouragement of Greek resistance groups 
opposing the Axis occupation, but it was immediately caught 
up in the political struggles amongst the various factions 
of the resistance movement, much to the dismay of the 
Foreign Office. 
They were completely taken aback in March 1943 when SOE 
transmitted a consolidation of the first reports from the 
Mission. 12 The immediate reaction was a letter of enquiry 
about Harling which amounted to a thinly veiled complaint 
that not only had the Foreign Office had not been alerted to 
the operation, '21*1 but, more important, that the Liaison 
"Harling and the British (later Allied, when American 
Office of Strategic Services personnel joined) Military 
Mission are described in detail by the first commander, 
Brigadier E. C. W. Myers, in The Greek Entanglement 
(London: Hart-Davis, 1955); and by his second-in-command 
and ultimate successor, Colonel C. M. Woodhouse, in The 
Apple of Discord (London: Hutchinson, n. d. (1948). 
-FO371/37201/R2050. 
13-'Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Undersecretary, knew 
of this operation in advance, but it is possible that he 
and others in the Foreign Office understood it to be only 
a military sabotage action, which indeed was its inital 
task.. Cadogan"s knowledge of Harling is explained by 
Richard Clogg, "Pearls from Swine, - in British Policy 
towards War-Time Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece 
ed. Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 
1975), pp. 176-177, citing the documents in 
P0371/33177/R2657. 
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Officers were involving themselves in Greek politics. The 
Foreign Office saw this as an infringement of their 
prerogatives, exacerbated by the fact that SOE officers had 
little background or training in political matters, 
especially in the complexities of internal Greek politics. 
This last was no doubt true, but it is also apparent that 
the Foreign Office itself had very little understanding of 
the situation.: 704 The letter of enquiry led to lengthy and 
heated discussions between the two bodies, which did nothing 
to satisfy the Foreign Office. 00 This argument amounted to 
the opening round of a battle between the two concerning 
Greece which was to continue until the end of the war. 
It was evident from the reports of the British Liaison 
Officers, and fragmentary information brought out of Greece 
by refugees, that there were several separate Greek 
resistance groups. Their distinctive political orientations 
were not defined at this stage, but it gradually became 
clear that there were two principal organisations, EAM/ELAS 
3"Clogg, ibid., pp. 170-171, points out that the Foreign 
Office were aware in September 1942 of the existence of 
some of the resistance movements and their relative 
strengths, citing F0371/33175/R1793,33187/R5354, and 
33163/R8961. The relative lack of knowledge of the 
Foreign Office is demonstrated, for example, by the two 
Foreign Office memoranda on Greek resistance movements of 
8 and 15 March 1943 in 37222/R2301. 
`300371/37201/R2050, R2636, R3348. 
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and EDES. r-, EAM'' was founded by leaders of the Greek 
Communist Party (KKE) as a resistance group open to all 
Greeks. A large proportion of the rank and file were not 
communist sympathisers, but joined the organisation for 
patriotic reasons. The leaders of EAM made strong efforts 
to create the impression that it amounted to an apolitical 
nationalist movement, a reputation EAM achieved during the 
war years in many quarters outside Greece. From the begin- 
ning, EAM was the largest group, with the greatest capa- 
bility for guerrilla warfare. In political terms, it would 
be difficult to call it republican, since there is no clear 
picture of the form of government it advocated for post-war 
Greece; it certainly was opposed to the return of the King 
and his Government-in-Exile during the occupation years. 
EDES*"-9 represented a different strand in Greek poli- 
tics, that of Venizelist republicanism. Its titular leader 
was General Nicholas Plastiras, who had been driven into 
"John Louis Hondros, Occupation and Resistance (New York: 
Pella, 1983), chapter 4, provides a clear and balanced 
summary of the resistance groups. Other useful sources 
are Nigel Clive, A Greek Experience (Wilton: Michael 
Russell, 1985); Nicholas Hammond, Venture Into Greece 
(London: Kimber, 1983); John L. Loulis, The Greek 
Communist Party (London: Croom Helm, 1982); Myers, Greek 
Entanglement; Stephanos Sarafis, ELAS (London: Merlin, 
1980); and Woodhouse, Apple of Discord. 
-37EAM (Ethniko Apeleutherotiko Metopo) (National Liberation 
Front) was the overall political organisation of this 
particular movement; ELAS (Ellenikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos 
Stratos> (Popular Greek Liberation Army) was its guerrilla 
arm. There was in practice so little distinction between the 
two that the term EAM will be used for both organisations, 
except in direct quotations. 
0*'Kommounistikou Komma Ellados. 
QEthnikos Demokratilos Ellenikos Synthesmos (National 
Republican Greek League). 
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exile in France by royalists after two attempted coups 
d'etat in the early 1930's. The leader in Greece was 
Colonel Napoleon Zervas. In its original programme it 
strongly denounced George II and his court, and demanded a 
free election at the end of the war to establish a demo- 
cratic regime which it obviously expected to be republican. 
It never developed the popular support nor the organisa- 
tional strength of EAM, but did have major influence in some 
areas of Greece. The other, more minor, resistance groups 
differed on many political points, but all had one principle 
in common--opposition to the return of the King. Despite 
unanimity on this point, efforts to unify the various groups 
were in vain. In particular, EAM and EDES saw each other as 
enemies and often seemed to view the other as more dangerous 
and undesirable than the Germans. 
The Harling Mission made contact with both EAM and EDES 
and established liaison officers with the headquarters of 
each. From the outset, the British supplied money, arms, 
and equipment, more or less equally. The principal aim was 
military, in terms of tying down large numbers of German 
troops, interdicting supply lines to North Africa, and 
preparation for the eventual invasion of Greece. British 
military authorities, especially the Middle East head- 
quarters in Cairo, valued the resistance movements highly 
and insisted on support to them, regardless of their 
political background. The Foreign Office, therefore, came 
into conflict with both SOE and the military in their 
insistence on continuing the sponsorship of the King and the 
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Government-in-Exile in the face of the anti-royalist atti- 
tude of the resistance groups. 
The problem was to be further complicated by the per- 
sonal policy of Winston Churchill. This was one of stubborn 
support to the King, even after the Foreign Office, late in 
1943, began to realise that there was more hope of a stable 
and pro-British government in Greece if the future of the 
King was made negotiable. 
The fact that there were to be three conflicting 
British policies towards Greece only emerged in March 1943, 
as it became evident that the King had little popular 
following inside or outside Greece. There was also the 
strong possibility that the resistance elements might estab- 
lish an anti-royalist government in Greece at the libera- 
tion, before the British could install the King and his 
administration. This in itself would be undesirable, but 
the outcome would be worse if the result was a strongly 
anti-British government. 
It is not clear whether the Foreign office was more 
disturbed by SOE's involvement in political matters, or by 
the contents of the first reports of the liaison officers. 
Not only did these stress the unpopularity of the King, but 
they included demands of the resistance for a promise by the 
King that he would submit himself to a plebiscite before 
returning to Greece. The idea of a plebiscite was suggested 
at the same time by the office of the Minister of State in 
Cairo, d° but the Foreign Office seems to have recognised its 
4-Minister of State telegram 528,7 March, 
FO371/37216/R2069. 
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existence for the first time from the initial Harling 
reports. l The demand for a definite promise of a plebi- 
scite was to be the major issue in Greek politics inside and 
outside Greece for the next three years. It was also to be 
one of the most intractable problems for the British in 
their relationships with Greece for the same period. 
The revelation that SOE officers were involving them- 
selves in political affairs in Greece, and were giving 
support to anti-monarchist groups of guerrillas, roused the 
Foreign Office to battle with both SOE and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. Orme Sargent wrote to the Director General of SOE 
on 14 March complaining about the actions of the Harling 
Mission, and suggesting that relations be broken off with 
guerrilla bands which did not support the King, or at least 
that these should receive no further support unless they 
agreed to accept the return of the King and the Government- 
in-Exile. SOE defended its actions and pointed out that 
breaking off relations or support would drive the resistance 
"The initial Harling reports were made into a summary by 
SOE and sent in this form to the Foreign Office. Piers 
Dixon minuted on this summary that Harling`s commander, 
Colonel Myers, was devising a political programme and in 
so doing had generated the idea of a plebiscite (7 March, 
F0371/37201/R2050). Myers- actual messge (3407/8,24 
January 1943, Woodhouse Papers, Liddell-Hart Archive, 
File Woodhouse 1/5) strongly suggests that the concept of 
plebiscite came from Zervas, and was not an interpreta- 
tion or an inspiration on the part of Myers. The 
specific word -plebiscite- probably has some significance 
in analysing later arguments with George II, who, when 
making what he thought were concessions to non-royalist 
views, consistently refused to use this word. 
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groups concerned into direct opposition and ensure future 
chaos. -: 2 
In a strongly worded memorandum sent to the Chiefs of 
Staff the next day, the Foreign Office expressed the opinion 
that 'far more importance must be attached to building up a 
strong Greek Government able to control the country and 
ensure that it will not lapse into chaos or civil war when 
we land troops in Greece, than to such ephemeral damage as 
can be done to the Axis through subversive activities 
carried on in the present phase of the war when we can offer 
no direct threat to the Axis occupation of Greece. - They 
asked the Chiefs of Staff for a `ruling' as to the precise 
value of sabotage by the resistance, since supporting 
leftist and anti-royalist bodies amounted to strengthening 
the opposition to the monarchy. The Foreign office made it 
clear that they were not suggesting that SOE break off 
relations with specific resistance groups, which contradicts 
the letter to SOE. The memorandum concluded by saying that 
the Prime Minister approved their position. -3 
Simultaneously, the Foreign Office proposed that a new 
directive to SOE should include, 
.. 
it is of growing 
importance now that we should build up the King and the 
Greek Government. Every effort should therefore be made to 
avoid strengthening or encouraging anti-monarchist elements 
in Greece, even if this may mean dispensing with their 
, "Sargent-s letter has not been located but its contents 
are clear from the SOE reply of 16 March, 
F0371/37195/R2432. 
'3Memorandum, 15 March, F0371/37222/R2363. 
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services in particular cases. ' SOE objected strongly; the 
Chiefs of Staff informed the Foreign Office that they hoped 
political considerations would not be allowed to hamper or 
reduce the good work being done by the guerrilla bands. 
They saw no objection to instructions to the British Liaison 
Officers to let it be known to guerrilla leaders that they 
had the King of Greece and his government to thank for the 
support given them. -+a 
It was in the atmosphere of Greek army revolts, changes 
in the Government-in-Exile, its move to Cairo, and unpopular 
political reports from SOE, that a new policy statement was 
hammered out in London in mid-March 1943. Much of this new 
document was identical in meaning with that of October 1942, 
but there were differences of emphasis. The definite 
declaration in October that we do not intend to restore the 
King by force' was no longer included. The suggestion that 
a plebiscite should be held on the future of the King was 
strongly resisted. There was grudging approval for the idea 
of holding elections if there was 'a strong demand for an 
alternative to the Tsouderos Governemnt', which in itself 
suggests a British intention to permit a continuation of a 
non-elected royalist government indefinitely. This is 
emphasised by the words: `We strongly deprecate the raising 
of the Constitutional issue which would call the existing 
monarchial regime into question. - 
The only recognition of the strength of the opposition 
to the King is the statement that there was no certainty 
"Foreign Office minute, 15 March, and Ismay's letter, 17 
March, F0371/37195/R2431, and R2434. 
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that the King and his government would be able to assume 
control peacefully when Greece was liberated. To overcome 
this difficulty, much emphasis was placed on an extensive 
propaganda campaign to be directed towards the people of 
Greece to build support for the King. The theme was to be 
not so much the merits of the King and his government, but 
the fact that they had the support of the British. There 
was to be included an appeal to the fundamental Anglo- 
philism of the Greek people'. 
With repect to relations with the resistance groups, 
the new policy was further from the Foreign Office view than 
that proposed by the Chiefs of Staff: 
In view of the operational importance 
attached to subversive activities in Greece, there 
can be no question of S. O. E. refusing to have 
dealings with a given group merely on the grounds 
that political sentiments of the group are opposed 
to the King and Government, but subject to special 
operational necessity S. O. E. should always veer in 
the direction of groups willing to support the 
King and Government and furthermore impress on 
such other groups as may be anti-monarchist the 
fact that the King and Government enjoy the 
fullest support of H. M. G. 
The tone of this document indicates a marked difference 
of attitude towards the Greek political situation. Earlier 
statements implied that the British hoped that the King 
could be restored along with an intention to bring this 
about. There was also the implication that it might not be 
possible, and that some alternative course might have to be 
devised. The March statement initiates an integrated 
campaign to overcome opposition with detailed instructions 
on propaganda techniques and on how SOE should deal with 
resistance groups opposed to the King. There was no longer 
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any suggestion that the King or his government might have to 
be abandoned. In short, the King was to be upheld regard- 
less. 
This change may have been the result of the disturb- 
ances in the Greek Army, or because Churchill was acting as 
Foreign Secretary when the new statement was being prepared. 
Its contents and instructions for implementation were sent 
to the Minister of State in Cairo as a message from the 
Prime Minister' instead of being incorporated into a Foreign 
Office telegram. " The newer and stronger statement may 
represent Churchill's own feelings rather than those of the 
Foreign Office. Certainly, the new policy is in keeping 
with Churchill's determination to restore the King at all 
costs, and marks the beginning of a divergence between 
the Foreign Office and Churchill with regard to Greece. 
The policy statement of March represents the strongest 
British position in defence of the King during the war. 
From this time the Foreign Office, if not Churchill, was 
gradually modifying its position, as it came to realise the 
real strength of opposition to the King. These modifica- 
tions should have pleased the Americans and attracted their 
support, but the latter maintained their unhelpful attitude, 
both in failing to assist in influencing the King and his 
government, and, in some cases, by unwarranted interference. 
, 
41-Statement of policy in Churchill's telegram 871 to Cairo, 
18 March (not located), repeated to the British Embassy 
in Washington as Foreign Office telegram 2070,30 March, 
marked as being from 'Mr Churchill, Foreign Office' 
(CAB122/742). 
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The series of modifications in British policy appears 
in hindsight to have been unnecessarily torturous; they 
suggest a complete reluctance to accept the actual situa- 
tion, and a set of concessions made grudgingly and regret- 
fully. There were factors which did contribute to the 
process and to some degree excuse what often seems pure 
stubborness. 
A major problem was that of obtaining the cooperation 
of the King in implementing a policy which would make him 
more acceptable to the Greek people and less of an issue for 
the left wing of the resistance to exploit. What was 
essential was an unequivocal statement by the King that he 
would accept the verdict of a plebiscite in which the Greek 
people decided whether or not they wanted the restoration of 
the monarchy. From mid-1943 onwards the British urged the 
King to make such a statement; as a result of this urging, 
George II made a number of promises, none of which were 
entirely clear and, hence, satisfactory to those who claimed 
to represent the Greek people. 
There is, of course, doubt as to whether any statement 
would have been acceptable to EAM or its supporters; the 
question of the King's restoration must be seen as the main 
political issue being used by EAM to maintain its popularity 
in Greece and not as the fundamental problem. If the King 
had agreed to the most concessionary formula which could 
have been devised, or even have abdicated in favour of a 
republican, but moderate, government, EAM would have found 
another issue. 
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As it was, the King came closer to accepting a 
plebiscite, but other matters arose which made it possible 
for him to avoid a definite statement. These concerned the 
question of when the plebiscite should be held in relation 
to the liberation, and whether the King should return to 
Greece before the vote on restoration was taken. 
6. The Support of Zervas for the King 
The Foreign Office dislike for the resistance groups 
should now have diminished so far as EDES was concerned. On 
9 March Zervas sent a message by way of the British Mission 
to the King and Government-in-Exile, pledging his support 
during the period of the German occupation. He promised to 
welcome the return of the King if it should be as a result 
of an expression of the people's will. To the surprise of 
everyone involved, he went on to say that if the British 
wanted the return of the King even without such an express- 
ion (the term plebiscite is not used), we will not oppose-. 
The use of the term -we` was understood by those in Cairo 
and London to mean that Zervas was speaking both for himself 
and for his movement, but it is clear that he did not 
consult the other leaders of EDES before making this 
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commitment. " For this reason EDES as a whole could be 
considered as pro-royalist or pledged to the support of the 
Government-in-Exile. 
The immediate result of the Zervas letter was a reply 
to Zervas by George II which thanked all the officers and 
men of the forces fighting in Greece against the enemy 
and went on to state that The King after his return 
to Greece, will base himself on the will of the people and 
will follow the opinion which the people will express freely 
on all questions concerning them. '-7 
The initial reaction of the Foreign Office was 
unenthusiastic. Zervas was described as 'leftist, but anti- 
communist'. It was assumed that Zervas's statement that he 
would welcome back the King as a result of the people's will 
was a demand for a plebiscite; the willingness to accept the 
King in any case was 'very interesting". It was pointed out 
that Zervas made no mention of the Government-in-Exile, to 
which the Foreign Office wished to give equal support. 
While the Zervas letter did little immediately to 
change the Foreign Office view of Zervas and EDES, gradually 
EDES gained favour as it became clear that EAM was a serious 
' Text of the message in translated cablese form in F0371/ 
37194/R2266. The accuracy of this English version is 
vouched for by Myers in the accompanying notes. Wood- 
house, The Struggle for Greece (London: Hart-Davis, 
1976), pp. 35-36, provides the background for the initia- 
tion of this message, suggesting that Zervas' volte-face 
was the result of a denunciation by the Government-in- 
Exile of both EDES and EAM, which forced Zervas to decide 
between communism and monarchy. Zervas-s failure to 
consult with other EDES leaders is based on Woodhouse, 
op. cit., p. 36 and n. 54; and Apple of Discard, pp. 74- 
75. 
"Letter, 21 March, FRUS, 1943, IV, 131. 
---'Minute, 14 March, F0371/37194/R2266. 
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threat to the return of the King and the Government-in- 
Exile. Perhaps the most important impact of the exchange of 
letters between Zervas and the King was that it gave the 
Foreign Office the idea that the King's reply amounted to a 
promise to permit the people of Greece to decide on the 
future of the monarchy. ß 
7. American Reaction to the Modified Policy 
The March policy statement was sent by Churchill to the 
British Embassy in Washington for transmittal to the State 
Department. The Embassy informed the Foreign Office 
that they considered it undesirable to provide the Americans 
with the statement as written, because it might create the 
impression that the British were committed to the monarchy 
as a permanent solution This might grate on American 
republican sympathies, or be seen to violate the spirit of 
the Atlantic Charter. It was recommended that the substance 
of the new policy be given to the State Department, but be 
introduced by a section stressing that the final form of 
government for Greece was a matter for the Greek people to 
decide. This would continue by pointing out that the only 
nucleus presently available for a stable government immedi- 
ately after liberation was that provided by the King. The 
Foreign Office agreed with this suggestion. E0 
Perhaps first demonstrated by Laskey's minute of 4 June, 
F0371/37202/R4? 17. 
r-'Washington telegram 1590,4 April; Foreign Office 
telegram 2300,8 April, F0371/37195/R3093. 
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The amended text was passed to the State Department who 
were told that it was a reply to the questions put to Strang 
by Murray on 29 March (supra, p. 20), although it does not 
provide clear or complete answers. It did respond to the 
question about a plebiscite by saying that H. M. G. strongly 
deprecated the immediate raising of the Constitutional 
issue concerning the monarchy. The other matter, that of 
the return of the King prior to elections, was not 
approached directly. It was indicated that the British 
would not object to the holding of elections at a moment 
considered appropriate by Allied Commanders', from context 
meaning at some point after the return of the King and his 
government. In substance, the Americans were told that the 
British did not intend a plebiscite or elections prior to 
the return of the King. BI 
The State Department mulled this over for some time 
before replying. On 2 July they handed the British Embassy 
a memorandum which welcomed all the points they could agree 
with. At the same time, it expressed definite concern that 
the return of the King without the approval of the Greek 
people could lead to civil disturbances requiring inter- 
vention by Allied troops. It went on to say that the United 
States Government was not prepared to undertake, or actively 
associate itself with, measures designed to enable the King 
and his government to obtain the support of the Greek 
people and reinforce their authority with regard to the 
a- Greek armed forces. 
"Aide-Memoire, 27 April, FRUS, 1943, IV, 131-132. 
r-2ýIbid., pp. 133-134. 
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8. The King's 4 July 1943 Declaration 
In May, Leeper suggested to the Foreign Office that 
some new statement by the King was needed, if he were to win 
the support of Greek public opinion. Such a statement 
should be 'clear, definite and practical'. - Dixon, in the 
Foreign Office, took the same view, although it is not clear 
whether this was a result of Leeper's suggestion. Dixon 
specifically mentioned a promise of a plebiscite, although 
he was convinced that such an action could not be taken 
until 'normal conditions' had returned. 64 
With the approval of Eden, Leeper was told to urge the 
King to make a new statement in which he would promise to 
submit the question of the return of the monarchy to a 
popular vote, along with a declaration that he would not 
establish a dictatorship again and would maintain the 
existing constitution as restored in February 1942. This 
statement would then be endorsed by the British Govern- 
ment. The instructions also dealt with the matter of 
whether the King would return to Greece prior to the plebi- 
scite. F-s This problem, which was eventually to become as 
critical as that of the plebiscite itself, came to the 
surface accidentally. It appears that the Foreign Office 
r, Letters, 12 and 24 May, F0371/37231/R4505 and 
37202/R4717. 
Sd}inute, 26 May, F0371/37202/R4666. 
SSMinute, 10 June, and Foreign Office telegrams 81 and 82, 
15 June, ibid., R4717. 
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had not thought of it since the idea of a plebsicite had 
been rejected as recently as the declaration of 18 March. 
On 20 May, the Allied Territories (Balkans) Committee, 
a group of diplomats and military officials operating under 
the auspices of the Minister of State for the Middle East in 
Cairo, discussed general policy with regard to the return of 
Allied Governments to their homes upon liberation. Among 
the items considerd was a draft aide-memoire prepared by 
Leeper for transmittal to George II and Tsouderos, which was 
mainly a reminder that 'a promise had been made to the 
poeple of the world that they will be permitted to choose 
their own government` upon liberation, apparently a general 
formula applicable to all countries to be liberated. The 
committee approved Leeper-s draft and instructed him to 
forward it to the King and his Prime Minister, after he had 
made it clear to them verbally that the Greek King would not 
enter Greece during the first phase of occupation. sc-4 
The King was duly informed, and objected strongly to 
the verbal instruction, on grounds that it would diminish 
his prestige with the Greek people. He felt that he should 
enter Greece with the invading troops, although he was 
willing to place himself under the complete jurisdiction of 
the Allied Commander. He would take only his Prime Minister 
with him. Leeper, in reporting the King's reaction, sug- 
gested that the King's presence might lead to hostile 
demonstrations during military operations. Eden made mar- 
ginal comments: `I had not heard of this. Clearly the King 
Extract from A. T. B. (43) 4th Meeting, F0371/37202\R5020. 
Underlining in original. 
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must go. He cannot be left behind. - and, with regard to 
possible disorders, `It is most unlikely. ' On a similar 
message from the Commander-in-Chief Middle East concerning 
the King's return, Eden wrote: -I feel much sympathy for 
the King in this. -s*7 
The Foreign Office staff was unhappy with this unfore- 
seen development, but recognised that the problem was bound 
to arise. In an analysis by Dixon, it was accepted that 
the arrangement might be interpreted as an imposition of 
the King on the Greek people by British bayonets'. If the 
Greek Prime Minister accompanied the King it might be taken 
as a British attempt to impose a government as well. On the 
other hand, it was felt that permitting the immediate return 
would avoid resentment on the part of the King and would 
strengthen his prestige. It was also suggested that his 
return would 'settle once and for all the question of the 
King's future', which implies a continuing Foreign Office 
determination to restore the King regardless of Greek 
opinion. Later in the same minute, Dixon suggested that 
the best way to avoid hostile demonstrations would be the 
prior promise by the King of a plebiscite on the monarchy 
question. On balance, Dixon felt that the King should 
return with the troops. 
The authorities in Cairo also took note of the King's 
strong feelings. At a meeting of the Middle East Defence 
Committee, it was proposed that the King should accompany 
'-(Eden-s comments on Leeper-s telegrams 101 and 102, both 
22 May, ibid., R4594 and R4595. 
39 
the invading troops, under the orders of the Allied Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and that no member of the Greek Government 
should accompany him. The idea was immediately accepted by 
the Foreign Office and the War Office. se 
Eden pointed out to Churchill that the Cairo Defence 
Committee was entirely right in recommending that the King 
should return with the Allied forces, so long as it was in a 
purely military capacity. Churchill replied somewhat 
testily that he saw no reason to call his Kingship' into 
question. George II should go back as he left, as King, 
presumably objecting to the King being required to return in 
a purely military capacity. Eden explained, using Dixon's 
phrase, that this was necessary in order to avoid the 
impression that the King was being reimposed by British 
bayonets. Further, if he returned as the sovereign, he 
might get in the way of the Allied Commander. -5-4 The net 
result was that the proposal of the Middle East Defence 
Committee was established as the policy concerning the 
King's return for some time, presumably with Churchill's 
grudging authority. 
The new declaration by the King demanded by the Foreign 
Office and Leeper was issued on 4 July 1943, and was to 
become the basic statement of his position until the second 
civil war of December 1945. Leeper later implied that the 
statement was devised by the King, '* but the truth is that 
Minutes of 23 and 28 May, and Minister of State telegram 
1287,26 May, ibid., R4666. 
Minutes of 12,15, and 21 June 1943, PREM3 211/15. 
': ° When Greek Meets Greek (London, Chatto and Windus, 1950), 
p. 30. 
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it was hammered out by Leeper and the Foreign Office, with 
interpolations by members of the Government-in-Exile, along 
with limitations demanded by the King. The essential points 
were to be a statement that the King was willing to submit 
the regime to a popular vote, and a clear indication that 
the King would accompany the landing of British troops in 
his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of Greek forces. No 
member of the Government-in-Exile would go with him. t1 
As might have been expected, SOE objected to the 
mention of the King's return on grounds that Greeks at home 
would see this as a trick to re-establish the monarchy by 
force. '2 The Foreign Office took no heed of this objection, 
perhaps because it was received after they had given Leeper 
permission to discuss the proposal with Tsouderos. While 
Tsouderos initially agreed to the draft text, he reported to 
Leeper that it had been necessary to remove mention of the 
King's return because of pressure from other members of the 
Government-in-Exile. Their objections, Leeper thought, were 
based on a fear that this point would do too much to 
cep, r6 to tte Soo`ý1 wl of tfiwou 
hove. k, PP o wt ý MF e -1 increase the King's popularity Tsouderos was able to 
obtain the King's approval to the amended text. rlThe 
final version, broadcast on 4 July, included a 
promise that a constituent assembly would be called within 
six months of liberation to decide the institutions 
by 
"'FO371/37202/R4717. While the Foreign Office specifically 
called for a plebiscite in their internal minutes, the 
term was not used in their message to Leeper of 15 June. 
«Glenconner-s memorandum, 30 June, F0371/37222/R5684. 
*Leeper-s telegram 156,2 July, Ibid., R5764. 
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which Greece must endow herself in sympathy with the forward 
march of democracy'. The King stated that he was confident 
that `no Greek and least of all myself would fail to respect 
the decision of the constitu*ent assembly'. There was also 
a promise that the existing cabinet would resign as soon as 
the government returned to Athens, in order that a fully 
representative administration could take its place. GA 
In retrospect, this would seem to be a definite 
commitment by the King to allow the Greek people to decide 
an the future of the maonarchy, but through an elected body 
rather than by direct vote. The word `plebiscite' is not 
used, a matter which raised doubts in the minds of many as 
to whether the King's proposal would really be acceptable. 
The more important problem at the time was that the 
declaration said nothing about whether the King would return 
to Greece before the people had expressed their desires. 
This omission seems critical, since the view did exist in 
anti-royalist circles that the entry of the King with the 
invasion troops would be tantamount to his restoration, 
regardless of any promise to consult the people. This view 
was probably buttressed by the recollection of George II's 
broken promise in 1935 not to install a dictatorship. 
With this declaration as evidence of the King's good 
intentions now a matter of record, the British Government 
began an attempt to overcome the American objections to the 
policy statement of 18 March, which were contained in the 
State Department memorandum of 2 July (supra, pp. 36). 
One of the initial British reactions to the Department's 
C5 4Fu11 text, loc. cit. 
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position did concern the timing of the King's return. 
It was felt by Foreign Office staff that the United States 
would never sanction the return of the King with the 
invasion forces. Therefore, discussion of the point should 
be avoided. In replying to the American memorandum, it 
should only be said that everything possible would be done 
to assist the return of the King and his government, `unless 
we think it would be opposed by a large majority-. This 
should be followed by a statement that the British Govern- 
ment did not anticipate such opposition and that the recent 
declarations by the King, especially that of 4 July, should 
minimise the danger. The suggestion that the return of the 
King should not be discussed was overruled by Sargent, and a 
detailed point-by-point reply was sent to the State Depart- 
ment on 4 August. ss 
This stated that the King would return with the 
invasion troops, although he would not be accompanied by any 
member of his government. The major argument advanced for 
this decision was that a request from an Allied sovereign 
could not be `lightly refused-. The message included a 
detailed statement of the danger of a civil war being 
started by resistance groups in Greece as soon as Axis 
control was removed. It was felt that this danger was 
greater that the risk of disturbances which might be caused 
by the King's return. The hope was expressed that the King 
would be able to resolve the party quarrels and prevent the 
OF'The proposal to avoid discussion of the King's return is 
that in Laskey`s minute, 7 July, in F0371/37197/R5865. 
Underlining in quotation in the original. 
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establishment of `tyrannical rule by any one individual or 
group-. In conclusion, the great benefits expected from the 
King's statement of 4 July were emphasised and described as 
offering the best chances of assuring stability and 
a 
democratic rule in Greece-. -- 
This aide-memoire is evidence either of a failure to 
understand the situation in Greece or an attempt to deceive 
the Americans. It is difficult to believe that the Foreign 
Office did not consider the possibility that the return of 
the King before a popular vote was taken could be an issue 
which could spark off civil war. It is equally difficult to 
believe that they could think the King capable of resolving 
political quarrels, given. the record of Greek politics in 
the twentieth century. In any case, events made this 
message obsolete by the time the Americans had digested it. 
Instructions to the Washington Embassy in Foreign Office 
telegram 807,17 July, loc. cit.; text of aide-memoire, 
FRUS, 1943, IV, 137-141. 
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Chapter II 
The Visit of the Andarte Delegation to Cairo 
and Its Effect on British Policy 
August-November 1943 
1. Leeper-s Initial Attitude 
and the Foreign Office Reaction 
Before the new British policy and the new declaration 
by the King could have any effect, events in Cairo forced a 
fresh new analysis of the problems, and, eventually, a major 
change in Foreign Office policy. On 13 August 1943, six 
andartel leaders from Greece arrived in Cairo, flown out 
from an airstrip built in the middle of occupied territory 
by the British Mission. The delegation included four 
members of the EAM, two of whom were members of the 
Communist Party. The initial intention had been to bring 
out one representative each of EAM, EDES, and a third 
resistance group, EKKA, but at the last moment and without 
warning to Cairo, the communists insisted on adding three 
more delegates. They were accompanied by Brigadier Myers, 
the commander of the mission, and by David Wallace, who had 
'The Greek word -andarte-, meaning guerrilla or irregular 
fighter, was commonly used during the occupation period 
to denote members of the resistance. 
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been dropped into Greece as a representative of Eden and 
Leeper. 
The arrival of the delegates led to immediate problems. 
No one had anticipated what their attitude would be, nor the 
intensity with which they would make demands. Myers had 
warned SOE Cairo of the importance of this visit to the 
future of Greece, but it is not definite that this message 
was passed to Leeper or the Foreign Office. -O Prior to 
departure Myers had achieved some measure of agreement 
amongst the three guerrilla groups on a programme of 
cooperation with the Government-in-Exile, but nothing was 
discussed concerning the future of the monarchy., * Leeper 
later claimed that he had had only short notice of the 
arrival of the group, and that he had been told that their 
mission was the discussion of military questions-6 His own 
messages show that he knew of the impending visit, and 
2Accounts in English by participants in the visit of the 
group to Cairo are limited to Myers, The Greek Entangle- 
ment, and The Andarte Delegation to Cairo, ' in British 
Policy towards Wartime Resistance, ed. Phyllis Auty and 
Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 147-166; 
and Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek. Valuable discussion 
of the visit, including material from Greek sources, is 
provided by Richard Clogg, 'Pearls from Swine' and C. M. 
Woodhouse, 'Summer 1943, ' both in Auty and Clogg; and 
Papastratis, British Policy towards Greece, pp. 104-112, 
sMyers, The Andarte Delegation, " p. 149. 
4Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 238-243. 
SLeeper, When Greek Meets Greek, p. 31. 
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welcomed it as an opportunity to clarify the future of 
relations with the resistance movements. E> 
He was impressed with Myers at their first face-to- 
face meeting, despite his earlier complaints concerning 
Myers` supposed interference in political matters.? Leeper 
made a drastic change in his position with regard to the 
King after discussions with Myers, Wallace, and the dele- 
gates. He seems to have been heavily influenced by his 
private talks with Wallace, who had been sent into Greece 
more or less as Leeper-s private investigator. Wallace had 
been expected to bring back evidence to show that Myers had 
exaggerated the opposition to the King within Greece; 
instead, he confirmed Myers reports. 
The andarte delegation were joined in Cairo by Georgios 
Exindaris, a liberal political who had recently escaped from 
Greece, without the aid of SOE. Together, these seven men 
of differing political views began a strenuous attack on the 
policies of the Government-in-Exile, urging a more repre- 
sentative cabinet and a statement by the King that he would 
not return to Greece without a plebiscite. 
ELeeper's letters, 21 July and 13 August 1943, F0371/ 
3? 204/R7217 and R7884. Bickham Sweet-Escott, a senior 
SOE official, recalls speaking to Leeper before the 
arrival of the delegation and finding him delighted at 
the prospect of meeting them (Baker Street Irregular 
(London: Methuen, 1965), p. 174). Woodward, British 
Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 
1970-1976), Vol. III, 392-393, accepts Leeper's claim 
that he had no previous warning, but cites no evidence. 
The matter is discussed in detail by Clogg, 'Pearls from 
Swine, - p. 182. 
7Leeper's earlier disapproval of Myers is shown by his 
letters, 12 May, F0371/37202/4504; and 19 June, 
37197/R5717. 
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As a result of these demands and talks with Myers and 
Wallace, Leeper cabled to London that the case against the 
King was very strong. He reported that Tsouderos had told 
George II that a broad coalition representing most factions 
in Greece could be formed only if the King would agree not 
to return until a plebiscite was held. Leeper asked for 
guidance from the Foreign Office, but clearly was pressing 
for instructions to advise the King to adopt this proposal. 
On the same day, Leeper wrote a long letter to Sargent 
making an even stronger case for forcing the King to accept. 
Eden was not at all pleased. On the margin of Leeper's 
telegram he wrote: 'Surel'y this is not fair to the King. ` 
and `I am very doubtful about this. The King has proved 
himself our friend. We must do the best we can for him. - 
Leeper sent a second cable that day, reporting with 
obvious approval that Myers and Wallace agreed that EAM now 
realised that only a policy of cooperation with the British 
could gain them support, and that they must now work with 
other national groups in a coalition. The only way in which 
they might gain significant popular support would be to 
exploit the issue of the King's early return. From this, 
Leeper drew the conclusion that, once the King announced 
that he would put off his return until the people called 
him, political movements in Greece would become `steadily 
more national and less communist'. 
On this message, Eden noted that he agreed with the 
hypothesis that only a pro-British policy could gain 
support, but British policy supported the King, with the 
implication that EAI+t's only chance of success would be a 
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policy of backing George II. He had doubts about the 
suggestion that EAM could obtain backing by exploitng the 
issue of the King's return. - Sargent submitted a draft 
reply to Eden, which was approved and dispatched. In 
forwarding the draft, Sargent noted that he hoped it would 
`check the sudden tendency in Cairo to sell out to the 
E. A. M. delegation'. He admitted that the situation was 
'confoundedly difficult', because the King might find 
himself without a government if he stood firm. 
Sargent's telegram goes a long way towards an under- 
standing of the real policy of the Foreign Office and Eden 
at this time. There was a definite feeling that the 
insertion of left-wing representatives into the Government- 
in-Exile would result in a republican government resolved to 
give the King no opportunity to appeal to his adherents in 
Greece. There was a qualification that the simultaneous 
inclusion of representatives of 'Royalist elements in 
Greece" might avoid this result. The London officials 
SLeeper-s telegrams 199 (F0371/37198/R7516) and 201 
(37204/R7548), and his letter to Sargent (ibid., R7884), 
all dated 13 August 1943. Leeper-s initial attitude to 
Myers after his arrival in Cairo, and Wallace-s emphasis 
on the opposition to the King, are brought out best in 
these three documents, especially in the letter to 
Sargent. Wallace's two reports written before he 
returned from Greece (in British Reports from Greece, ed. 
Lars Baerentzen (Copenhagen: Museum Tuscalanum Press, 
1982) do not make a strong case against the King. The 
reports contained in the delayed telegrams (37204/R8088) 
again do not emphasis the opposition to the King, 
although they show that it existed to a significant 
degree. Myers provides two accounts of his first meet- 
ings with Leeper in Cairo which are completely consonant 
with Leeper-s 13 August reports (Greek Entanglement, pp. 
248-249; and The Andarte Delegation, - pp. 150-152). 
Leeper-s 1950 memoir, When Greek Meets Greek, gives no 
hint of this initial attitude towards Myers. 
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wanted any decision as to whether the King should return at 
liberation to be postponed 'until nearer the time`. Should 
the King publicly announce his willingness to postpone his 
return until a plebiscite could be held, a left-wing domi- 
nated government would so influence the Greek people that 
the vote would go against him. Such a promise would be 
tantamount to signing his-abdication. The Foreign Office 
was still clinging to the belief that there was substantial 
support for the King within Greece, contrary to every report 
it had received from SOE and even contrary to the views 
Leeper was now expressing. 9 
Before Leeper received this message, he sent a further 
report of the discussions between Tsouderos and the dele- 
gates, again stressing the difficulties Tsouderos believed 
would result if the King returned to Greece at the time of 
liberation. The Foreign Office somehow saw in this report 
evidence that the opposition to the King was weakening. 
They also deduced that the fact that the andarte delegation 
came to Cairo confirmed this idea. 10 
Leeper at first does not seem to have recognised that 
his new views-were being rebuffed. His immediate response 
to Sargent-s message only pointed out that the Foreign 
Office analysis of what would happen in Greece if the King 
Foreign Office telegram 128,16 August, 
F0371/37204/R7548. 
lc'Leeper-s telegram 204,16 August, F0371/37198/R7641; and 
Foreign Office telegram 131,17 August, Ibid., R7648. 
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delayed his return differed from that of Tsouderos. x1 It is 
difficult to establish the point at which he did understand 
the Foreign Office position because his reports for the next 
week are taken up almost entirely with attacks on Myers and 
SOE. On about 16 August, Wallace found that messages he had 
sent to Leeper from Greece had never been delivered by SOE, 
through whose channels they had been sent. While these 
messages contained no information or opinions which differed 
from the reports sent back by Myers, or from Wallace-s 
discussions with Leeper once he had arrived in Cairo, Leeper 
took the view that SOE had deliberately withheld the 
messages from him. -- 
Almost from the moment he found out about the withheld 
messages, he began to hold Myers responsible for all the 
difficulties in Cairo, criticising him as one who had no 
glimmer of political understanding- and as naive concerning 
EAM. Leeper also put forward the view that Wallace had been 
too much under the influence of Myers, and that he had been 
in a daze when he first arrived in Cairo and unable to 
1 Leeper"s telegram 210,18 August, P0371/37198/R7742. His 
telegram 212,19 August, ibid., R7798, also indicates 
that he did not understand the meaning of Sargent-s 
telegram. 
1--Leeper-s telegram 205,16 August, F0371/37204/R7754. His 
full fury is best illustrated by his letter, 21 August, 
ibid., R8216; his telegram 225,25 August, Ibid., R8047; 
and his letter, 25 August, 37199/R8314. The contents of 
the messages and the circumstances surrounding the delay 
are discussed by Woodhouse, -Summer 1943, " pp. 141-142. 
Woodhouse makes a convincing case for believing that the 
delay was not deliberate, and it is difficult to see what 
motive SOE would have had for deliberately withholding 
the information. Some of the reports reached London by 
10 August; Leeper states that he saw none of them until 
22 August (his letter, 23 August, 37204/R8088). 
N 
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provide an independent view of conditions within Greece. 
This view is difficult to sustain, particularly in view of 
Wallace's conversations in the Foreign Office in September, 
when he could hardly have been under the influence of Myers 
(infra, pp. 62). It is equally difficult to understand why 
he took out most of his anger on Myers, who certainly could 
have had nothing to do with the delayed delivery, but Myers 
was an easy'target, as the man who had brought the 
delegation out of Greece in the first place. Leeper may 
have criticised Myers so stridently in order to cover up his 
own embarrassment for having accepted the demands of the 
andartes initially. -- 
Leeper-s anger directed at Myers and SOE was so great 
that it is difficult to determine just what went on in Cairo 
with regard to the delegates in the next ten days. Leeper 
himself wondered whether Sargent-s 'interest in the politi- 
cal crisis here has not been subordinated to what I am sure 
is his much greater interest in the revelations I have been 
producing about S. O. E. "id Myers, the only other British 
'*Myers, in The Andarte Delegation, - p. 152, states that 
he felt that Leeper, on or about 17 August, received a 
message from the Foreign Office to support the King and 
oppose the proposals of the delegation from the mount- 
ains. Myers assumed that it was this message which 
caused Leeper-s change of attitude towards him. It is 
not clear whether Myers, writing this in 1975, was aware 
of Sargent-s telegram of 16 August. Leeper-s messages 
and correspondence in the period 16-23 August would 
suggest that it was not Sargent-s telegram, but the 
withholding of Wallace-s messages which influenced 
Leeper, unless the latter was criticisng Myers to hide 
his shame. 
14Leeper"s letter, 21 August, F0371/37204/R8216. 
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participant who has left a useful record, - was given little 
information by Leeper after Sargent-s message; he was not 
even aware of its contents although he guessed that Leeper 
had received new policy instructions from London at about 
this time. The course of events must be reconstructed from 
occasional references in Leeper-s telegrams and letters, and 
from Greek sources. 
While Leeper was coming to terms with Sargent-s 
message, the delegates became even more insistent. Together 
with Exindaris and Kannellopoulos, they made a formal demand 
on 17 August that the King should not return until the Greek 
people had expressed their will. Two days later Tsouderos 
and the Greek cabinet made a public statement to the effect 
that this request represented the will of a large segment of 
Greek public opinion. " The delegates then asked that they 
should be given three posts in the Cabinet, the Ministries 
of Interior, War, and Justice, to be adminstered from within 
Greece. The right-wing members of the existing cabinet 
refused this demand and threatened resignation. x' While 
', The Commander-in-Chief, Wilson, in Eight Years Overseas 
(London: Hutchinson, n. d. (1948)), pp. 164-168, dis- 
cusses the visit of the andartes in a balanced fashion, 
but provides little in the way of specific detail. 
Personal Experience 1939-1946 (London: Constable, 1962), 
the memoirs of Richard Casey, the British Minister of 
State in the Middle East at the time, contains no 
information on the delegation's visit. 
lEClogg, -Pearls from Swine, - p. 186, citing the account of 
the EDES delegate, Komninos Pyromaglou, 0 Dourelos Ippos 
(Athens, 1958), pp. 154,155. 
'Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 153-155; Sargent's 
telegram CONCRETE 419,20 August, F0371/37198/R7742. 
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Leeper avoided admitting that he twice changed his mind, 10 
he had, shortly after first meeting the delegation, pressed 
for an all-embracing coalition' as the only solution to the 
Greek problem. `,, 
The net result of Sargent's telegram was the forced 
return of the guerrilla delegation to the mountains without 
any definite reply to their demands. The delegates managed 
to delay their return for two weeks, which brought 
Churchill's wrath down an Leeper. They finally returned to 
Greece in the second week of September. 20 
2. The King's Appeal to Churchill and Roosevelt 
From the beginning of the visit, the King was aware of 
the demands being made and the effect they were having on 
Tsouderos and the remainder of the Cabinet. On 18 August, 
he sent identical messages to Churchill and Roosevelt, then 
both in Canada for the Quebec Conference. He ask for their 
advice, expressing the view that his message of 4 July was 
sufficient to cover the problems. He asked specifically 
"The suggestion that Leeper was reluctant to admit that he 
had briefly backed the wrong horse is based on a 
comparison of his views in When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 
30-33, with the contents of his telegrams 210,212,215, 
and 217 (19,19,21, and 21 August) in F0371/37198/R7742, 
R7798, R7819, and R7851; his letter, 21 August, 
37204/R8216; and his letter, 25 August, 37199/R8314. 
19Letter, 13 August, F0371/37204/R7884. 
°Myers, The Andarte Delegation, 
- p. 153; Leeper's tele- 
gram 222,23 August, and Churchill's WELFARE 473,30 
August, both F0371/37198/R7950; Clogg, "Pearls from 
Swine, ' pp. 186-192. 
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that he should be allowed to accompany his troops back into 
Greece. 
-1 
Churchill apparently had had no part in the preparation 
of Sargent-s message, since he had left London on 4 August 
to travel to Quebec by sea. In reviewing the King"s 
request, he had no doubts that the King should return with 
his troops, but did see problems if liberation should be 
effected by Greek forces without British aid. In that case, 
the British would have less say about the King, and a 
coalition Greek Government containing a strong republican 
element might refuse to allow his immediate return. The 
King should therefore insist on equal royalist representa- 
tion in any coalition.:: 
-2 
Eden, now in Quebec, brought the letters to the 
attention of the American Secretary of State and placed it 
on the agenda for the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on 22 
August. At this meeting, Eden read out a report on the 
political situation in Greece, which incorporated much of 
the phraseology and substance of Sargent-s telegram. It was 
strongly urged that the British and American Governments 
should tell the King that they believed his 4 July statement 
was that best calculated to serve the interests of Greece, 
z1Fu11 text of the King's message in Foreign Office tele- 
gram CONCRETE 374,19 August 1943; that to Roosevelt, 
FRUS, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec 
(hereinafter FRUS, Quebec), 1943, p. 915. 
Minute, 19 August, PREM3 211/4; Winston S. Churchill, The 
Second World War, V, 416. It was at the Quebec Confer- 
ence that the two Allied powers agreed that there would 
be-no invasion of the Balkans, which probably accounts 
for Churchill's change of attitude. 
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and that the King should make no further statements about 
his return to Greece at this stage. --- 
Also read out, at Churchill's request, was a message 
from General Smuts, who made a strong recommendation that no 
plebiscite be held until Greece was restored to law and 
order. He also felt that the King might return to Greece in 
the interim to assist Allied administration. He closed with 
the recommendation that Churchill raise the matter with 
Roosevelt, citing a communist takeover in the Balkans as a 
possible result unless a strong hand was kept on the 
occupation. 
The two reports led to some general discussion of the 
attitudes which should be taken towards the Governments-in- 
Exile of 'refugee' countries, and a decision that the 
United Kingdom and the United States should continue to 
support these governments 'generally' until liberation. 
The official record stated that it was agreed between 
Churchill and Roosevelt that the British Government should 
reply to the King, `supporting his contention that he was 
prepared to return to Greece as soon as possible and submit 
the question of the Royal House to plebiscite'. This is 
followed in the offical record by: The President said the 
Eden's memorandum, prepared by the Foreign office in 
response to a request from Hull, and sent to Eden as 
CONCRETE 419, PREM3 211/4; Hull's copy, FRUS, Quebec, 
1943, pp. 1044-1045. The editors of FRUS suggest that 
this was sent as CONCRETE 374, but that message transmits 
the text of George II-s appeal to Churchill 
(F0371/37198/R7758). 
z4Smuts telegram 715,20 August, and Churchill's reply that 
he fully concurred with regard to the necessity of 
supporting the King, (telegram WELFARE 461,28 August), 
PREM3 211/4. 
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United States Government would not take any different 
position. - 
A few days later, a senior State Department official 
queried this last sentence with Ray Atherton, the American 
Minister to Canada, who was present at the meeting. The 
Department was very surprised to see this remark on the 
record, since the consistent view of the Department had been 
that the return of the King with the liberating forces would 
be extremely dangerous. Atherton said that the minutes of 
the preceedings were misleading, in that the President was 
referring to the general position with regard to refugee 
governments and not specfically to the return of, George 
II.: 21 It will be seen infra, p. 64, that the State 
Department did not accept Atherton-s interpretation. 
Eden next day sent a reply in Churchill's name to the 
King. It did not take the form agreed to by Roosevelt and 
Churchill, perhaps because the specific mention of a plebi- 
scite might be distasteful to George II. It presented the 
view that the policy of the 4 July message would best serve 
the interests of Greece, and the hope that the King could 
avoid any further statements concerning your own position 
when Greece is liberated'. -- 
Churchill sent a second message to George II on 31 
August in which he hoped that the King was recovered from a 
recent illness. He continued by saying: We are all 
looking forward to your return to Greece at the head of your 
r, FRUS, Quebec, 1943, p. 933, and n. 26. 
E>Telegram WELFARE 349,23 August, F0371/37198/R7950; and 
FRUS, Quebec, 1943, p. 1046. 
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Armies and remaining there until the will of the Greek 
people is expressed under conditions of tranquility. -27 
This is a more definite statement of British policy than 
that in his first reply, and perhaps is a better reflection 
of Churchill's real attitude. It commited Britain to 
returning the King at the time of liberation and to sup- 
porting him there until his future could be decided. The 
fact that it was sent from Quebec, and included the phrase 
'all of us' might even have led the King to infer that it 
represented Roosevelt's attitude as well. No evidence has 
been found to indicate that the contents of this second 
message were furnished to the State Department, or to 
Roosevelt, although Alexander Kirk, the American Ambassador 
to the Greek Government, twice made passing references to 
'Churchill's two messages to the King'. 
-2- 
The Americans had great difficulty in framing their 
reply to George II. The day after the King's request for 
advice arrived in the State Department, Wallace Murray, now 
Advisor on Political Relations, sent a memorandum to the 
Secretary of State recommending that the United States 
should not encourage George II to return with the invasion, 
'a decision we are not party to in any case'. In Murray's 
view, such an action would be in violation of the Atlantic 
Charter. Instead, the King should negotiate with the 
ý27Telegram WELFARE 490,31 August, 1943, PREM3 211/5. 
Kirks telegrams 57 and 58,4 and 7 September, FRUS, 
1943, IV, 150-151. Presumably Kirk learned of the second 
message from Leeper. 
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representatives from Greece and give further assurances that 
he stood by the 4 July declaration. 
A few days later, Adolf Berle, the Assistant Secretary 
of State, sent another memorandum to Hull concerning the 
problems arising in Cairo. This appears to have been 
prompted by reports from Kirk. The American Ambassador had 
kept the Department informed concerning the visit of the 
andartes to Cairo and the British and Greek Government's 
problems in dealing with them. While he sometimes joined 
with Leeper in making suggestions to Tsouderos and the King, 
he often did not agree with British policy. He was afraid 
the United States might become involved in Greek affairs in 
such a way that it would have to accept some responsibility 
for British actions, if these should fail. -° 
Berle's memorandum concerned the attitude to be taken 
towards the King. He felt that the British were committed 
to the re-establishment of the monarchy, subject to a 
plebiscite. At the same time, he noted that the British' 
asserted that the United States was likewise committed to 
the King, although the State Department was not aware of any 
such commitment. He was seeking clarification on this 
point. i After summarising the strength of opposition to 
the King within Greece, Berle raised the question of an 
answer to the King's request. If the President did give 
2 Memorandum, 19 August 1943, NARS 868.00/1274-1/5. 
°Kirk-s telegrams 40,44,45,47, of 17,19,20,22 
August, FRUS, 1943, IV, 141-147. 
131-Berle mentioned a letter pending before Sumner Welles, 
the Undersecretary of State, for this purpose; perhaps an 
attempt to find out from Roosevelt whether he had indeed 
made such a commitment. 
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George II advice as to his course of action, the United 
States would be committed to supporting it. Further, in 
view of the fact that the King had sent an iidentical 
request for advice to Churchill, it would be highly 
advisable that the two replies should be in harmony. 
The State Department's view was that it would be 
preferable to establish a small commission of Greeks repre- 
senting the Government-in-Exile and the other parties or 
groups. This commission would enter Greece upon liberation 
with the King remaining abroad until elections could be 
held. The memorandum ended with a recommendation that Hull 
should discuss the matter with the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
and the President in order to arrive at a definite policy to 
be implemented by the Theatre Commander-in-Chief. There is 
an implication that Berle intended that the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff should establish a unified Anglo-American policy, 
but there is no evidence of any action resulting from this 
paper. 02 
On 31 August, Berle sent another memorandum to Hull. 
He now felt that the British were determined to return the 
King to Greece at the time of liberation, a policy with 
which the State Department did not agree. He therefore 
urged Hull to discuss the matter further with Roosevelt and 
'2"Memorandum, 25 August 1943, NARS 868.01/379. Berle used 
the phrase 'joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington' for the 
body which was to establish the policy. The fact that 
'joint' is not capitalised and the phrase in Washington' 
is added suggests that he meant the Anglo-American 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, the term he used elsewhere in 
the memorandum, and not the purely American Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 
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Churchill, who were to meet in Washington the following day. 
There is no evidence that Hull did so; the conversations 
between Roosevelt and Churchill in the period 1-11 September 
were almost exclusively devoted to military matters. -v-0: 3 
There is a strong impression that the staff of the 
State Department was trying to avoid replying to the King's 
message, at least until they could come to some satisfactory 
agreement on a joint Anglo-American policy. On the same day 
Berle sent his second memorandum to Hull, Kirk pointed out 
that Churchill's reply to the King had been received in 
Cairo on 26 August. He followed this up a few days later 
with the report of a comment by Tsouderos to the effect that 
anti-royalist circles in Cairo saw the delay in the American 
reply as evidence of a divergence in Anglo-American 
policy. 3-4 On 1 September, the State Department submitted a 
reply for the President's approval. This was finally 
delivered on 8 September. 
It said only that the President hoped that all Greeks 
would accept the King's 4 July statement as a guarantee of 
an opportunity to express their political will at the 
earliest practical moment, and that they would meanwhile 
devote themselves to winning the war. Kirk was instructed 
to inform the King orally that the President would find it 
difficult to advise him as to his reply to the emissaries 
ý`Memorandum, 31 August, FRUS, 1943, IV. 149. 
Kirks telegrams 52 and 57,31 August and 6 September, 
ibid. 
, 
pp. 149,150. 
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i 
from Greece, but that he doubted that any new policy 
statement at this time would be advisable. 'a- 
The replies of Churchill and Roosevelt were made known 
to the Greek Cabinet and the emissaries from Greece (who had 
not yet departed from Cairo). According to Tsouderos, this 
produced a calming effect on the Government-in-Exile. -- 
Myers suggests that the receipt of the replies from Roose- 
velt and Churchill stiffened the determination of the King 
and Tsouderos to stand fast against the delegation, and 
implies that this was within a few days of 17 August. 07 
This is doubtful, since the critical conference with the 
andartes was that of 21 August; Churchill's first message 
did not arrive in Cairo until 26 August and his second on 31 
August; Roosevelt's on 8 September. 
3. The Immediate Effects of the Andarte Visit 
The only immediate result of the visit of the andarte 
delegation to Cairo was the preparation of a detailed 
statement of policy for issue to all British officers in 
Greece. This was based on Foreign Office discussions with 
Myers and Wallace, who had gone to London at about the same 
"Ibid., p. 151. It is suggested that the slightly more 
definite, if negative, message was delivered orally in 
order that it would not be made public if the King 
published the replies. 
Kirks telegram 63,10 September, FRUS, 1943, IV, 152. 
07 The Andarte Delegation in Cairo, - p. 152. 
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time the delegation returned to Greece. ae This paper, dated 
20 September, differed little in fundamentals from 
Churchill's second message to the King of 31 August, in that 
it reiterated the determination to return the King to Greece 
with the liberating armies. The Liaison Officers were to do 
their best to build the King's reputation and to strengthen 
those groups which were prepared to accept British policy, 
while attempting to weaken those who opposed. It recog- 
nised that the last point might have to be modified in order 
to maintain and develop the guerrillas effort, i. e., EAM 
might have to be tolerated. 
The statement included what was probably the first 
recognition by the Foreign Office that 'almost all the most 
vocal and most powerful elements of the population were 
opposed to the King's return'. Even with this concession, 
the view was included that there was a serious risk of civil 
war breaking out at liberation unless the King was allowed 
to return and implement his 4 July programme. While Eden 
approved the statement in draft, he made a marginal comment 
This is the weakest link in our argument' against the 
portion which posited that civil war might occur if the King 
did not return to carry out his programme. 0w 
31'They travelled separately and were not interviewed 
together (Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 258-259), 
although there is no evidence that they presented 
contradictory views. 
: 39The statement, in F0371/37222/R8993, is accompanied by a 
copy of a letter of 8 October from Sargent to Brigadier 
Hollis of the War Cabinet Office, which makes the 
influence of Myers and Wallace evident. Sargent's letter 
to Hollis of 21 October in 37206/R10177, is useful in 
understanding the statement. 
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The State Department continued to contemplate its Greek 
policy. On 10 September, Foy Kohler prepared a memorandum 
intended to lead to a re-statement of United States policy 
which, after approval by the President, should be communi- 
cated to British authorities, as well as American diplomats 
involved. This paper set forth the view that the United 
States Government was now committed to adopt an attitude 
not contrary to that of the British as regards the develop- 
ment of the Greek political situation, because of Roose- 
velt's statement at Quebec that we would not take any 
different position to that of the British'. " This seemed 
to disregard the disclaimer by Ambassador Atherton to the 
effect that Roosevelt had been quoted out of context (supra, 
p. 5? ). 
Presumably this memorandum led to the formulation of 
the State Department Aide-Memoire of 8 October to the 
British Embassy, a belated answer to the British note of 4 
August (supra, p. 43). The reply is hardly a re-statement 
of U. S. policy, and it is doubtful that it was seen by 
Roosevelt. The only significant point is the sentence 
ending `. 
.. 
it is the Department's understanding that the 
President discussed the matter with the Prime Minister and 
understood that the Foreign Office would reply to the King's 
telegram, in the sense that the British Government would 
support the King's contention that he was prepared to return 
to Greece as soon as possible and would submit the question 
of the Royal House to plebiscite-. 4: ' exactly what Roosevelt 
°"NARS 868.01/369. 
-41FRUS, 1943, IV, 152-154. 
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had agreed with Churchill; there is a suggestion that the 
Americans were complaining that Churchill's reply to the 
King was not sufficiently definite concerning the timing of 
the King's return or a promise of a plebiscite. There is 
also a subtle hint that the State Department did not agree 
with the idea of an immediate return of the King. 
The hints were not lost on the British Embassy. In a 
letter to the Foreign Office of 26 October, Ronald Campbell 
pointed out that there was still a great divergence in 
American and British views. He based this on inferences 
from the Aide-Memoire and from a conversation of a member of 
his staff with an unnamed official of the State Department. 
He pointed out that the American memorandum did not comment 
on many of the arguments set forth, in the British note of 4 
August; notably those which outlined the reasons for sup- 
porting the King, and those which emphasised the dangers of 
a guerrilla-led civil war unless the King returned with the 
troops to resolve quarrels and choose a representative 
provisional government. 
He further reported a conversation he had had with Foy 
Kohler who emphasised the American view that the King should 
not return until called for and that he should bring leaders 
of movements within Greece into his Government-in-Exile. 
Kohler conveyed the impression that the Americans were 
rather reluctantly -acquiescing in a policy with which they 
were not in full agreement-. The Foreign Office took 
cognizance of Campbell's points, but felt that the problems 
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might be avoided because a new policy with regard to Greece 
was just being formulated. 4: 2 
4. A Plan to Solve the Greek Problem 
Two new factors caused the September 1943 restatement 
of policy to be short-lived. The first was the decision at 
the Quebec Conference that future operations in the Balkans 
would be limited to supply for the guerrillas, minor 
Commando raids, and strategic bombing. 4 21 This meant that 
there would probably be no invasion of Greece by Allied 
Forces; 44 instead it was quite likely that the liberation of 
Greece would amount to a re-occupation by the Government-in- 
Exile after the German forces withdrew. 
The second factor was a direct result of the treatment 
given the andarte delegation to Cairo. Their demands having 
been ignored, EAM began what is often called the 'First 
Round' of the Greek Civil War, a series of armed attacks on 
EDES in an attempt to gain control of the entire resistance 
movement. In addition to weakening the non-Communist 
elements, it meant the abandonment for the time being of any 
attacks on the Germans, and the use of British supplied arms 
Campbell's letter, and Foreign Office minutes of 9 and 15 
November 1943, F0371/37222/R11214. 
a*'CCS 319/5 Final, Report of Conclusions Reached by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24 August, paragraph 17, in 
FRUS, Quebec, 1943, p. 1124. 
44No full-scale Allied invasion was ever planned. There 
was an asumption that such an action was probable within 
Greece and, to a considerable extent, within the Foreign 
office. 
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and equipment against pro-British groups. British policy 
towards Greece would have to take this into account along 
with all the other problems. 
In late September 1943 the Foreign Office and the 
Chiefs of Staff exchanged letters about the course of action 
to be taken in the event of a peaceful withdrawal of German 
troops from Greece. The Chiefs suggested that the return of 
the King in these circumstances would increase the risk of 
disturbances. 4s Eden expressed the opinion that the 
presence or absence of the King was not likely to affect the 
course of events to any material degree. The Chiefs of 
Staff learned of Eden's view and made a strong objection. nr" 
Michael Rose of the Foreign Office accepted that the Chiefs 
-had hit on the one dangerously weak link in the argument- 
1. e., the idea of allowing the King to return immediately. 
He strongly doubted the assertion in the 20 September 
statement that the King's return might save Greece from 
civil war, and recommended that the King should be advised 
to promise not to return before a plebiscite. 47 
Leeper had still not changed his views on the 
unpopularity within Greece of the King. On 6 October, he 
pointed out to the Foreign Office that the probability that 
only a few British troops would accompany the returning 
Greek Government made it advisable to explain to the King 
4'COS(43)595(O), 30 September, CAB122/742. 
4 Foreign Office letter, 10 October and COS reply, 14 October, COS(43)248th, CAB122/742; and minute, 18 
October, F0371/37206/R10177. 
Minute of 18 October, loc. cit. 
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the danger of an immediate return. 4LI4 On the same day he 
forwarded a message which led to a substantial change in 
British policy towards the entire Greek situation. The key 
points originated with the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of 
Athens, Damaskinos. As developed by Leeper, the new ideas 
amounted to a three-way sharing of influence in order to 
pave the way for a peaceful liberation of Greece. ' In this 
scheme, General Plastiras, titular head of EDES, should be 
brought out from Vichy France and sent to the mountains to 
take charge of that body, with the expectation that he would 
gradually gain control of most of the resistance movments. ° 
4iTelegram 295, F0371/37231/R9703. Churchill minuted to 
Eden concerning this message: This is a sudden change. - 
4Frank Macaskie, a British officer in hiding in Athens, 
had close relations with Damaskinos. In late Septem- 
ber/early October he escaped from Greece, bringing with 
him two letters from the Archbishop which contained, 
inter alia, the idea that Damaskinos should be made 
responsible for law and order in Athens until the arrival 
of military government or the Government-in-Exile (copies 
of the letters, F0371/37206/R10450). Leeper-s proposal, 
in his telegram 298,6 October, and the comments of the 
Foreign Office and Eden, 37205/R9785. It would appear 
that Damaskinos did not propose the return of Plastiras; 
this was probably an idea originating in Cairo. 
1-c! SOE had suggested arranging his escape to use him in 
Greek affairs for some time, usually arousing Foreign 
Office opposition. Sargent commented at a Foreign 
Office/SOE meeting, 9 March 1943, to the effect that 
Britain could never have anything to do with Plastiras 
(F0371/37194/R2369). See the detailed background study of 
Plastiras by SOE Cairo and the resulting Foreign 
Office/Athens Embassy correspondence of June/July 1943 
(37197/R5657 and R5671, and 37198/R7321). In the summer 
of 1943, Tsouderos began a series of messages to 
Plastiras through an intermediary in Switzerland, using 
the communications facilities of Leeper and the British 
Legation in Berne (F0371/37197 passim). The Foreign 
Office was fully aware of this action, and saw no harm in 
Tsouderos efforts to obtain his support (Dixon-s letter, 
8 July 1943,37197/R5657). The Foreign Office did begin 
to accept the possibility of using Plastiras in late 
September (memorandum, 20 September 1943,37222/R8993). 
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The King should be prevailed upon to appoint a regency 
council headed by Damaskinos and including prominent Greeks 
in Athens, such as the Chief of Police. Once the Germans 
departed, this council would constitute a legal authority 
with which the British military could work. While it was 
not specifically stated in Leeper-s message, it was implied 
that the regency council would act for the King and thus 
obviate any need for him to return prior to a plebiscite. * 
The Foreign Office staff were not enthusiastic about 
this scheme, doubting both Plastiras' chances of gaining 
control over the resistance, and the value of Damaskinos- 
influence. They foresaw the plan as pitting two British 
4oQiý ýt 
agencies agsýrt each other in the civil war by lining up 
SOE and the military behind EAM, while the Foreign Office 
were backing Plastiras and EDES. Eden examined the pro- 
posal, but deferred any decision until he could discuss it 
with the British authorities in Cairo, on his way to Moscow. 
Before embarking on these discussions, he spoke to the 
King. After the usual complaints about SOE, Gorge II 
claimed that some of his ministers had given him an 
ultimatum to either agree not to return to Greece before a 
plebiscite, or accept their resignation. Eden expressed 
surprise at this, terming it blackmail which the King could 
not be expected to tolerate. He advised him to tell his 
ministers that he could not pre-judge the conditions which 
might exist at liberation, when he would 'take the course 
which would best serve his country'. After discussing the 
matter with Tsouderos, who was at that point opposed to the 
King"s immediate return, Eden recommended to Churchill that 
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the King defer any decision. Tsouderos also recommended to 
Eden the plan to engineer the cooperation of Plastiras, 
Damaskinos, and the Government-in-Exile. -l 
Eden then submitted a proposal to the Middle East 
Defence Committee which more or less incorporated Leeper's 
plan. George II should be induced to establish a regency 
council under Damaskinos; Plastiras was to be brought back 
to head EDES and an effort was to be made to establish an 
agreement between the Archbishop, Plastiras, and the Govern- 
ment. Simultaneously, supplies to EAM were to be suspended 
in an attempt to stop or weaken the civil war, and the value 
to the military of the guerrillas was to be re-examined. 
The specific problem of the King's immediate return does not 
seem to have been discussed, although the idea of a regency 
council would imply some change of policy on this point. 
The Commander-in-Chief Middle East approved the plan, 
although he wanted continued guerrilla action. E12 
Leeper discussed these proposals cautiously with George 
II and reported that the King approved the idea of bringing 
together Zervas (Leeper apparently did not mention 
Plastiras), Damaskinos, and the Government. He was prepared 
to give Damaskinos authority to act on his behalf in Athens. 
Leeper told him that EAM was exploiting the matter of his 
proposed early return, but that there was no question of his 
"Cairo telegrams 1935 and 1943,15 and 16 October, 
PREM3 211/15. 
"Eden's telegrams 1942 and 1943,15 and 16 October, 
F0371/37206/R10294 and 10295; Wilson's telegram CIC/129, 
9 October, Ibid., R10555. 
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making a declaration that he would not return. Leeper 
specifically denied rumours that the King had heard to the 
effect that he would be pressed to make such a declaration, 
which seems misleading, if not deliberately untruthful. s: 3 
The apparent agreement of the Commander-in-Chief proved 
illusory. The implications of Eden's proposals were dis- 
cussed in the Special Operations Committee of the Middle 
East Command for ten days. The major issue was that of 
breaking off relations with EAM, to which SOE Cairo and the 
military objected, on grounds that such an action would 
prevent the British Military Mission from carrying out 
sabotage against the Germans. The military now accepted 
that EAM was unlikely to undertake significant action 
against the Germans, but felt that any measures to withdraw 
support would endanger the lives of the Liaison Officers or 
at least prevent them from undertaking sabotage operations 
themselves. Leeper"s only hope by 31 October was that Eden 
might force a change of attitude when he stopped off in 
Cairo as he returned from Moscow. 61 
During the wait for Eden, Leeper forwarded a report on 
the attacks by EAM on EDES, which generated more discussion 
in London. Churchill, who only three weeks before had been 
asking the Foreign Office to explain the difference between 
EAM and EDES, i. e., which was royalist and which communist, 
"Aeeper-s telegram No. 1 to Eden (then in Moscow), 20 
October, Ibid., R10489. 
F4Leeper's letter, 31 October, F0371/37222/R11431; and the 
confirming letter of the same date from Wallace (now back 
in Cairo), F0954/11A. 
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reacted strongly. He demanded of the Foreign Office and SOE 
London proposals for starving or attacking EAM. E5a 
SOE London replied with a counter-proposal which recom- 
mended that a senior British officer be sent into Greece to 
organise the various guerrilla groups into a national army 
of liberation. The King should be induced to announce that 
he would limit himself to representing Greece at the peace 
conference and would not return until after a plebiscite. 
If EAM would not accept these proposals, the British 
Liaison Officers would be withdrawn. The Foreign Office 
explained to Churchill that Leeper was pressing for strong 
action against EAM, but the Commander-in-Chief wanted to 
avoid a break in order to protect the Liaison Officers. Any 
decision would have to await Eden's return to Cairo. At 
the same time, the Foreign Office sent Leeper a detailed set 
of instructions to govern his discussions with Eden. There 
were two main points. Every effort should be made to unite 
the guerrillas under Plastiras. Perhaps even more emphasis 
was given to the importance of weakening EAM, unless SOE 
could make a convincing case for that movement's 
indispensibility. 157 
Eden returned to Cairo on 4 November, but was engaged 
in Turkish matters until 7 November, when he addressed the 
Middle East Defence Committee. He pointed out that the 
continual support of EAM would result in the almost certain 
"Churchill"s 
request for explanation, 16 October; his 
demand for proposals, 3 November; Leeper"s telegram 335, 
2 November, PREM3 211/6. 
6Minutes, 4 November, loc. cit. 
'Telegram 241,4 November, loc, cit. 
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resignation of the Government-in-Exile; it would assist a 
group of extremists who intended a coup d'etat against the 
wishes of the Greek people; and, if EAM succeeded, the 
result would be a Greece which would look to Russia, not 
Britain, after the war. This seemed to convince the 
Committee that a break with EAM was required, an action 
which could only be accomplished by propaganda, which would 
of necessity involve the issue of the King's return. Eden 
and the Committee agreed that unless EAM influence was 
broken the monarchy was doomed; the only way to break this 
influence was to persuade the King to promise to delay his 
return until the will of the Greek people wes determined. 
The best method of safe-guarding the King's interest while 
awaiting such a determination would be the establishment of 
a regency council. r-a 
Leeper, in reporting Eden's visit to Cairo, seems to 
have misjudged the new attitude of the Foreign Office 
towards the King. He wrote to Sargent prior to Eden's 
return to London making it clear that although he had 
originally felt that the King should return at liberation, 
and had held this view as the official position, he had 
begun to change his mind. He now had to admit that he had 
accepted, as a new policy, that the King should declare his 
willingness to remain abroad until a plebiscite could be 
held. He feared that Sargent would not agree with what 
would seem to be a volte-face. His protestations of 
r-Telegram GRAND 102,19 November, F0800/410; Middle East 
Defence Committee minutes, 7 November, WP(43)572,17 
November, F0371/43680/R3107; The War Diaries of Oliver 
Harvey, ed. John Harvey (London: Collins, 1978), p. 320. 
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innocence, which are not in keeping with his attitude 
towards the King since early August, were unnecessary; 
Sargent replied that he now agreed with the idea of a new 
declaration by the Kings- 
Probably at the instigation of Eden, a new policy 
statement was prepared by the Foreign Office and forwarded 
to the War Cabinet on 14 November. This document centred on 
the need to break with, or weaken, EAM, on grounds that 
failure to do so would lead to the resignation of the 
Government-in-Exile, and might well result in the establish- 
ment at liberation of a minority dictatorship. The latter 
would not only be a disservice to the Greek people, but 
could be against Britain's interest since such a dictator- 
ship would naturally look to Russia rather than Britain in 
the post-war world. 
It was therefore necessary to take action against EAM. 
Mere withdrawal of money and supplies would be of little 
value since EAM already had sufficient arms to make them- 
selves independent. Reliance would have to be placed mainly 
on propaganda to unite moderate opinion and to win over 
moderate elements within EAM. But, a propaganda campaign 
could not avoid raising the issue of the King. If the EAM 
could insinuate that Britain intended to 'reimpose the King 
at the point of British bayonets-, they would retain and 
increase the support they already had. The influence of the 
EAM could be broken only if the King gave a pledge not to 
I-, 192, eeper's letter, 9 November, and Sargent's reply, 1 
December, F0371/37208/R12219. 
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return to Greece until the constitutional issue had been 
settled either by a plebiscite or by a constituent assembly. 
The Foreign Office therefore recommended that an anti-EAM 
propaganda campaign be initiated, and the King be asked to 
make a declaration that a regency council would be nominated 
at the moment of liberation, but that he would not return 
until the constitutional issue had been settled., s° 
This paper was debated in the War Cabinet on 16 
November, with Attlee in the chair, since Churchill was 
already on his way to Cairo by sea. While the Minister of 
Economic Warfare (Selborne), representing the SOB view- 
point, was willing to agree to the plan provided the 
military consequences were acceptable, the Chief of the 
Imperial Staff (Brooke) was not. He had no objection to 
Damaskinos and the regency council, but felt that the breach 
with EAM could not be supported. He was asking the 
Commander-in-Chief Middle East for his latest appreciation. 
There was general agreement that the break with EAM could 
not be undertaken unless the King made the required 
'WP(43)518, F0371/37222/R11828. The proposal to bring 
Plastiras out of France was not included, despite the 
fact that SOE had already begun an operation to 
accomplish the escape, with the knowledge and approval of 
the Foreign Office and the Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
East (Foreign Office minute, 8 October, 37205/R9785; 
Wilson's telegram CIC/129,9 October, 37206/R10555; SOE 
letter Dixon, 10 October, 37200/R10074; and the series of 
telegrams of the Berne Legation, Leeper and the Foreign 
Office, in 37200, passim. Rose of the Foreign Office 
minuted on 23 October, -We want General Plastiras more 
than ever now in view of the Secretary of States 
proposal to the Middle East Defence Committee. ' 
(37200/R10219) Despite all the activity and hope, the 
proposal to bring Plastiras back seems to have been 
shelved until the following autumn. 
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declaration. A decision was deferred, pending receipt of 
the new appreciation from the Middle East. *-' 
Whether as a result of the Chiefs of Staff request for 
a new appreciation, or on his own initiative, Leeper on 18 
November discussed the problem with Wilson. In Leeper's 
words to Eden: -I put to the Commander-in-Chief the 
following plan which I worked out after you left Cairo', 
although there seems no aspect of this plan which differs 
from Eden's proposal to the War Cabinet. Leeper reported 
Wilson's first reaction as favourable, which was confirmed 
by the Commander-in-Chief's new appreciation forwarded to 
London the following day. The Chiefs of Staff agreed to 
support Wilson's position, apparently accepting Eden's 
42 proposal. 
Eden reported his discussion with the Middle East 
Defence Committee and the indecisive War Cabinet meeting of 
16 November to Churchill, stating that he intended to ask 
the Cabinet for permission for Churchill or himself to 
approach the King and ask for the desired declaration. He 
suggested that this should not be as difficult as it might 
seem since there were some indications that the King was 
moving towards the desired position. The basis for Eden's 
1WM(43)155, CAB65/36; and Eden's telegram GRAND 102,19 
November 1943, FO800/410. Cadogan, in The Diaries of Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, ed. David Dilks (London: Cassell, 
1971), p. 575, puts it that -A. (Eden) didn't get it all 
his own way, and I think I'm right. I'm doubtful about a 
complete break with EAM and holding a pistol to the head 
of the King'. 
I'Leeper"s telegram 634,18 November, F0371/37208/R11908; 
C-in-C telegram CC/436,19 November, and Howard's Foreign 
Office minute, 20 November, both 37209/R12642; Howard was 
not sure that Wilson was really in favour. 
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optimism was not stated, but it seems probable that he was 
referring to a letter written by the King to Tsouderos on 8 
November. In this, the King stated that at the liberation 
he would examine the question ofýhis return to Greece and, 
depending on his own appraisal of the military and political 
situation at that happy time-, he would make his decision. 
According to Tsouderos, this at first pleased the Greek 
cabinet, but they later demanded further concessions, per- 
haps feeling that the King was weakening in his resolve. 
Eden's message reached Churchill when he was already 
in despair over the entire situation in the Mediterranean. 
While on board H. M. S. Renown enroute to Cairo, he prepared a 
detailed analysis of the strategic position. He was 
especially unhappy with the fact that there were so few 
resources available for operations in the Balkans, since the 
main Allied command under Eisenhower did not include 
responsibility for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
This area was assigned to the Middle East Command in Cairo, 
which had been drained of forces for the build-up to 
OVERLORD, the forthcoming invasion of France. 
Churchill felt that the emphasis on OVERLORD would 
result in missed opportunities for action against the 
Germans in the Balkans in the months before May 1944. In 
his words, -It was an odd way to help the Russians to slow 
down the fight in the only theatre where anything can be 
done for some months. - A marginal handwritten note on the 
'keeper's telegram 354,14 November, F0371/37231/R11714; 
telegram GRAND 102,19 November, F0800/410; Kirk's tele- 
gram 110,23 November, FRUS, 1943, IV, 155-156. 
77 
covering memorandum which may be in Churchill's hand reads: 
'It is a missing link in the story. '-4 In this atmosphere, 
it is hardly surprising that Churchill was unhappy with the 
proposal to restrain the King. He replied to Eden: 'I 
grieve deeply at this and prefer to wait until you come 
before approaching the King of Greece. --- 
The problem was discussed again in the War Cabinet that 
same day, 22 November. The Chiefs of Staff representative 
reported that the military value of EAM was now believed to 
be small, basing his remarks on the Wilson appreciation. 
There was general agreement on the proposal, which was 
identified as that presented by Leeper to Wilson on 18 
November as the new plan which he had worked out after Eden 
left Cairo. Presumably in view of Churchill's message, 
which Eden reported, the final conclusion was that Churchill 
and Eden should 'deal with the matter broadly along these 
lines. '*Ss 
d4PREM3 136/6. The covering memorandum on 10 Downing 
Street stationary, dated 29 December 1943, identifies the 
writer and the time and place of preparation. It further 
states that the study was amended by the Chiefs of Staff 
in order to avoid giving offence to the Americans. In 
the -somewhat softer- form it was the basis for 
Churchill's opening remarks at the first plenary meeting 
of the British and American Chiefs of Staff in Cairo 
(Text in FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 
(hereinafter FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, 1943), pp. 330-334. 
A long extract of an early, and probably only partially 
amended, version is printed in Churchill, Second World 
War, V, 260-262. Details of the strategic position 
and the American versus British views are in Maurice 
Matloff, -Allied Strategy in Europe, - in Makers of Modern 
Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 
1986), and in John Ehrman, Grand Strategy (London: HMSO, 
1956-1976), Vol. V, 105-122. 
yETelegram FROZEN 67,22 November 1943, F0800/411. 
`WM(43)160th, CAB65/40. 
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The discussions concerning the new proposal gave rise 
to a point which now seems obvious, but had not previously 
surfaced. Laskey, in a Foreign Office minute on Leeper's 
report of his discussions with Wilson, warned of the dangers 
of ambiguity in the declaration the King was expected to 
make. '? Whether Laskey recognised it or not, ambiguity was 
the major defect of the King's 4 July statement, and of the 
King's 8 November letter. For that matter, it was to be a 
major source of difficulty for all of the next year. 
Presumably by coincidence, Lord Selborne, responsible 
for SOE as Minister for Economic Warfare, made the same 
point that evening in the War Cabinet meeting. He pointed 
out that Leeper proposed only to ask the King to declare 
that he would not return 'until notified to do so by a 
properly constituted and representative Government on Greek 
soil after liberation', thus avoiding the word 'plebiscite'. 
In Selborne-s opinion, the avoidance of this word might 
result in robbing any declaration of its real value, 'since 
plebiscite formed a regular feature of Greek political 
life'. '=*11 This is the first time the possible significance 
"Minute, 22 November, F0371/37208/R11908. 
WM(43)160, CAB65/40. One might question whether plebi- 
scites did form 'a regular feature of Greek political 
life'. There were four plebiscites in Greece in the 
inter-war years (1920,1924,1926,1935). Lars Beerentzen 
of the University of Copenhagen's Department of Modern 
Greek and Balkan Studies suggests in a private communica- 
tion that Greeks in 1943 would best remember the two of 
1920 and 1935. Since both were linked with political 
upheavals involving the monarchy which resulted in some- 
what rigged royalist triumphs, one might question whether 
a plebiscite would be the most desirable precedent for 
the establishment of a stable post-war government. 
Details of the significant plebiscites are set forth in 
George Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic (Berkeley: Uni- 
versity of California Press, 1983), pp. 28,32-33,48-51. 
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of the actual word was noted; there seems to be a 
deliberate avoidance of `plebiscite' by the King and his 
followers, by the Foreign Office, and by Leeper. Only SOE 
used the word consistently. 
In informing Leeper of the War Cabinet decision, the 
Foreign Office did recommend that the desirability of 
including the word plebiscite be considered in the prepara- 
tion of the King's declaration. This was followed by 
another instruction to place stress on the need for an exact 
formula to prevent any cunning interpretation by the King's 
enemies-. - Unfortunately, it was to be impossible to carry 
out either of these instructions. 
5. Summary 
The visit of the delegates from the mountains was an 
almost unqualified failure. No advantage was taken of the 
opportunity to coordinate the guerrilla effort which was the 
main purpose of the visit. The failure of the British to 
agree to obtain a more definite statement from the King or 
to consider representation of the andartes in the Govern- 
went-in-Exile led only to the first outbreak of civil war 
and the ending of most of the effort against the Germans. 
The abrupt decision to return the delegation to the mount- 
ains without further discussion was unnecessary, and is 
difficult to understand, except in terms of the unreasoning 
"Foreign Office telegrams 268 and 269,23 November, 
F0371/37208/R11908. 
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anger of Leeper and Churchill. The excuse that the demands 
were too extreme is impossible to justify in view of the 
fact that it required participation of EAM in the government 
to obtain the Lebanon agreement of May 1944, and a definite 
commitment of the King to end the December 1944 uprising. 
The only positive result was the belated realisation by the 
British that the issue of the King was so critical that some 
new approach was required. 
0 
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Chapter III 
Confusion in Cairo 
December 1943 
1. The Conferences in Cairo 
and the New American Ambassador 
For the next month, Greek policy was to be considered 
and, to a limited extent, decided in Cairo, while Churchill, 
Eden, and Roosevelt held meetings there before and after the 
Tehran Conference. This occurred even though British and 
American statesmen never got round to direct discussions of 
Greek problems, except for some unpleasant recriminations at 
the break-up of the second vist to Cairo. Both sides 
conferred with George II and his Prime Minister, but the 
British failure to establish a joint position with the 
Americans led to near disaster. There was to be confusion, 
negligence, and irresponsibility on both sides, and at all 
levels. 
This was the first time the Americans were in a 
position to exert some influence on Greek affairs, except 
for the rather confused discussion at Quebec the previous 
summer. Unfortunately, they had no established policy. 
While the staff officers in the State Department who dealt 
with Greek affairs had definite views, these had not been 
adopted as official positions. Roosevelt took no State 
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Department representative with him to Cairo and Tehran, 
relying on a group of American Ambassadors and Harry 
Hopkins2 of his personal staff for diplomatic advice. The 
Ambassadors included John Gilbert Winant -- (Court of St 
James), Averell Harriman4 (Soviet Union), Lawrence Stein- 
hardt (Turkey) and Alexander Kirk65, who was Minister to 
Egypt and Ambassador to the Governments-in-Exile of Greece 
and Yugoslavia. 
Kirk had maintained relations with the King and Tsou- 
deros since the establishment of the Government-in-Exile in 
Cairo in March, but had acted mainly as an observer. His 
detached attitude seems to have been based an a belief that 
Greek affairs were so dominated by British influence that 
there was no point in becoming involved. -' Privately, he 
'Charles Bohlen, head of the, Soviet Section in the State 
Department, and Frederick Reinhardt of the same section, 
were assigned to Roosevelt as interpreters and advisors, 
but neither had been involved in Greek affairs. 
Harry Hopkins (1890-1946), social worker and Roosevelt's 
administrator of major relief programmes during the 
Depression, special advisor and assistant to the 
President on Foreign Affairs, 1939-1945. 
: 3J. G. Winant (1889-1947), Ambassador to London, 1941- 
1946. 
, 4W. Averell Harriman (1891-1986), special representative 
of Roosevelt in London, 1941-1942; Ambassador to Russia, 
1943-1946; Ambassador to London, 1946. 
'-Alexander Kirk (1888- ), Minister to Egypt, 1941-1944; 
Ambassador to Greek and Yugoslav Governments, 1943-1944; 
Political Advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander, 
Mediterranean Theatre, 1944-1946. 
Kirk was not appointed Ambassador to the Greek Government 
until June 1943, but his predecessor, Anthony Drexel 
Biddle, remained in London when Tsouderos and the Greek 
cabinet moved to Cairo. 
'Kirk's telegram 1079,5 June 1943, NARS 868.00/1238. 
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complained to a friend in the State Department that he had 
been given 'no clear-cut impression of our policy--if any-- 
towards Greece-. e 
Kirk was replaced as Ambassador to the Greek and 
Yugoslav Governments during the Cairo Conference by Lincoln 
MacVeagh9, who had been the American Minister to Greece from 
1933 to 1941. MacVeagh brought with him an extensive 
knowledge and understanding of Greek affairs and person- 
alities. He came to Cairo directly from South Africa, where 
he had been serving, so that he had had no opportunity to 
discuss Greek policy with the State Department. 
There were no written instructions for him from 
Washington, except for a personal letter from Wallace Murray 
of the State Department. Murray pointed out that MacVeagh 
would find a number of documents in the Embassy files which 
would give him the general lines of State Department 
thinking on the problem of the return of the King (which 
seems to contradict the complaint of Kirk a few months 
before). Murray stated that the Department's ideas were 
based mainly on the advice MacVeagh had sent to Washington 
when he left Greece in June 1941, and repeated to him a long 
extract from MacVeagh-s final dispatch. He added a copy of 
'Letter-, 15 July, NARS 868.00/1301. 
'Lincoln MacVeagh (1890-1972), member of an old New 
England family which included an Ambassador to Japan, a 
Minister to Turkey and Italy, a Secretary of the Treasury 
and an Attorney-General; after an early career as 
publisher, Minister to Greece, 1933-1941; Minister to 
Iceland, 1941-1942; Minister to South Africa, 1942-1943; 
Ambassador to the Greek Government, 1943-1948; Ambassador 
to Portugal, 1948-1952; Ambassador to Spain, 1952-1953. 
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the outdated British policy statement of October 1942, and a 
confusing set of papers prepared by the Department at the 
time of the Quebec Conference. He did mention that much of 
the confusion at Quebec was caused by the fact that the 
State Department had been unable to get its ideas to the 
President at the proper time. The only definite point which 
can be extracted from this letter is the State Department's 
objection to the King's return with the liberating forces. 1- 
MacVeagh suffered a further disadvantage. He did not 
arrive in Cairo until 28 November, after both the British 
and American parties had left for Tehran. He therefore had 
no opportunity to discuss Greek affairs with Roosevelt or 
any member of his entourage. He was briefed once by Kirk 
and George V. Allen, Assistant Chief of the State Depart- 
ment's Division of Near Eastern Affairs (which supervised 
Greek relations), who was passing through Cairo on his way 
from Moscow to Washington. It would seem that neither of 
them had had any discussion with the party from Washington; 
1CLetter, 15 November, NARS 868.00/1304A. Undoubtedly 
without MacVeagh-s knowledge, the State Department told 
Roosevelt that MacVeagh would have full background on 
Greek problems, "particularly the Greek King-, when the 
President visited Cairo (FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 
129). Leeper reported to Eden on 7 December that 
MacVeagh had just received a letter from the State 
Department dated 15 November -strongly urging our line- 
(F0371/37231/R13507). Assuming this is the Murray let- 
ter, it would seem that Leeper was guilty of exaggera- 
tion, since the British "line- had not been adopted even 
tentatively until 22 November. However, since the criti- 
cal action in Cairo took place on 6 December, Leeper"s 
report cannot have had any significant effect, i. e., it 
could not have induced Eden to think that Roosevelt 
approved the new British policy. The suggestion that 
this letter was the only indication MacVeagh had of State 
Department policy is borne out by his diary entry of 17 
December (Iatrides, RacVeagb, p. 410). 
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nor had they any knowledge of the new British policy. The 
briefings by Kirk and Allen seem to have amounted to only 
one morning and one afternoon session, and could only have 
involved Greece partially, since Kirk was also turning over 
responsibility for Yugoslavia to MacVeagh. 
2. Preparing Churchill, MacVeagh, and Roosevelt 
for the New British Plan. 
The new American Ambassador obtained most of his up-to- 
date information from the Greek Prime Minister, the Minister 
of the Household of George II, the British Ambassador, and 
the British Minister of State. The latter two gave MacVeagh 
a thorough briefing on the new British proposal, and 
provided him with a detailed memorandum of it. MacVeagh 
told Leeper he was very favourably impressed and would 
support the plan if given a chance. Leeper reported that he 
had 'coached' MacVeagh on what he was to say to Roosevelt. 1t 
Unknown to I +_: Veagh, the President had already injected 
himself into Greek affairs. He received George II and 
Tsouderos on the afternoon of 24 November, prior to his 
departure for Tehran. According to the American record, 
this was a short courtesy call, " but Leeper greeted Eden 
upon his return to Cairo with a different story. In his 
words, the President told the King he had heard that some 
Greeks urged him not to return at once to his country, but 
11latrides, MacVe&gh, pp. 388-394; Leeper-s letter, 4 
December, F0800/276. 
'-; 
-'-Roosevelt Conversations, ' FRUS, Cajro and Tehran, 1943, 
pp. 297,345. 
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he strongly urged the King not to listen to them, but to go 
in with his troops. Eden agreed with Leeper that this was 
neither a timely nor a helpful suggestion, but there is no 
indication that Eden took any action such as warning 
Churchill of the President's attitude. The Foreign Office 
took no alarm at the news. Sargent passed Leeper's report 
to a colleague with the comment This may amuse you, 
although it is not clear that he was referring to Roose- 
velt's remarks. 
-%t3 
Perhaps Eden was concentrating on a more difficult 
task. Churchill had not yet been completely informed as to 
what was to be done, having received Eden's rather general 
outline of the new policy only while en route to Cairo. 
Eden asked Leeper for a brief for his talk with the King, 
which he intended to discuss with the Prime Minister after 
the two returned from having Thanksgiving dinner with 
Roosevelt. At the dinner, Roosevelt volunteered an account 
of his conversation with the King. Churchill was amused, 
and suggested that Eden explain his new policy, which rather 
differed from that of the President. Eden apparently side- 
stepped, but he had had another warning that the new plan 
was in danger. 
Desmond Morton, an aide to Churchill who specialised in 
relations with Governments-in-Exile, had spent the early 
evening helping Leeper prepare the brief Eden had requested. 
He was present at Churchill's villa when the Prime Minister 
returned from the dinner without Eden, and decided that he 
: "ILetter, 27 November, and comment, loc. cit. 
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should brief Churchill then on the Greek plan. Churchill 
was in an extremely cheerful mood, but was uninterested in 
Morton's attempts to discuss Greece or its King. 
Eventually, as Morton persisted in his efforts, Churchill 
adopted a Napoleonic attitude and composed and sang a song 
about the King of Greece. Morton gave up. 
-, 
- 
Before the statesmen left for Tehran, Leeper gave a 
copy of his brief for Eden to Ambassador Winant, who seems 
to have been regarded as the senior diplomatic official in 
Roosevelt's party. He explained the significance of the 
plan to Winant, although he was not sure that the latter 
understood it. " At some time prior to 3 December, and 
probably before the move to Tehran, Eden discussed the new 
plan at length with Winant and Harry Hopkins, providing them 
with another copy of the brief. Hopkins expressed the 
opinion that the plan represented the right policy" and 
promised to recommend it to the President.: - 
Churchill and Eden returned to Cairo on 2 December, and 
Eden began work on Greek affairs. He decided that he would 
open discussions with the King and Tsouderos on his own, and 
asked Leeper to obtain Churchill's permission for this 
"'Loc. cit. The Thanksgiving dinner has been described as 
being rather exuberant, with Churchill dancing with 
Roosevelt's rather portly and elderly aide, General 
Watson (Churchill, The Second World War, V. 268-269; 
Pawle, The War and Colonel Warden (London: Harrap, 
1963), p. 267). Kirk was present at the dinner, but 
apparently did not mention the conversation concerning 
the King to MacVeagh. 
"'Letter, 27 November, P0800/276. 
1115Morton to Churchill, 2 December, and Eden to Churchill, 7 
December, PREM3 211/15; Hopkins- copy of the brief in 
FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 850-852. 
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procedure. This may indicate simply that Eden had no 
opportunity to ask Churchill personally, or that Eden 
hesitated to bring up a topic for which the Prime Minister 
had no enthusiasm. Leeper used Morton to obtain a note from 
Churchill saying 'I agree, but with regret'. The next day 
Eden saw George II and gave him a copy of the brief to read 
(but not to keep). It would appear that Eden did not 
attempt to explain the significance of the document. The 
King made no comment, and Eden and Leeper assumed that his 
failure to object to the new plan was a favourable sign. 
Leeper also let Tsouderos read a copy of the brief. 
While Tsouderos approved the new plan, he was very surprised 
that the King had not mentioned it when telling him of 
Eden's visit. Tsouderos immediately went to the King to 
learn that the latter had only glanced at the brief and had 
not understood its import. After some rather agitated 
disucssion the King calmed down and seemed to accept the 
proposal, subject only to the reservation that he must 
discuss it with Churchill before making his final 
decision. 117 Leeper reported this to Eden who passed it to 
Churchill in a note an 5 December. Churchill commented in 
writing 'Let us talk this over', but there is no record of 
such a discussion before 7 December. '- 
17Leeper's letter, 4 December, and Eden's minute, 5 
December, F0371/37231/R12837. 
IeLeeper-s letter, 4 December, F0800/276. 
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3. The King's Visit to Roosevelt 
The King visited Roosevelt on 6 December, before seeing 
Churchill. The only records of this meeting are second-hand 
versions originating with the King, and an account written 
six weeks later by the President, which was not, so far as 
is known, revealed to British authorities. Tsouderos, 
reporting what the King told him of the meeting, stated that 
Roosevelt himself had raised the question of the King's 
return. Roosevelt is supposed to have said that the war was 
not yet over and it would be a great mistake for the King to 
make the proposed declaration. He promised to discuss the 
matter with Churchill on his way to the airport when he left 
Cairo. Tsouderos felt that the King would have agreed to 
make the declaration with the slightest encouragement from 
Roosevelt, but that Churchill might still persuade him. tq 
Field Marshall Smuts, who had a long acquaintanceship 
with George II, saw the King the same day. Smuts gave 
Leeper an account similar to that of Tsouderos, adding that 
the King accused the British of trying to get rid of him, 
11ILeeper-s minute to Eden, 7 December, F0371/37231/R12837, 
Eden that same day noted on the margin that someone (name 
or title illegible) had already told him of the meeting. 
According to his informant, the King had said that the 
British were blackmailing him into resigning his crown. 
Eden continued: But this may only be the President's 
gloss! ' which may mean that Eden received his information 
from Hopkins or some other American source. 
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and that Roosevelt had stated that he had not been consulted 
by the British on this change of policy.:: o 
Eden arrived at Roosevelt's villa while the King and 
the president were still talking, to be told by Hopkins that 
'British policy was not going well-. When the President 
emerged from his talk with the King, he told Eden he was not 
happy with the way the Foreign Secretary was treating the 
King. The next morning Roosevelt, on his way to the 
airport, told Churchill with some vehemence that Eden was 
trying to deprive George II of his crown. : 21 In reporting 
the Cairo and Tehran meetings to senior British ministers 
two weeks later, Eden stated that the President opened the 
discussion with the King by saying 'Don't let anybody bully 
you into giving an undertaking not to go back to your 
z"Leeper's minute to Eden, 7 December, PREM3 211/15 (there 
are two Leeper minutes to Eden dated 7 December). In 
Leeper's account to the Foreign Office of the King's 
meetings with the President and Smuts, he indicates that 
Smuts assured the King that the British were still his 
friends, but that Smuts feared that the King might 
abdicate (F0371/37231/Rl2837). Some weeks later, Leeper 
suggested that Smuts' attitude at this meeting with the 
King was almost as much to blame for the King's refusal 
as was Roosevelt's (Leeper's letter to Eden, 24 January 
1944, F0371/43677/R1860). While Smuts was certainly a 
strong supporter of the Greek Royal Family, and had 
opposed a Greek plebisicite at the time of Quebec (supra, 
p. 60), there is no other evidence of any interference by 
Smuts at Cairo. The Foreign Office refused to circulate 
Leeper's letter (intended by Leeper to be his formal 
report on his actilvities since 1 July 1943) to the 
Dominitons, partially because of this comment on Smuts. 
"Eden, The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), pp. 498- 
499. It is not understood how Hopkins knew British 
policy was not going well, unless Hopkins had been in the 
President's room and left temporarily, 
. 
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country. I am sure they will all be only too delighted to 
see you again. '2! 2 
Roosevelt gave his version of the conversation in a 
letter to MacVeagh on 15 January 1944, but limited it to the 
point that George II felt he was being 'blackmailed' by the 
British. In the same letter he revealed a considerable 
naivete concerning Greek politics and institutions. He 
recommended a constitutional monarch having no political 
powers whatsoever, an elected Prime Minister with a fixed 
term, and limitations on the number of political parties, a 
set of proposals which shed considerable light on how ill- 
prepared he was to comment on the British plan. =- 
Churchill and Eden did discuss the problem of the Greek 
King on 7 December, in the light of Leeper's report on 
Smuts' conversation with the King, and, presumably, the 
version provided by Tsouderos. z; "4 Shortly afterward they 
entertained the King at luncheon, but the only record of the 
The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, ed. Ben 
Pimlott (London: Cape, 1985), entry for 21 December 
1943, p. 686. Sir David Hunt in a private communication 
relates a story emanating from Cairo at the time to the 
effect that what Roosevelt actually said was closer to: 
You don't want to listen to that Winston and 
Anthony have been giving you; you just get on your white 
horse and ride into Athens at the head of your troops and 
everyone will cheer. ' The original source of this was 
Colonel Levidis, the Master of Ceremonies of the Greek 
Royal Household, who claimed to have been present. (The 
official record of the meeting of Roosevelt and the King 
do not show either Hopkins or Levidis as being present 
(FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 660,740). ) While one 
may not be sure of the actual words, the sense is 
completely consistent with Eden's remarks to the British 
ministers; Eden would probably not have reflected Roose- 
velt's opinion of the merit of the British proposal. 
-3Iatrides, MacVeagh, pp. 444-445. 
ý2'4Eden-s minute, 7 December, PREM3 211/15 
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conversation which has been located is a brief but unclear 
account by Eden, which indicates that the King refused to 
promise to postpone his return until a plebiscite could be 
held. 2S According to a report reaching MacVeagh, Churchill 
told the King at this meeting, 'I am a Royalist-, 2#=-- which 
was in itself probably enough to encourage George II to 
refuse the request in any case. 
The words of Roosevelt to the King, whatever they were, 
were criticised as 'irresponsible" (Eden), "=7 'frustrating' 
(Eden), 2" 'sabotage- (Eden), 2"- -selling the pass' 
(Cadogan), '° 'devious' (David Hunt), '-'I 'annoying- 
(Sargent), 32 'astonishing' (Leeper), ý-` and 'shocking' 
(Oliver Harvey). 
-'44 Eden and the Foreign Office ever after 
stressed that the President had ruined the entire plan; 
without a firm and definite statement by the King, there was 
Eden, The Reckoning, p. 499; to an extent confirmed by 
Eden's telegram of 17 August 1944, PREM 212/1. 
ýFRUS, 1943, IV, 160. 
17The Reckoning, p. 498. This is Edens first published 
comment. C. M. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, p. 295, 
points out that Eden asked him to omit mention of 
Roosevelt's actions in this matter when Woodhouse was 
writing The Apple of Discord in 1948. 
ý-"Telegram, 17 August 1944, PREM3 212/1 
"Note, 3 January 1944, F0371/37210/R13964. 
°Diaries, p. 585. 
: 31'Performing Fleas, - Times Literary Supplement. 11 
February 1983. 
'3ýýiinute, 8 December 1943, F0371/37231/R12837. 
--When Greek Meets Greek, p. 35. 
='4Diaries, pp. 324-325. 
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no possibility that EAM's influence could be reduced. '-" The 
proposal for a regency council, upon which so much weight 
had been placed, could not be implemented without the King's 
signature. In the event it would be another year, and 
another civil war in Greece, before George II would agree to 
any sort of Regency. 
Whether the new plan, even if put into effect in its 
entirety, could have solved the problem of Greece is 
debatable, but the question does arise as to why the 
President acted in such a contrary and inexplicable manner. 
The late Elisabeth Barker has suggested that Roosevelt's 
support for the King was due to an inordinate respect for 
monarchs; she felt he collected kings in the same way he 
collected stamps. -- It is more likely that he saw himself 
as the equal of kings and queens, if not somewhat superior, 
in that he was both head of state and head of government. 
Churchill may have had his `King mania'; Roosevelt did not. 
From what little is known of Roosevelt's actual views 
on Greek politics, it is suggested that he had only a vague 
under-standing and little interest. His reaction to 
Churchill's presentation of the Greek problem at Quebec, 
supra, pp. 56-57, seems at best an acceptance of Churchill's 
wishes without much thought to its significance. In the 
previous October, he had remarked in public to the Greek 
In reporting the discussions with the King to the War 
Cabinet on 13 December, Eden was restrained; he only 
expressed the fear that the President's intervention 
would have a very injurious effect on the general plan 
(WX(43)169th, CAB65/40). 
, 5Churchi11 and Eden at War (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 
188. 
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Ambassador, -After all, King George has the right to return 
to Greece as Commander-in-Chief of his army. '-7 This sug- 
gests that he was aware of the British policy existing at 
that time, but that he did not agree with, probably did not 
know, the State Department's view. He may have been relying 
only on his memory of Quebec. oe 
Some effort had been made by the British to inform 
Roosevelt of the new policy, but it is doubtful that its 
exact details and justification ever reached him. Leeper 
explained it to Winant and Eden discussed it with both 
Winant and Hopkins, but there is no evidence that either of 
the two brought it to Roosevelt's attention. MacVeagh, in 
his diary, gives the impression that he explained the plan 
to the President, but a careful reading creates doubts. He 
probably provided the historical background and the current 
situation in Greece, but it would appear that he made no 
detailed explantion of the British plan of action or of its 
purposes. 
MacVeagh did leave with the President a short, but 
clear, memorandum, with a copy of Leeper-s brief attached. 
This began: -Firstly, it should be made absolutely clear 
"Memorandum of 13 October, referring to a meeting on the 
previous day, NARS 868.01/412. 
°ýýordell Hull later told MacVeagh that Roosevelt, before 
he went to Cairo, had refused to admit that -everything 
that is being done- regarding Greece and the Middle East 
in general is "British policy"', but afterwards he was 
fully convinced (conversation, 15 August 1944, Iatrides, 
MacVeagh, p. 581). This does not seem in keeping with 
other evidence and may reflect Hull's lack of under- 
standing of the Middle East situation. 
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that the King is not going to be forced on the country 
against its will 
.. 
It continued: 
... 
the so-called Communist forces at 
present making so much trouble in the country are 
spreading the charge that the Allies intend to 
force the King back on Greece in their own 
interests. This is a tremendous propaganda weapon 
ee of the independent spirit of the Greeks. 
The British proposal that the King declare now 
that he will not return until asked to do so by 
the Greek people themselves is, therefore, a good 
one. It would deprive subversive elements of 
their chief appeal to the Greek people. It would 
also be in the King's own interest, tending to 
strengthen his cause, which has been inevitably 
weakened by his association with the Metaxas 
dictatorship and his own subsequent absence from 
the country. But only a declaration by him can 
fill the bill in view of the widespread distrust 
of the Allies in this matter which has been sown 
in Greece. 
It will be noted that MacVeagh did not draw attention to the 
importance of the proposed regency council, or to the 
proposals to integrate resistance forces into the Greek 
army, two facets of the plan considered essential to its 
potential success. 
It is not difficult to believe that Roosevelt never got 
round to reading MacVeagh-s memorandum or Leeper-s brief. ---, 
He may have retained nothing from the conversation with his 
ambassador except that the British intended to prevent the 
"Carbon copy headed 'MEMORANDUM (Left by Mr McVeagh [sic] 
with the President)-, and dated 3 December 1943, in 
F0371/37231/R13507. No copy has been found in American 
files. 
ac'Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 
Vol. III, 401, n. 1, states that The President himself 
had seen the British proposals before they were submitted 
to the King" and therefore Roosevelt's complaint that he 
had not been consulted was contrary to the facts. Wood- 
ward provides no source for the implication that the 
President had actually read and understood the British 
plan. 
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return of the King. In other words, he did not really 
recognise that he was being informed of a major change in 
British policy. In-his conversation MacVeagh seems to have 
stressed that the United States should not be involved in an 
attempt to force any regime whatsoever on the Greeks. 41 
This emphasis may well have reinforced Roosevelts refusal 
to support the British proposal. 
Even if MacVeagh did make the new plan clear, George II 
may have convinced Roosevelt that MacVeagh was in league 
with the British. The American Ambassador had seen the King 
after speaking to the President, but before the King saw 
Roosevelt. MacVeagh-s record creates the impression that he 
urged the King to go along with the Foreign Office plan. He 
did make it clear that this was a personal, not an official, 
piece of advice, and that he did not want to interfere in 
Greek internal affairs. His description of his conversation 
is clear, logical, and convincing, and it should be remem- 
bered that MacVeagh was probably better acquainted with 
George II than any other non-Greek person involved. 42 
MacVeagh must have been unpleasantly surprised shortly 
after Roosevelt left Cairo, when he received what amounted 
to a reprimand from the President. This was delivered by 
Winant, to whom it had been whispered by Roosevelt as the 
latter prepared to board his aircraft, and shortly after the 
President complained to Churchill concerning Eden's attitude 
towards the King. According to Winant, Roosevelt forbade 
MacVeagh to associate himself with any attempt to force the 
""Iatrides, XacVeagh, pp. 396-397. 
ý: 2Ibid., pp. 399-400. 
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King's decision against his will". Further, the President 
felt that MacVeagh had already `gone too far in this 
direction'. Not surprisingly, MacVeagh wondered what the 
King had said to Roosevelt. '" 
MacVeagh sent Roosevelt a detailed defence of his 
actions, which stressed that he had made it clear to the 
King that the United States did not wish to interfere in 
Greek internal affairs. In his apologia MacVeagh admitted 
that he had told the King the British plan was a very good 
one, but had emphasised that the King should make up his own 
mind. Roosevelt replied, saying that he fully understood 
the matter, and only wanted MacVeagh to know that the King 
felt he was 'being "railroaded" or "blackmailed" by the 
British'. - 
While MacVeagh's first reaction to Winant's message 
from the President was that the King had complained that 
MacVeagh was giving too much support to the British, he 
later came to the conclusion that it was not the King, but 
the British who had brought the Presidential wrath down upon 
him. He felt that they had overemphasised his approval of 
the plan, and thus given Roosevelt the wrong impression of 
his attitude., *- Whether MacVeagh had specific evidence of 
this or not, it was true that Leeper had told Eden that the 
American Ambassador was entirely in favour of the proposal, 
°- Diary, 8 December, ibid., pp. 406-408. 
-4MacVeagh's letter, 13 December; Roosevelt's reply, 
January 1944, ibid., pp. 406-408,444-445. 
, "Tiary, 17 December, ibid. 
, 
p. 409. 
15 
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and Eden had emphasised this idea to Churchill. 4- While 
logical, it is difficult to see how the British could have 
communicated this impression to Roosevelt, since they 
apparently did not discuss Greek affairs with the President 
until the journey to the airfield. 
MacVeagh can hardly be blamed for the failure of the 
grand design, or of disloyalty to American policy. He did 
favour the British plan, although there seems no reason to 
believe that he was unduly influenced by Leeper or Casey; he 
seems to have judged it on its merits, based on his long- 
term knowledge of Greek politics. He had received next to 
nothing in the way of official instructions, either from the 
State Department47 or from his predecessor. All that he 
knew of United States policy was that contained in the 
letter from Murray, which stressed the belief that the 
King's return was undesirable, at least until the will of 
the Greek people was known. 4 Although he was an old 
"Note, 5 December, F0371/37231/R12837; and Eden to 
Churchill, 5 December, PREM3 211/15. 
47MacVeagh's report of his own conversations with the 
President, and the meetings of the King with Roosevelt, 
and with Churchill and Eden, puzzled the State Depart- 
ment, who took the report to indicate a major change in 
British policy on Greece. MacVeagh had his staff prepare 
a more detailed analysis, which ignored Roosevelt's 
interference, but emphasised that the British were not 
turning their backs on the King, but trying to preserve 
his position. It is obvious from the State Department's 
enquiry to MacVeagh that neither Roosevelt nor his 
personal staff informed the State Department of their 
involvement in Greek affairs at Cairo (FRUS, 1943, IV, 
157-160; and Iatrides, XacVeagh, pp. 413-414). 
4'As late as 17 December, MacVeagh confided to his diary 
that the only guidance he possessed with regard to Greece 
was Murray's letter concerning the King's return 
C Iatrides, MacVeagh, p, 410). 
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personal friend of the President, he had no knowledge of 
Roosevelt's views, even after his talk with him in Cairo. 
Roosevelt was a difficult man to brief, particularly if he 
had pre-conceived ideas or wished to avoid making an 
immediate decision. Under these circumstances, it is easy 
to accept that MacVeagh was unable to impress upon the 
President the real significance of the British plan. 
4. Roosevelt's Motivations 
In attempting to explain Roosevelt's attitude on 6 
December the following possible factors may be considered: 
First, for unexplained reasons, he arrived in 
Cairo believing that the King should return with 
his troops. 
Secondly, he was unhappy with the decision 
forced on him the previous day to abandon 
Operation BUCCANEER, the invasion of the Andaman 
Islands in Southeast Asia. 
Thirdly, he was irritated because he had not 
been properly informed of the British plan. He 
may have felt that the British themselves should 
have explained it to him, rather than leaving it 
to the newly arrived American Ambassador. 
Finally, much of what he did understand of the 
new plan was probably what George II told him, and 
it is difficult to believe that the King gave him 
the most accurate account of its advantages, if 
indeed the King understood what it was intended to 
accomplish. 
In these circumstances, it is easy to imagine that 
Roosevelt reacted to George II-s complaints about his 
treatment by the British by telling the King to stand up for 
his rights. This suggestion is buttressed by Roosevelt's 
warning to MacVeagh through Winant against associating 
himself too closely with British plans for the King, and by 
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his complaints to Eden concerning his conduct towards the 
monarch. 
5. British Responsibility 
If Roosevelt's advice to the King was critical of the 
entire British policy for Greece, as Eden later intimated, 
the British had only themselves to blame for his unfavour- 
able action. Had Churchill wholeheartedly supported the 
plan, if Eden had personally convinced Churchill of its 
necessity, and if the two of them had discussed it with 
Roosevelt before he saw the King, there is a good chance 
that he would have gone along with it. Unfortunately Eden 
left the briefing of Roosevelt to Winant and Hopkins, who, 
probably, paid little attention to its importance and never 
took it up with the President. 
In hindsight, it seems evident that the only person who 
had a reasonable chance of explaining the new proposal to 
Roosevelt and obtaining his support was Churchill. But, 
Churchill had accepted the plan with regret when it was put 
to him at Malta, and the one attempt to discuss it with him 
personally, that of Morton prior to Tehran, was an obvious 
failure. There is no evidence that Eden discussed the plan 
with Churchill prior to Roosevelt's second meeting with the 
King; he did provide him with briefing notes, and a written 
account of his own talks with the King, but, so far as can 
be determined, he never warned the Prime Minister of 
Roosevelt's probable atttiude. There is no reason to 
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suppose that Eden ever asked Churchill to discuss the matter 
with Roosevelt. 
Churchill and Eden had been in constant touch for the 
previous twelve days. Surely, Eden could have discussed the 
matter and encouraged Churchill to intercede with the 
President. Churchill should have been able to find an 
opportunity to explain the matter to Roosevelt. Logical as 
this may seem, it is probably true that the pressure of 
other affairs during the first meeting of the three heads of 
government made it almost impossible for Eden to use any 
influence on Churchill concerning the Greek plan, particu- 
larly when it was evident that it was unpopular with the 
Prime Minister. Perhaps Churchill was not too displeased to 
find that the President was supporting what may still have 
been his own desires with regard to the King. 
There is the possibility that Eden was not entirely 
convinced that the new plan was necessary; therefore he may 
have lacked the determination to ensure its adoption. 
MacVeagh mentions a report that Eden was only persuaded to 
accept the proposal with difficulty. d This does not seem 
to be in keeping with Eden's discussion in Cairo in October, 
or in the War Cabinet in November, but it is not entirely 
far-fetched. 
However, did the failure of this plan amount to such a 
tragic defeat? Would the King have made the appropriate 
declaration even if urged by Roosevelt? His record of 
making declarations both before and after this incident 
"FRUS, 1943, IV, 159; Iatrides, MacVeagh, p. 413. 
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shows a continuous refusal to make definite committments. 
Even though the King refused to agree to the new plan, he 
did issue a new statement a few days later, which satisfied 
no one. He eventually gave in on an immediate return to 
Greece, but he would not approve a regency, despite constant 
efforts by the British, strongly supported by the State 
Department. Even after their dramatic visit to Athens in 
the midst of the fighting in December 1944, Churchill and 
Eden had a monumental task in forcing the King to appoint 
Damaskinos Regent, and to agree without reservation not to 
return to Greece until a plebiscite could be held. 
Further, would the King's definite agreement to these 
points in December 1943 have solved the British problems, 
prevented civil war, and permitted the establishment of 
moderate democratic government? It is true that EAR made 
the issue of the King their major propaganda theme, but 
would they have given up any attempt to seize power in 
Greece if this issue not longer existed? Surely, they would 
have found another issue. Their support might have been 
somewhat less without the question of the King, but it 
certainly was not the only political issue available to 
them. 
Nevertheless, the plan of November 1943 was to all 
intents and purposes the action taken at the end of December 
1944. The King finally made a definite promise not to 
return before a plebiscite and appointed Damaskinos Regent. 
This was the essential stipulation which made the Varkiza 
agreement between EAM and the Greek Government possible. 
True, EAM may have stressed the issue of the King only as a 
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face-saving device to cover up their defeat by -British 
bayonets-, but one cannot ignore another possibility. Full 
and public support by Roosevelt for the proposal, ideally 
coupled with American participation in the liberation, might 
have put EAM in the awkward position of having to oppose 
both the United States and Great Britain. Such a situation 
might have changed the decision to begin the -Second Round" 
in December 1944. 
Roosevelt, to say the least, was irresponsible in 
interfering without making an effort to understand the new 
British policy. His action was all the more reprehensible 
in view of the American refusal to take any interest in or 
to feel any obligation to Greece during the war years. 
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Chapter IV 
Indecisive Planning, December 1943-October 1944 
1. The King's Letter of 8 November 1943 
At the end of the Second Cairo Conference, Tsouderos 
and the British were left with the task of picking up the 
pieces. The first action was taken by the Greek Prime 
Minister, apparently without British prompting or knowledge. 
On 10 December 1943, he told Churchill that he had persuaded 
the King to make a back-dated modification to his letter of 
8 November, which amounted to agreeing that when he did make 
his decision concerning his return to Greece, he would do so 
`in agreement with my Government". The addition of these 
few words seem to have been taken by Tsouderos and the 
British as a major improvement, although it is difficult to 
see why. It hardly amounted to obtaining approval by the 
Greek people, given that the Government-in-Exile was not 
truly representative. ' 
Despite this weakness, the 8 November letter, along 
with the 4 July 1943 declaration, were to be the keynotes of 
British attempts to prove that the King would not be forced 
upon the Greeks. The letter, heretofore confidential, was 
1Leeper-s telegrams 382-386,11-12 December 1943, 
F0371/37231/R13070, R13091, R13092, and R13093; 
MacVeagh"s telegram 130,14 December, NARS 868.01/417. 
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published and widely distributed in an effort to reduce 
support for EAM in Greece. 
There was a question as to what the King intended to 
take up with his Government. The version which the King 
signed spoke of -examining the question of the date of my 
return-, while the published version was limited to 
examining the date of my return-. This change, alleged by 
one source to be a deliberate action of a Minister of the 
Greek Government, could be taken as a promise not to return 
unless the situation seemed favourable, or even a promise 
not to return before a plebiscite; the original version 
might limit the King only to taking advice as to just when 
he should return, e. g., at liberation or some time later. - 
The King pointed out to MacVeagh that he did not 
consider the letter to be a new declaration, and insisted 
that MacVeagh notify Roosevelt that he was not violating the 
advice the President had given him in Cairo. According to 
the King, the promise to consult his Government concerning 
his return did not constitute any change in his position, 
since he would naturally consult This own appointed 
ministers- when making an important decision. ' Leeper and 
MacVeagh agreed that the new statement put the King in the 
hands of the republican members of the Cabinet, which in 
their view meant that the King would probably never return 
Lee, Royal House of Greece, p. 167. Woodhouse, Struggle 
for Greece, p. 73, states that the omission of the three 
words led many Greeks to believe that the King had agreed 
not to return without a plebiscite; see comments by 
Leeper and the Foreign Office in F0371/43728/R1110, and 
by Harold Macmillan, War Diaries (London: Macmillan, 
1984), p. 538. 
='Iatrides, MacVeagh, p. 414. 
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to Greece; 
-& it is possible that the King hoped to replace 
his opposition ministers with royalists. 
Tsouderos also managed to persuade the King to agree 
that Damaskinos should represent the Government-in-Exile in 
Athens. With this and the modified letter as a basis, 
Tsouderos and Leeper prepared a new plan, which relied to a 
considerable extent on the expectation that Damaskinos would 
be able to rally moderate Greek political leaders to the 
side of the Cairo Government and the King. A second element 
of the plan was an appeal to Zervas and Sarafis, the 
military leader of EAM, to conclude an armistice and 
separation of forces, to be followed by an arrangement to 
unify all the resistance elements under the control of the 
British Commander-in-Chief. Groups which suppported this 
proposal would be provided with arms and supplies. In order 
to press EAM to accept or to put them in an unfavourable 
light if they refused, there would first be an attempt to 
obtain the agreement of the United States and the Soviet 
Union to issue a joint appeal to the resistance groups to 
accept the call for unity. s 
Tsouderos made an appeal to the guerrillas for unity in 
a radio broadcast on 21 December 1943. The following day 
the British Embassy in Washington presented details of their 
plan to the State Department. The Americans supported the 
Tsouderos appeal and provided a message to the Greek Prime 
'Ibid., pp. 405-406. 
sSummary of piecemeal proposals from Cairo as modified by 
the Foreign Office, F0371/37209/R13126, R13128, and 
R13188. 
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Minister for publication. This was broadcast by the Greeks 
on 31 December, along with a similar message from the 
British Government. 
It was not so easy to obtain a statement from the 
Soviets. Eden sent two messages to Molotov through the 
British Charge d'Affaires urging a similar Soviet message, 
but was rebuffed; according to the Soviet Ambassador in 
Cairo, because the Kremlin had 'no information as to 
internal Greek affairs, they did not consider it appropriate 
for the Soviet Union to become involved with them". Tsou- 
deros, in his New Year's Eve broadcast, had to manage with 
expressing the hope that other Allied Governments would 
follow the example of the British and the Americans. 
After the British notes had been delivered in vain, 
Harriman, the American Ambassador in Moscow, told Molotov of 
Hull's message to Tsouderos. Within two days, Moscow radio 
broadcast a call to Greece for `guerrillas and citizens- to 
unite for the final stuggle against the Germans and for the 
independence and freedom of the Greek people`. Harriman 
inferred that his intervention had succeeded where the 
British had failed. Molotov followed with an indication 
that he would support the Allied effort and a Soviet 
statement was given to the Government-in-Exile for publica- 
tion. ' If Harriman's talk with Molotov was the decisive 
factor in producing a Soviet statement, it was not because 
of a strong State Department desire to assist the British or 
IF0371/43677/R1860; FRUS, 1943, IV, 160-166. 
'Harriman-s telegrams, 3 and 5 January 1944, FRUS, 1943, 
IV, 165-166; F0371/37210/R13709 and 43714/R273. 
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to try to solve the Greek problem. The American Ambassador 
had already reported to Washington that the British and 
Greek Ambassadors in Moscow had informed him of their vain 
efforts, and added that he had had no instructions on the 
matter from Washington. E 
While these messages from the three major powers do not 
seem more than high-blown sentiments, they are credited by 
Woodhouse, who was by then the senior British Liaison 
Officer in Greece, with having had a major effect in 
bringing about his success in arranging the truce between 
the warring guerrilla factions signed at the VOW Plaka 
bridge in late February 1944. - 
2. The King's Refusal to Make a New Declaration. 
Leeper and Tsouderos hoped that the amended letter of 8 
November would placate the opposition, at least among the 
politicians, but their optimism soon evaporated. The 
Government-in-Exile sent an emissary to Damaskinos in Athens 
to tell him that the King would appoint him as his 
representative in Greece, with powers to act when the 
Germans left. In the meantime, Damaskinos should try to 
establish an understanding with the Greek political leaders 
in Athens. The Archbishop accepted this role and notified 
Tsouderos that he had obtained a joint statement from 
several leading figures that they were satisfied with the 
°Harriman-s telegram, 26 December 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV, 
164-165, and n. 2; F0371/43675/R602. 
'Struggle for Greece, p. 65. 
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amended 8 November declaration. They would be willing to 
work with the Cairo government, provided that it was 
broadened to take in a wide range of political views, 
including those of the movements in Greece. 10 
Damaskinos and the politicians changed their attitudes 
when in early March 1944 a courier arrived from Athens 
demanding that the King immediately sign a secret constitu- 
tional act appointing Damaskinos Regent until a plebiscite 
could be held. This was represented as the agreed views of 
all parties including the socialists and the communists, 
although the latter two groups added some other demands. 11 
At the same time, Greek factional leaders in Cairo demanded 
an amendment to the King's letter which would stipulate that 
the monarch would not go back to Greece before a plebiscite 
could be held. l2 
Tsouderos responded by proposing to write to the King 
(now in London) demanding his signature on the proposed 
constitutional act and his agreement to the broadening of 
the government by the inclusion of representatives of all 
other parties. 10 Churchill learned of the proposal and 
1°Leeper's telegram 52,53, and 63,27 and 29 January 1944, 
and letter, 15 January, F0371/43676/R1440, R1441, and 
R1485; his letters, 4 and 25 February, 43678/R2276 and 
43680/R3104. 
11Leeper-s telegrams 96 and 146,11 February and 7 March, 
F0371/43678/R2263 and 43681/R3700; Iatrides, MacVeagh, 
pp. 464,472-475. 
1LIatrides, MNcVeagh, p. 464; Leeper-s letter, 4 February, 
and telegram 96,11 February, F0371/43678/R2263 and 
R2276. 
13Leeper's telegrams 146-149,7-9 March, F0371/43681/R3700, 
R3770, and R3810. 
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wrote to Eden that the King should not be pressed to sign; 
he should stand on the 8 November letter. Edens note to 
his staff was, This is the reaction I expected. But, we 
need not necessarily abandon the project--we can always 
return to the charge. '' 
Before any indication of the British attitude could 
reach Tsouderos, he had written to the King. The latter 
immediately refused to consent to the idea of a regency 
under Damaskinos, although he would consider some widening 
of the political spectrum of the Government. }- While the 
King's attitude towards Damaskinos seemed adamant, Tsouderos 
and Leeper appealed to London for pressure on the King to 
change his mind. Eden sent a long memorandum to Churchill 
in which he pointed out that Tsouderos- proposal was, 'in 
effect, what we asked the King to do last November' 
(presumably referring to the discussion in Cairo on 7 
December). He quoted from a message to Leeper to the effect 
that there was now convincing evidence that all leading 
politicians in Greece were agreed on the necessity for the 
King to delay his return. 
Eden felt that the British Government could not advise 
the King to reject the appeal, but should take the line that 
he must make his own decision in consultation with his 
government. In Edens view the King at Cairo was offered a 
x4Eden"s minute, 10 March; Churchill's note, 11 March and 
Edens comments, F0371/43681/R3810. 
*'Leeper-s telegram 154,13 March, PREM3 211/11; Iatrides, 
Mac Veagh, pp. 464,466,468-9,472-475; and FRUS, 1944, 
V, 87-89. 
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reward, the promise to break off relations with EAM and to 
incorporate the guerrillas into the Greek regular forces. 
Now that Britain had abandoned these two proposals, there 
would be no sure advantages` to the King in acceding to 
Tsouderos' request. -, 
Eden's comments are contradictory. He seems to have 
forgotten that the so-called 'reward' had been abandoned 
almost entirely because of the King's refusal to make the 
desired statement in December. Perhaps there would be 'no 
sure advantages to the King' in terms of immediate actions, 
but the attempt to establish a regency and a broader 
coalition government appears to have been the best plan 
available if the King were to have any hope in regaining his 
e. s1cýb(isk 
throne, and if the British were to free and 
friendly post-war Greece. Therefore, Eden's refusal to 
exert pressure on the King to sign the constitutional act 
was in the interest of neither the King nor of Britain. 
Perhaps he was going against his own views becasue he knew 
Churchill would be annoyed with the thought of putting 
pressure on the King again, but it seems more likely that 
Eden shared Churchill's view that the King should be 
supported regardless of the political situation. 
In London, the King confirmed to the Foreign Office that 
he had refused to sign the constitutional act. He would 
accept Damaskinos as his representative in Greece, and as a 
1'Churchill-s minute, 10 March; Leeper-s telegram 154,13 
March; and Eden's memorandum, 17 March, PREM3 211/11. 
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member of his Government, but not as regent. "7 The Arch- 
bishop would therefore have no authority to act for the 
crown, except as a negotiator. Leeper reacted with a strong 
telegram to the effect that the King was endangering not 
only the monarchy, but the future of his country. 1Ic 
Churchill told Eden, -I think the Greek position has 
got to get worse before it gets better. I do not see how 
the King can worsen his own position by refusing to sign new 
documents. It seems to me that Tsouderos has been giving 
him right advice behind the scenes, while puffing away for 
our delectation in public. - Before Eden could reply, the 
situation had worsened. While the messages from Churchill, 
Roosevelt, and the Soviet Union may have had a major effect 
in bringing about the guerrilla truce of the Plaka bridge, 
the failure of the King to make a clear declaration of 
intent seems to have been the root cause of the outbreak of 
mutiny in the Greek armed forces in Egypt in early April. °' 
Tsouderos, in the face of the mutiny which he blamed on 
the King's intransigence, had lost whatever support he had 
"The King stated that he had received advice from Smuts 
and the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand recommending that he not sign. On Eden's 
orders, Smuts and the three Prime Ministers were queried, 
but all stated that they had had no message from the 
King, and had not made such a comment (FO371/43684/R5084, 
R5402). 
''Foreign Office telegram 121,1 April, PREM3 211/11; 
Leeper`s telegram 198,3 April, F0371/43728/R5316. 
'"inute, 2 April, F0371/43684/R5592. 
QThere seems general agreement that EAM propaganda, 
intensified by the Kings failure to sign a new 
statement, set off the revolt (Leeper`s telegram 215,6 
April, PREM3 211/11; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 189; 
Eden's minute, 5 April, F0371/43684/R5592). 
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had from the remainder of the Cabinet. Urged by Leeper to 
send a further blunt message to the King, he wired his 
resignation instead. -, The King accepted; he did make a 
statement to the effect that he would abide by a plebiscite, 
but this was not accepted at face value by the Greeks in 
Cairo; there were strong doubts as to whether he would 
actually comply. 
Churchill, temporarily in charge of the Foreign 
Office, bombarded Leeper with instructions on handling the 
mutiny, which was soon put down by British military and 
naval forces. He made a statement of his personal policy 
towards Greece for delivery to the Greek politicians and 
mutineers, a statement whose sincerity seems questionable. 
He stressed that the King could not be discarded to suit a 
momentary surge of appetite amongst ambitious emigre non- 
entities", presumably referring to the Cairo politicians who 
had toppled Tsouderos; and denied that the Greeks could 
'find constitutional expression in particular sets of 
guerrillas, in many cases indistinguishable from banditti, 
who were masquerading as saviours of their country'. In his 
peroration he went so far as to say '[The King] submits 
himself freely to judgement of the people as soon as normal 
conditions permit`, and `Once the German invader has been 
1Leeper's telegrams 198-200,3-4 April, F0371/43728/R5316 
and R5317. 
I`Iatrides, X'Ic Veagh, p. 496; FRUS, 1944, V. 95. 
z: 3'Eden, exhausted by the dual responsibility for the 
Foreign Office and the leadership of the House of 
Commons, went on leave from 6 to 14 April (Cadogan, 
Diaries, pp. 617,623). 
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driven out Greece can be a republic or a monarchy entirely 
as the people wish'. One would hardly imagine that George 
II would have signed such a definite statement; it was his 
refusal to do so which was a major factor in provoking the 
mutiny. -- 
Churchill sent a copy of this statement to Roosevelt, 
along with background information on the mutiny. Roosevelt 
replied with an unsolicited message which might be given to 
the Greeks in Cairo. Without mentioning the King, this 
expressed the hope that the British course of action would 
'succeed in bringing back the Greeks into the camp of the 
Allies' and called on all Greeks to show a personal 
unselfishness' to calm the troubles. It would appear that 
the State Department was not consulted in the preparation of 
this appeal, which was published in the Cairo press on 1 
May. The Greek Ambassador in Washington protested to the 
State Department that Roosevelt had been too harsh in 
suggesting that the Greeks had left the 'camp of the Allies- 
because of the mutiny. -s- 
Churchill thanked Roosevelt and directed that the 
President's message be read to the mutineers, but he was 
clearly worried about the possibility of American inter- 
ference. A few days earlier, he had instructed Leeper and 
all others concerned: On no account accept any assistance 
from American or Soviet sources, other than as specifically 
"'Letter, 16 April, FRUS, 1944, V, 97-99. 
: 2ý-Ibid., pp. 106. Hull seems to have had to ask the White 
House for a copy of Roosevelt's message which he received 
one week later, 
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enjoined by me. '-' This probably explains why Leeper turned 
MacVeagh down when the latter asked if the Americans could 
be of any help. MacVeagh inferred that Leeper feared the 
Americans would offer themselves as arbitrators, which might 
result in a less than complete victory.: -2-1 Neither 
Churchill's nor Roosevelts appeals seems to have had much 
effect on the mutineers or the politicians. 
Tsouderos, after a brief interlude, was replaced by 
George Papandreou, who had been brought out of Greece as a 
leader of the moderate elements in the homeland. Initially, 
Papandreou was sworn in without a cabinet (civil servants 
temporarily administering the governmental departments) 
until a fully representative government could be estab- 
lished. This was eventually formed after a major conference 
was held in the Lebanon. Papandreou deliberately avoided 
the constitutional question concerning the future of the 
King until a new government could be formed. 
After the Lebanon conference, while EAM was negotiating 
the terms upon which it would enter the Government, the 
position of the King was a fundamental issue to be settled 
before EAM would join the Cabinet. - Papandreou, after 
discussions with Leeper and the King, drafted a statement 
ý'Churchill-Roosevelt messages, 16-18 April, FRUS, 1944, V, 
96-99; Churchill's telegram 7808/4,14 April, PREM3 
211/11. 
=27MacVeagh-Leeper conversation, 19 April, during which 
MacVeagh learned of Roosevelt's messaage for the first 
time (Iatrides, MacVeagh, pp. 502-503; FRUS, 1944, V, 
101). 
2c-; MacVeagh's telegram, 6 June, ibid., pp. 115-116; 
Iatrides, lfacVeagh, pp. 535-538. 
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which claimed that the constitutional question had ceased to 
exist since it was accepted by all that there would be a 
-free and genuine- referendum. So far as the timing of the 
Kings return was concerned, this would be a decision made 
in consultation with his government. The new Greek Cabinet 
approved this formula, and the King gave his approval, 
although there is evidence that he accepted it reluctantly. 
He seems to have believed that he was not irrevocably 
committed to postpone his return until a plebiscite; even if 
he was, he felt that a Greek Government could release him 
from his promise.: 2- 
Most of the existing Cabinet appear to have believed 
that the King had made a firm promise, and statements to 
this effect were made in BBC broadcasts. The American 
Ambassador felt that the radio announcement was a deliberate 
ploy on the part of Leeper to prevent the King from going 
back on his word. Leeper did admit to MacVeagh that he 
could not be'sure of the King's sincerity. - While the EAM 
delegates to the Lebanon Conference seemed to have accepted 
the declaration at face value, '-l their colleagues in the 
mountains pressed for a statement from the King himself. "-z 
The doubters were right; when the King left Cairo for London 
"Leeper's telegram 405,13 June, F0371/43732/R9261; 
MacVeagh's telegrams, 13 and 16 June, FRUS, 1944, V, 122- 
124. 
=i°Iatrides, MacVeagh, pp. 542,544. 
='SLeeper-s telegrams 415 and 417,14 and 15 June, 
F0371/43742/R9409, R9450. 
:? EAM message to Papandreou. reported to MacVeagh by the 
British Embassy, Iatrides, MdcVeigh, p. 562. 
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a few weks later, he made it clear to Leeper that he did not 
feel imself bound by Papandreou-s statement on the constitu- 
tional question; he would only conform to the letter to 
Tsouderos of 8 November. : ml. 
3. Preparations for the Liberation of Greece 
By August 1944, it was becoming evident that the 
Germans were withdrawing from Greece. Preparations began 
for the reentry of the Greek Government accompanied by a 
small British force, whose actual mission was the prevention 
of a takeover by EAM. In a paper summarising the situation, 
the Foreign Office stated that the King had announced in his 
8 November letter that he would make no decision about the 
timing of his return to Greece until the country was 
liberated and that he would then act in agreement with his 
Government. The Greek Ministers had announced that in their 
opinion the King should await the decision of a plebiscite. 
In the Foreign Office view, the Greek Government should 
advise the King not to return immediately and he would 
agree. The question was one which should be settled between 
the King and his Government, without British intervention. 
The Foreign Office paper failed to reflect the doubts on all 
sides as to the King's sincerity. 
This paper was discussed in Cabinet the next day. The 
minutes made no reference to the matter of the King's 
return, but a `Corrigendum' was added later at the request 
11"Leeper-s telegram 634,31 August, PREM3 212/1. 
: w4WP(44)433,8 August, CAB65/53. 
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of Eden, based on remarks made by Lord Cranborne, the 
Secretary of State for the Dominions. Cranborne stated that 
`There would be an advantage from all points of view in the 
King not returning to Greece until after a plebiscite had 
taken place. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
should advise him that this would be the wisest course and 
endeavour to persuade him to adopt it. -: n- 
Shortly after this War Cabinet meeting, Churchill left 
London for Italy. The following week he received a message 
from Eden which mentioned inter alia the Cabinet decision 
that the King of Greece should be advised not to return to 
Greece until after the plebiscite, but to come to London'. 
Churchill fired back a cable asking for full details of the 
Cabinet decision referred to. On hearing of the 
'Corrigendum' he denied that he had seen it, or that he had 
accepted its contents. Eden replied that, while the Prime 
Minister had been absent from part of the Cabinet dis- 
cussion, he had returned before the meeting was over, and 
had not only agreed to the position, but had made a 
suggestion as to how it might be implemented. What followed 
was an interchange of telegrams which could only be likened 
to a children's pantomime: You did approve it. '; 'I did 
not. -; 'Oh, yes, you did. '; 'Oh, no, I didn't. ' -ta 
Churchill was of the opinion that he had not approved 
the idea of extracting a firm promise that the King would 
ý'WM(44)103rd, 9 August, CAB65/47; telegrams CLASP 74 and 
127,16 and 19 August, PREM3 210. 
': " Telegrams CLASP 56,74,89,127; and CHAIN 51,78, 
113,114,143,15-21 August 1944, PREM3 212/1; and 
CHAIN 56, PREM3 210. 
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not go back to Greece until after a plebiscite, which might 
mean a delay of a year or so. He feared that if the King 
thought the idea of a delay was a British policy he might 
abdicate. 3-7 
By early September, Eden was convinced that there was a 
considerable belief within and without Greece that the 
British troops were being sent in to restore the King; at 
the point of British bayonets- was the phrase often used. 
The establishment of the national government in Athens might 
be very difficult in such circumstances. Eden finally took 
the bit between his teeth and advised the King not to 
accompany the government on its return, but failed to gain 
agreement.: 30 
The problem was passed to Churchill, who gave in and 
informed the King that he would have to remain abroad until 
the Papandreou government was established; otherwise it 
would be said that he was being brought back by the British, 
and this would prejudice him with his own people. According 
to Churchill, the King accepted this view as he knows I am 
his friend-. The problem was therefore solved temporarily, 
although the suspicion remained in many Greek minds that 
the British intended to allow the King to return before the 
plebiscite. Churchill privately told Eden that he would 
disavow Papandreou if he did not bring the King back as soon 
-"Telegrams CHAIN 78 and 113, PREM3 212/1. 
'BETelegram, 7 September, F0954/11B. The Foreign Office 
suggested to King George VI that he urge the Greek 
monarch to seek the advice of his government as soon as 
possible concerning a return prior to a plebiscite 
(F0371/43716/R14687), but there is no evidence that this 
was carried out. 
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as the situation permitted, which presumably meant some time 
after the liberation, but prior to any plebiscite. -- Eden 
agreed that it would not be fair to expect the King to 
remain outside Greece until a plebiscite could be held. "} 
The King, for reasons which are unclear, appointed his 
brother Prince Paul, the heir to the throne, as Regent in 
Cairo during his own absence in London. Eden felt that Paul 
would be more trouble than the King, because The has less 
brains and a German wife [Princess Frederika]'. He recom- 
mended to Churchill that a regency council be established 
instead. Churchill felt that this would be offensive to the 
King, although he accepted that the King must be kept out of 
the way until Papandreou-s Government was firmly estab- 
lished., 41 At the same time, a group of Greek political 
leaders in Cairo, who had resigned from the Government, made 
their re-entry conditional on the appointment of a Regent in 
Greece, thus turning down the idea of the Crown Prince as 
Regent. 
-4m 
As the day of liberation approached, Papandreou began 
to see the need for some sort of regency to be established 
in Athens. He told Macmillan of a plan for a regency 
"Eden, 2 October, and Churchill, 6 October, PREM3 212/9; 
Churchill, 4 October, F0371/43717/R16400. 
a1-'Eden-s minute, 4 October, PREM 212/9. 
'Eden, 27 September and 4 October; and Churchill, 29 
September and 10 October, PREM3 212/9. Churchill's final 
words to Eden were We might end up in Athens ourselves. - 
See also Iatrides, MacVeagh, p. 592; Macmillan, War 
Diaries, p. 538; Macmillan, Blast of War (London: Mac- 
millan, 1967), p. 579; Stelio Hourmouzios, No Ordinary 
Crown (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972), pp. 161- 
164. 
a6: Iatrides, IMcVeagh, pp. 604,614. 
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commission to be instituted to facilitate the replacement of 
ministers and the signing of decrees. Macmillan saw no need 
th e- 
for a regency in^first days of liberation; instead the 
King's approvals could be obtained by the Greek Ambassador 
in London. After the government was duly established, it 
would be easier to obtain the King's consent to a regency. 
Macmillan"s proposal was put into effect. "- The liberation 
therefore took place without any arrangements for a regency, 
and without any clear decision as to when the King would be 
allowed to return. 
4. The Churchill-Stalin Percentage Agreement 
Meanwhile, military developments on the Eastern Front 
began to concern those involved in Greek affairs. From 
early 1944 it was evident that Soviet armies would soon be 
moving westward and southward into the Balkans. Once the 
Soviets entered Bulgaria, they might continue into Greece, 
either in pursuit of the Germans, or, if the Germans had 
left, simply as the liberating force. In May Churchill 
pointed out to Eden the danger of Communist `infusion and 
invasion- of the Balkans. His warning was soon followed by 
Eden's conversations with Soviet Ambassador Gusev and the 
a=fi'Iacmillan, Wrtr Diaries, p. 548; Iatrides, MacVeagh, 
p. 647. 
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percentage agreements-. The general lines of this develop- 
went have been analysed elsewhere; - here there are only two 
questions requiring discussion: Was Greece the predominant, 
if not the only, factor which impelled Churchill and Eden to 
embark on these negotiations? and: Does the American 
response to this diplomacy offer any explanation of their 
policy towards Greece? ar- 
In the initial step which led to the agreement, 
Churchill spoke of issues developing between Britain and the 
Soviet Union in Italy, the northern Balkans, and above all 
in Greece'. ' Eden's conversations with Gusev were limited 
to the possibility of dividing responsibility for Roumania 
"-$The exact details of the -percentage agreements' are best 
set forth by Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the 
Second World War, III, pp. 115-123,140-141,146-153, and 
350-351. Discussions with emphasis on Greece include 
Barker, Churchill and Eden, pp. 276-285; Stephen G. 
Xydis, The Secret Anglo-Soviet Agreement on the Bal- 
kans, ' Journal of Central European Affairs, XV-3 (October 
1955), pp. 239-262; and Churchill, Second World War, VI, 
72-77,194-201. Panos Tsakaloyannis, The Moscow 
Puzzle, ' Journal of Contemporary History, XXI-1 (January 
1986), pp. 37-55, concentrates on Greece, but ignores 
Eden's discussions with Gusev, which casts some doubt on 
his view that the agreement had no effect on Soviet 
policy towards Greece. Other treatments of value are 
John Lukacs, The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided 
Europe, ' New York Times Magazine, 5 October 1969; Joseph 
M. Siracusa, The Meaning of TOLSTOY, ' Diplomatic 
History, 111-4 (Fall 1979), pp. 443-463; and The Night 
Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe, ' Review of Politics, 
XLIII-3 (July 1981), pp. 381-409; Albert Resis, The 
Churchill-Stalin Secret "Percentages" Agreement on the 
Balkans, ' American Historical Review, LXXXIII-2 (April 
1978), pp. 368-387; and FRUS, 1944, I, 1004-1019, and V, 
112-131. 
There is a third question pertaining to Greece, that of 
whether Stalin, in failing to support EAM in 1944-1945, 
was carrying out his promises to Churchill. While 
intriguing and unanswered, it has no effect on Anglo- 
American relations with Greece. 
ýEChurchill-s minutes, 4 May 1944, F0371/43636/R7380. 
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and Greece. A7 Churchill did add Bulgaria to the proposal in 
mid-June, thus raising the offer to Stalin to two countries 
for one; but the grudging approval by Roosevelt for a three- 
month trial period applied only to Roumania and Greece. 
It was only on the occasion of Churchill's visit to 
Moscow in October 1944 that the scheme of 'percentages' of 
influence in the five countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Roumania, 
Hungary, and Yugoslavia) was initiated. While the thought 
of extending the Romania/Greece arrangement to the other 
three may have been in the minds of Churchill and Eden 
somewhat earlier, there seems little doubt that the plan 
originated in the desire to safeguard British interests in 
Greece. Perhaps the most telling evidence is that in 
Churchill's phrases 'I had obtained Russian abstention at a 
heavy price' and 'having paid the price to Russia for 
freedom of action in Greece. " In actuality, this was the 
only gain for Britain from the set of agreements which 
thoroughly irritated the State Department, if not Roosevelt, 
and may have assisted Stalin in gaining complete dominance 
over Eastern Europe. 
The second question, that of any revelation of U. S. 
policy towards Greece from the American attitude to the 
percentage agreement, can be answered only by implication. 
Certainly the State Department's response is strong evidence 
'Eden telegram 1377 to Moscow, 5 May 1944, ibid., R7214. 
-'Churchill's C-700, and Roosevelt's R-560.11 and 12 June; 
Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, ed. Warren F. Kimball 
(Princeton University Press, 1984), III, 178-180,182. 
Second World War, VI, 239. 
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of that agency's fervent opposition to spheres of influence, 
balance of power, and wartime agreements on post-war settle- 
ments. At the same time, their objections are doctrinaire 
and general, giving no attention to the specific matter of 
Greece, or to the possible advantages of maintaining Western 
influence in at least one area of the Balkans. 
Roosevelt himself seems not to have objected so much on 
doctrinaire grounds; his attitude was one of unconcern. In 
October, when asked by Churchill for his approval of the 
forth-coming talks with Stalin on the Balkans, he drafted a 
reply indicating that he was not interested one way or 
another in arrangements between Churchill and Stalin on the 
Balkans. Only swift action by Hopkins resulted in the 
United States maintaining a partial watching brief during 
the Moscow meeting, along with a covenant by Roosevelt that 
any decision would be prelimnary to a three-power summit 
conference. - In his correspondence, the President made no 
specific mention of Greece, much less of the possible 
advantages of the proposal for Greece or for the West. e-sl 
In summary, Churchill"s agreement with Stalin concerning 
the Balkans may have been a significant factor in preventing 
a Soviet invasion of Greece. If so, it was a major 
diplomatic success, unless it is believed that Churchill's 
s"Hopkins Fapers, ed. Robert E. Sherwood (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1949), pp. 825-826; original draft and 
final version of Roosevelt's reply, Kimball, Roosevelt- 
Churchill Correspondence, III, 343-344. 
£"°1Kimball, Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, III, 344 and 
365-366; Stalin's Correspondence with Roosevelt and 
Truman, ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R. 
(New York: Capricorn, 1965) pp. 164 and 166-167. 
125 
concessions gave the Soviets significant assistance in 
establishing their control over the remainder of the 
Balkans. The agreement flew against the principles of the 
State Department, and probably reinforced that agency's 
already strong view that the British intended to continue 
their imperialistic path in the Near East. Their objections 
carried little weight when American diplomacy was being 
conducted by the President and his private advisors. Roose- 
velt's disinterest in the matter was typical of his lack of 
concern for Greece. While his three-month approval was 
extended indefinitely by his acceptance of the October 
agreement, it is probable that he saw the arrrangement as 
one which would be superseded by the eventual peace settle- 
ment. In the final analysis, the percentage agreement has 
little long-term significance with regard to Greece, unless 
it did prevent the entry of the Red Army. 
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Chapter V 
The Liberation of Greece 
1. Military Preparations for the Liberation 
In addition to the problems of spheres of influence and 
the timing of the Kings return, there had to be some 
consideration of how the Greek Government was to be restored 
to the homeland. Until the Quebec Conference of August 
1943, it had been assumed that Greece would be liberated by 
a military and naval attack which would involve actual 
combat with the Germans. Areas captured-would be placed 
under military control initially with the Greek Government 
establishing itself gradually in the rear areas and expand- 
ing its authority as the battle lines moved forward. The 
decison taken at Quebec to engage in no major military 
operations in the Balkans meant that liberation would await 
a German withdrawal or surrender. 
Shortly after the Conference, the Foreign Office 
initiated a discussion concerning the need for British 
troops to accompany the Government-in-Exile back into Greece 
in order to prevent civil war or a coup d-etat. Their views 
were considered by the Chiefs of Staff, who had received an 
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estimate from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, (Wilson), 
that two divisions would be required. The Chiefs felt that 
such a large force would create a bad precedent for other 
Allied countries under occupation. They also believed that 
the return of the King with such a force would seriously 
increase the chance of a civil war. Eden quoted these 
opinions in a minute to Churchill, with the comment that no 
other Allied country was as divided as Greece. Even so, he 
discounted the possiblity of trouble in Greece unless one 
of the guerrilla organisations tries to seize power'. 
Churchill then wrote to the Chiefs of Staff saying that five 
thousand troops should be sent in, -only to prevent rioting 
in the capital or incursions from the countryside". - 
The question of troops for the liberation seems to have 
been then ignored until the following May when Lord Moyne, 
the new Minister of State for the Middle East, appealed to 
Churchill for a commitment of two divisions, citing the 
threat represented by Soviet advances into Romania and 
Bulgaria, and the dangers of EAM. Churchill replied One 
may often foresee evils without being able to avert them. I 
am passing your message to the Foreign Office and the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee. '4 
A few days later Eden reminded Churchill of his 
decision of the previous September that only five thousand 
'Henry Maitland Wilson (1881-1964), Commander-in-Chief, 
Middle East, 1943; Supreme Allied Commander, 
Mediterranean Theatre, 1944. 
'Letters and minutes, 21-29 September 1943, PREM3 210. 
: 3relegram MRI9953,8 May 1944, F0371/43714/R7467; telegram 
1055H, 9 May, PREM3 210. 
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troops would be necessary for the liberation. The Foreign 
Secretary pointed out the increased strength of EAM since 
that time and hesitantly suggested that that number might 
not be adequate. Churchill still felt that five thousand 
troops plus a few armoured cars would be all that could be 
spared. At the same time he told the Chief of Staff that 
troops would not be sent in unless the Germans were 
withdrawing and the British had 'the great majority of 
Greeks on our side, as well as the Government'. 4 This 
not accepted by the Chiefs, who explored the problem 
further. 
WaLS 
They asked the Joint Planning Staff to consider whether 
British policy in Greece could be maintained with only 
economic and 'other non-military' pressure. The planners, 
after a month's deliberation, concluded that EAM might 
attempt a coup within a fortnight of the arrival of the 
British force but their control would be weak and would 
probably collapse with the continued presence of the 
British. If the arrival of the troops were to be delayed by 
a month or so, EAM would be firmly established. They 
reccomended the despatch of a force of ten thousand plus 
armoured cars. 
"The Chiefs felt this figure was too low, and decided to 
plan for eighty thousand with only ten thousand to be used 
initially in the hope that the remainder would not be 
"Eden, 19 May, and Churchill, 21 May, PREM3 210; minute, 
21 May, F0371/43714/R8563. 
COS(44)178(1), 1 June, F0371/43714/R9025, and 
JP(44)155(Final), 30 June, 43715/R11755. 
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needed. Perhaps they felt the Americans would not agree to 
a larger initial force, but might allow more troops to be 
sent in if trouble ensued. Eden wrote to Churchill that ten 
thousand might not be adequate, but the British Government 
would be justified in sending in this number, even if no 
more were available, The matter went forward to the War 
Cabinet, with some fears on the part of Eden that Herbert 
Morrison- would wanted an assurance that the troops would not 
be used to put the King back on the throne. Attlee7 agreed 
with the dispatch of troops, but suggested that they be sent 
in `ostensibly in connection with relief operations' which 
he felt would mean 'less chance of becoming involved in 
Greece'. The War Cabinet agreed to the ten thousand man 
force, but included Attlee-s phrase 'ostensibly in con- 
nection with relief' in their conclusions. 
Churchill commented to Eden on these decisions from 
Italy, having left London immediately after the Cabinet 
meeting. He noted that the Americans should be told of the 
decision on troops before they learned of it through the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff. - The need to discuss the libera- 
tion of Greece with the Americans raised a number of points. 
There were major advantages in involving the United States 
in the military operation. The Foreign Office and the 
Cabinet feared that the despatch of troops to Greece would 
Herbert Morrison, (1888-1965), Labour Party leader; Home 
Secretary in the Coalition Government. 
Then Deputy Prime Minister. 
'COS(44)233, COS(44)242, and COS(44t640), 6 and 20 July, 
F0371/43715/R11755 and R12005; minute, 24 July, ibid., 
R12086; WM(44)103rd, 9 August, CAB65/47. 
'Telegram CHAIN 56,16 August, PREM3 210. 
130 
be seen as the restoration of the King with British 
bayonets. Even a token number of U. S. soldiers under arms 
would make the action an Allied undertaking, and do much to 
prevent accusations of neo-colonialism from the American 
press, as well as from British liberal and left-wing 
circles. 
MacVeagh took the view that it would be to the benefit 
of all concerned if the entire liberation was placed in 
American hands. This would ensure that the operation would 
not be imperiled by what he termed the bitterness, 
suspicion and distrust which British mistakes in this war 
have aroused'. Such an arrangement might also serve to keep 
the peace in the Balkans by giving the lead there to the 
power which had no self-interest in the area, rather than 
allowing it to be an arena of conflict betwen Britain and 
Russia. In late February 1944, he recommended this course 
to the State Department and, in a personal letter, to 
Roosevelt, who ignored it. MacVeagh did learn that his plan 
had been circulated to senior officers of the State Depart- 
ment and was considered `a masterpiece', but that was the 
last he heard of it. 1c, 
He was unaware that four days after the despatch of his 
letter to the President (no doubt before its arrival in 
Washington), Roosevelt had sent a letter to the Secretary of 
State concerning civil affairs in the Balkans (Greece was 
specifically mentioned). U. S. participation would be 
II°Iatrides, MacVeagh, pp. 449-596 passim, but especially 
pp. 449-456,465,507; other details on the relief 
operations in FRUS, 1944, V, 179-194. 
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limited to the provision and distribution of relief 
supplies, and no American troops would be used as occupation 
forces. MacVeagh learned that this was the War Depart- 
ment's policy a few weeks later from an UNRRA official just 
arrived from the United States, but it was four months 
before an official statement reached him. He was given to 
understand that the justification for this policy was that 
The Balkan operation is not a military one and will not 
help to win the war. ' MacVeagh confided to his diary 
`Granted; but what are we going to win the war for? ' 
Further, Washington insisted that, at least as far as Greece 
was concerned, the word 'Allied' should not be used., - 
While no specific reason for the adamant refusal to 
consider even a joint liberation operation has been found, 
it is probable from the context of Roosevelt's statement 
that it was based on a fear of the necessity of a long-term 
occupation. This came at at time when the President was 
refusing to consider U. S. participation even in the 
occupation of Austria. His position was reluctantly 
accepted by the British, who felt it unnecessary and 
unhelpful. Attlee, still concerned with the possible 
effect of a British-only military force, suggested again 
that the entire liberation operation be conducted under the 
guise of a relief effort. The Foreign Office pointed out 
"Letter, 21 February, cited in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, p. 216. 
1ýDiary entry, 14 March, Iatrides, MacVeagh, p. 466-467; 
State Department telegram, 7 July, FRUS, 1944, V, 184, 
186-188. 
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that this might be acceptable to the Greek Government, but 
could hardly be kept secret from the Americans. ' 
The sum and substance of the matter was that the 
Americans would participate in the re-occupation of Greece 
only in the role of relief administrators. The United 
States Government had been concerned at the plight of the 
Greek people under German occupation since 1941. In early 
1942 it began discussions with the British to permit 
shipments of foodstuffs by Swedish authorities. This led to 
a continuous, if limited, supply of essential items to 
Greece (with German permission) for the remainder of the 
occupation. 14 In January 1944, the State Department began 
discussions with British representatives and UNRRA officials 
concerning the provision of relief after liberation. A 
joint U. S. 
-U. K. headquarters called Allied Military Liaison 
(AML) was established in Cairo to carry out this mission in 
Greece and in other Balkan countries. MacVeagh was immedi- 
ately involved in the planning of the relief undertaking, 
which was obviously going to have to be connected with the 
military operation to return the Greek Government to Athens. 
Churchill, in his message to Eden recommending that the 
Americans be informed of the plans for the liberation 
expedition, also pointed out that it would be necessary to 
ask for some American military support. This would amount 
to the loan of troop carrier aircraft to transport part of 
the force to Greece. Before returning to London, he 
composed a flowery letter to Roosevelt, pointing out some- 
'Minute, 16 August, F0371/43715/R12722. 
''FRUS, 1942, II, 724-797; and FRUS, 1943, IV, 167-177. 
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what inaccurately that We have always marched together in 
complete agreement about Greek policy, and I refer to you on 
every important point. - After rather idealistic calls for 
unity, Churchill asked for agreement to use ten thousand 
British troops, including paratroops for which American 
troop carriers would be needed. 11 This was at a time when 
the Italian theatre had been stripped of a great deal of its 
combat strength for the invasion of southern France, and 
when troops were badly needed for Normandy. 
The request was not received in the spirit in which it 
was sent. The British had to -prod the Americans- for an 
answer. xc- Churchill wrote again in an uncharacteristic, 
apologetic manner. He made clear the importance he attached 
to the matter by ending on a defiant note, saying, -Should 
you feel you do not wish to express an opinion on the 
"'Telegram 755,17 August, FRUS, 1944, V, 132-133. The 
demands made on British resources in the Mediterranean 
Theatre at this time for DRAGOON (the invasion of 
southern France) are important in analysing the problems 
of providing a liberation force. This is brought out 
forcefully by Lars Bxrentzen, The German Withdrawal from 
Greece in 1944 and British Naval "Inactivity", - Journal 
of Modern Greek Studies, V-2 (October 1987), pp. 237- 
265). While Bxrentzen stresses the factors affecting the 
Royal Navy, his comments are equally applicable to all 
British resources. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, feared serious American protests concerning the 
removal of British units from Italy and elsewhere in the 
theatre (Bryant, Triumph in the West, pp. 253,272-272, 
294,297). Such protests apparently never came; the 
possibility may have been exaggerrated by Brooke because 
of his fervent opposition to the use of any British 
troops in Greece. 
16Piers Dixon, Double Diploma (London: Hutchinson, 1968), 
p. 113. 
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subject I am quite willing to go ahead on my own. -1-1 This 
was a rash promise, although an alternative plan, not 
communciated to the Americans, was considered. This 
amounted to transferring British troop carrier aircraft from 
-Northwest Europe- to the forces entering Greece. 10 It is 
not understood why it would be easier to obtain aircraft 
from the northern theatre than from the Mediterranean, but 
perhaps British aircraft were available there which were not 
under the control of SHAEF. 
Roosevelt finally replied quite coldly that he had no 
objection to the use of a British force to preserve order 
nor to the use of American aircraft if they could be spared 
from other operations. '" The implementing directive from 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff specified that one division of 
British troops could be used as `a purely British force, 
supplemented by U. S. transport aircraft as available to you 
[Wilson] and as can be spared-. ° The Americans made it 
very clear that while a few U. S. military personnel would 
accompany the force in order to administer relief supplies, 
''Telegram C-770,25 August, Kimball, Churchill- 
Roosevelt Correspondence, III, 296. 
iECOS(44)287,25 August, F0371/43715/R13411. The idea was 
still being considered on 6 September, apparently because 
the American aircraft made available were also needed to 
deliver supplies to Tito (43716/R14104). 
'` 'Telegram, 26 August, FRUS, 1944, V, 133-134. 
°This directive, FAN 409,8 September (copy in F0371/ 
43715/R15254), was prepared at Quebec. Curiously, it is 
mentioned, but not printed, in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, p. 
439. 
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no U. S. combat troops could be used. " The designation 
'Allied Military Liaison" (AML) had to be changed to 
'Military Liaison' (ML). 
The question of the command of the liberation expedition 
was complicated. It could not be placed entirely under the 
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre (Wilson), 
since the theatre was a joint U. S. 
-British formation, and 
the Americans would not accept the responsibility for the 
military operation which this arrangement would imply. 
After long-winded discussion and negotiation, it was decided 
that Wilson would supervise the relief operation of ML as 
Supreme Allied Commander, and the military operation wearing 
his other hat as the senior British officer in the theatre. 
Direct supervision of the military operation was assigned to 
General Paget, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, a purely 
British formation. Actual command of the expedition was 
given to Lt-Gen Ronald Scobie with an American officer 
(Brigadier General Percy Sadler) as Deputy Commander for 
Military Liaison, that is, for relief matters. -- 
With these problems solved, the British liberation 
force was assembled, along with appropriate naval and air 
support from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, and the 
American troop carriers. As the Germans withdrew, British 
forces were landed, Athens was occupied, and the Greek 
1Undated briefing papers, FRUS, Quebec, 1944, pp. 212-217; 
Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 573. 
--Wilson's telegrams, 4 and 22 August, and minutes, 5,6.8 
and 18 August, F0371/43715/R12086, R12962, R13090; Joint 
Service Mission telegrams, 31 August and 4 September, and 
Wilson's telegram, 5 September, 43716/R13966 and PREM3 
210. 
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Government installed. The liberators were welcomed, even by 
EAM. <a 
2. The Second Round of Civil War 
December 1944--January 1945 
The situation changed rapidly. EAM still controlled 
most of Greece outside Athens and Salonika. While its 
representatives were included in the expanded Government, it 
is not clear whether it had any real intention of co- 
operating with the other political parties in the long term. 
It feared the introduction of royalist Greek troops from 
Italy and the support given by the British and the leaders 
of the coalition to the remnants of the non-communist 
resistance. They foresaw a plot to destroy them and 
establish a right-wing administration. In early December, 
the pro-Communist ministers resigned and a full-scale revolt 
against the Greek Government began. Within a few days this 
included EAM attacks on British troops as well, until the 
official Government and British forces held only a small 
area in central Athens, along with scattered military bases 
elsewhere. 
Churchill ordered Scobie to `act as if you were in a 
conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress', and 
concluded: 'We have to hold and dominate Athens. It would 
Descriptions of the first few days of liberation are 
provided by Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 73-80; 
Macmillan, War Diaries, pp. 552-558; William Hardy 
McNeil, The Greek Dilemma (London: Gollancz, 1947), pp. 
124-129; and Richard Capell, Simionata (London: 
MacDonald, n. d. (1946)), pp. 39-48. 
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be a great thing for you to succeed in this without blood- 
shed if possible, but also with bloodshed if necessary. 'r. -4 
Of this message, which was to give rise to extensive 
criticism in both America and Britain, Churchill himself 
said, of all the telegrams I have written in this war it is 
the one I least liked after I had written it'. At the 
same time, large numbers of British troops were rushed to 
Greece, until the total strength was three divisions, in 
contrast to the one authorised by the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff. 
-`13 The breakdown of relations between EAM and the 
remainder of the Government, culminating in the outbreak of 
"Telegram 357,5 December, F0371/43736/R19933. 
2 Dixon, Double Diploma, p. 118, 
British authorities apparently did not seek prior Ameri- 
can agreement before moving additional troops to Greece. 
Some time prior to 30 December, the American Chiefs of 
Staff gave qualified approval for the movement of one 
division to Greece instead of to Palestine. Shortly 
thereafter, the British were forced to tell them of the 
possibility that another division would have to be moved 
to Greece from Italy. On 28 December the United States 
Joint Chiefs of Staff told the British Joint Services 
Mission in Washington that they saw no reason why formal 
Combined Chiefs of Staff approval was necessary for the 
transfer of a division originally destined for Palestine, 
since FAN 409 stated that Alexander acted in Greece in a 
purely British capacity. This seems contrary to the 
actual wording of FAN 409 which limited British troops to 
one division. The British Chiefs of Staff did point out 
that they fully realised that ground troops were badly 
needed in northern Europe by Eisenhower. (Combined 
Chiefs of Staff memorandum 750/1 and Joint Services 
Mission minute 474, both of 28 December 1944, and 
Combined Chiefs of Staff memorandum 750/2,16 January 
1945, all in CAB122/753. ) 
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civil war on 3 December, are analysed in detail else- 
whwere. -7 
It was evident that force alone would not establish 
stable government. Papandreou was ready to resign, but 
Churchill instructed Leeper: 'Force Papandreou to stand to 
his duty. Should he resign he should be locked up until he 
comes to his senses, when the fighting will probably be 
over. - : 20 Even so, a new administation was needed, with 
stronger leadership and more acceptable policies. From the 
beginning, it was accepted by all the British authorities 
concerned, except perhaps Churchill, that even the most able 
Prime Minister would fail unless the regency question could 
be solved. 
Oddly, the first attention given to the problem seems 
to be that of the American State Department, where a 
memorandum for the President was prepared on 6 December. 
This enclosed a draft message to be sent by Roosevelt to 
'From a political standpoint, the definitive account is 
John O. Iatrides, Revolt in Athens. Other useful dis- 
cussions: George M. Alexander, The Demobilization 
Crisis of November 1944, ` in Greece in the 1940s, ed. 
John O. Iatrides (Hanover: University Press of New Eng- 
land, 1981), pp. 156-166; Lars Bxrentzen, The Demon- 
stration in Syntagma Square, ' Scandana vian Studies in 
Modern Greek, II (1978) pp. 3-52; William Hardy McNeil, 
The Greek Dilemma', ch. 7, and 'The Outbreak of Fighting 
in Athens, 1944, ' American Slavic and East European 
Review, VIII-4 (1949), pp. 239-251; L. S. Stavrianos, 
The Immediate Origins of the Battle of Athens, ' loc. 
cit., pp. 252-261; and Heinz Richter, The Battle of 
Athens and the Role of the British, " in Greece, ed. 
Marion Sarafis (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1980), pp. 78-90. 
The military operation is treated in detail by William 
Jackson, History of the Second World War: The Medi ter- 
ranean and the Middle East, (London: HMSO, 1988), VI-3, 
18-29,73-109,164-172; see also Edgar O'Ballance, The 
Greek Civil War (London: Faber, 1966). 
! 
-"Telegram 357,5 December, F0371/43736/R19933. 
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Churchill recommending Papandreou's dismissal (on grounds 
that he was responsible for what the draft called 'Athens' 
"bloody Sunday" '), and the establishment of a regency. The 
memorandum was not sent to the President because of problems 
created by Stettinius, -s the new Secretary of State, in 
commenting on events in Athens (discussed infra, p. 157). 
Shortly after, MacVeagh reported that the idea of a regency 
was being revived in Athens. The State Department then sent 
a more detailed memorandum on the subject to Roosevelt on 13 
December. On the same day, the President made the desira- 
bility of a regency a major point in a cable to Churchill. 
The Prime Minister was most concerned about the Greek 
situation, particularly after a debate in the House of 
Commons on 8 December, in which the policies of the govern- 
ment were attacked by left-wing members for failing to 
assure the House that British military forces would not be 
used to disarm the friends of democracy'. He summoned 
Macmillan, 3 who was in London on his way to Washington, and 
sent him to Athens to take charge of negotiations. - 
Meanwhile, Leeper recommended to the Foreign Office 
that his plan of the year before be put into effect, that 
ý-Indward R. Stettinius, jr. (1900-1949), Lend-Lease Admini- 
strator, 1941-1943; Under Secretary of State, 1943-1944; 
Secretary of State, November 1944-June 1945. 
'ONARS 868.00/12-644. 
23lMacVeagh's telegram, 11 December; memorandum and 
Roosevelt's message, FRUS, 1944, V, 146,150-151. 
: 3: 7'Harold Macmillan (1894-1987), Minister of State Resident 
at Allied Headquarters, 1942-1945. 
°3=406 Parl. Deb,, cols. 1858-1909; Macmillan, War Diaries, 
pp. 599-600. 
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is, that Damaskinos be made regent. Alexander--, who had 
replaced Wilson as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, was now 
in Athens. He reported to London that he agreed with 
Leeper. Presumably as a result of these two messages, 
Churchill asked George II to appoint the Archbishop as 
regent. While the King agreed that his own presence in 
Greece would neither help his dynasty nor the current 
situation, and admitted that the British were right in not 
returning him, he would not make Damaskinos regent. He 
would agree only to appoint Damaskinos as prime minister to 
replace Papandreou. 
Churchill took this reply to the War Cabinet to be 
considered in the light of the recommendations of Leeper and 
Alexander. The War Cabinet sent Churchill and Eden back to 
the King to say that they favoured the appointment of 
Damaskinos as regent until the end of the emergency. The 
King remained adamant. The War Cabinet then concluded, 
rather weakly, that Damaskinos should be made prime 
minister, if British officials in Athens thought this would 
be satisfactory. =a Upon receipt of Churchill's account of 
his meetings with the King and the War Cabinet's con- 
clusions, Macmillan forwarded from Athens a well reasoned 
explanation as to why the appointment of Damaskinos as prime 
"General Sir Harold Alexander (1891-1969), Commander-in- 
Chief, Middle East, 1942-1943; Commander-in-Chief, Italy, 
1943-1944; Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean 
Theatre, 1944-1945. 
`fl-Leeper"s telegram 549,10 December, F0371/40737/R20429; 
WM(44)165,12 December, CAB65/48. 
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minister would not be desirable. He asked that Churchill 
'return to the charge'. -- 
Churchill was in some doubt as to whether Macmillan, 
Leeper, and Alexander were entirely correct in pressing for 
the appointment of Damaskinos as regent. He had formed a 
poor impression of the Archbishop, on the ground that the 
latter had achieved his position by subservience to the 
Germans. The fact that Damaskinos had then begun a quiet 
opposition to them once he was in power in the church might 
only mean that he would be capable of treachery to the 
British as well. As late as 21 December he characterised 
the Archbishop as `a Quisling and a Communist". -7 
Churchill also seems to have listened to the King's 
claim that Leeper and company were wrong in their view that 
there was general support for the Archbishop among the 
political leaders in Athens. To overcome this suspicion, 
Leeper and Macmillan tried to induce Papandreou and other 
members of the government to send telegrams to the King 
recommending that he give in to Churchill and Eden on the 
regency question. This resulted in a series of firm 
promises in Athens, especially by Papandreou, to send the 
required messages, and claims by the King in London that 
Papandreou and company were advising him that a regency was 
unnecessary. It would appear that the King based these 
claims on messages from Papandreou to the King in which he 
1acmillan-s telegrams 564,12 December, F0954/11B, and 
587,13 December, F0371/43737/R20427; Churchills 
account, 43698/R20723. 
"Draft telegram, 17 or 18 December, F0371/43738/R21499; 
Eden, The Reckoning, p. 578. 
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stated that he was being forced by the British to recommend 
the regency. Eventually, after numerous War Cabinet dis- 
cussions, meetings of Churchill and Eden with the King, and 
further misleading statements by the King, Papandreou on 20 
December sent a strong and definite recommendation for a 
sole regency. Even though this last message did not mention 
pressure by the British, the King, reported to the Foreign 
Office that it had. --s- 
In view of Papandreou's new message, Churchill and Eden 
went to see the King. George II still denied that he had 
received a clear recommendation from his Prime Minister, and 
claimed that the appointment of Damaskinos would be uncon- 
stitutional, since in his view only the heir to the throne 
could be made regent. Churchill then asked whether he would 
confirm that he would not return until a plebisicite had 
been held, to which George II agreed. This apparently 
surprised Eden, who reminded the King of their conversation 
in Cairo the previous December in which George II had 
refused to make such a statement, as the result of his 
advice from Roosevelt. As Eden understood it, the King had 
promised only to seek advice from his ministers as to the 
date of his return. 
The King agreed, but said that this statement was made 
when he still hoped to return at the head of his army and 
: "Foreign Office telegram 457,13 December, and Leeper/ 
Macmillan telegrams 602,611, and 628,14 and 15 Decem- 
ber, F0371/43737/R20933, R20995, and R21048; Leeper/ 
Macmillan telegrams 634 and 638,17 December, and Foreign. 
Office minutes, 15,16, and 22 December, 43738/R21148, 
R21105, R21106, R21290, and R21579; the Kings letter to 
Churchill, WM(44)741,15 December, CAB66/59. 
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fight Germans. He now felt himself bound by his pledge of 
July or August 1943 (presumably the 4 July 1943 broadcast) 
that he would not return to Greece until the people had 
expressend their will. Eden indicated that he did not think 
the Greek people understood that this was the King's 
position, nor could he recollect a pledge in such terms. 
The King concluded by saying that, while he could not agree 
to a regency, he would be glad to help in any other way, 
such as appointing a new prime minister. 
---- 
While this clear statement about the return to Greece 
was seen by Eden as an improvement (assuming the King could 
be relied upon to make it into a formal declaration), it 
would do nothing to stop the civil war still raging in 
Athens, or to establish stable government. On Christmas 
Eve, Churchill decided to go himself to Greece to find a 
solution. Taking Eden with him, he first met Damaskinos and 
almost immediately changed his opinion of him, allegedly 
because he saw the Archbishop as cast in the mould of `a 
scheming medieval prelate'. He caused to be brought 
together on Boxing Day practically all the protangonists in 
the affair except the King. This dramatic meeting of Greek 
political leaders, including representatives of EAM, under 
the chairmanship of Damaskinos, was opened in the presence 
of Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Leeper, Alexander, Scobie, 
and the diplomatic envoys of the Soviet Union, the United 
'Eden's telegram to Leeper, 22 December, F0371/43739/ 
R21719. The Foreign Office undertook a detailed 
investition to assure themselves that the King had 
never made a clear promise of this type. 
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States, and France. The non-Greeks withdrew after Churchill 
had made clear his determination to obtain a solution. 
In the face of the sheer weight of outside authority, 
the politicians agreed to try to end the civil war. " A 
communique was issued to the press by Leeper, reporting that 
Damaskinos had informed the British authorities of the 
overwhelming desire of those present Cat the conference] for 
the immediate establishment of a regency as an essential 
prelude to the solution of the many other problems facing 
the conference-. 13-1 The agreement stood or fell on the 
possibility of obtaining the King's approval of the 
regency, 42 although Churchill later told Roosevelt that he 
would have had to renounce the King, if he had not agreed. 
Every possible weapon had to be used on the King--from the 
definite message of Papandreou to an equally definite appeal 
for a regency under Damaskinos from Roosevelt. 
"'The most illuminating accounts of the conference are 
those by John Colville, Footprints in Time (London: 
Collins, 1976), 174-179, and Pierson Dixon in Double 
Diploma, pp. 120-125. Others are Churchill, Second World 
War, VI, 260-263; Eden, F0371/43639/R21726, and The 
Reckoning, p. 581; Macmillan, Blast of War, pp. 627-631, 
and War Diaries, pp. 617-619; Leeper, When Greek Meets 
Greek, pp. 124-126; and Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: 
The Strugggle for Survival (London: Sphere, 1968), pp. 
234-237. MacVeagh abandoned his diary in the midst of 
the Athens fighting (Iatrides, MacVeagh, p. 662) ; his 
only account is his 27 December telegram, FRUS, 1944, V, 
pp. 170-171, and an eight page letter, 28 December, NABS 
868.00/12-2844. The Confidential Print account is in 
F0371/48244/R266 and R287. 
, "Macmillan, Vr Diaries, p. 639. 
As C. M. Woodhouse points out in Struggle for Greece, p. 
112, EAM fear of Greek right-wing troops, not the 
question of the King, was responsible for the outbreak of 
civil war. This does not invalidate the fact that agree- 
ment to end it hinged on the establishment of the 
regency. 
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Even with all these pressure points, the King was 
unwilling to give in. Churchill and Eden returned to London 
and spent over six hours seeking the King's consent to a 
regency. He tried to avoid the word regent and wanted to 
modify his promise that he would not return until a 
plebiscite could be held. 4- Finally in the early hours of 
the morning of 30 December, he agreed to announce that he 
was apppointing Damaskinos Regent. This was accompanied by 
a firm promise not to return before a -free and fair 
expression of the national will- 
. 
ýa Even after making this 
definite agreement, he attempted a few days later to qualify 
his position by sending Papandreou a message in which he 
claimed to have retained the right to demand that the Regent 
follow his advice. Papandreou, on the King's orders, pub- 
lished this message, to the dismay of both Damaskinos and 
the British. The War Cabinet instructed Eden to remonstrate 
with the King but the latter's actions appear to have had no 
serious effect. 4S While there were to be further problems 
with the King, his position in Greek politics was no longer 
an issue threatening to destroy the government. 
The fighting continued, although EAM began negotiations 
for a truce. The reinforced British forces were gradually 
gaining the advantage. EAM began a withdrawal from Athens 
on 5 January and signed a truce on the 10th. Two days later 
a Widen, The Reckoning, P. 582. 
-4Text of King's public statement, Churchill, Second World 
War, VI, 265-266. 
I*ýLeeper-s telegrams 9 and 10,1 January, and Foreign 
Office telegrams 18 and 19,2 January, F0371/48244/R79 
and R129; WM(44)176th, 30 December, CAB65/48; and 
WM(45)1st, 2 January, CAB65/51. 
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a formal agreement between EAM and the Greek Government was 
signed at the village of Varkiza near Athens. This called 
for a plebiscite to be followed by the election of a 
constituent assembly, the demobilisation of the ELAS forces, 
and an amnesty for political crimes. ' 
3. The American Attitude to the British Actions 
The American attitude to the problems of Greece in 
December 1944 was far from helpful. The use of force 
against the armed uprising of EAM brought widespread 
criticism of the British in the press of the United States 
(and in Britain as well). Most of the foreign press corps 
in Athens was pro-EAM and opposed to official British 
policy. 47 Their reports created hostility, but much of 
their criticism was reinforced by the belief outside Greece 
that the EAM guerrillas were heros of the resistance against 
the Germans. They could thus be seen as fighting to restore 
democracy in the face of a British attempt to impose a 
right-wing monarchy. 
, *'Text in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 308-310. 
'A thorough analysis of the attitudes of the British and 
American correspondents in Athens in December 1944 is 
provided by Richard Capell, Simionata, passim. Capell, 
for the Daily Telegraph, and A. C. Sedgwick of the New 
York Times, were the only two newsmen who did not share 
the bias. Capell felt that one reason for the antipathy 
of the press to the British was the uncooperative 
attitude of Leeper. Leeper at first rebuffed attempts to 
provide him with a press attache, but Osbert Lancaster, 
the Daily Express cartoonist, was sent out to fulfill 
this function. From Capell"s account, Lancaster was not 
able to reverse the anti-British tendency. 
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By those who recognised that EAM was pro-communist or 
communist-led, the British were accused of endangering the 
Grand Alliance. The angry journalists failed to comment on 
the fact that the Soviet press kept silent concerning the 
use of arms against communist-led organisations (the 
Churchill-Stalin percentage agreement was not then public 
knowledge). 
The newspaper outcry was not in itself indicative of a 
strained relationship between the two powers, but the 
American Government immediately made it clear that it did 
not support the British actions in Greece. On the day the 
first riot began in Athens, the American radio service in 
Europe broadcast a statement by the new American Secretary 
of State, Stettinius, which -viewed with sympathy the 
rv+ov 
- 
Yet e. htS 
aspirations of the resistance i ^v- - ý- and the anti- 
Fascist elements in liberated countries- and stressed that 
the United States would not attempt to influence the 
composition of governments in any friendly country. While 
the message did not specifically mention Greece, it was 
given full publicity in the Greek Communist newspaper in 
Athens that day. 40 
This was followed on 5 December with a press statement 
by Stettinius which was given world-wide publicity. While 
its subject was a simultaneous political crisis in Italy, it 
contained a general statement reflecting the principles of 
the Atlantic Charter to the effect that Americans expected 
that newly liberated countries should be allowed to work out 
, *°MacVeagh-s telegram, 3 December, and State Department 
reply, 12 December, FRUS, 1944, V, 141-142,147-148. 
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their desired forms of government without outside inter- 
ference., 44 It was taken as American criticism of British 
actions in Greece. 
Churchill immediately sent a cable to Roosevelt° which 
may well have been the most violent outburst of rage in all 
of their historic correspondence-. 4,1s In defending his 
actions in Greece to the House of Commons, Churchill hardly 
veiled his vexation at the Americans. The official 
British historian of these matters states that the British 
authorities -found the American attitude the more wounding 
because the Soviet Government had abstained hitherto from 
any similar conduct or comment. They might well be 
encouraged now to begin. - O 
Eden instructed the British Embassy to speak to 
Stettinius -as roughly as you like-. 14 The senior British 
diplomat present in Washington, Michael Wright, called on 
Stettinius with a message from Eden concerning the Greek 
aspects of the problem which he stated was -too unpleasant" 
to be left in written form. The American record implies 
that the British diplomat calmed down only after a pot of 
tea had been brought to the Secretary of State's office. 
Wright asked that Stettinius issue an amending statement 
"Text in FRUS, Yalta, 1945, pp. 266-267. 
cC-845,6 December, Kimball, Churchill-Roosevelt 
Correspondence, pp. 437-439. 
S-1Hopkins Papers, II, 830-831. 
X2406 Parl. Deb., cols. 929-930,8 December 1944. 
Woodward, British Foreign Policy, III, 461. 
--Foreign Office telegram 10307,6 December, 
F0371/43647/R20178. 
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with particular reference to Greece. He is said to have 
concluded his interview by telling the Secretary of State 
that he would send a message to Eden saying that Stettinius 
had been -reasonable about this matter-. -s 
The British Embassy reported that Stettinius had 
approved a hasty draft statement without sufficient 
reflection, 5` but the American record shows that the state- 
ment was approved by three senior State Department 
officials, and that Stettinius had gone over it carefully 
because of possible embarrassing questions. 4"1-7 Admiral 
Leahy, the Presidential Chief of Staff, confirmed in his 
memoirs that the statement was a deliberate announcement of 
American policy with regard to both Italy and Greece. 
Stettinius' clarifying statement of 7 December does not 
seem to have been entirely sincere, even though the British 
Embassy assisted in its drafting. -" Stettinius wrote to 
Roosevelt privately saying that in this statement he had 
attempted to -disassociate us from British policy-. The 
6I'Stettinius -Record', 1-9 December, FRUS, Yalta, pp. 430- 
433. Stettinius' formal Memorandum of Conversation con- 
cerning this meeting of 6 December, ibid, pp. 269-270, is 
far less informative. 
'--""Telegram 6518,7 December, F0371/43697/R20239. A month 
later, in discussing this incident, Stettinius made it 
clear to Halifax that he strongly opposed actions in the 
Mediterranean which appeared to reflect British neo- 
colonialism (telegram 33,2 January, PREM4 27/10). 
, 17Stettinius 'Record', FRUS, Yalta, p. 430. Robert 
Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981), pp. 90-101,117, examines the 
genesis of the Stettinius statement in some detail. He 
suggests that the circumstances which brought it about 
led to the American insistence on the Declaration of 
Liberated Europe at Yalta. 
r--E-'I Was There (London: Gollancz, 1950), pp. 334-335. 
Text and comment on drafting, FRUS, Yalta, p. 433. 
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American Associated Press service saw this second statement 
as only a further attack on British policy. I" Alexander 
Kirk, now American Political Advisor to Alexander, asked the 
State Department whether the United States military con- 
tingent engaged in relief activities in Greece alongside the 
British should be withdrawn. The Department took the view 
that any withdrawal might be interpreted as an attempt to 
use relief as a political weapon. 
In what was probably an attempt to mollify Churchill, 
Harry Hopkins and Forrestal sent congratulations to him on 
his House of Commons speech of 8 December on Greece. =A 
few days later, Roosevelt sent Churchill a message express- 
ing his appreciation of the -anxious and difficult alterna- 
tives' which the British faced in Greece and stating his 
willingness to give any help possible-; but the tone is 
that of the righteous citizen offering aid to an unfortunate 
offender. Whatever comfort remained was practically 
destroyed by the continuation: 
As anxious as I am to be of the greatest help 
to you in this trying situation, there are 
limitations, imposed in part by the traditional 
policies of the United States and in part by the 
mounting adverse reaction of public opinion in 
this country. No one will understand better than 
yourself that I, both personally and as Head of 
State, am necessarily responsive to the state of 
public feeling. It is for these reasons that it 
'"The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. ed. Thomas M. 
Campbell and George C. Herring (New York: Vintage, 1968) 
p. 192. 
r'State Department reply to Kirk, 13 December, FRUS, 1944, 
V, 212. 
c`: 'Churchi 11, Second World War, VI, 247. 
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has not been possible to take a stand along with 
you in the present course of events in Greece. 
Even before Roosevelt's apologia, another matter 
relating to Greece flared up. During the most critical 
stage of the revolt, the American Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral King, ordered the senior American naval commander in 
the Mediterranean to stop the British using American ships 
to transfer badly needed supplies to Greece. When Admiral 
Somerville, the senior British naval officer in the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, approached King's Chief of Staff, he was 
told that this was a war in which the United States was not 
participating. It seems clear that the British had author- 
ity to use the ships and that King was in breach of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff system in giving direct orders to 
an Admiral under the control of the British Commander of the 
Mediterranean Theatre. Hopkins managed to have the order 
rescinded before Churchill could make an issue of it with 
Roosevelt, but it added to the strain between the two 
powers. --s 
G 'FRUS, 1944, V, 150-151. 
"Hopkins Papers, pp. 832-834; Churchill's letter, 11 
December, and the draft message he originally intended to 
send to Roosevelt, Kimball, Churchill-Roosevelt 
Correspondence, pp. 452-455; WM(44)164th, 11 December, 
CAB65/44PREM3 212/5; telegrams to and from Allied Forces 
Headquarters, British Chiefs of Staff, and British 
Mission, Washington, 9-13 December, CAB122/567. Lt-Gen 
J. A. H. Gammell, just returned from a visit to Allied 
Forces Headquarters, reported to the Chiefs of Staff that 
the senior American naval and air officers in the theatre 
had strongly regretted King's actions and had made a 
special effort to remedy the situation as soon as his 
order had been rescinded. This included using American 
bombers to drop ammunition and supplies to the British 
forces in Greece, which was completely unaauthorised 
(Letter, 19 December, loc. cit. ) 
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The British leaders in Athens during the December 
revolt were further distressed by the strict, almost 
ostentatious, attitude of neutrality suddenly adopted by the 
American Ambassador, and other American officials. The 
sight of the Stars and Stripes painted on U. S. driven 
vehicles and worn as armbands by Americans irritated the 
British. According to Leeper, this blatant neutrality 
acted as a tonic to ELAS and was made abundant use of in 
their propaganda'. els Macmillan even reported to the Foreign 
Office that MacVeagh refused to allow British soldiers to 
drink from his well, even though the Americans were drawing 
British rations. 16 
There is no question of a British misunderstanding of 
the American attitude. MacVeagh wrote that his actions were 
governed by the desire to make it clear that as the 
President said "we are not involved". '`-'' At the same time, 
he was in close contact with the British Ambassador, and 
asking what the United States might do to help. At Leeper's 
suggestion, he urged the State Department to support the 
British plan for a regency. -O 
'r ""When Greek Meets Greek, p. 112. He wrote to Sargent on 
12 January; -Inside Athens, we British were all heroes, 
without discrimination. And I am glad to say the 
Americans are dirt. Our neutral Allies cut the most 
ignominious figure during the five weeks that the battle 
lasted. They were frightened, though their danger was 
considerably less than ours. They wanted appeasement. 
They covered themselves with stars and stripes, their 
arms, the bonnets of their cars, the roofs of their 
houses, their souls were nothing but an orgy of stars and 
stripes- (FO800/276). 
"E'Telegram 589,13 December, F0371/43698/R20779. 
«''Iatrides, MacVeagh, p. 638; MacVeagh's public statement, 
New York Times, 6 December. 
'ý" Te1egram, 15 December, FRUS, 1944, V. 155. 
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Macmillan later felt that Churchill, at the great 
conference in Athens on Boxing Day, was at a considerable 
disadvantage in not being able to state that Roosevelt had 
agreed to the British intervention: 
If we could have published his telegram to 
Churchill [Roosevelt's cold acquiescence to the use 
of British troops in Greece, 26 August] at that 
time it would have had a very great effect. But 
the President has let us down badly and Winston is 
very hurt about it-. -- 
Actually, Roosevelt had given Churchill a modicum of 
support. In his cable of 13 December, explaining his 
position in the wake of the Stettinius affair, Roosevelt 
suggested a regency, and a statement by the King that he 
would not return before a plebisicite, the latter a complete 
reversal of his Cairo position. 70 While this provided no 
specific help, the fact that Roosevelt had suggested the 
line of action Churchill was to take at the end of the month 
amounted to accepting responsibility for it. If Churchill 
had failed, the Americans would have found it difficult to 
criticise. 
Macmillan used the idea that a regency would please the 
Americans as an argument in attempting to persuade the Greek 
Government to accept the idea, although he based this on 
"Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 628. The source is given as 
Macmillan's diary entry for 26 December, but the printed 
version (War Diaries, p. 618) of this work states he 
went a long way to suggest that Roosevelt had also 
agreed--as indeed he did in August, and if we could 
publish his telegram to Winston it would indeed make the 
Americans look foolish (the President has let us down 
badly and Winston is very hurt about it)-. 
7'As Orne Sargent was quick to point out (F0371/43698/ 
R21013). 
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comments by MacVeagh, rather than the President's message. 
Churchill was not happy with this approach, although Mac- 
millan thought the Prime Minister was merely -upset with the 
entire situation. '" Roosevelt did back up his suggestion 
with some action, when, at Churchill's request, he sent 
George II a message indicating that he supported the idea of 
regency. This must have reached the King just before 
Churchill and Eden finally obtained the King's agreement, 
but there is no evidence that it had any effect on the 
outcome 
. 
72 
Had Britain chosen to bear a grudge over her treatment 
by the United States, she could not have been blamed. 
Macmillan pointed out that had there been more support and 
less hostility from the Americans, the British might have 
destroyed the pro-communist popular movement in Greece in 
1945, so that the troubles of 1946-1949 would never have 
occurred. " Almost three years later, Bevin said, concern- 
ing the British entry into Greece in 1944, 
. 
we 
received no support from the U. S. and certainly no help from 
them. We were tilted at and pulled to pieces in the U. S. on 
all sides. --4 
Shortly after the Truman Doctrine speech Churchill 
wrote two articles for the New York Times under the front 
"71Macmillan-s telegram, 17 December, and Churchill's 
objections, F0371/43738/R21105, R21499; Macmillan, War 
Diaries, p. 612. 
7Churchill"s request and Roosevelt's message to George II, 
both 28 December, FRUS, 1944, V, 173-175,177. 
`Blast of War, pp. 663. 
, 74Minute, 19 August 1947, F0371/61003/AN2922. 
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page headline `Churchill Says Britain Saved Greece from 
Communism'. In these articles, Churchill pointed out that 
the current hearings in the U. S. Congress over the Greek- 
Turkey aid bill were concerned with 'precisely the issue 
which broke upon us in Athens in December 1944'. He went on 
'I was astonished to see what a bad press I got in America. 
Besides this the attitude of the State Department was sourly 
critical'. Again, 'Even President Roosevelt, whom I had 
kept constantly informed, remained silent under a series of 
protesting telegrams from me. When one has been in such-a 
close mental and moral relationship as I have been, and 
still aspire to be, with great tides of public opinion in a 
brother nation, it is a shock to feel them flow all of a 
sudden in the opposite direction. '7 
4. British and American Policies during the War--A Summary 
December 1944 marks the lowest point in Anglo-American 
relations with regard to Greece. The overall impression for 
the war years is one of continual disagreement, if not 
hostility. Until Roosevelt's message of 13 December, the 
Americans had maintained neutrality, if not complete dis- 
interest, in what they considered to be a strictly British 
problem. Roosevelt's statement We would take no other 
position- at Quebec in 1943; his reply to the Kings request 
for advice soon after; Hull's comment on the 4 July 1943 
New York Times, 10 and 11 April 1947. The quotations 
above give only a hint of the full intensity of 
Churchill's feelings as expressed in these articles. 
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statement, and his appeal to the guerrillas for unity in 
late December 1943, are all vague and often vacuous. 
The President's message to the mutineers in April 1944 
with its call for Greeks to return to the camp of the Allies 
was badly received; his advice to the King in Cairo in 
December 1943 may have prevented a peaceful solution to the 
problem of the monarchy. Whether the American failure to 
give enthusiastic support to the percentage agreement had 
any effect on Greek affairs is questionable. Certainly, the 
Stettinius statement in early December 1944 not only helped 
to create an atmosphere of hostility to the British actions 
in Greece, but may well have given encouragement to EAM to 
continue the revolt against the Government and the British. 
American actions and attitudes were not deliberate 
attempts to damage British objectives or to impose their own 
suzerainty over Greece. It was a mixture of a belief that 
Greece was outside the U. S. area of interest, and the long- 
standing American view of Britain as an imperialistic power. 
The inconsistency of a strong belief in the evils of spheres 
of influence and the assumption that Greece was entirely a ýº,, posýible 
British problem is to explain, except in terms of 
an American lack of understanding of the real implications 
of their idealistic policy. The Americans saw Britain as 
being engaged in an attempt to establish a sphere of 
influence in Greece, by means of the imposition of a client 
government which was not believed to be acceptable to the 
majority of the Greek people. The view that the British 
were attempting to restore their long standing interests in 
Greece is accurate; the fault is that the Americans equated 
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it with an out-moded view of the British acquisition of 
Empire in the late nineteenth century. On both counts, 
their actions and policies in Latin America gave them little 
reason to criticise Britain. -- 
Much of the American attitude can be explained in terms 
of a lack of understanding of Greek affairs and the 
strategic position of Greece, on the part of Roosevelt, and 
probably of Hull. The Greek specialists in the State 
Department, principally Foy Kohler and Wallace Murray, had 
an excellent understanding of Greek affairs; in fact, their 
analyses of the position of the Greek King and the effect of 
British pressure for his restoration are remarkably 
prescient. Their continued insistence on the need for a 
plebiscite and for the prohibition of the King's return 
before it could be held was vindicated by the developments; 
their prophecies of an EAM attempt at a coup were borne out. 
From December 1943 they had the advantage of the reports and 
recommendations of MacVeagh, who had eight years of previous 
experience in Greece. Despite British views of MacVeagh as 
a 'humourless pedant` and `unlikely to take 
'Michael Wright made a spirited attack on the one-sided 
attitude of the United States towards spheres of 
influence in view of their Latin American policies, in a 
talk to American critics of British actions in Greece in 
January 1945 (F0371/44555/AN370). 
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responsibility, - he was an excellent observer with an 
incisive knowledge of Greek politics. 
The difficulty was one by no means restricted to Greek 
affairs. Roosevelt conducted most of his foreign diplomacy 
without reference to the State Department. To the extent 
that he had advisors, he relied on Hopkins and Leahy. Hull 
and Stettinius had little contact with him, and, it is 
suspected, had little influence when they did. Specialists 
in the State Department could write memoranda recommending 
courses of action and urge the Secretary of State to take 
them up with the President, but they were seldom successful. 
Under such circumstances, Roosevelt's lack of knowledge of 
specific problems, and probable lack of interest in many of 
them, meant that there was often no policy beyond generali- 
ties. This was certainly true of Greece during the war. If 
there is another factor, it is the general feeling in 
American circles that the country had nothing to gain or 
lose with regard to Greece; no desire to expand its 
connections; no fear that the country might fall into 
hostile hands. 
This may explain American policy; but could another 
attitude have brought about a different result, or at least 
"Macmillan, in telegram 593,13 December 1944, uses the 
term 'humourless pedant' but follows this by saying that 
MacVeagh was no fool, and praising him for supporting the 
idea of a regency (F0371/43698/R20779). Leeper, in a 
report of 26 July 1945 on all the diplomatic chiefs in 
Athens, was still smarting at MacVeagh's stringent 
neutrality in December 1944 (48441/R12555). In the 
following year, his successor took a much more generous 
view of MacVeagh's abilities, probably because American 
attitudes to Greece were changing (Post Report of 11 
November 1946,58953/R16822). 
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led to the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous nation 
without the suffering entailed by the civil war? American 
support for the idea of plebiscite and regency as set forth 
in the British plan of November 1943 might have weakened 
EAM's position to the extent that the Government could have 
been established in Athens in December 1944 without diffi- 
culty. Full and public support by Roosevelt for this 
proposal, coupled with American participation in the libera- 
tion, might have put EAM in the awkward position of having 
to oppose both the United States and Great Britain. Such a 
situation might have changed the decision to begin the 
'Second Round" of December 1944. Instead, the failure to 
take part in the military aspects of the return to Greece 
ensured that that country ended the war as a British sphere 
of influence. 
American policies may well have reduced the chances of 
a peaceful liberation of Greece, but British policies were 
to a large extent responsible for the actual developments. 
If one unfortunate aspect of British attitudes to Greece can 
be singled out, it is the fact that for almost all of the 
wartime period, there were at least two, and usually three, 
British policies in existence at the same time. Procopis 
Papastratis, in his work on British policy towards Greece, 
concludes The basic objective of British policy with regard 
to Greece before, during, and immediately after the Second 
World War was to restore, after the cessation of hostili- 
ties, Britain's political influence in that country within 
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the wider south-east European perspective. - It is agreed 
that this was the Foreign Office policy, but that department 
often had to bow to the influence of others. 
The British military, while no doubt wanting to ensure 
that Greece would be an ally of Britain in the post-war 
world, were more concerned that operations in Greece should 
support the war effort, either by cutting the German supply 
lines, or by tying down the largest possible numbers of 
German troops where they could not interfere with other 
operations. Their objectives clashed with those of the 
Foreign Office during much of 1943, but in 1944 they began 
to accept the danger of an over-powerful EAM, and were more 
worried about an attempted coup than the diplomats; their 
concern in the days before liberation was mainly for the 
safety of the British Liaison Officers. The third policy 
was that of Churchill, which, while accepting the desira- 
bility of the Foreign Office objectives, gave such stubborn 
support for the restoration of the King that it was very 
difficult to carry out logical plans. 
While the Foreign Office objectives remained constant 
during the period, their policies for achieving them under- 
went a number of changes. Initially, in 1941-1942, there 
was an assumption that the King and his cabinet would be 
welcomed back in Greece as the legitimate government. 
Elections would be held and democracy would prevail, 
probably amounting to continuing rivalry between royalist 
and republican groups. While American observers felt that 
7 'British Policy towards Greece, p. 217. 
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the King had lost most of his popularity, the Foreign Office 
seems to have felt that his leadership against the Italians 
and the Germans guaranteed him continuing support after the 
war. The reports of the British Liaison Mission, together 
with information from escapees, gradually began to convince 
the British authorities in Cairo that there was little 
backing for the King within Greece. At the same time, it 
was established that the largest resistance movement, EAM, 
was communist dominated. 
By late August 1943, these views were gradually being 
accepted within the Foreign Office, although Eden found it 
difficult to accept that it might not be possible to restore 
the King without a struggle. From this time on, there were 
continuous attempts to break the power of EAM and restore 
the popularity of the King. These efforts were impeded by 
military desires to maintain EAM as a weapon against the 
Germans, but the military objections were never allowed to 
interfere significantly with Foreign Office plans. This was 
because the military authorities began to realise that EAM 
was doing little to fight the Germans, but devoting its 
energies to destroying rival resistance groups, and possibly 
preparing for a revolt which would require strong British 
military forces to prevent. 
The first major attempt to accomplish the Foreign 
Office objectives, the plan of November 1943, was thwarted 
by Roosevelt in Cairo, but Churchill's reluctance to press 
the plan contributed heavily to the failure. Further 
occasions during the spring and summer of 1944 to demand 
that the King agree to plebiscite and regency were never 
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seized upon with vigour or determination by Eden or 
Churchill. It was not until the last minute that Churchill 
prevailed on the King to remain abroad during the first 
phase of liberation. The negotiations which had brought EAM 
into the government in October 1944 were ruined by the 
failure of Churchill and Eden to solve the problem of the 
King before the return to Athens. The result was the civil 
war. 
Eden's responsibility for this failure is not clear. 
He accepted the plan Leeper called his own in November 1943, 
and recommended it to Churchill, but it does not appear that 
he did enough to convince the Prime Minister of its merits. 
His failure to discuss it with him in Cairo before it was 
too late may have been the result of too much other business 
for both of them, but there does seem to be a reluctance to 
force the issue. Again, his failure to press the King to 
sign the constitutional act demanded by Tsouderos in April 
1944 is another refusal to take definite action. It was 
only in September that Eden took a strong line with 
Churchill, and then only over the question of the King's 
return with the liberation forces. It must be accepted that 
Eden would have faced major opposition from Churchill if he 
had taken any stronger position at any time, but his com- 
ments on internal papers give rise to the that he was, at 
heart, hoping that by some miracle the King could be 
restored immediately and without difficulty. 
There can be little doubt that Churchill, to the end, 
fought for the restoration of the King without qualifica- 
tions. He never understood the amount of opposition to the 
163 
King within Greece, or the strength of the EAM. He was 
confident that the sight of the Union Jack and a few 
armoured cars would ensure that the Greek government would 
be installed in Athens without incident. His last-minute 
decision to restrain the King from returning with the troops 
seems based on the probable effect on outside public opinion 
of a restoration on the point of British bayonets- rather 
than on the possibility of civil war. 
It is too easy to criticise Churchill and Eden for what 
seem to be mistakes. Greece was a relatively minor area of 
difficulty in the midst of world-wide diplomatic and mili- 
tary problems. They had no way of knowing the real strength 
and intentions of EAM, nor any accurate measure of the 
support which would be available for the King or the 
Government upon its return. They were hampered by the 
scarcity of military resources and restrained by their 
alliance with the United States, whose attitude varied from 
indifference to opposition, so far as British efforts to 
solve the Greek problem were concerned. In the end, they 
brought about a reasonable solution, although at a consider- 
able cost, both in casualties on both sides in the December 
uprising, and in world opinion. 
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Chapter VI 
Political Guidance in the Post-War Period 
January 1945--February 1947 
1. The Need for Political Guidance 
Having saved Greece from the EAM, the British now had 
to try to save it from itself. The fighting stopped in 
January 1945, but the truce was only enforced by the British 
bayonets of the three divisions of troops which had been 
sent in to quell the Second Round. The Government was now 
in the hands of the Archbishop as Regent, but had to be 
reorganised on new lines if it was to survive. As the 
saviours of the nation and the guarantors of its safety, the 
British had to ensure that the new administration would 
establish law and order, rebuild the shattered economy, and 
conduct the plebiscite and elections promised by the Varkiza 
agreement. Failure in any of these tasks could lead to a 
revivial of EAM and a new left-wing revolt or a right-wing 
dictatorship. 
Both the Churchill and Attlee Governments wished to 
allow the Greeks to proceed to reorganise and reconstruct 
the battered country with as little interference as 
possible, but the desperate economic situation, the reaction 
of a majority of the politically active against EAM, and the 
inability of Greek political leaders to submerge personal 
and factional rivalry made it necessary for the British to 
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provide economic and military support (discussed in the 
following chapter) and to intervene constantly in Greek 
political affairs. 
In providing political guidance, the British found 
themselves caught between the desire to delay major politi- 
cal decisions until law and order could be reestablished and 
the memories of the civil war diminished, and the wishes of 
a majority of the Greek electorate at the time for right- 
wing government. The efforts to install administrations 
broadly representative of the entire political spectrum were 
frustrated; basically because they were unable to postpone 
the return of elected governments until stability returned. 
They were thus subject to criticism from both sides; for 
their attempts to delay the democratic process, and for 
their failure to prevent the installation of a right-wing 
government. 
The hegemony of the right and the failure of measures 
to restore the economy, were responsible for the 'Third 
Round' of. civil war beginning in the summer of 1946, which 
could lead to the conclusion that British policy in Greece 
for the two years after Varkiza was a failure. Given the 
United Kingdom's straightened financial situation in the 
period, and the failures of Greek political leaders to react 
effectively to the many problems, it is surprising that the 
British were able to maintain that stability which did con- 
tinue until the American acceptance of responsibility. In 
these two years, the Americans maintained their policy of 
non-involvement, at least until the late autumn of 1946; 
even then their aid to Britain and the Greeks was minimal. 
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2. Churchill's Policy 
January--August 1945 
Churchill's initial instructions, only a few days after 
the King's appointment of Damaskinos, and even before a 
truce had been arranged, were to limit British involvement. 
He told Eden, 'We do not wish to mix ourselves up too 
closely in the domestic affairs of Greece 
... 
I 
conceive our policy in Greece to be purely military, namely, 
to hold the Attica region long enough for the Archbishop's 
Government to set up a military force to keep order and 
defend themselves 
. . 
'1 Several months later when 
Leeper was being accused by American journalists in Athens 
for alleged interference in Greek affairs, Churchill advised 
the Ambassador to keep out of the detail of Greek politics 
Shortly after the Varkiza agreement was signed, Mac- 
millan and Leeper proposed that the Greek Government be 
required to sign an accord with Britain binding itself to 
observe a number of conditions, which came close to abandon- 
ing sovereignty. These included a pledge to discharge its 
responsibilities with impartiality until the elections; to 
select all ranks of the armed forces, provincial government 
representatives and civil servants without regard to politi- 
cal background; and to make arrests only in accordance with 
the Varkiza agreement. (the new Greek Government was alleged 
17 January 1945, F0954/11C. 
'Leeper's telegram 995,17 April, and Churchill's 970,20 
April, F0371/48266/R6914. 
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to have been arresting EAM supporters on trumped-up criminal 
charges). In return, Britain would increase the number of 
British troops to remain in Greece; provide equipment for 
expanded Greek armed forces and police; and supply an 
increased amount of relief stores. Their arguments were 
based on the view that public opinion both in the United 
Kingdom and in Greece would hold Britain responsible for the 
policies of a government which they had installed, and 
especially for the impartial implementation of the Varkiza 
agreement. 
The reception in the Foreign Office was hostile. The 
Greeks might refuse to sign an agreement which would strip 
them of all real power and in effect establish a British 
protectorate; it might give the Soviets an excuse for 
similar arrangements in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. 
Sargent pointed out that Lord Cromer had never had a formal 
document in Egypt.: 1 Eden agreed and forwarded the proposal 
to Churchill who echoed the Cromer analogy. The Prime 
Minister felt that the threat to withdraw the British troops 
was sufficient to control the Greek Government. 4 
Churchill discarded this rather simplistic attitude as 
it became evident that there would have to be continued 
interference in Greek politics. While there was much 
criticism in the Greek press of 'British intrigues", the 
Greek politicians continually manaeuvered for British 
=Telegrams 676 and 677,5 March, and Foreign Office 
minutes, 6 and 7 March, F0371/48259/R4385. Lord Cromer 
was the British political agent in Egypt, 1883-1907, who 
was in all but name the governor of the country under 
British occupation. 
4Minute, 11 March, F0954/11C. 
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support and were particularly happy to place responsiblity 
for the establishment of stability on London. A major 
factor was the frequent change in alignment in Greek 
political circles. Until January 1945, the Greek political 
spectrum was divided into the small group of supporters of 
the King; a broad centre of republicans; and the left of the 
Socialists and the Communists. From that time on, the 
centre, which might earlier have been expected to take 
control of the country in view of the general opposition to 
the King, lost ground. S 
The events of December brought about a major shift in 
public opinion towards the right and the King. A number of 
political figures of the centre saw this trend and began to 
take advantage of it. Some felt that support of the King 
was what the British wanted and therefore necessary to 
retain British aid; others felt that joining the decisive 
swing to the right would be the best route to personal 
advancement. The politicians who did not move to the right 
were constantly forming temporary and shifting alliances 
with each other, or refusing to join in concerted efforts to 
achieve stability because of personal jealousies or self- 
interest. In this situation, it was impossible for the 
'Because Greek political parties (except for those of the 
far left) were constantly dividing and then forming new 
alliances, ususally in terms of support for leaders, 
rather than because of doctrinal changes, political 
matters will be discussed in terms of royalists, republi- 
cans, and the left, rather than using party names. 
Richard Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1988) provides a detailed account 
of the various parties and the changes amongst them. 
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British Government to remain aloof, and only a few weeks 
passed before definite interference was necessary. 
The first action of Damaskinos upon his appointment as 
Regent was to require the resignation of Papandreou, which 
was fully supported by the British. Papandreou was replaced 
by General Plastiras. This appointment was the culmination 
of discussions within British circles, going back to 1943, 
of the idea of installing Plastiras in a position of 
leadership amongst the Greeks. - While these were never 
acted on, Plastiras was brought back from liberated France 
to Greece in December 1944, and took a leading part in the 
Boxing Day conference. He seems to have been respected then 
by all but the extreme right-wing: even EAM was reported to 
have felt he might be acceptable. - 
The final decision to bring Plastiras to Greece stemmed 
from almost simultaneous initiatives of Eden and Papandreou. 
The day the EAM uprising began, Eden asked whether there 
should not be reconsideration of the idea, although it is 
not clear as to exactly what role Plastiras was expected to 
play. Two days later Leeper reported that Papandreou wanted 
Plastiras to become his Minister of War, presumably to put 
down the revolt. Action was taken immediately and Plastiras 
The various discussions are noted in Chapter 2. SOE 
revived the idea in their letter to the Foreign office, 
22 July 1944, F0371/43733/R11589. 
'News-Chronicle, 22 December 1944. 
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arrived in Athens on 13 December. - Within three weeks he 
was Prime Minister. 
While there was something ironic in the titular head of 
EDES acting as the peacemaker between EAM and the royalists, 
the choice was logical for the moment. Plastiras was 
unquestionably a republican, yet he was willing to accept 
and support the King's regent, at least until the plebi- 
scite. At the same time he was an ardent anti-communist. 
It was Leeper's intention to create a broad and moderate 
centre movement which would isolate both the extreme left 
and the extreme right. The initial cabinet included a wide 
range of politicians and gave rise to hopes that a stable 
government appealing to a substantial majority of the Greek 
people could be established. 
Plastiras proved to have too little political acumen 
for such a difficult situation. As a republican, he was 
unhappy with the rapid and definite swing of public opinion 
to the royalists which the December uprising had brought 
about, but he tolerated the growing right-wing violence 
against the left. - In addition, he began filling posts in 
the civil administration and the armed forces with his own 
nominees, a matter which probably irritated the other 
'Eden's draft, about 4 December, Leeper's telegram 483 and 
Foreign Office telegram 374, both 6 December, F0371/ 
43736/R19932 and R20100; and WM163(44)3,11 December, 
CAB65/44. 
"George Th. Mavrogordatos, The 1946 Elections and Plebi- 
scite, " in Greece in the 1940s, ed. John 0. Iatrides 
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 
181-194, provides a detailed examination of both right- 
wing and left-wing violence in this period, as does 
Richter, British Intervention in Greece, pp1ssim.. 
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political figures in the Cabinet even more. "' By late 
February it was evident that Plastiras would either have to 
be placed under firm control or be removed. He was replaced 
by a new `service- government under Admiral Voulgaris, but 
the right-wing attacks on EAM and its supporters continued. 
The difficulties of the Plastiras period were in part 
concerned with the question of the timing of the plebicsite 
and elections which had been promised in the Varkiza 
agreement. In that document the Greek Government pledged 
itself to hold the plebiscite before the end of 1945, and 
elections as soon as possible thereafter. Within a month, 
royalist factions were clamouring for an immediate plebi- 
scite while public reaction to EAM was at its height. 
Leeper feared thato while the King would be returned by 
an early vote, there would soon be a swing against him. 
This, in turn, would lead to more reliance on ultra-right 
wing movments in order to safeguard his throne. Leeper 
therefore wanted to postpone the plebiscite until more 
normal conditions prevailed. - Churchill reacted with a 
long and sarcastic minute to Eden: 
"Nigel Clive, -British Policy Alternatives 1945-1946, ' in 
Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, ed. Lars 
Baerentzen, John O. Iatrides, and Ole L. Smith (Copen- 
hagen: Museum Tuscalanum Press, 1987), pp. 41-43. 
Clive, a member of the British Embassy staff in Athens 
during the period, provides an informed summary of the 
political developments. 
"Leeper-s telegrams 756,793, and 794,15 and 19 March, 
F0371/48260/R5105, R5267, and R5268. 
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Apparently Mr. Leeper-s policy now is to 
delay the fair and free expression of the will of 
the Greek people, for fear they should vote for the 
return of the king, and thus get out of step with 
the general movement throughout the Balkans towards 
the Left. 
We must face the fact that the Greek proletariat, 
after the taste they have had of Communist brutali- 
ties, may wish to vote Conservative. This terrible 
prospect is not however incompatible with democracy, 
where the will of the people should be freely 
expresed. I recognise that it would be a pretty 
serious business if Conservative Governments were 
returned in Britain and in Greece by overwhelming 
majorities at about the same time. 
He concluded: The above is for your eyes alone, and should 
not be shown to the Republican Guard at the Foreign 
Office. -12 
Eden, perhaps without consulting Churchill, told Leeper 
he agreed with the idea of postponement, so long as it was 
not for too long. ].. 3 A few days later, Churchill sent the 
Foreign Secretary another minute covering the same ground as 
that quoted above, but without the sarcasm. This caused 
Eden to instruct Leeper to arrange the plebiscite within 
four months. 114 Within three weeks, Churchill, acting as 
Foreign Secretary during Eden's absence in the United 
States, reminded Leeper of the four-month deadline. Leeper 
replied that it would probably require five months to 
organise the administrative machinery and security for the 
voting. Churchill refused to accept this extension, ', ` `' but 
s 20 March, F0954/11C. 
"Telegram 772,25 March, PREM3 213/11. 
1"Churchill's minute, 29 March, and Eden's telegrams 812 
and 883,30 March and 6 April, F0371/48263/R5825, R5757, 
and R5989. 
"Churchill-s telegram 994,22 April, and Leeper-s 1046 and 
1049, both 25 April, F0371/48267/R7055, R7408, and R7457. 
173 
there seems to have been no further action in setting a date 
until August, by which time Churchill was no longer in 
office. 
3. The Development of the Decision 
to Hold the Election before the Plebiscite 
March-September 1945 
In March 1945, Leeper reported that Damaskinos was 
suggesting that the elections to a Consitutent Assembly 
should be held before the plebiscite. The Foreign Office 
expressed surprise at this idea, on grounds that they saw 
no chance of a stable govenment being established before a 
plebiscite. "r- For some time the question of the date of 
either vote was overshadowed, so far as the British were 
concerned, by matters such as the problem of maintaining the 
Voulgaris cabinet in office, although the question of 
whether the elections should precede the plebiscite was 
receiving considerable attention in Greek political circles. 
The issue was raised anew by the Americans in July in 
connection with the question of foreign supervision of the 
elections. The original idea was that of MacVeagh, who, in 
the early days of the fighting in Athens, suggested that a 
three-power (Soviet, British and American) commission should 
be formed which would oversee a plebiscite, after the 
disorders had been put down. He felt that, if the British 
would accept such an plan, it would assure both sides of 
fair play and 'restore confidence in British intentions 
Leeper"s telegram 850,28 March, F0371/48263/R5825, and 
Foreign Office telegram 812,30 March, PREM3 213/11. 
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which is now so sadly if unjustly lacking throughout the 
Greek world. - MacVeagh sent this proposal to the State 
Department and the President, after discussing it with 
Leeper, who told him that "similar thoughts have passed 
through his mind" which he is communicating to his Govern- 
ment-. 11.7 
The Department pointed out to Roosevelt that the 
British would probably veto Soviet participation in such an 
arrangement and the United States should not `intervene on a 
purely Anglo-American basis'. On the same day, Stettinius 
sent the President a memorandum on the Greek situation in 
which he mentioned that there were many public demands for 
the establishment in Greece of a United States-Soviet- 
British Commission to assure fair play'. 1' Shortly after- 
ward, Eden remarked in the House of Commons that "if our 
Allies will come and help" in organising free elections, 
"their help would be welcomed"-. The State Department then 
recommended that the United States should take part in a 
tri-partite commission if asked to do so. ' 
No definite action was to be taken on this recommenda- 
tion for six months, although it would seem that the British 
had some indication from sources within the State Department 
that the United States would participate. 
-° 
They were 
"-7Telegram, 8 December, FRUS, 1944, V, 145; Iatrides, 
MacVeagh, pp. 659-662. 
iöMemoranda, both 13 December, FRUS, 1944, V, 148-150. 
1 406 Parl. Deb., col. 1909,20 December 1944; Kohler-s 
memorandum, 22 December, FRUS, 1944, V, 165; Hurrays 
memorandum, 6 January, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 99-101. 
"FRUS, 1945, VIII, 128, n. 67. 
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perhaps relying on the Declaration of Liberated Europe 
signed at Yalta, which pledged the three powers to facili- 
tate the holding of elections in countries newly freed from 
the Axis. The Americans made no specific announcements 
concerning Varkiza or Greek elections, but from the time of 
Yalta, the State Department was prepared to participate in 
the elections. 123. In mid-June, the British Embassy in 
Washington outlined the entire problem of the Greek 
elections to the State Department and followed up with a 
paraphrase of a Foreign office telegram which assumed that 
the Americans had agreed to participate in observing the 
elections. This led to a conference of senior officials and 
a formal recommendation to Truman, the new President, who 
agreed. 2ý 
In announcing the agreement, the Americans suggested 
that elections for a constituent assembly precede the 
plebiscite. This was described as an idea 'which has been 
gaining popular approval in Greece and which has recently 
been subscribed to by the three EAM signers of the Varkiza 
Agreement'. They felt that the plebiscite should'be delayed 
for about six month's after the election so that the new 
2'The State Department position after Yalta is set forth in 
its Briefing Book Paper, "Elections in Greece, - FRUS, 
Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, I, 653-654. 
"British Aide-Memoire, 16 June, paraphrase of British 
telegram of 27 June, minutes of 29 June, and memorandum 
for the President, 4 July, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 126-131; 
Foreign Office telegram 6842,27 June, 
F0371/48272/R10729. 
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government would have time to establish itself. '=1 This 
point aroused objections from the Athens Embassy, who 
pointed out that it would violate the Varkiza agreement, to 
which the United States was not a party. Laskey, in the 
Foreign Office, felt the idea was inadvisable, but was 
worried about telling the Americans so, in case itýgave them 
the idea that we are contesting their view because it would 
mean delaying the king's return-. The strongest reaction 
came from Churchill, who found it to be contrary to all his 
correspondence with Roosevelt. He felt the object of the 
State Department paper was to deny the Greek people a 
chance to say whether they will have the monarchy or not-.: 2- 
Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, was directed to 
deliver a message from Eden concerning the Greek elections 
to Joseph Grew, acting for the new American Secretary of 
State, James F. Byrnes, zs who was en route to Potsdam. Eden 
expressed strong opposition to holding the plebiscite after 
the election, on grounds that it would be unwarranted 
interference in Greek affairs, it would violate Varkiza, and 
the dangers the State Department foresaw might not come 
about. He suggested that the two votes might be taken on 
`Aide-Memoire, 5 July, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 132-133; Athens 
weekly summary, 17-24 June, F0371/48273/R1116; Athens 
telegrams 1567 and 1570,21 July, 48275/R12346; Iatrides, 
MacVeagh, pp. 680-681. 
"Washington telegram 4694,6 July, and Athens telegram 
1501,7 July, F0371/48274/R11516, R11561; and MacVeagh-s 
telegram, 9 July, FRUS, Potsdam, 1945, p. 659. 
2sJames F. Byrnes (1879-1972), Congressman and Senator, 
1911-1941; Supreme Court Justice, 1941-1942; Director of 
War Mobilisation, 1942-1945; Secretary of State, June 
1945-January 1947. 
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the same day, but concluded that there was no need to decide 
the problem immediately. The contents of the message were 
forwarded to Byrnes at Potsdam, but there is no record of an 
American reaction. 
-- 
At the accession of the British Labour Party to power, 
Damaskinos asked the Athens Embassy to tell Ernest Bevin, 
the new Foreign Secretary, of the need for a definite 
decision concerning the elections and the plebiscite. His 
arguments were similar to those used by Leeper in March. An 
early plebisicite would return the King, but his popularity 
would soon decline. He would then have no alternative but 
to support an extreme right-wing government. This would 
drive the centre parties into the arms of the communists, 
and civil war would ensue. Early elections on the other 
hand would lead to a broadly representative government which 
would be strong enough to rebuild the economy and establish 
stability. 
-- 
The message was well timed. A week or so before, the 
Foreign Office had prepared a lengthy memorandum for Bevin 
to summarise the situation in Greece, and the 'basic 
principles which have hitherto detemined our policy towards 
Greece-. This constitutes the first detailed statement 
found of British policy towards Greece after the liberation. 
The most important principle was that we require a stable 
1rew-s memorandum of his conversation with Halifax, 10 
July; and paraphrase of Eden's telegram (7313 in F0371/ 
48274/R11561) of 9 July, FRUS, Potsdam, 1945, 
pp. 660-661. 
'Letter of Harold Caccia (Charge d'Affaires in Leeper-s 
absence), 14 August, F0371/48277/R14008. 
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and pro-British government in Greece and the sincere 
friendship of the Greek people if we are to maintain our 
political and military position in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and to safeguard our lines of communication with the East". 
This could be achieved if 'we can promote the formation of a 
government which represents the will of the Greek people', 
since the majority of the Greek people were 'fervently and 
genuinely pro-British'. 
There were other reasons which made it necessary for 
Britain to undertake responsibility in Greece. The Greeks 
could not be left to fend for themselves in view of the 
economic chaos which the war had brought. Firm guidance 
would be necessary if the country was not to slip into 
anarchy or dictatorship. The Greeks had never yet made a 
success of democracy. ` 
The memorandum included a detailed discussion of the 
problems involved with the preparations and scheduling of 
the elections and the plebiscite. The arguments for and 
against holding the elections first were rehearsed, and 
mention was made of the American suggestion to hold the 
plebiscite six months after the elections for the assembly. 
The Foreign Office saw much merit in this view, but there 
was some doubt that elections could produce a stable govern- 
ment if the King's future was not yet settled. Up to this 
point it had been accepted that this was a question which 
the Greeks themselves should settle; the Foreign Office had 
attempted to 'restrain the U. S. Government from offering any 
premature advice'. 
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No recommendations were made, but it was concluded that 
several decisions would have to be made by the Foreign 
Secretary or the Cabinet. The first was that of whether or 
not to maintain the Regent and the existing Government. If, 
it was decided to do so, elections should be held as soon as 
possible. A decision was also required concerning the order 
in which the plebiscite and the parliamentary election 
should be held. The initial draft expressed the view that 
the best solution would be for the election to come first, 
followed closely by the plebiscite, but this was changed by 
a hand-written amendment to the effect that `our present 
view is that the Varkiza Agreement should be maintained'. -- 
Presumably on the basis of this memorandum, Bevin 
recommended to the Cabinet that the elections and the 
plebsicite be held as soon as possible. It would be prefer- 
able to hold the elections first, but this decision should 
be made by the Greeks. Damaskinos and the existing govern- 
ment should be maintained, but action must be taken by the 
Greeks to meet the criticism of the left concerning violence 
and repression. The Cabinet approved the recommendations 
three days later. 
-s-, 
On the same day his paper was sent to the Cabinet, 
Bevin sent a message to the British Embassy in Washington 
for discussion with the State Department. He attached 
importance to the Varkiza agreement and felt that any 
amendment to it should be made by the Greeks in order that 
'Draft of 5 August or earlier, F0371/48276/R13143. 
""CP(45)10?, 11 August, CAB129/1; CM21(45), 14 August, 
CAB128/1. 
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pre &e r red 
they take full responsiblity. Even so, he to hold 
the election before the plebiscite, although he did not 
agree with the American proposal for a six-months hiatus 
between the two. The British and American Ambassadors in 
Athens should tell the Regent in strict confidence that the 
elections should be held first with the plebiscite to follow 
within two months. He included a summary of the paper sent 
to the Cabinet, with added emphasis on the British desire 
for American cooperation on Greek matters. The State 
Department informally agreed to have the American repre- 
sentative in Athens discuss with Damaskinos the possibility 
of holding the elections before the plebiscite (nothing was 
said about changing the interval from six month to two). a<) 
The British intended not to offer advice on the exact 
timing or order until Damaskinos could visit London, but the 
State Department now became impatient, entirely for admini- 
strative reasons. Arrangements had already been made to 
organise the American election observer commission, using 
U. S. military personnel from Germany who would only be 
available if the operation began by 1 December. They 
therefore wanted an immediate decision as to the date of the 
election, and, in particular, desired as short an interval 
as possible between elections and plebiscite, to avoid 
retaining the commission in idleness or sending a second 
group later. 
"'Paraphrase of Foreign Office telegram of 11 August, memo- 
randum of conversation, 13 August, and British Embassy 
note, 18 August, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 136-139,144-145. 
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MacVeagh, on instructions from Washington, joined 
Harold Caccia (British Charge d"Affaires in Athens in 
Leeper`s absence in London) in lengthy discussion with 
Damaskinos in an effort to establish a date for the 
elections. This resulted only in the Regent's statement 
that elections could probably be held by late December or 
early January, but the plebiscite should be postponed for a 
long period; according to Caccia"s report, from three to 
five years. Such a lengthy delay would force the right, 
centre, and left to join together and produce a stable 
government. , a1 
Leeper joined Sargent and Hayter, the head of the 
Southern Department, to discuss this idea. They concluded 
that the postponement of the plebiscite would result in a 
`pro-British vote- in the parliamentary elections which 
would defeat the rightists. This would force republicans 
and royalists to join together to form a stable government, 
unless the King repudiated the Regency. In the latter case, 
the royalists might attempt a coup. The Foreign office view 
was passed to Byrnes (then in London) with a request for 
American comments. =j== 
Damaskinos arrived in London a few days later and 
presented his plan both to the Foreign office and to Byrnes. 
Byrnes, after talking to Damaskinos, informed his deputy 
that he would accepted the postponement of the plebiscite, 
"State Department telegram, 1 September, and MacVeagh-s 
telegrams, 3 and 5 September, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 150-154; 
Athens telegram 1830,5 September, F0371/48279/R15270. 
"Laskey-s minute, 6 September, F0371/48279/R15270; memo- 
randum, 11 September, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 155-156. 
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but not for as long as three years. Several days later, 
Bevin, who had been too busy with the Council of Foreign 
Ministers meeting to discuss the matter in detail with the 
Regent, told Byrnes that he agreed to the postponement. 
Byrnes was willing to accept joint responsibility for what 
amounted to major interference in Greek affairs, although he 
would not agree to a three-year delay. 
- 
x1 Sevin finally 
agreed to make a public recommendation for an early election 
and an appreciable, but undefined, postponement of the the 
plebiscite. 
Before an announcement could be made the King's 
approval would be required to prolong the regency. The King 
refused Damaskinos` first entreaties, but finally agreed 
`under pressure- to the postponement of the plebiscite, when 
faced with the joint decision of Bevin and Byrnes.: On 19 
September, a Joint British, American, and French official 
communique was issued, stating that the three governments 
hoped that elections for an assembly could be held before 
the end of the year. These should provide a basis upon 
*"Byrnes' memorandum, 13 September, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 157; 
Sargent-s minute, 10 September, F0371/48279/R15578; 
Hayter's minute, 14 September, and report of Bevin/Byrnes 
meeting, 15 September, 48280/R16291 and R16292. 
"Memorandum of conversation of King and Damaskinos, 13 
September, F0371/48280/R16291; Winant"s telegram, 19 
September, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 159. 
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which a stable government could be formed. Only then could 
a "free and genuine' plebiscite be held. - 
The King immediately wrote to Bevin, Byrnes, and the 
French Foreign Minister, Bidault, complaining that neither 
he nor the Archbishop had been been consulted. This is 
inconsistent with the record of Damaskinos' two meetings 
with him, as well as the several conferences of Damaskinos 
with Bevin and company, but not untypical of the King. He 
pointed out that the new arrangement violated the provisions 
of Varkiza as well as the Royal Act of 29 December 1944, 
i. e., his agreement to appoint Damaskinos as Regent. He 
emphasised that the latter document had been signed on the 
advice of the British Government, a polite version of the 
pressure Churchill and Eden had exerted that night. He 
feared that the reversal of the order of voting would 
exacerbate the instability and lead to further violence. 
Even so, he would not create any difficulties in what he 
termed this new policy of the Allies-. Bevin thanked the 
King for his promise not to create any difficulties, but 
assured him that he was confident the three-power declara- 
tion on the order of the voting was in the best interests of 
Greece. Byrnes sent a similar reply-"--, a 
""'Telegram from Byrnes` Special Assistant, 19 September, 
FRUS, 1945, VIII, 158-159. The French were included, 
since they had already been invited to join the 
commission to observe the elections. The Soviets had 
been asked to join, but declined. 
George II to Byrnes, 22 September; Bevin-s letter to 
Byrnes, 29 September; and Byrnes letter to the King, 1 
October, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 160-161,165-167. 
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4. Intervention to Avoid Economic Collapse; 
the Postponement of the Plebiscite 
September 1945-March 1946 
Leeper and Damaskinos returned to Athens to find that 
the three-power declaration had had little effect on 
progress towards political unity. The King's popularity 
remained high; the republicans still wanted to delay voting. 
Voulgaris, no doubt at the urging of Damaskinos, announced 
that the election would be held on 20 January 1946, with the 
plebiscite to follow at an unspecified date. The non- 
royalist parties, the liberals, socialists, and communists, 
immediately announced that they would abstain from the 
election. Faced with this seemingly insurmountable problem, 
Voulgaris and his service government resigned. =i7 
Leeper recommended that Damaskinos attempt to form a 
republican administration, but the Regent felt that a 
royalist government would be best, since it would seem to 
represent a majority view. Leeper asked Bevin to intervene, 
but the Foreign Secretary felt he had already involved 
himself enough in Greek politics. He was annoyed at 
Leeper's implication that it was the duty of the British to 
tell the Greeks how to run their affairs. Hayter added his 
own objections to the way Leeper was appearing to be 
'turning Greece into a second Egypt'. While Leeper and his 
staff felt that London did not understand the Greek situa- 
tion, they followed orders and told Damaskinos the problem 
'MacVeagh-s telegrams, 4-9 October, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 167- 
172; Leeper`s telegrams 1949,2027,2050, and 2058,23 
September, 3,6,7, and 9 October, FO371/48280/R16280; 
48282/R16948, R17077, R17083, and R17193. 
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was his to solve. While Damaskinos tried in vain to form a 
coalition, Leeper asked London to be released from the non- 
intervention instruction, without success.., 
Bevin did assure Damaskinos that British troops would 
put down any revolt, whether from left or right, and added 
that he would consider the postponement of the elections 
until the following spring when conditions might encourage 
the republicans to join in a broad government. Hector 
McNeil, the Parliamentary Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
made a similar statement in the House of Commons, mentioning 
that the British Government would accept an election date of 
mid-May. Privately, Bevin told Leeper that he rejected the 
idea of a royalist government; he had expected Damaskinos to 
appoint a centre-left administration. His words were The 
only reason for forming Ca royalist government) would be the 
danger of royalist disturbances if a contrary decision is 
°- taken. 
Leeper renewed his request to intervene on 30 October, 
causing Bevin to tell Hayter: `My difficulty with Greece is 
that I do not know what advice Leeper would tender. ' Hayter 
concurred, but it was decided to try to restore the prestige 
"-'MacVeagh-s telegrams, 11 and 16 October, FRUS, 1945, 
VIII, 172-173; Leeper's telegrams 2062,2063,2064, and 
2075, Foreign Office telegram 2062,9 October, Hayter's 
letter, 10 October, and Lascelles' letter, 11 October, 
F0371/48282/R17131, R17132; 48283/R17309; 48452/R17101, 
R20925. 
'3'4MacVeagh-s telegrams, 16 and 17 October, FRUS, 1945, 
VIII, 173-174; Leeper"s telegram 2091,13 October, and 
Bevin"s telegram 2139,20 October, F0371/482,83/R18206, 
and R18452; and 414 Parl. Deb., cols. 1641-1648,19 
October. 
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of the Regent by publishing Bevin"s message concerning 
postponement of the elections until spring. -o Damaskinos 
finally tried, and failed, to form an all-republican govern- 
ment. Leeper asked London again for permission to inter- 
vene, and on 1 November, Bevin forwarded a firm set of 
suggestions for the Regent. His Majesty's Government would 
prefer a fully representative government, but accepted that 
this was impossible in view of the royalists- refusal to 
participate. Therefore, Damaskinos should appoint his own 
candidate with as broad a government as possible. He should 
not worry about right-wing criticism. As an incentive, 
Hector McNeil would be sent to Athens to investigate the 
need for economic aid. 4. % 
Before these instructions reached Athens, Damaskinos 
had appointed a new government, with Panayotis Kannel- 
lopoulos as Prime Minister. It was made up mainly of 
conservative republicans, and seems to have satisfied no 
one. The new Premier displeased the royalists by refusing 
to commit himself on a date for the elections; the republi- 
cans not represented in the government accused him of 
cooperating too closely with the right. His entry into 
office coincided with a drastic weakening of the economic 
situation which emphasised the need for a strong leader. 
The seriousness of the economic situation combined with 
the failure of the government to make any progress on 
°°Leeper's telegram 2139,30 October, Hayter-s minute, 31 
October, and Foreign Office telegram 2218,31 October, 
F0371/48283/R18452. 
"Leeper-s telegram 2199 and Bevin-s telegram, both 1 
November, F0371/48284/R18571. 
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political problems resulted in Bevin-s decision to send 
McNeil to Athens immediately. The envoy was instructed, 
with Cabinet approval, to tell the government to rid the 
army of right-wing extremists, set a date for the election, 
and ensure that the electoral roles were accurate. In 
return, the British would send an economic mission to Greece 
to help the administration to tackle the economy. 4=2 
McNeil relayed Bevin-s message, but was immediately 
faced with objections. Kannellopoulos stressed the need for 
economic aid, but felt the Greek people would not accept a 
mission which might dictate to the Greek Government. At the 
same time, he wanted a definite statement from the British 
Government that the Greek politicians should agree to a long 
postponement of the plebisicite. At a sumptuous banquet 
given for McNeil by the Greeks, who had equated his arrival 
with a major reconstruction loan, the British envoy shocked 
the company by announcing that there would be no additional 
economic aid. 4 
This resulted in a financial panic. Damaskinos decided 
to dismiss Kannellopoulos and attempt to form a government 
uniting all parties. To do this, he would announce that the 
plebisicite was postponed for three years, since he felt 
that this was the significant issue. He asked that Bevin 
support this delay, should the King object, a request which 
"CP(45)266,3 November, CAB129/4; CM(45)49th, 6 November, 
CAB128/2. 
A: `ý'Minutes of the conferences in Athens, 14-22 November, 
F0371/48285/R19825, R19828, and R19830,48286/R20169; 
48416/R21248 and R21249; and MacVeagh-s telegram, 17 
November, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 270-271. 
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Leeper and McNeil approved on grounds that it was the only 
way in which chaos could be avoided. Bevin refused to bow 
to pressure. On 17 November, he told McNeil: `I cannot be 
a party to further manoeuverings about dates of elections 
and plebiscites, and I cannot give any backing as suggested 
[by you]. It would just be buying a pig in a poke. What I 
want is a Government capable of reconstructing Greece. - He 
demanded that the Greek Government begin a programme of 
reconstruction in accordance with the advice of the new 
economic mission. The parties should be told that the 
elections would take place by 31 March 1946, and the 
plebiscite in March 1948. If these conditions were not met, 
there was a direct threat of the loss of British support. 4A 
Damaskinos pointed out to Leeper that the execution of 
the terms of this ultimatum would only result in a refusal 
of the royalists to cooperate, so that he would have to 
appoint a purely republican government. This government 
would be unable to cope with the financial crisis, so that 
the republicans would lose the election. Leeper felt that 
the current enthusiasm for the royalists was based on either 
fear of the communists or opportunism, and was only tempor- 
ary. In his view, a republican government for the months up 
to the end of March would ensure the defeat of the royalists 
"McNeil-s telegram 2298,16 November, and Bevin-s tele- 
grams 2336 and 2339,17 and 18 November, F0371/48337/ 
19561 and 48285/R19555. 
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in the election, so long as Greece was given substantial 
British economic aid., us 
Damaskinos presented Bevin's terms to the leaders of 
the political parties (except for the KKE), and, with 
McNeil's approval, stated that acceptance of these terms 
would ensure that Greece received some economic aid. All 
the republican leaders accepted this programme, but the 
royalists refused. Damaskinos thereupon gave Sophoulis, the 
Liberal leader, the task of forming a new government. 
Despite the complete acceptance by republican politicians of 
Bevin's requirements, several of them refused to join the 
new Cabinet, either because of personal animosities or, 
perhaps, for opportunistic reasons, i. e., the possibility of 
preferment under a royalist administration. Damaskinos 
thereupon announced his intention of resigning the regency. 
This was a serious matter, since the King would be apt to 
accept the resignation, abolish the regency, and appoint a 
royalist government. - 
Despite McNeil's initial insistence that no financial 
aid would be forthcoming, limited funds were made available 
for currency stabilisation funds, and a renunciation of 
earlier Greek debts was arranged. These two grants were 
coupled with requirements for economic and financial reforms 
on the part of the Greeks. More or less simultaneously, the 
Minutes of meetings, 19 November, F0371/48286/R20281; and 
48338/R20282. 
"Leeper/McNei1 telegrams 2323,2339,2340,2344, and 2390, 
20,22, and 28 November, F0371/48285/R19654, R19793, 
R19780, R19794, and 48286/R20090; and MacVeagh's tele- 
grams, 20,22, and 23 November, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 178- 
183. 
190 
American Government, arranged a reconstruction credit of 
twenty five million dollars, accompanied by firm urgings for 
drastic changes. As will be seen, neither effort had long- 
term effect on the deteriorating situation. '? 
The King issued a public statement almost as soon as he 
heard that Sophoulis had been asked to form a new admini- 
stration, stating that The postponement of the plebisicite 
in Greece for three years accompanied by the formation of a 
one-party government creates an entirely new situation. - He 
went on to stress the points he had made in his letter to 
the three Foreign Ministers the month before concerning the 
violation of the Varkiza Agreement and the circumstances 
under which he had been pressed to appoint the Regent, as 
well as the view that this action was stifling the senti- 
ments of the Greek people. The King concluded with the 
statement: `So far as I am concerned the repudiation of 
every decision that has so far been taken compels me to 
regulate my future attitude without any reservation other 
than the interests of my people and the respect of its 
sovereign will. - 
The Foreign Office told the King that he was in error 
concerning plans for the plebiscite, and disagreed with his 
analysis. Apparently no notice was taken of the with- 
drawal of the promise of the month before to create no 
"Details of the financial aid are provided in Chapter VII. 
II'King-s public statement, 21 November, his written memo- 
randum, 20 November, and the Foreign Office reply, F0371/ 
48285/R19838; and further Foreign office comments, Win- 
ant's telegram, 22 November, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 181-182. 
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diffitculties despite his objections to the tim-three-power 
declaration concerning the plebiscite. Left-wing and centre 
circles in Greece regarded the statement by the King as an 
incitement to civil war, but Leeper was assured by Greek 
military and police authorities that there was no liklihood 
against` 
of an attempted coup an-, ý a government supported by the 
British in the absence of any indication of support by 
other Allies'. -'p 
The publication of the King's statement led to a 
question by Eden in the House of Commons. Bevin, in reply, 
pointed out the King's errors and explained the background 
and contents of the ultimatum of 17 November. Churchill 
intervened to point out that the postponement of the 
plebscite was not in keeping with the pledges and under- 
standings we have given, not only to the King but. to the 
Greek people, with whom it is a burning question. ' 
Bevin pointed out that he had been in Cabinet, but did not 
remember any mention of a date. 
Bevin also pointed out that he had defended Churchill's 
actions in Greece in December 1944 in a speech to the Labour 
Party Conference on the 13th of that month. He quoted a 
portion of that speech to the effect that he had said the 
plebiscite should follow a fair election. Until recently, 
he had never tried to implement this view, but had done his 
best to follow the Varkiza Agreement. He justified his 
return to the idea of holding the election first on grounds 
that If I forced this issue of the institutional question 
a= `MacVeagh's telegram, 22 November, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 182. 
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before I got tranquility in the country, I should run the 
danger of civil war, disturbance, and economic disaster, 
and, God knows, Greece has had enough of that. ` A few days 
later Churchill wrote to Bevin, saying that he still felt 
holding the plebiscite first would remove the issue of the 
monarchy from the election campaign. A lengthy answer was 
prepared, but Bevin saw Churchill privately instead. '"" 
Two weeks later, the King visited Bevin and provided a 
lengthy memorandum of complaints. He reviewed the develop- 
ment of Greek politics since Varkiza, placing major blame on 
the British support of Plastiras. Had this arch-republican, 
as the King viewed him, not been appointed, it would have 
been possible to arrange collaboration between republicans 
and royalists while communism was the common threat. He 
recommended that the British re-institute a service govern- 
ment and conduct the elections and plebiscite without delay. 
After arguments by Bevin, the King agreed to accept the idea 
of the election first, but maintained his objections to a 
postponement of the plebiscite. -' 
The British were worried by Damaskinos- refusal to 
withdraw his decision to resign. Bevin made a personal 
appeal to him to remain, to which Leeper added his own 
urgings. These had no effect, but the Regent did express to 
Leeper 'a willingness to reconsider if MacVeagh made a 
"416 Fart. Deb. 
, 
cols. 618, and 767-770,22 and 23 
November; Churchill letter to Bevin, draft reply and 
mention of the private meeting of which no details are 
given, F0371/48287/R20548. 
"Foreign Office minute, 5 December, recording Bevin-s 
meeting with the King on 3 December, and the Kings 
memorandum, F0371/48287/R20745, R20769. 
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personal request'. Leeper found the American Ambassador at 
the hospital bedside of his wife, and rushed him to the 
Archepiscopal palace. MacVeagh, without consulting the 
State Department, urged him to withdraw his resignation. 
His major argument was the probable effect on American 
opinion, which may have been taken (and may have been 
intended) as a subtle hint that American aid might be 
forthcoming. Damaskinos agreed to stay in office, after 
being assured that he could quote MacVeagh's advice in a 
public statement. This, while mentioning Leeper's urgings 
and Bevin's message, began with His Excellency, the 
Ambassador of the United States, 
.. .' 
and clearly implied 
that the Regent had changed his mind only because of the 
American intervention. MacVeagh was complimented by 
Washington on his action. s2 
5. The Election of March 1946 
On 29 November, the American and British heads of the 
Allied Mission for the Observation of the Greek Elections 
(AMFOGE) arrived in Athens and were told by Sophoulis that 
the election would be held in March; a few days later he 
MacVeagh-s telegrams, 23 and 26 November, and State 
Department telegram, 28 November, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 182- 
184; Foreign Office telegram 2363,22 November, and 
Leeper"s telegrams 2349,2350, and 2352, all 23 November, 
F0371/48285/R19846, R19847, R19854, and R19855; and 
Leeper-s telegrams 2374 and 2376,25 November, 
48286/R19927. 
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publicly announced that it would take place on 31 March. F3 " 
For the next four months, almost to the day of the election, 
there were attempts from within and without the government 
to postpone it. In retrospect, these efforts seem non- 
sensical, since the usual demand was for only a two week 
delay. F4 The matter came to a head in February, when 
Sophoulis convinced Leeper that a two month delay was 
necessary. Bevin, troubled by vii Soviet criticism in the 
United Nations Security Council over the continued presence 
of British troops in Greece, sent a strong message to Leeper 
saying he would never consent to such a proposal and that he 
hoped the issue would never be raised again. c, 
Even so, the demands for delays continued up until the 
week before the election. In early March, the State 
Department formed the view that the majority of the Greek 
people wanted the elections on schedule. On 2 March, the 
American Charge d'Affaires in Athens was instructed to tell 
the Greek Foreign Minister that the Americans hoped rumours 
that the elections would be postponed were incorrect. He 
was to point out that the United States felt that any delay 
would hamper Greek rehabilitation and that it would be 
E*'MacVeagh-s telegram, 4 December, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 
185-186. 
, *AMFOGE report, 10 December, FO371/48288/R21275; Mac- 
Veagh-s telegrams 4,7, and 8 December, Greek Embassy 
letters, 6 and 10 December, Byrnes letters, 11 December 
and 7 January, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 185-193. 
SELeeper"s telegrams 253,254, and 282,5,7 and 10 
February, F0371/58673/R1905 and R1906, and 58674/R2192; 
Foreign Office telegram 226,8 February, 58673/R1905; 
Sophoulis message, 15 February, and Foreign Office 
minutes, 15 and 16 February, 58675/R2633 and R2634. 
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difficult for the Americans to hold their election observers 
in Greece for any longer period. The State Department's 
instructions were conveyed to Christopher Warner of the 
Foreign Office, who reported them to the British Embassy in 
Athens with the comment: This shows a most welcome and 
unexpected initiative on the part of the United States 
Government. - He went so far as to send the U. S. Embassy a 
letter of thanks for the support. , 
In the meantime, Rankin, the American Charge in Athens, 
and Henry Grady, the head of the American election mission, 
held up the message, on grounds that it would reinforce the 
claims of the left-wing in Greece that the Allies were 
forcing premature elections. They suggested that Byrnes 
make a press statement instead, stressing the administrative 
difficulties of retaining the mission in Greece. Instead, 
on 19 March, Byrnes made a press statement, saying only that 
the United States hoped the elections would be held at the 
earliest practicable date, but the timing was entirely up to 
the Greek Government. ' 
Grady then pointed out that Byrnes' press statement was 
being interpreted in Athens as meaning that the Americans 
were not unsympathetic to postponement... The British 
Embassy in Washington delivered an Aide Memoire to the State 
"London Embassy telegram, 27 February, Athens Embassy 
telegram, 2 March, Bevin message to Sophoulis, 7 March, 
FRUS, 1946, VII, 115-118; London Embassy conversations 
with the Foreign Office, 4 March, Foreign office telegram 
to Athens, 6 March, and thank you letter, 12 March, 
F0371/58678/R3567. 
'Rankin-s telegrams, 8 and 11 March, and State Department 
telegrams, 14 and 19 March, FRUS, 1946, VII, 118-122. 
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Department, which, in an air of thinly veiled disappoint- 
ment, thanked them for a copy of Byrnes- statement. The 
note continued by urging that the American Embassy in Athens 
comply with their original instructions of 2 March to urge 
the Greek Government to adhere to the date of 31 March. The 
same day, the Foreign Office issued a strong public state- 
ment to the effect that His Majesty's Government did not 
take the view that the state of security in Greece would 
improve if the election was postponed. The Greek people, 
parties, and press should use all their power and influence 
to obtain an overwhelming poll on 31 March. v-r 
Perhaps as the result of Grady`s comments or the 
Foreign Office statement, Byrnes authorised Grady to give 
Sophoulis a copy of Byrnes" press statment, along with an 
oral statement that the United States hoped there would be 
no postponement; the main grounds being a fear for the 
effect on the economy. This episode can have had little 
effect on Greek political affairs, but it is illustrative of 
how little understanding Byrnes and his close advisors had 
of Greek affairs, and, probably, how little real attention 
they were paying to them at this time. 
The election was held as scheduled on 31 March. The 
result was a definite victory for the royalists, with 65% of 
the valid votes; the remainder went to the republican and 
other centre parties. The Communist and Socialist Parties 
"'Grady telegram and British Aide-Memoire, both 20 March, 
FRUS, 1946, VII, 123-125; The Times, 21 March. 
"State Department telegrams, 21 and 22 March, FRUS, 1946, 
VII, 126-127. 
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in mid-February had decided to boycott the elections. This 
gave rise to a never-ending argument that the election 
results were unrepresentative, but it is difficult to 
imagine that the participation of the far left, even in 
coalition with the centre, would have prevented a royalist 
victory. The three-power allied commission which observed 
the elections reported that they were, with minor 
exceptions, fair and honest. The results were completely 
consistent with forecasts made by most Greek politicians and 
British officials. - 
""Mavrogordatos, The 1946 Elections and Plebiscite, - and 
Richter, British Intervention in Greece, pp. 441-451, 
both conclude that the elections was far less fair and 
honest than the AMFOGE report indicated, but neither 
estimate the effect of the illegalities involved on the 
actual outcome. Both believe that the results would have 
been inconclusive had the two left-wing parties partici- 
pated. The AMFOGE Report suggests that there would still 
have been a royalist victory. 
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6. British Policy from Varkiza to the Election 
January 1945--March 1946 
Whether the British were wrong to refuse to condone a 
delay for the election cannot be determined; it seems doubt- 
ful that a postponement for two or three months would have 
resulted in any significant swing to the centre. Such a 
delay would have meant even greater deterioration of 
stability and of the economy. The major argument was 
that a government reflecting the will of the people might be 
more decisive and better able to cope with the situation, 
espceially if, as was hoped, it comprised a broad selection 
of political parties. Even if it did not, an elected 
government should be more effective that the appointed 
interim arrangement, an argument which was not borne out 
by the royalist administration which did come to power. 
Postponement of the plebiscite until the reaction to EAM 
diminished might result in a more genuine expression of the 
will of the people with respect to the monarchy. 
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At the same time, the right-wing violence which con- 
tinued for most of the period might have resulted in large- 
scale intimidation of voters; it was not illogical to 
consider the possibility of EAM attempts to interfere with 
the electoral process. It would be highly advantageous if 
the election could be held before the British troops were 
withdrawn from Greece, an action which was expected to take 
place within a few months of Varkiza. This factor lost its 
importance after it was decided to maintain a sizable 
British garrison in Greece at least until the election and 
plebiscite had taken place. 
British actions from Varkiza to the election of March 
1946 involved a number of contradictions. There was no 
clear concept of the problems which had arisen from the 
civil war. To the extent that there was a policy in January 
1945, it was that of Churchill to remain aloof from Greek 
internal affairs as much as possible, to retain a British 
military presence until the Greek Government was able to 
restore law and order, and to encourage the Greeks to 
establish a stable political system for the future. 
The Foreign Office generally accepted this view and 
hoped that the political leaders would join together in the 
wake of the attempted Communist take-over and establish a 
200 
government of national unity, or at least, a roughly two- 
party political system in which the moderate right would 
alternate with the centre and moderate left. The King might 
or might not return, depending on the results of the 
promised plebiscite, although, in view of the opposition to 
the King during the occupation, it was more likely that 
Greece would become a republic. Churchill, always the 
supporter of the monarchy, wished for the return of the 
King, and a conservative government, preferably with the 
consent of the majority. In Athens, Leeper recognised the 
goals of the Foreign Office, but was far more aware that 
Greek politicians had little hope of achieving them, without 
strong guidance from the British. 
There were several factors which were not evident in 
early 1945. There was the massive swing of public opinion 
from opposition to the King to strong support for him and 
for the right wing political movements. The communist-led 
revolt of December 1944 caused a reaction which was not 
limited to an abhorance of the left, but a shift far across 
the political spectrum. The volatility which always 
characterised Greek politics accounts for much of the 
movement, but there was also a feeling that Britain favoured 
the King, and it would therefore be in the best interests of 
Greece to please the British. 
A second factor was the right-wing campaign of terror 
and violence against those who had supported EAM. This saw 
the formation of such groups as `X', the use of ex-Security 
Battalion personnel in the ranks of the Government police 
and military forces, large-scale imprisonment without trial 
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of left-wing suspects, and a general violation of many of 
the provisions of the Varkiza agreement. x The toleration 
and often acceptance of such illegal actions by the right 
wing political parties did much to bring down the original 
government of national unity under Plastiras, and made it 
almost impossible for the formation later of a broad and 
effective government before the election. 
The Foreign Office policy of forming a broadly based 
government to restore law and order came close to violating 
the principles of democracy. If it is accepted that these 
principles implied that the interim government should be the 
one which best represented the wishes of the majority of the 
people, it follows that a right-wing administration should 
have been installed. Unfortunately, a Greek right-wing at 
this stage would no doubt continue to condone the violence 
against the left, fill the ranks of the army and the police 
with its followers, and use its position to ensure that it 
won the election when it came. 
The importance of the timing and relative order of the 
election and plebiscite was a third factor not recognised at 
the time of Varkiza. That agreement called for both to be 
held during 1945, with the plebiscite to be followed as soon 
as possible by the election. When the agreement was signed, 
it is probable that both the communists and the republicans 
believed that the plebiscite would result in the rejection 
*"This is not to imply that there were not violations of 
Varkiza by EAM, in matters such as the failure to 
surrender arms, and, in some areas, terror against the 
right. Some details of the extent of left-wing violence 
are discussed in Mavrogordatos, The 1946 Elections and 
Plebiscite. - 
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of the King. All groups seem to have expected the election 
to result in a broadly representative new assembly, in which 
the communists would have a significant if relatively minor 
position. This was the basis for Leeper-s early attempts to 
form and maintain a broadly-based interim government. 
The British could feel justified in such attempts, in 
the long-term interests of Greece. They expected that, as 
time went on, the reaction to the events of December would 
wear off, and the Greek people could make their decisions as 
to their government and the question of the King in a more 
rational atmosphere. In addition, until some degree of law 
and order was restored and the election was held, they could 
not be positive that the majority did support the right. 
Even Churchill did not attempt to introduce a right-wing 
government, although he pressed for the plebiscite and 
election at the earliest possible moment, in the belief that 
the sooner they were held the more likely was a right-wing 
triumph. 
Once it was evident that there was a major shift to the 
King and the right-wing, the British needed to consider a 
new policy for the timing and relative order of the two 
polls. Churchill definitely wanted an early plebiscite with 
the election soon afterward. He was not bothered by the 
possibility that an early vote on the King might not reflect 
the real desires of the Greek people, or that the King's 
return might mean the use of his influence to establish a 
right-wing, but unrepresentative government. He was unable 
to implement his views before leaving office, due to the 
very real difficulties of restoring stability, and the time 
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necessary for preparing new electoral registers and the 
machinery for the elections themselves. 
Leeper and the Foreign Office felt strongly that the 
popularity of the King and the right-wing was a temporary 
phenomenon. If the royalists were given power, there would 
soon come a time when popular opinion would change sub- 
stantially and lead to strong oppositon, if not civil war. 
Adding to this the failure of the interim governments to 
establish law and order, particularly in terms of putting 
down right-wing extremism, there seemed to be good reason to 
postpone the plebiscite and election. 
There was a significant change in British policy 
coincident with the ascension to power of the British Labour 
Party. With Churchill`s departure, there was no longer 
significant British support for the King and the royalists. 
There was now a united British policy for the establishment 
of a broadly based coalition, regardless of the state of 
public opinion. At the same time, there was agreement, 
strongly supported by Damaskinos and Byrnes, that the 
plebiscite should be postponed until after the election; the 
only question was for how long. 
This new policy was a violation of the Varkiza Agree- 
ment, and seemingly undemocratic. It was based on the view 
that it would be best for Greece in that a non-royalist 
interim government might provide more stability and reduce 
the incidence of violence and terrorism, so that the 
eventual elections would be more truly representative. As 
far as the Varkiza Agrement was concerned, EAM was only too 
happy to accept the postponement of the election and the 
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plebiscite, since their only hope of gaining some share of 
political power rested on delay. The matter raises two 
questions. First, was the British Government justified in 
ignoring the current strength of the right-wing on grounds 
that it did not really reflect the long-term interests of 
the Greek people, or that a right-wing government, even if 
popularly elected, would lead Greece to disaster? It could 
be argued that, without firm evidence of the strength of 
royalist feeling, it would be fairer and perhaps even more 
in keeping with democratic ideals to maintain an interim 
government in which most parties were represented, regard- 
less of their relative strength. 
Secondly, did Bevin support Leeper and the Foreign 
Office in their attempts to establish and maintain broad- 
based governments because he considered this the best course 
of action for Greece in the long run, or was it a matter of 
opposing right-wing political groups--or even an instance of 
introducing `Socialist foreign policy-? The latter view 
seems far-fetched, in the absence of any evidence in its 
favour. Bevin seems to have been following the course which 
the Foreign Office had already charted, accepting their 
appreciation of the situation and the probable effects of 
early elections. The only decision'which really amounted to 
a reversal of Foreign Office views was that to postpone the 
plebiscite until after the election, a matter on which the 
Foreign Office had had trouble making up its mind. 
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7. American Policy from Varkiza to the Election 
January 1945--March 1946 
American policy during this period remained one of 
friendship towards Greece and a reluctance become involved 
in internal Greek affairs. This was a continuation of the 
view that Greece was of little interest to the United 
States, and, in any case, a British problem. MacVeagh 
maintained a close watch on the political developments and 
discussed them frequently with the British diplomats in 
Athens, sometimes offering comment, but, to their irrita- 
tion, often concluding with, But this is your Third 
International, not ours. - The Foreign Office echoed this 
complaint, in saying that the usual State Department reply 
to any approach for help with regard to Greece was -Greece 
is your headache-. 
-::; - 
To the extent that the State Department had a definite 
policy towards Greece, it was that contained in a briefing 
paper prepared for Truman prior to the Potsdam Conference. 
Its opening sentence implied a major change of American 
policy: To take an active and benevolent interest in 
Greece at this time offers one of the most practical means 
d ¢. tti. oo atrati nq 
of 1 this Government's determination to play an 
international role commensurate with its strength and public 
committments. - After accepting that Greece had been 
"Caccia-s telegram 1671,9 August 1945, F0371/48276/ 
R13415; Sargent-s letter to Leeper (underlining in 
original), 9 November, F0800/276. 
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traditionally closer to Great Britain, it made much of 
shared cultural values and Greek emigration to the United 
States. While admitting that American intersts in Greece 
had not been extensive, it suggested that these interests 
had been of a type to promote good-will: trade, banking, 
engineering and development projects, philanthropy, arche- 
ology, and education-. 
The paper continued: 'Traditionally our policy 
towards Greece has been one of friendship characterized by 
refusal to intervene in internal Greek affairs. The Yalta 
decisions necessitate a reorientation of this policy, for at 
that meeting this Government indicated its willingness and 
determination to participate in Allied guarantees that 
smaller nations liberated from Axis domination should be 
guaranteed the right of choosing by peaceful and democratic 
means the government under which they wish to live. ' 
The announcement of a new and far more positive policy 
towards Greece was followed by an anti-climax; a list of 
what the United States should be prepared to undertake. 
This was limited to supervision of the election and plebi- 
scite; economic assistance, which seemed to be limited to 
advice and possibly some industrial credits; reduction of 
1comrr, ¢re1Qf 
financial, social and cultural barriers', which 
suggests American insistence on the `Open Door' policy 
whether the Greeks wanted it or not; and some diplomatic 
support for Greek territorial claims. 
There were two points of interest which were rather 
hidden away. One was a statement that, in suggesting that 
the Greeks ask for a three-power commission to observe the 
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election, It might be possible to indicate our belief that 
a republican form of government offers more possibilities 
for a peaceful future than the return of a monarchy already 
stigmatized by totalitarianism. - While there is no 
evidence that such an indication was ever passed to the 
Greek Government, or to British authorities, it must have 
played some part in American thinking in the ensuing months. 
There was also a comment on Soviet influence in the 
Balkans. While not anticipating full Soviet control of most 
of the area, the paper suggested that there were two 
obstacles to American influence there; a possible closed, 
Russian-controlled economy, and, the extreme nationalism of 
certain countries. Greece was an exception to general rule 
of xenophobia in the Balkans, and desirous of closer 
relations with the United States. The paper continued: 
The present Greek fear of Russia is probably responsible 
for this attitude--an attitude which this Government depre- 
cates but which is understandable and might better be dis- 
sipated by our becoming an active mediator than by our 
relinquishing all of Greek affairs to the control of Great 
Britain. - In another section, there is the statement: The 
situation in which British-dominated Greece and Turkey (and 
perhaps Albania) would become isolated economically and 
politically from a group of Russian-dominated Slavic 
neighbors on the north would be a real menace to world 
peace. - e-z3 
* FRUS, Potsdam' 1945, pp. 651-652. 
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The State Department, therefore, in late June 1945, 
would seem to have had no fear of the spread of Soviet 
influence into Greece, nor any idea of a possible establish- 
ment of Russian domination of the Balkans, except in terms 
of possible Soviet control of the economy of the area. To 
the extent it saw a threat, it was from the establishment of 
British influence on a scale so great as to create a 
significant barrier between Greece and the rest of the area. 
By suggesting that the United States should become involved 
in Greek affairs in order to prevent excessive British 
influence, without any corresponding action to diminish 
Soviet economic hegemony, there is a hint that the State 
Department saw the British, rather than the Russians, as the 
more dangerous to American interests. 
The paper was, of course, only an outline of State 
Department thinking and a proposal for the consideration of 
the President. There is no evidence that action was ever 
taken to institute a programme of active mediation. In the 
period up to the election, there were only three instances 
of American influence being brought to bear. The first was 
the recommendation of July 1945 that the plebiscite should 
be postponed until after the election. This idea was 
already being discussed in the Foreign office, and there is 
no indication available of how much weight the American 
proposal carried when Bevin made his decision. The second 
was MacVeagh-s intervention with Damaskinos to persuade him 
not to resign, but this was at the fervent request of 
Leeper, and without reference to the State Department. The 
$25,000,000 credit accompanied by strong demands for reform 
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of January 1946 was perhaps the most important of the three, 
but hardly amounted to interference. The full participation 
of the Americans in the observation of the election was a 
result of their commitments made at Yalta, and not the 
outcome of a new policy. 
In summary, from Varkiza to the election, the United 
States maintained its neutrality in Greek affairs. Behind 
the official statements can be seen a gradual transition 
from thinly veiled hostility to a more sympathetic attitude. 
This change was probably influenced by the growing American 
realisation of its new-found role in international affairs, 
as recognised in the briefing paper quoted above, and by a 
simultaneous perception of a Soviet threat, a matter dis- 
cussed in subsequent chapters. It is also possible, although 
difficult to demonstrate, that the Americans were beginning 
to realise that the British were not going to be able to 
establish a new colony in Greece, and that their intentions 
might not be as evil as they had suspected. 
8. The Plebiscite 
April--September 1946 
From the first of April 1946, the British were in a 
more difficult position than before. They would now be 
dealing with an elected government which might expect to 
handle matters without external interference. Furthermore, 
the royalists had a substantial majority in the new Parlia- 
ment, which gave them not only the implied right to form a 
one-party government, but even more reason to exert their 
independence. The presence of a substantial number of 
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British troops along with British military, police and 
economic advisors meant that the Greeks were dependent to an 
extent for the maintainence of law and order and recon- 
struction, but the expected withdrawal of the troops and the 
limited amount of actual aid being given reduced British 
influence further. 
The Foreign Office, even prior to the election, recog- 
nised the problem. In late February, Hayter asked Sargent 
what British policy should be if the royalists won, pointing 
out that they would have to back the Greek Government 
regardless. Sargent felt that the new government would try 
to retain British support, especially since a rightist 
victory would consolidate Communist opposition to such an 
extent that it would be a direct threat to the royalist 
regime. The British difficulty would the criticism they 
would receive at home. McNeil agreed with Sargent, saying, 
`I've been wondering what we do about the emerging Govern- 
ment between the period when they take over and when the 
banked-up civil war overtakes them. ' His solution was to 
retain the various missions and good-will, so long as the 
new government maintained a semi-liberal attitude to 
prisons, courts, and the gendarmerie. At the same time, 
Britain should plan to remove its troops by autumn at 
least. r-* 
'4Minutes, 21 February and 1 March, F0371/58676/R3032. 
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In the instructions to Leeper's successor, Sir Clifford 
Norton, 
-- it was recognised that the days of Cromerism in 
Greece wwould soon be ended. As soon as the election 
results were known, Norton informed Greek political leaders 
that the British Goverment favoured a broad coalition, 
rather than accepting the royalist government which seemed 
indicated. In addition, the plebiscite should be postponed 
until 1948, and Damaskinos should remain as Regent. At the 
request of the British, the State Department was asked to 
instruct the American Embassy in Athens to offer similar 
advice, and hoped that Byrnes would make a public statement 
hoping that the Regent would continue. Washington issued 
appropriate instructions to Karl Rankin, in charge in 
MacVeagh's absence. - 
Constantine Tsaldaris attempted to form a government 
which would include some centrist leaders, but he would not 
accept the long delay in holding the plebiscite, unless the 
British insisted on it for 'international reasons'. It soon 
appeared that Tsaldaris intended to allow centrists no real 
power or influence in the new administration Norton felt 
unable to interfere in view of his instructions, but his 
reports brought immediate orders from London to threaten 
Tsaldaris with the withdrawal of British economic and 
"Clifford Norton (1891-1971), Minister to Seitzerland, 
1942-1946; Ambassador to Greece, 1946-1951. Leeper left 
Athens on 7 March. 
"Foreign Office telegrams 539 and 688 to Athens, 13 March 
and 1 April, telegram 3162 to Washington, F0371/58679/ 
R3748 and 58682/R5023; and Rankin"s telegram, 2 April, and 
State Department telegram, 5 April, FRUS, 1946, VII, 128- 
132. 
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military aid unless the plebiscite was delayed and a broad 
government was formed. "" Norton delivered Londons ultima- 
tum, but Tsaldaris, after a few days of pretence at 
acceptance, put himself at the head of a one-party, royalist 
government, which intended to hold the plebiscite within 
months. --- 
While this government was being formed, the problem of 
the regency arose again. Damaskinos sent his offer of. 
resignation to the King almost simultaneously with the 
election. The King was in favour of accepting, maintaining 
the view he had expressed two years before that constitu- 
tionally only the heir to the throne could be appointed 
Regent. He was probably more influenced by his fear that 
Damaskinos would be able to maintain the policy of postpone- 
ment of the plebiscite. Bevin put pressure on the King to 
retain Damaskinos, without immediate effect. C-Si 
In a few days, the King accepted the resignation in 
principle-, but asked the Archbishop to remain until the 
arrangements for the plebiscite could be made. Rankin 
accompanied Norton and the temporary Greek Prime Minister in 
a visit to the Regent, who made it clear that he did not 
wish to remain under such conditions. Rankin made an 
individual appeal to Damaskinos not to make a final 
"Norton-s telegrams 720,727, and 728,2 and 3 April, and 
Foreign Office telegrams 701 and 712,3 and 4 April, 
F0371/58683/R5170, R5240, R5276, and R5247. 
"Norton-s telegrams 739 and 872,4 and 18 April, F0371/ 
58684/R5321 and 58687/R6054; Rankin-s telegram 5 April, 
FRUS, 1946, VII, 130-131. 
Memorandum from the King, 4 April, and Bevin's reply, 6 
April, F0371/58684/R5388. 
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decision, and urged Norton to ask London to try to change 
the King's attitude. The effect of Rankin`s intervention is 
not known, but the Archbishop did decide to remain in office 
for the time being. Rankin also made it clear to Greek 
political leaders 
-the Americans opposed an early 
plebiscite, citing the severe 
economic situation and the inadvisability of holding the 
plebiscite during the forthcoming Council of Foreign 
Ministers Conference. 
-- 
Meanwhile, Bevin had been discussing the matter of the 
plebiscite with the King, who felt that the majority of the 
Greek people now wished him to return. In addition, as long 
as the plebiscite was postponed, the constitutional issue 
would predominate politics so drastically that the economic 
problems could not be attacked. He wished for a September 
plebiscite, which would allow time for preparation and 
campaigning, but would come before the winter made communi- 
cations difficult in the mountains. He promised that if he 
were returned he would pursue a programme of moderation, 
with a hint that he might try to reduce the worst of the 
rightist excesses. At this point Bevin began to consider 
the merits of George II's arguments, and, without mentioning 
his discussions with the King, sent a summary of the 
'Rankin-s telegram, 10 April, and Winant-s telegram, 10 
April, FRUS, 1946, VII, 133-135. Damaskinos continued as 
Regent until the King returned as the result of the 
plebiscite. 
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advantages of an early plebiscite to Norton, indicating that 
he might change his mind. yx 
The Americans were still supporting the British 
opposition to an early plebiscite a fortnight later, when 
Dean Acheson, '' the American Under Secretary of State in 
succession to Grew, reiterated this position to the Greek 
Ambassador in Washington on 18 April. ' On 26 April, at the 
Paris Council of Foreign Ministers Conference, Bevin spoke 
to Brynes, expressing his belief that the plebiscite should 
not be postponed after all. His argument to Byrnes was that 
British troops would have to withdrawn from Greece before 
the end of the year in order to press for the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Bulgaria. If the plebiscite were to be 
held without the presence of British troops, the results 
would probably be fraudulent, presumably because of excess- 
ive right-wing interference. This might, in turn, lead to 
the left initiating civil war. Therefore the plebiscite 
should be held in September. 
According to the American notes of this conversation, 
Byrnes saw the logic of Bevin"s argument, and would give the 
matter consideration. According to the British record, 
Byrnes said the British were in a better position than the 
'1Foreign Office telegram 248 and King's memorandum, both 4 
April, F0371/58684/R5388; Foreign Office telegram 784, 
58686/R5962; Dixon-s minute, 5 April, 58687/R6045; 
Norton's telegram 872,18 April, 58687/R6054; Winant`s 
telegram, 10 April, FRUS, 1946, VII, 134-135. 
"Dean Gooderham Acheson (1893-1971), international lawyer; 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 1933; Assistant 
Secretary of State, 1941-1945; Under Secretary of State, 
1945-1947; Secretary of State, 1949-1953. 
7"TRUS, 1946, VII, 144-5. 
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United States to assess the situation and that if the 
British thought that September 1946 was the right date, the 
United States was prepared to accept it. `*74 
In the second week of May, Norton was instructed to 
notify Tsaldaris that the British agreed to an autumn 
plebiscite, and Rankin was told that the United States would 
accept such an arrangement, although it was felt that the 
Greek Government should have put the solution of the 
economic problems above the issue of the monarchy. *76 When 
the new Greek Parliament convened on 12 May, it was 
announced that the plebiscite would take place on 1 
September. 
For the next four months, there was little British or 
American involvement in Greek political matters except for 
the organisation and operation of a second Allied Mission to 
Observe Greek Elections (AMFOGEII). The plebiscite took 
place in an atmosphere of considerable violence, intimida- 
tion, and corruption, but the Mission concluded that, even 
allowing for irregularities, there was a majority in favour 
of the return of the King (the official results gave the 
King 69% of the votes cast). -- 
74Bevin-s telegram 9 from Paris, F0371/58687/R6382; Memo- 
randum, 27 April, FRUS, 1946, VII, 148-149. Byrnes did 
not finally make up his mind until 7 May, when he 
instructed Acheson to obtain Truman-s approval (ibid., 
pp. 157-158). 
'Norton's telegram 1047,10 May, F0371/58690/R7099; State 
Department telegram, 16 May, FRUS, 1946, VII, 162-163. 
'Report on the Observation of the Greek Plebiscite, 7 
September, Ibid., pp. 204-207. 
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9. British and American Policy after the Plebiscite 
September 1946--February 1947 
The King was undoubtedly pleased, but realised he faced 
a difficult future. Before leaving London, he made it clear 
to Bevin and the Foreign Office that he intended a moderate 
policy with which he hoped to gain the cooperation of all 
policitcal elements except the Communists. He expected to 
form a new administration with Tsaldaris as Prime Minister, 
in which as many parties as possible would be represented., 7,7 
While he was received in Athens in a spirit of harmony, 
negotiations to include the Sophoulis Liberals failed, 
probably because the latter felt it would be better tactics 
to allow the royalists to weaken themselves in the face of 
the desperate economic situation. The British authorities 
a hCaýt'aýeme-v, 
held back from intervention, other than further 
to the King to try to form a coalition. It was only after 
the Americans began to take a more active interest in Greece 
that they put pressure on the right-wing government to 
modify its policies. 
For the past two years, the Americans had maintained 
their policy of neutrality, modified only by their active 
participation in the election missions and the occasional 
reinforcement of British advice in times of political 
crisis, usually on the initiative of MacVeagh or Rankin, 
'King's memorandum to Bevin, 13 September, and Bevin-s 
account of his meeting with the King, Foreign Office 
telegram 1954,14 September, F0371/58709/R14079. 
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rather than instuctions from Washington. October 1946 marks 
the beginning of a more positive attitude on the part of the 
United States towards Greece, the origins of which are 
traced in a subsequent chapter. One of its earliest effects 
was an instruction to MacVeagh to take a stronger role in 
influencing Greek politics. The new policy took the British 
by surprise. While the American Charge d'Affaires in London 
had told the Foreign Office on 16 October that a programme 
of American economic assistance to Greece was being pre- 
pared, he seems to have said nothing about a new approach to 
political affairs. ---a 
MacVeagh, prior to receiving new instructions from 
Washington, saw the King on 11 October and made several 
suggestions on the purely personal and informal basis which 
he seems to invite and appreciate-. These included rather 
emphatic recommendations that he insist on the formation of 
a broadly based government; and that he press for action to 
ensure impartial justice, observation of civil rights and 
the elimination of right-wing violence against the left. 
The King expressed his complete agreement with these ideas, 
although MacVeagh doubted that he would be able to do much 
about them. While MacVeagh took this action without 
specific instructions from the State Department, but he was 
highly commended for his action by Acheson, who indicated 
that he should tell the King that the United States 
Government was in full agreement with MacVeagh-s suggestions 
'Minute, 17 October, F0371/58712/R15603. Gallman 
apparently referred to Acheson"s telegram to Athens, 
FRUS, 1946, VII, 235-237. 
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and was gratified to learn of the King's reception of 
them. - 
MacVeagh showed his report on the conversation to 
Norton who passed on a summary to the Foreign Office, 
without much comment. The Foreign Office were not particu- 
larly happy about this development. Selby minuted: 'I am 
not sure that the Americans are not asking the King to 
assume some of the powers of a dictator. If he is going to 
act as a constituional monarch, he has got, ipso facto, to 
accept the advice of his ministers on most questions. -Or' 
On 16 October, the same day he received his commenda- 
tion from Acheson, the State Department sent MacVeagh a 
detailed list of intended American actions with regard to 
Greece, covering a number of topics, most of them dealing 
with the economic situation and Greek foreign affairs. Also 
included were instructions to explain to the King and Greek 
political leaders that American actions in support of Greece 
were based on the assumption that the Greek Government 
'would strive for a policy of moderation in connection with 
divergent Greek political factions the basic loyalty of 
which to Greece is not subject to question, as well as in 
its relations with neighboring countries'. While this seems 
to have given carte blanche for actions against the Com- 
munists, there was a strong warning that the United States 
7'MacVeagh's telegram, 11 October, and Acheson's telegram, 
16 October, FRUS, 1946, VII, 233-235 and 238.. 
'Norton's telegram 266 SAVING, 14 October, and Selby-s 
comment, F0371/58711/R15347. 
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would look with disfavour on excessive measures by the 
extreme right against its political opponents. 
The Greek Government was also to be warned that the 
State Department believed that they had not applied measures 
for internal order impartially, but had encouraged lawless- 
ness on the part of the extreme right. Further, the 
Department held that there had been significant falsifica- 
tion of the plebiscite vote, although they accepted that a 
majority voted for the King. It continued: `Also, although 
Tsaldaris may be legally correct in stating that the March 
elections gave the Populist Party a clear mandate to form a 
Government it would appear that this is not a time for 
narrow legalistic argumentation but for an enlightened and 
patriotic attempt to bring together all decent democratic 
elements in Greece in a unity equally important now for the 
continued existence of the Greek nation as it was during the 
war. ' The State Department indicated that they had sug- 
gested informally to the British that they consider giving 
the King similar advice. MacVeagh replied that he could not 
concur too strongly in the revaluated [sic] policy. 12.71 
MacVeagh saw the King again a few days later and 
acquainted him with the contents of the State Department 
statement. The King accepted the American views and seemed 
to agree with them. He made no criticisms of the British, 
but commented on MacVeagh-s remarks: 'This is just the way 
Bevin talks to me. - MacVeagh told Norton of this second 
conversation with the King, although it is not clear 
1State Department telegram, 15 October, and MacVeagh 
telegram, 17 October, FRUS, 1946, VII, 235-237. 
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how much detail concerning the new policy was given to the 
British Ambassador. The latter sent an immediate telegram 
to the Foreign Office, commenting that he felt MacVeagh's 
actions represented an excessive intervention in Greek 
affairs. -: - 
The State Department had earlier suggested to the 
British Embassy in Washington that the two powers send 
simultaneous messages to George II welcoming his return to 
Greece, and hoping that his new government would not engage 
in any excesses or violations of civil rights. They 
suggested publication after the notes had been formally 
delivered by the Ambassadors. The Foreign Office took a 
rather contradictory position; on the one hand they termed 
it a welcome tendency of the United States to show an 
interest in Greek affairs, which should not be discouraged; 
on the other hand, they felt such a note amounted to undue 
interference in Greek affairs, especially since George II 
was supposed to be a constitutional monarch, and presumably 
therefore not in a position to influence the elected 
government- e-a 
No decision was taken in London for some time, because 
it was intended to use the request in an attempt to obtain 
more definite ideas of what the new policies of the State 
Department were. As an incentive, the Americans were to be 
given a general review of British policy. However, this was 
`i`MacVeagh"s telegram, 19 October, ibid., pp. 238-239; 
Nortons telegram 2281,19 October, F6371/58711/R15391. 
13='1ashington Embassy telegram 5975,8 October, and Selby-s 
minute, F0371/58710/R14984. 
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then deemed unnecessary in view of recent talks between 
Byrnes and A. V. Alexander, Minister without Portfolio, 
(discussed in Chapter VII), although the Foreign Office was 
still opposed to the idea of a joint message. The need for 
a reply to the Americans was discussed, along with Nortons 
report of MacVeagh-s second talk with the King. The Foreign 
Office view was set forth in a memorandum by C. F. A. Warner 
of 25 October: 
This sudden suggestion seemed puzzling, until 
we discovered some time later that it was only one 
item in a new United States policy towards Greece, 
and was to be accompanied by offers of potential 
help. 
.......................... Our position in this matter is quite different from 
that of the Americans since we have been urging 
moderation on both the King and the Government on a 
number of different points for a long time past and 
we are taking active steps to produce the desired 
result in the case of the Greek trade unions. In 
any case general exhortations to be moderate are 
not appropriate. What is required is carefully 
considered advice on specific points. 
This matter has been discussed with Sir Orme 
Sargent and it was agreed that we should enlighten 
the State Department's not unnatural ignorance on 
the ins and outs of the internal situation about 
which we are much better informed through our 
Missions and through closer contacts with the Greek 
King and Government by giving them a full picture. 
A lengthy draft telegram rehearsing numerous arguments 
to be given to the State Department was drafted, but 
apparently not used. Instead, a short message was sent to 
the effect that the British no longer saw any need for the 
message. The Americans eventually decided that it was 
unnecessary in view of MacVeagh's talks with the King. 
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There is no indication that they were influenced by the 
British attitude. - 
A few days later MacVeagh and Norton saw Tsaldaris and 
again urged the broadening of the Government. While he 
agreed to try, he found that the other parties would agree 
only if he stepped down as Prime Minister, a condition he 
was unwilling to accept. The King then intervened without 
success in an attempt to force a coalition, and MacVeagh and 
Norton continued their efforts. In early November they 
succeeded in bringing enough pressure on Tsaldaris to bring 
about the dismissal of the Minister of Defence, Petros 
Mavromichalis, who appeared to be using his position to 
support right-wing violence and terrorism. 
Bevin made a personal approach to Tsaldaris when the 
latterwas in London to invite other parties to join the 
government; the Foreign Office considered open intervention 
in Greek affairs to establish a coalition, but it was 
decided that the King would not cooperate; MacVeagh and 
Norton continued their pressure, but none of these actions 
brought about any change until the end of January 1947, when 
Dimitrios Maximos, an elderly and moderate royalist, became 
Prime Minister of a cabinet which included representatives 
ýý4William"s minute, 24 October, Warner's memorandum, 25 
October, and Foreign Office telegram 10235,28 October, 
F0371/58711/R15391; State Department tele-gram, 6 
November, FRUS, 1946, VII, 239. 
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of most of the Greek political parties except for the 
Communists. 
.. '-- 
British policy after the election was rather more 
straight-forward, althought the relationship with the Greek 
Government was remarkably similar. The initial instructions 
to the Athens Embassy was to interfere as little as 
possible, although it was made clear to the Regent that the 
British wanted a broad coalition and a postponement of the 
plebiscite. Both objectives were contrary to the wishes of 
the political party which had won the election with an 
overwhelming majority, yet these departures from democratic 
principles were the result of the best of intentions. The 
British were convinced that the political stability and 
economic recovery of Greece could only be assured by the 
establishment of a moderate government representing a wide 
spectrum of interests, and by the postponement of the 
question of the Kings future. 
In the event, neither of these two British objectives 
were achieved. The rightist groups forced an early plebi- 
scite, the return of the King, and a right-wing government. 
The failure of successive Greek Governments, centrist or 
right-wing, to institute full law and order and to halt 
economic deterioration resulted in the resumption of civil 
the various attempts of MacVeagh, Norton, and Bevin to 
broaden the government from late October 1946 to the 
accession of the Maximos administration are reported in 
detail in F0371/58712-9,58751,58759,58890-1, and 
66994-8; and FRUS, 1946, VII, 270-1,286-8, and FRUS, 
1947, V, 4-5,9-13. 
pp. 270-1,286-8; and 1947, V, 4-5,9-13. 
224 
war, this time on a far more extensive scale. British 
efforts to postpone the plebisicte had to be abandoned. 
There was never as much direct intervention as before the 
election; the only successful actions were those connected 
with the Regent's attempts to resign prior to the plebiscite 
and the behind-the-scenes pressures to rid the royalist 
government of Mavromichaelis and, at the very end, the 
establishment of the broadly based government of Maximos. 
This is not to argue that British policies, if they had 
been accepted by the Greeks, would have solved the problems 
and prevented the Third Round. Centrist or broad coalition 
governments did not, in this period, represent the will of a 
majority of the people; perhaps more to the point, there was 
no factor in Greek politics which would override personal 
and factional disagreements sufficiently to make a coalition 
workable. Even if such a government could have been estab- 
lished, it would have been faced with an ecnomic crisis 
which could not be remedied without the injection of 
substantial capital and sound financial administration. 
Britain could (and did) provide economic advice throughout 
the period, but it was usually ignored. If the British had 
been able to provide the necessary reconstruction aid, they 
might have used their control of funds to ensure that a 
sound economy was re-established. 
British political policies from Varkiza to early 1947 
may be criticised on grounds that they failed to establish a 
moderate and stable government along with economic recovery. 
They may also be faulted for ignoring democratic principles 
in their attempts to procure governments made up of all the 
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main political movements instead of accepting the royalist 
election victories. There is no doubt that their intentions 
were logical and in the best interests of Greece. The 
dangers of right-wing control of Greece were fully recog- 
nised (except by Churchill) and go a long way towards 
justifying British interference. If there is a valid 
criticism, it concerns the relative lack of British pressure 
on Greek Governments to eliminate extreme right wing terror- 
ism, but it is difficult to suggest what substantial 
measures the British might have taken beyond more persistent 
protests. 
In the long run, was the British policy towards Greece in 
this period harmful or helpful to Greece? Would any other 
policy, short of the use of massive numbers of British 
troops to police the country from one end to the other, have 
reduced right-wing violence and provided more stability? 
Would an early plebisicite and election have established a 
popular government which would have been able to establish 
law and order and begin reconstruction, or would they have 
led to right-wing dominance far more extreme than that which 
came into effect after March 1946, or even civil war? There 
seems little doubt that an early plebiscite and election 
would have returned the King and a royalist assembly, in 
view of the actual results when the votes were taken. 
Whether this would have been more dangerous in, say, the 
summer of 1945, than a year later is impossible to estab- 
lish. What is evident is that British policy succeeded in 
preventing further civil war for eighteen months, and held 
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the political system together until 1947, although not 
without great difficulty. - 
~J6-'American policy from the time of the plebiscite is 
analysed in greater depth in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter VII 
Economic Support for Greece 
January 1945--January 1947 
1. The Economic Situation 
From the time of the plebiscite onwards, Greece was in 
the throes of the Third Round, that is, the organised rising 
of the EAM. Whether this was a reaction to the violence of 
the extreme right or a deliberate'attempt to seize control 
of the country is a not a question for this work, nor is the 
matter of whether it was an action directed by Stalin. ' The 
significant point is that the revolt prevented the Govern- 
ment from maintaining law and order in many areas of Greece 
from the autumn of 1946 onwards. Its strength can most 
easily be demonstrated by the fact that it required three 
years to bring it to an end, even with extensive American 
economic and military aid. The increasing pressure of the 
uprising was a major factor in British and American efforts 
to establish an effective government in this period, as well 
as amounting to an financial problem for the British. 
'These problems are discussed by Evangelos Averoff- 
Tossizza, By Fire and Axe <New Rochelle: Caratzas,. 
1978); D. G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965); Mavrogordatas, The 1946 
Elections and Plebiscite; - Richter, British Intervention 
in Greece; Ole L. Smith, -On the Beginning of the Greek 
Civil'War, - Scandanavian Studies in Modern Greek, I 
<1977), pp. 15-31; and Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, 
ch. 7. 
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The economic problems of Greece were as significant in 
its post-war development as those of political stability and 
law and order. The country had been in a state of actual 
famine since 1941, relieved only partially by the food 
shipments of the Red Cross. There had been massive physical 
destruction of houses, olive groves, vineyards, machinery, 
and ships, the main sources of Greek income and subsistence. 
The shortages of food and every other sort of commodity, 
coupled with a failure of successive governments to balance 
the budget, had brought about spiraling inflation until the 
only standard of value was the gold sovereign. The military 
forces entering Greece brought with them emergency supplies 
for the civilian population, and in April 1945 UNRRA began a 
full-scale programme of relief which continued into mid- 
1947.2 These measures were only palliative; there was a 
desperate need for outside financial assistance for recon- 
struction and for stringent controls on the Greek economy. 
Even before the truce which halted the civil war in 
January 1945, the Greek Government was asking the British 
and American Governments to take over the costs of the Greek 
Armed Forces, in order to preserve their foreign exchange 
assets for the purchase abroad of necessary consumer goods. - 
After considerable negotiation, the British Government 
agreed to assume the costs of food pay and equipment of the 
War Department message, 6 January, and MacVeagh's tele- 
grams, 8 January and 12 March, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 193-194 
and 201-202. 
=aMacVeagh's telegrams, 26 and 30 January, ibid., pp. 
195-197. 
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new armed forces, and continued this support until May 
1947. 
- 
So far as reconstruction was concerned, the British 
pinned most of their hopes on the United States. When 
arrangements were being made to turn over the functions of 
Military Liaison (the military relief operation) to UNRRA in 
mid-March 1945, Leeper recommended to MacVeagh that the 
joint Anglo-American committee system which had supervised 
ML should be retained to advise the Greek Government on 
economic matters. MacVeagh disagreed and advised the State 
Department against such an arrangement, since it would 
amount to the sharing with the British the responsibility 
for the success or failure of a Greek reconstruction problem 
which cannot fail to become involved in local politics'. If 
the United States were to assume some role in advising the 
Greek Government, it should be carried out behind the scenes 
in order to avoid embarrassment. The State Department 
agreed completely. - 
The day after the State Department's reply, Roosevelt 
wrote to Churchill in quite a different vein, suggesting 
'Further details on the British support of the Greek Armed 
Forces in note 24, this chapter. 
15MacVeagh's telegram and State Department reply, 14 and 20 
March, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 202-203,211-212. In July 1945, 
Governor Lehman, the American Director of UNRRA, visited 
Athens and urged MacVeagh to join with the British 
Embassy in advising the Greek Government on UNRRA 
affairs. MacVeagh 'explained to him at length the 
superior position enjoyed by the British here in con- 
sequence of their political and military tutelage over 
the country, and emphasised that American advice can, in 
my opinion (and in accordance with the [State] Depart- 
ment's instructions), be most effectively rendered if 
given independently of an association inevitably over- 
shadowing in Greek eyes' (ibid. p. 229, n. 50). 
230 
that a three-power economic commision for Greece be estab- 
lished comprised of persons such as Oliver Lyttleton, the 
British Minister of Production; Donald Nelson, the former 
Chairman of the American War Production Board, and Anastas 
Mikoyan, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Trade. Churchill 
pointed out all the disadvantages of a commission which 
included the Soviets, but used this as a welcome opportunity 
to recommend a joint Anglo-American committee to advise the 
Greek Government on economic matters. In a memorandum 
prepared by the State Department, the President agreed that 
inviting the Russians was probably not a good idea. At the 
same time he rejected the Anglo-American committee proposal 
on grounds that it would violate the principles of Yalta. 
Also included was a reference to Leeper-s discussion with 
MacVeagh and the Department's confirmation of MacVeagh-s 
views. 13 The British Government, both in London and through 
its Athens Embassy continued to press for American partici- 
pation on joint Anglo-Greek economic committees, often by 
urging the Greek Government to invite the Americans to send 
representatives to meetings, and by describing various 
committees as `tripartite".: 
Roosevelt, 21 March; Churchill, 3 April, State Department 
draft reply, undated, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 203-208; it was 
formalised and signed by Roosevelt, 8 April (Kimball, 
Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, III, 618-619). 
''A discussion of this situation, with exact details, is in 
MacVeagh-s telegram, 18 June, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 224-228. 
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2. Limited American Aid 
While both the British and American Governments recog- 
nised that there were major economic and financial problems 
involved in Greece after the liberation, it was not until 
the autumn of 1945 that the desperate situation began to be 
recognised. In October the Senior Deputy Director of UNRRA, 
Commander R. G. A. Jackson, reported to the Director General 
the signs of an approaching economic breakdown. This he 
blamed on the failure of the Greek Government to take 
positive action to reform the economic and fiscal systems. 
In his view, only intervention from outside could save the 
situation. He recommended the formation of an economic 
advisory mission by the major powers, Britain, the United 
States and Canada (Canada was a major contributor to UNRRA). 
Jackson felt that unless action was taken within four or 
five weeks to show that these powers were intent on 
intervening in Greek economic affairs, there would be a 
collapse so severe as to make further help of no value. - 
Jackson's messages made the State Department 
'increasingly apprehensive of a possible breakdown of Greek 
Government machinery-. They saw no possibility of American 
loans to a country 'offering such little financial and 
economic stability as Greece at this time', but indicated 
that they were giving serious consideration to Jackson's 
Jackson's three messages, 27 and 28 October, FRUS, 1945, 
VIII, 246-251. 
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recommendations. MacVeagh, asked for his opinion, did not 
play down the seriousness of the economic situation, but was 
not convinced that a complete disaster was imminent. He 
also opposed the United States joining any semi-permanent 
economic advisory body. He was hopeful that early elections 
would do more to improve the economy than would be possible 
through technical advice. - 
At the same time, General William Morgan (British 
Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean in succession 
to Alexander), and Field Marshall Alan Brooke (Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff who was visiting the theatre), had 
reported that the Greek economic problem was more desperate 
than ever. Morgan saw the problem as a military one, citing 
the `Red Tide" in Greece's northern neighbours, and sug- 
gested that the projected withdrawal of a large number of 
British troops and the ending of British financial support 
to the Greek Armed Forces (due to end 1 January 1946), 
coupled with the chaotic economic situation, would leave 
Greece vulnerable to invasion. Unless the United States was 
prepared to play a more active role in the country, the 
British should cut their losses and abandon Greece. Morgan 
felt the most useful Ae3 i" contribution would be a 
garrison of United State troops or at least air force units 
alongside the British. He recommended that Attlee discuss 
Greece with Truman on his forthcoming visit to Washington. - 
State Department telegram, 2 November, and MacVeagh-s 
telegram, 5 November, Ibid., pp. 252-253,257-258. 
"Kirk-s telegrams, 2 and 4 November, Ibid., pp. 251-254. 
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The State Department took note of Morgans recommenda- 
tions and prepared a memorandum for Truman, warning that 
Attlee might broach the subject, While the Department could 
not agree to the acceptance of any military responsibility 
in Greece, they felt the situation 'critical enough to 
justify active steps on our part-. If matters worsened, it 
might not be possible to hold the election under conditions 
which would ensure a fair decision. The fear of an invasion 
from the North was mentioned. The 'active steps- proposed 
amounted only to telling the Greeks that the United States 
was deeply concerned; urging them to undertake -a stringent 
program of economic stablization-; letting them know that 
any future loans to Greece would depend on how well they did 
this; and offering the services of some technical experts. 
Since primary responsibilities in Greece rested with the 
British, no action should be taken until proposals were 
discussed with London. Truman approved holding such dis- 
cussions, but declined to commit himself until he was aware 
of the results.,, 
After it was clear that the British approved and 
MacVeagh had been consulted, the State Department prepared a 
draft note to be sent to the Greek Government to incorporate 
the warnings and the offer of technical experts. It did 
include the announcement of a $25,000,000 Export-Import Bank 
loan, but the overall effect was stern. Truman sent the 
draft back to the State Department, saying it was harshly 
: ': 'Memoranda, Ibid., pp. 263-267. Attlee apparently did not 
mention Greece in his talks with Truman (Ibid., p. 252, 
n. 98). 
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worded. He commented: `While I am not an expert in the 
matter, cant we say the same things and implement the same 
policy in a little more friendly way. - The note was duly 
, 
(¬(ivere. d 
amended, approved by Truman, and eventually de's to the 
Greek Government on 12 January 1946; a public announcement 
of its contents was made the same day. 12 This action was 
taken at exactly the same time, the British provided the 
110,000,000 grant f or'stabilisation of the currency and the 
cancellation of the Greek war debt, but there is no evidence 
that the two actions were coordinated. 
The $25,000,000 Export-Import Bank credit arranged by 
the United States was the culmination of negotiations going 
back to the Bretton Woods conference of July 1944, when 
Kyriakos Varvaressos, Governor of the Bank of Greece and 
Ambassador Extraordinary for Economic Affairs, visited 
Stettinius, then Under Secretary of State. Varvaressos 
provided a careful review of the assistance already given by 
the British, Americans and Canadians, along with an analysis 
4overn ment 
of the urgent needs of the Greek Gve. n =en-t, and concluded 
with a request for a loan of $25,000,000. 
A few days later, Alexander Argyropoulos of the Greek 
Foreign Office, met with State Department officials and 
MacVeagh (then on leave in Washington) to discuss this 
request. According to Foy Kohler, who had called the 
meeting, -it was understood some time ago that if we looked 
I-Baxter-s report, 10 January, State Department telegram, 
28 November, MacVeagh-s telegram, 1 December, Acheson"s 
memoranda, 20 December and 3 January, and Truman-s note, 
22 December, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 267 (n. 17), 272,275-6, 
290-291,299. 
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after Greece's dollar needs, the British would take care of 
what they want in pounds, and it does not appear that what 
they need in dollar exchange now is anything like the sum 
requested'. In addition, the Americans feared that money 
loaned to Greece might be used to reimburse the British. 
Argyropoulos was asked to provide more details of Greek 
needs and the purposes for which the money was to be used. ':. ':, 
The State Department was generally favourable to this 
loan, despite their unenthusiastic attitude in their dis- 
cussions with the Greek representatives. At the time, such 
a loan was prohibited by American law, since Greece had 
defaulted on its World War I debts, and had not made the 
partial payments required by the Hoover Moratorium of 1932. 
There was now hope that new legislation could be obtained to 
n egoti qt/ons 
avoid this difficulty. In the meantime, to tthn con- 
tinued in order to define the terms of the proposal, but no 
real progress was made. Varvaressos returned to Washington 
in May for further talks about the loan, and was given some 
encouragement, but the legal ban was then still in force. 
On 31 July 1945, Greece, along with most other nations who 
tCVarvaressos memorandum, 27 July, and Kohler-s memorandum, 
5 August, FRUS, 1944, V, 216-222; Kohler-s statement 
(italics in original), Iatrides, MacVeagh, p. 578. 
Kohler was apparently referring to a British statement of 
September 1942, which indicated that the Foreign Office 
accepted that Greek requirements for sterling would be a 
responsibility of Britain (FRUS, 1942, II, 803-804). It 
is not clear as to when or whether the United States had 
agreed to provide necessary dollars. 
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were members of the International Monetary Fund, was freed 
from the provisions of the old law. - 
Shortly afterward, Varvaressos, now Deputy Prime 
Minister, made a radio broadcast in which he said that the 
American Import-Export Bank had invited Greece to submit an 
official request for a loan. He continued by saying that 
the request had already been submitted in the amount of two 
hundred and fifty million dollars and we are certain that 
it will be accepted. - He added that Greece could obtain 
further amounts from the International Bank for Recon- 
struction which was to be established in the near future. 
MacVeagh asked the State Department for the basis for the 
`astronomical expectations- of the Greeks, and was told that 
there was none; there might be some moderate loans to 
Greece. In a few weeks, MacVeagh reported that almost daily 
references in the Greek press to the large loan were 
convincing the Greek people that the sum was assured, so 
that the eventual denial by the United States would have 
unfortunate repercussions. The State Department instructed 
him to impress upon the Greek Government that the 
$250,000,000 was not being taken seriously. l-' 
"State Department telegrams, 25 October and 7 November, 
Murray's memorandum, 28 October, and MacVeagh-s telegram, 
14 November, FRUS, 1944, V, 222-223 and nn. 55 and 57, 
224-227; Baxter"s memorandua, 3 and 5 May, and Clayton's 
letter, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 213-215 and n. 27. 
1sMacVeagh"s telegrams 18 and 21 August, 20 September, 2 
October, and 5 January, Greek Ambassador's letter, 20 
August, and State Department telegrams, 25 August and 22 
September, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 232-236 and n. 66,243-244, 
and 299-300. 
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The American authorities informed the Greek Ambassador 
that, pending action on the large loan, they should submit a 
separate request for the $25,000,000 amount, which would 
receive favourable consideration. In a subsequent dis- 
cussion, it was made clear that any additional amounts would 
have to be the subject of new proposals. The Greek Govern- 
ment was not able to submit a detailed plan explaining how 
the twenty-five million dollars was to be used until mid- 
November, and this had to be modified in the light of the 
Athens Embassy's knowledge of the real needs of Greece. 
While the stern message sent in draft to Truman for approval 
on 20 December included a definite statement that the loan 
would be forthcoming, it was not approved until 9 January, 
which accounts for the delay until 12 January 1946 in 
notification to the Greek Government. - 
3. British Financial Aid 
At about the same time the State Department was 
reacting to the UNRRA and Morgan appreciations, the Foreign 
Office told the American Ambassador in London that they were 
concerned about the deterioration of the Greek economy, and 
that Hector McNeil was being sent to Athens to give some 
strength and encouragement ' to the new Greek Government of 
"State Department memoranda, 25 September and 19 October, 
MacVeagh-s telegrams, 5 and 29 November, State Department 
telegrams 16 and 28 November and 11 December, ibid., pp. 
237-238,245-246,256-257,269-270,272-274,283; 
Acheson"s telegram, 10 January, FRUS, 1946, VII, 89-90. 
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Kannellopoulos. 3.7 As discussed in Chapter 6, McNeil 
offered a British economic mission in return for Greek 
promises to reform the military and proceed with the 
election. 
Even though the Greeks held out for significant 
financial aid as a quid-pro-quo for reform, McNeil recom- 
mended to London that the British send out an economic 
mission to Greece in any case, suggesting American partici- 
pation. Bevin made a formal request to the American 
Government to participate in the mission and to join them in 
sending the Greeks an identic message. This would say that 
Greece had sufficient reserve foreign currency to purchase 
necessary goods, and therefore there was no urgent need for 
loans. The two powers would try to provide needed materials 
for reconstruction, but Greece would have to stablise the 
economy through its own efforts. At the same time, it 
suggested that assistance already given Greece through UNRRA 
and other aid would be wasted unless the Greek Government 
took immediate steps to halt inflation by instituting heavy 
taxes. 
The American Government made no answer to Bevin, 
although the State Department informed MacVeagh that there 
would be no American participation in the proposed economic 
mission. Despite a letter of reminder from the British 
Embassy, the State Department still had not replied to 
either message after five weeks, and had not even told its 
representatives in London of their attitude. No record has 
1'Winant-s telegram, 7 November, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 262. 
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been found of any written reply to Bevin, although it would 
appear that the British Embassy in Washington was told 
informally of the American position. - The British Economic 
Mission arrived in Athens in mid-December and made great 
efforts to help the Greeks with so little success that the 
head of the Mission wanted it abandoned within nine months 
of its inception. It did serve a useful purpose at least in 
reporting the economic and financial problems of Greece. " 
Even though McNeil had denied the possibility of 
financial aid, the Greek Government began pressing Britain 
for a large loan for reconstruction purposes. The need was 
fully recognised, but Britain's own financial problems made 
it unlikely. Britain finally proposed an arrangement by 
which they would make a loan of ten million pounds to 
provide backing for the Greek currency, with the proviso 
that the future issue of drachmae would be regulated by a 
currency control commission on which British and American 
representatives would play a major part. 
It was made clear that Britain would provide no further 
funds for rehabilitation or reconstruction, although Greece 
would be supported in any applications for loans from the 
new International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. 
''Foreign Office telegrams 12159 and 13021,4 December, 
F0371/48388/R20345 and R21439; Washington Embassy tele- 
gram 8264 and Foreign Office telegram 12081,2 December, 
48416/R20791 and 20388; MacVeagh"s telegrams, 15 and 16 
November; British Aide-Memoire, 3 December, State Depart- 
ment telegram, 17 December, and Baxter memorandum, 10 
January, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 267-269,276-277,288-289, 
295-296, and p. 296, n. 57. 
"'General Clarke-s memorandum, 30 August, F0371/58803/ 
R13630. 
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The Greeks were also required to take steps to balance their 
budget, increase taxes, reduce the size of the civil 
service, and limit wage increases. Britain would also waive 
repayment of £46,000,000 loaned to Greece during the war. 
The Foreign Office had great difficulty in convincing the 
Treasury, but Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
finally gave in, telling Bevin, 'I have little confidence 
in Tsouderos and Co. and I rely on you to put all possible 
pressure on them to do their duty so that we shan`t have 
thrown this 110 million down the drain! '-c' 
The State Department, not surprisingly, objected to the 
idea of an American representative on the currency control 
commission. This would amount to `participation in the 
internal affairs of a friendly foreign nation far in excess 
1ý 
of that to which the United States had heretofore been 
willing to agree'. It was possible that the commission 
might fail to achieve its aims, in which case the United 
States would 'share the onus of such failure and become 
subject to attack in Greek politics'. In a message to the 
Greek Government, Byrnes repeated-both these objections, but 
agreed to allow an American citizen to serve on the body in 
a private capacity` provided that it was clearly understood 
that the participation by an American national in no way 
committed the United States to providing any additional 
financial support. The American member was to be selected 
x`: 'The package was announced publicly on 25 January 1946 (418 Fart. Deb., cols, 451-454. The Joint Leeper/MacVeagh 
appeal, 11 January, FRUS, 1946, VII, 91-92; summary of 
British discussions on economic aid, 24 December, F0371/ 
8338/R21610; Dalton letter, 14 January, 58721/R979. 
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by the Greek Government from an informal list of persons the 
U. S. Government would suggest. - 
The British package of economic aid and the conditions 
imposed on the Greek Government were transmitted to Tsou- 
deros on 24 January, three days after the publication of the 
U. S. note announcing the $25,000,000 Export/Import Bank 
credit, along with the appeal for reforms. It was accepted 
by the Greek Government and given a moderate welcome by the 
Greek public; there was some recognition of the difficult 
pSltton 
of Britain. Within a few weeks, the British Cabinet 
was sent -a flaming warning-1-2 by Dalton on the state of the 
deficit in the balance of payments. He included a memo- 
randum by Lord Keynes on the general financial problems of 
the nation. This included a statement that aid to Greece 
would have to be reduced, with a recommendation that Britain 
should attempt to induce the Americans to assume some of the 
burden, once UNRRA aid ended.: -- 
In mid-April, Norton wrote to Sargent concerning the 
costs of the Greek Armed Forces. The British had been 
supplying rations, uniforms and weapons under the Anglo- 
Hellenic Agreement of 1942, but this commitment had expired 
on 1 January 1946. The annual cost of this requirement was 
almost exactly equivalent to the total estimated revenue of 
Greece for the same period. Bevin warned the Cabinet that, 
'State Department telegram, 10 January, Byrnes memorandum 
to Tsouderos, 15 January, and Winant's telegram, 22 
January, FRUS, 1946, VII, 89,95-96,100-104. 
"Dalton, Diaries, 9 February 1946, 
1ýtP(46)58,9 February, CAB129/7; Dalton, Diaries, 18 
February. 
unless further outside aid could be obtained, the Greek 
forces would have to be reduced to the extent that they 
could not be effective against an invasion from the north. 
The Chiefs of Staff recommended that Britain resume payment 
of the sterling costs, about £15,000,000 annually. In June, 
the Cabinet decided to restore aid until the end of 1946, 
and in July the Defence Committee of the Cabinet extended 
this period to 31 March 1947. Dalton was most unhappy, 
claiming that the Greeks had not made good use of the funds 
already given them, but finally agreed. He made it clear 
that there should be no further loans.; -- 
With very minor exceptions, the funds for the armed 
forces were to be the only financial aid given by Britain to 
Greece after the currency stablisation loan of January 1946. 
In all, British financial aid to Greece from January 1944 to 
January 1947 amounted to thirty million pounds in support of 
the Greek armed forces, plus the ten million pounds for the 
""DO(46)23rd, 7 March, CAB131/1; Norton's letter, 15 April, 
58766/R6356; Norton's telegram 1201,27 May, 58729/ 
R7947; CP(46)213,30 May, CAB129/10; CM(46)54,3 June, 
CAB128/7; DO(46)91,15 July, CAB131/3; Minute, 20 July, 
F0371/58701/R11673. 
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currency fund.: xý As late as November 1946, it was assumed 
that reconstruction aid was not really needed. Donald 
Maclean, of the Washington Embassy, told the State Depart- 
ment then that the Foreign Office had assumed that Greece 
could find assets to tide them over, but a recent message 
ino4ic. cted 
from Norton had that the situation was grave. 
4. Attempts to Obtain American Aid 
In considering the problem, the Foreign Office staff 
thought of one posible, if only partial, solution. Bevin 
had had a discussion concerning Greece with Byrnes during 
the Paris Foreign Ministers Conference in April, during 
which, according to the British records, Byrnes said, -The 
Communists must be kept out of Greece at all costs-. While 
no American record of this remark has been found, it was to 
lz4'The most detailed breakdown of British aid to Greece, 
1944-1947, is that dated 29 January 1947 in F0371/67032/ 
R2438; this agrees almost exactly with the figures in 
Dalton`s letter to Attlee of 17 February 1947, Ibid., 
R2443. This estimate is confirmed by a most careful 
examination of accounts by Foreign Office and Treasury 
officials in early 1948 (72279/R2487>. Dalton's figures 
of eighty-seven million pounds (434 Parl. Deb., cols. 
650-651 (6 March 1947) are misleading; they apparently 
include forty-eight million pounds for the maintenance of 
British forces in Greece, most of which would have had to 
be spent wherever these troops were stationed. No con- 
firmation has been found for Bullock's statement in 
Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary (London: Heinemann, 
1983>, p. 161, that Britain made available a loan of 
twenty-four million pounds for reconstruction. 
"Memorandum, 18 November, FRUS, 1946, VII, 264. 
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be quoted by the British for the next year as a promise by 
the United States to provide aid to Greece. ==, r 
Byrnes" statement gave the Foreign Office the idea that 
it might be possible to induce the Americans to share 
whatever financial burdens would otherwise fall exclusively 
on our own shoulders`. Hayter approved the idea, although 
he pointed out: `Possibly the present moment, when we are 
trying to involve the Americans in Palestine, is not the 
best one to involve them in Greece. Alternatively it must 
be held that it is better to make them swallow both at one 
gulp. - Another official had doubts about pinning the 
Americans down. He felt they I were taking a very good line 
in resisting the Soviet pretensions just now and they might 
be inclined to feel that we were trying to commit them too 
far and to resent it-. 
A draft proposal suggested that Bevin discuss the 
matter with Byrnes during their June meeting in Paris, but 
this was marked suspend", apparently on Sargent-s 
instructions. '-' This decision may have been influenced by a 
messaage from the Washington Embassy that the State 
Department expected the Greeks to have a stable economy by 
"Foreign Office minute, 9 May 1946, F0371/58767/R6382. 
British discussions concerning possible American aid 
to Greece continually quote such a statement of Byrnes. 
American records mention a conversation of Bevin and 
Byrnes concerning Greece on 26 April but there is no 
quotation similar to this, or anything about a communist 
threat to Greece (FRUS, 1946, VII, 148-149). 
"Minutes, 9,10, and 27 May, F0371/58766/R6356. 
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1947 and to need no external assistance, except for Inter- 
national Monetary Fund aid. -- 
July saw a new attempt of the Greek Government to 
obtain more financial assistance. The Greek Embassy in 
Washington sent a telegram to Tsaldaris, just before he left 
for Paris and London, saying that a senior officer of the 
Export-Import Bank had urged the Greeks to apply for large- 
scale loans for reconstruction. The Greek Government there- 
fore developed a proposal for a loan of six billion dollars 
'(£1,500,000,000) over a period of five years. Tsaldaris 
approached the British first for this amount, pointing out 
that the Greeks did not know whether to turn to the 
Americans or not. On 12 July, he eventually revealed the 
apparent American offer and asked whether there would be any 
objection to going to Washington to discuss it. Dalton was 
very much in favour of asking for as much American aid as 
possible. -c-, 
The British leaders were not aware that Tsaldaris"s 
economic advisor had already described the proposal to 
Leonard Unger, who served Byrnes in the same capacity. 
Unger-s record shows that he strongly discouraged hopes of 
Washington Embassy telegram 3193,16 May, Treasury 
Records, Class 236 (hereinafter T236), File: OF48/34/1A. 
No copy has been found in Foreign Office records. An 
internal Treasury minute in the same file sets forth the 
view that the State Department figures were based on out- 
of-date Greek statistics. Treasury officials believed 
that Greece might meet her foreign exchange requirements 
for 1947 by selling off her reserves, but would then be 
destitute in 1948. 
'-'°Stephen G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, pp. 257ff; 
minutes, 8-10 July, F0371/58906/R10729; London Embassy 
telegram, 18 July, FRUS, 1946, VII, 183-184. 
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any loan of such magnitude, and reported his conversation to 
Byrnes. It would appear that Byrnes did not have time to 
read Unger's memorandum before the Greek Prime Minister 
visited the Secretary of State on 5 July. Tsaldaris told 
Byrnes that Unger had found the Greek proposal reasonable. 
Byrnes" Political Advisor who was present pointed out 
. 
that 
the Greeks were asking for six billion dollars, an amount 
which Byrnes might not think was within the realm of 
possibilities-. The Secretary of State agreed and Tsaldaris 
was quick to point out that the figure was only tentative. 
Byrnes did ask the State Department to examine the possi- 
bility of additional Export-Import Bank aid. -' 
Within hours of Dalton-s approval of an approach to the 
Americans, Tsaldaris called on the American Ambassador in 
London, Averell Harriman. He told him of the reported 
willingness of the Import-Export Bank to grant large-scale 
loans, and of his conversation with Byrnes in Paris, 
although he did not seem to have mentioned that the latter 
had given little hope for any major aid. He wanted Harriman 
to arrange for visit to Washington by Greek economic experts 
to discuss their proposals with the Export-Import Bank. 
Harriman reported the visit to the State Department who 
replied that the Greek Embassy telegram which began this 
imbroglio had seriously misrepresented the attitude of the 
Export-Import Bank. All that had been said was that the 
Bank would examine any new Greek requests; no encouragement 
'Unger-s memorandum, and memorandum of Byrnes' con- 
versation with Tsaldaris, both 5 July, FRUS, 1946, VII, 
175-179. 
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had been given. The chances of further loans from this 
source were very slim. The Bank had little in the way of 
uncommitted funds; there were other deserving countries 
which had not received any loans; and, the Greeks had not 
yet used any of the $25,000,000 credit granted in January. 
However, a Greek mission could be sent to Washington to 
discuss general economic problems, so long as it was 
understood that the Greek public was not given the 
impression that a loan was to be discussed. ty 
Despite this warning, the Greek mission which arrived 
almost immediately in Washington asked for a new Export- 
Import credit in the amount of $175,000,000. The State 
Department reported this to Truman, along with an account of 
the UNRRA aid which had already been given to Greece, and 
the fact that the January credit had not been touched. It 
was pointed out that the Greeks had been warned that no loan 
would be discussed. Truman met the mission and made it 
clear that any further aid would be dependent on Greek 
efforts to deal with its own economic problems. The mission 
left Washington empty-handed, although a month later credits 
of $35,000,000 were granted for the Greek purchase of 
American surplus war property. ::;, 
'Harriman-s telegram, 12 July, and State Department reply, 
13 July, FRUS, 1946, VII, 180-182. 
: 'Memoranda of Acheson and Baxter's memorandum, both 7 
August, and State Department telegrams, 14 August and 7 
September, FRUS, 1946, VII, 187-188 and n. 46,190-191, 
and 201-202. There is no evidence of a connection 
between the visit of the Greek mission and the additional 
aid for the purchase of surplus property. 
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As the months went on, the British became more and more 
aware of the need of financial aid for Greece. After 
another telegram from Athens, officials of the Foreign 
Office and the Treasury met in late September to consider 
ways and means. It was hoped that the United States might 
be persuaded to provide reconstruction aid, although there 
was little chance that the Americans would share the cost of 
the maintenance of the Greek Armed Forces. This expenditure 
now amounted to the only financial aid the British were 
providing, but it was a burden which had been expected to 
end by mid-1946. With the increase in the guerrilla 
activity, it seemed impossible to withdraw or reduce the 
subsidy; in fact, far greater support for the armed forces 
was badly needed. 
As a result of these discussions, Bevin sent a formal 
letter to Dalton, then in Washington. This recommended that 
a British promise to extend its support of the Greek Armed 
Forces until the end of 1947 be used as a lever to secure 
the largest possible American reconstruction loan. There 
was an implication that Dalton might begin negotiations with 
the Americans. The Chancellor sent word back to London to 
the effect that he wished action on this proposal deferred 
until his return. He saw little chance of any aid beyond 
March 1947. -- 
Without waiting for a reply from Dalton, Bevin wrote to 
Attlee asking permission to refer the question of the 
: 
-"'Selby's minute, 17 September and Bevin's letter, 23 
September, F0371/58767/R13693 and R14121; Trend's tele- 
gram, 4 October, and his letter, 3 October, 58768/R14969, 
R15437. 
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strategic importance of Greece and that of the amount of 
future support to be given it to the Chiefs of Staff. 
Attlee agreed and thus set in motion an extensive exami- 
nation of the Greek problem which was to go on for the next 
four months. Considerable attention in the deliberations of 
the Chiefs of Staff was given to reports of a discussion on 
15 October between A. V. Alexander*-, Minister without Port- 
folio (soon to become Minister of Defence) and Byrnes 
concerning Greece and Turkey. Byrnes expressed a definite 
interest in providing equipment for the Greek forces, and 
mentioned that he was sending an economic mission to Greece 
to study the long-term economic needs. The Foreign Office 
took Byrnes- statements as an indication that America would 
take a much greater interest in Greek affairs. =i" 
The Chiefs of Staff almost immediately directed the 
Joint Planning Staff to prepare a detailed study for 
presentation at an early date. This resulted in two reports 
covering all aspects of the Greek problem. ----/ So far as 
financial assistance was concerned, the Planning Staff 
'Albert Victor Alexander (1885-1965), Cooperative Society 
leader and long-time Labour member of Parliament; First 
Lord of the Admiralty, 1929-1931,1940-1945, and 1945- 
1946; Minister without Portfolio, October-December 1946; 
Minister of Defence, 1947-1950. 
: ''Bevan to Attlee, 30 September, and Attlee's reply, 1 
October, F0371/58709/R14591; and Selby's minute, 11 
October, 58731/R14873. The British report and discussion 
of this meeting are in 58658/R15770 and R15933. The only 
account found in American records is the memorandum given 
to the American Embassy in Athens by the British Embassy 
(FRUS, 1946, VII, 913-915). 
"JP(46)199(Fina1), 4 November, and JP(46)204(Final), 
11 November, F0371/58658/R16257, R16564. 
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strongly recommended continued British support of the Greek 
armed forces, along with a major effort to obtain as much 
American aid as possible. The Chiefs of Staff approved the 
two reports on 6 and 13 November, and recommended a 
conference to consider the implementation of the Planning 
Staff's views. > 
Attlee ordered that the conference be postponed until 
Bevin (then in New York) and Alexander could be present. 
The matter came up again in the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 
25 November, but Attlee this time stated that the matter 
required a major Cabinet decision which could not be taken 
in the absence of Bevin and Alexander. *-" No further 
reference has been found of discussion of the problem by the 
Chiefs of Staff or at Cabinet level until early January. 
The Foreign Office was impatient to put pressure on the 
Americans. At about the same time the Chiefs of Staff were 
discussing the first of the two planning studies, 
instructions were sent to the Washington Embassy to tell 
Clayton, the senior economic officer of the State Depart- 
ment, that -our main and perhaps only contribution towards 
assisting Greece in 1947 would be the supply of equipment to 
the Greek armed forces-. At first glance this would appear 
to be a threat of a major reduction in support, but it was 
followed by a statement that the British `would do no more 
than look after the Greek armed forces and hoped the United 
States would look after economic rehabilitation. - Clayton 
"COS(46)163,6 November, and COS(46)167,13 November, 
CAB? 9/53. 
: a`''COS(46)171,25 November, CAB79/54. 
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did promise to attempt to obtain some aid for Greece, but 
stressed that it was essential in making such a request to 
Congress to be able to state how much others Ei. e., the 
British] were contributing. 4° 
The possibility that the British were threatening to 
limit further aid to equipment is also weakened by a message 
to Washington of 19 November which stated that the Foreign 
Office was thinking of thirty to thirty-five million pounds 
aid to the Greek Armed Forces over a four year period, 
provided the United States contributed between twenty-five 
and forty million pounds in 1947 for reconstruction. A few 
days later London forbade the Embassy to use this proposal 
in any discussions with the State Department. 41 
In late November, in spite of a note from Attlee 
specifically forbidding action on Greek matters until Bevin 
and Alexander returned, the Foreign Office prepared a draft 
telegram to Bevin instructing him to approach Byrnes on aid 
to Greece. Attlee refused to approve the message on grounds 
that this might leave Bevin in the position of half- 
promising that we will do any-thing, providing the Americans 
take up their load-. According to Hector McNeil, who 
discussed the draft with Attlee, He was particularly sore 
because under the scheme we would still be left to carry the 
"The instructions were in Foreign Office telegram 10608, 
which has not been located, but its contents are inferred 
from Washington Embassy telegram 6755,22 November, which 
also reports Clayton's reactions and an informal warning 
that Congress would expect the British to share in 
providing reconstruction aid (F0371/58659/R16975). 
"Foreign Office telegrams 10957 and 11506,10 November and 
9 December, F0371/58658/R15942 and 56659/R16975. 
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political animus even if the Americans remain [sic] for the 
full amount. - The Prime Minister did agree that Bevin might 
see what ideas the Americans have. On 3 December, a tele- 
gram to this effect was sent to Bevin in New York, with 
Attlee"s approval. The last paragraph read: -I [McNeil] 
think I should tell you that in my opinion the whole 
question of our policy towards Greece and Turkey is in the 
melting pot, and that there is a very great reluctance here 
to contemplate a continuation of our military, financial and 
political commitments in Greece. --- 
Bevin replied almost immediately that he could not 
approach Byrnes as suggested; all he could do was inform him 
of the situation and urge haste in sending the proposed 
American economic mission. Bevin went on: 
The last paragraph of [your message] has come 
to me not only as a surprise but as a shock. The 
policy of the Government has been based hitherto on 
the assumption that Greece and Turkey are essential 
to our political and strategic position in the 
world and I have constantly had that assumption in 
mind in my conversations both with the US of A and 
Russia, and it has been one of the underlying 
assumptions in our negotiations for the peace 
treaties 
.... 
Am I to understand that we may 
now abandon this policy? I really do not know 
where I stand. -- 
McNeil's attitude in his message to Bevin is curious, 
in view of the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff that 
aid to Greece should be continued, but some light is shed by 
a note of 9 December from McNeil to Sargent. Entitled Two 
Points on Greek Affairs', it states: 
4`McNeils minute, 2 December, and Foreign Office telegram 
2712,3 December, F0371/58659/R17594. 
=Kevin's telegram 2295,5 December, ibid., 817720. 
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EB very grumpy, but eased when told PM would 
not take action until EB returned. 
My conversation with PM very straight forward, 
but he did say to me that he had another high 
military opinion which substantiated his doubts 
about our rightness. 4 
It is not clear whether Attlee or the Foreign Office 
was doubting whether Greece should be supported, but an 
uncontradicted minute written shortly afterwards in the 
Foreign Office points out the serious dangers of abandoning 
Greece. - It would therefore seem that Attlee was the 
dubious party. 
5. Hints of a New American Attitude 
While there were no further British attempts to involve 
the Americans until the beginning of 1947, there were some 
indications that help might be forthcoming. Shortly after 
the Bevin-Byrnes conversation in Paris in April, the British 
Embassy in Athens reported that conversations with the U. S. 
Charg6 d"Affaires -leave the impression but no more that 
American assistance is not impossible'. aE, During the Paris 
Peace Conference of July-October, Byrnes and Bevin discussed 
the economic problems of Greece. Byrnes promised that the 
United States would try to help with economic aid, but no 
44Loc. cit. 
4r'Williams- minute, 19 December, Ibid., R18501. 
4 Norton's telegram 1201,27 May, F0371158729/R7947; this 
file also contains a letter of the same date from H. 
Somerville-Smith of the Treasury expressing a similar 
view. 
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specific measures appear to have been mentioned. Byrnes 
did initiate a new policy of aid for Greece at about this 
time, but no indication has been found that his discussions 
with Bevin were in any way responsible. 
The Americans were slowly moving towards a more 
positive approach to involvement abroad during the first 
half of 1946, but the specific cause of Byrnes- change of 
attitude towards Greece was a new appraisal of the Soviet 
threat to Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean. This was 
the result of pressures on Turkey for bases in the Dar- 
danelles and the return of border territories, which cul- 
minated in a strong Soviet note to the Turks on 7 August 
1946, denouncing the Montreux Convention and making a thinly 
disguised demand for bases. " American concern for the 
eastern Mediterranean was increased with the shooting down 
of two U. S. Air Forces transport aircraft by the Yugoslavs 
in August, with the loss of American lives. 4 
a'Few details of the Byrnes-Bevin discussions have been 
found. Byrnes telegram to Acheson, 24 September, in- 
cludes a statement that the Secretary was particularly 
interested in Greece and Turkey, and follows this with a 
mention of a discussion with Bevin on Turkey (FRUS, 1946, 
VII, 223-224). It would seem logical that they discussed 
Greece as well at this time. Acheson's telegram to Mac- 
Veagh, 8 November, recounts Byrnes-Bevin discussions 
concerning Greece during this conference, but all that 
is said about financial aid is to the effect that the 
United States 'would endeavor to strengthen the economic 
position of Greece (ibid., pp. 262-263), 
'eThe circumstances surrounding the Soviet note and the 
American reaction are set forth in FRUS, 1947, VII, 827- 
856; and in Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold 
War in the Year East, pp. 359-363. 
"Details of the Yugoslav incidents, which had a serious 
effect on Administration and State Department attitudes 
to the Soviet Union, FRUS, 1946, VI, 915-956. 
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As a result of this increased tension in the area, the 
American Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a memorandum con- 
cerning the strategic importance to the United States of the 
Turkish straits. This painted out the seriousness of the 
Soviet military threat to Turkey and its probable effects on 
the countries of the Near East. At the same time, a paper 
was written in the War Department on `U. S. Security 
Interests in Greece-, which stressed the importance of 
Greece to American security and recommended substantial 
economic assistance. Ems. 
A copy of the JCS memorandum and information concerning 
the War Department study were sent to the Secretary of State 
in Paris. Byrnes cabled back to Clayton, then Acting 
Secretary of State, expressing his agreement with the JCS 
paper and the conclusions of the War Department draft. He 
therefore wished that efforts be made to provide aid to both 
Turkey and Greece. Presumably before receiving Byrnes- 
comments and instructions, Clayton sent him a letter refer- 
ring to both the JCS and War Department papers, and enclosed 
a draft memorandum of a new policy towards Greece. " Byrnes 
approved the memorandum an 1 October, and a long cable was 
sent to MacVeagh, incorporating its main points. After 
''JCS Memorandum 1704,23 August 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 
857-858; the War Department paper has not been formally 
identified, but must be the undated memorandum prepared 
on 5 September and sent to the State-War-Navy Coordina- 
ting Committee on the following day (ibid., p. 225). 
s1Byrnes' telegram, 24 September, and Clayton's letter, 25 
September, FRUS, 1947, VII, 223-226. Clayton cabled 
Byrnes on the same day, but presumably after his letter 
had been sent, that the Department concurred completely 
with Byrnes' views (icc. cit. ). The memorandum, slightly 
revised, is printed in Ibid., pp. 240-245. 
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rehearsing the theme of a Soviet threat, the paper, shorn of 
vague promises of diplomatic support, amounted to a proposal 
to sell the Greeks arms if the British were unable to 
provide them; recommendations to the Export-Import Bank that 
loans to Greece be approved, if for sound purposes; and the 
dispatch of an economic mission to Greece. " There is no 
indication that the matter was discussed with Truman. 
The economic mission had already been discussed at 
Paris by Byrnes and Tsaldaris. Its function was that of a 
fact-finding survey team, to determine Greek needs for 
reconstruction. The 'Porter Mission', as it was called 
after Paul Porter was made its Chief, did not arrive in 
Greece until mid-January 1947. It was still engaged in its 
investigations when the British finally decided to withdraw 
all financial support in February 1947.17' The plan to send 
this mission to Greece must have given the British some hope 
of American aid for reconstruction, although it was evident 
from the beginning that any positive results would be a long 
way off. The vague statements of Byrnes at his meeting with 
Alexander must have also raised British expectations, but 
more indications were to come. 
On 31 October, the Washington Embassy reported an 
interview with Loy Henderson, the Director of Near East 
"Byrnes- approval, 1 October; State Department telegram to 
Athens, 15 October; and MacVeagh-s telegram, 17 October, 
concurring in the proposed actions; FRUS, 1946, VII, 233- 
235 and n. 3. 
'Details of the Porter Mission are contained in FRUS, 
1946, VII, 254-255,257,264,266,278; and FRUS, 1947, 
V, 16-22. 
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Affairs in the State Department. Henderson had just come 
from a discussion with Byrnes and confirmed that -inasmuch 
as Turkey and Greece were of strategical importance to the 
United States, the U. S. was clearly interested in Turkish 
and Greek affairs-. Henderson indicated that while it was 
understood that the British Government would be primarily 
responsible for military assistance, this did not mean that 
the United States would not be glad to examine the possi- 
bility of helping in this field. The proposed economic 
mission would shortly visit Greece, but there was no 
indication of the extent or type of economic aid which might 
be forthcoming. No loans would be made until the mission 
had reported. The British were invited to make suggestions 
as to how Greece might be helped, even with military aid. s4 
While Byrnes' decision to accept the memorandum 
amounted to a change in his policy towards Greece, M. S. 
Williams of the Foreign Office failed to see it as signifi- 
cant, because no specific promises were made. He commented: 
The fact which emerges from this telegram is that in spite 
of Mr Byrnes rather airy assurance that we and the US should 
share responsibility for the military aid and civil recon- 
struction of Greece and Turkey, the State Dept have no clear 
"Washington Embassy telegram, 31 October 1946, F0371/ 
67032/R1609. Henderson-s comments to the British Embassy 
appear to be based on his own memorandum of 21 October, 
and a revision of the same date of the memorandum which 
had been forwarded to Byrnes in Paris. The meeting with 
the Secretary was probably the occasion for his approval 
of the final draft, which has a marginal notation that 
Byrnes approved it approximately 1 November. The 
question of aid for Greece, including loans, was also 
discussed at a conference of senior State Department 
officers, including Henderson, with Byrnes on 29 October (FRUS, 1946, VII, 240-245 and 255). 
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idea where the funds for the American share of such a plan 
are to come from. --- 
December brought a flurry of indications of United 
States interest in Greece. On the 13th, MacVeagh told 
Norton that the State Department urgently wanted lists of 
equipment needed by the Greek armed forces. MacVeagh 
`expressed concern that his Government had woken up so late 
in the day to what was at stake in Greece'. According to 
Norton, he read out an urgent telegram he was sending to 
Washington telling the State Department that the United 
States Government `should be prepared without delay to 
provide Greece with up to $80,000,000 in cash or kind for 
1947'. A delay until the report of the economic mission 
could be made might result in 'general social collapse". No 
evidence has been found in American records of a mention by 
MacVeagh of the need for this specific amount, but he did 
warn Washington at this time of the problem, using the 
phrase `inescapable consequences of social collapse'. sc- 
This was followed by a letter dated 20 December 1946 
from the American Embassy in London to Sargent, repeating 
the American concern for adequate military equipment for the 
Greek forces, and making an urgent request for lists of 
`4`Minute, 5 November 1946, F0371/58658/R15942. 
"Norton-s telegram, 14 December 1946, referring to a con- 
versation with MacVeagh on the 13th, F0371/67032/R1609; 
MacVeagh-s telegram, 14 December, FRUS, 1946, VII, 282. 
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needed materiel. Y On 26 December, Norton reportd that 
MacVeagh had shown him two further telegrams from the State 
Department. One stated that eight Dakota (C-47) aircraft 
were immediately available to the Greeks if they were 
wanted. The other asked for lists of equipment needed on an 
urgent basis. MacVeagh added that in his view the State 
Department -would cool off" unless the offer of help was 
quickly welcomed. Norton indicated that he was furnishing 
the Americans with tentative lists of equipment. }73 
The State Department did cool off. After considering 
MacVeagh-s telegram (the supposed eighty million dollar 
message), the Department notified him on 28 December that 
very little immediate financial aid could be expected. E-ý'3 
The change of atttiude may have been due to British lethargy 
in providing the lists of equipment or to the extravagant 
tone of MacVeagh-s message, but it is more likely that it 
was the result of a visit of Tsaldaris to the State 
Department in late December. The Greek Prime Minister asked 
for fifty to sixty million dollars for the next three months 
"Gallman's letter, F0371/67032/R1609. This resulted from 
MacVeagh's telegram, 16 December, in which he emphasised 
the need urgent need of military equipment for the 
Greeks. He had obtained lists of Greek requirements, and 
asked the State Department to instruct the London Embassy 
to press the British for comments. Byrnes personally 
approved this request. FRUS, 1946, VII, 282-283 and n. 
77. The British did not reply until 13 January, stating 
that no answer could be made until the whole matter has 
been considered by Ministers, which event the Foreign 
Office hopes would soon take place' (Sargent's letter to 
the American Charge d'Affaires, F0371/58768/R18414). 
51 orton-s telegram, F0371/67032/R1609. The State Depart- 
ment messages are apparently those of 13 and 19 December, 
FRUS, 1946, VII, 278-279 and 283, n. 77. 
'FRUS, 1946, VII, 285-286. 
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and a total of $1,246,000,000 over a five year period. The 
Department feared that Tsaldaris would `attempt to distort 
U. S. promises to "explore urgently possibilities of 
immediate as well as long term assistance" - to build his 
own position in Greek politics. ---- 
These fears were probably reinforced by a visit of Lord 
Inverchapel, the British Ambassador in Washington, to Byrnes 
on 4 January. Inverchapel said that his Government was 
disturbed by a statement Tsaldaris had made to the press to 
the effect that he expected to receive aid from the 
Americans in the near future. The Ambassador was told that 
no commitment had been made, although the Greeks might try 
to get a loan from the Export-Import Bank. Even this was 
not viewed with much optimism. -% No explanation is given as 
to why Inverchapel should be disturbed by the idea of an 
American loan to Greece; perhaps he was merely 
surprised that such an action should be contemplated. 
Yet with all these negative indicators, there seemed 
great optimism in the Cabinet on 30 January when the Cabinet 
decided to make the major reduction in aid to Greece., ', '-`2 
Great trust was placed in the single remark of Byrnes to 
Bevin in April and his slightly more encouraging response to 
Alexander in October. Perhaps Henderson-s story of a major 
change in State Department policy shortly after reinforced 
this view, despite M. S. Williams" characterisation of it as 
-rather airy-. 
ä- 'lState Department telegram, 3 Janaury, Ibid., pp. 286-288. 
"'Byrnes memorandum, 4 January 1947, FRUS, 1947, V, 1-2. 
1'CM(47)14, CAB128/9. 
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This interpretation of Byrnes- attitude is probably 
closer to the mark than the belief that his rather off- 
handed remarks to Bevin and Alexander constituted any 
commitment or real intention to provide significant aid. 
All that Byrnes promised Alexander was the supply of some 
equipment for the Greek armed forces and the dispatch of an 
economic mission which might recommend some reconstruction 
aid. Byrnes" new policy towards Greece which Henderson 
mentioned, perhaps a bit too enthusiastically, amounted only 
to the memorandum approved on 1 October, that is, diplomatic 
support, possibly the sale of some arms, and the economic 
mission. 
There is no question that 1946 saw the beginnings of a 
major change in American foreign policy towards the Soviet 
Union, a change which might be expected to make the United 
States look more sympathetically towards aid to Greece, but 
only if that aid was needed to deter further Soviet 
expansion. In hindsight, with the knowledge of American 
actions and attitudes in 1947 and 1948, it would seem very 
logical for the British to expect assistance. In the autumn 
of 1946 or the early spring of 1947, this could not be clear 
to an outside observer of the American political scene; it 
was not that definite in the inner circles of Washington. 
British leaders could not have been aware of Truman`s 
'I`m tired of babying the Soviets- letter to Byrnes in 
January 1946, they may have seen a slightly stronger 
attitude in Byrnes" Press Club speech of February. The 
Americans did join with the British in protesting against 
the Soviet delay in evacuating Iran. The only obvious 
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indicator of a major change concerned Germany. Clay's 
refusal to continue reparations from the American Zone in 
May, followed by Byrnes`s offer for an economic merger of 
zones in July and his Stuttgart speech of September, 
amounted to a significant chain of events. By the first of 
October 1946, the Americans had made it clear that they 
would stand up to the Soviets with regard to reparations; 
they would begin the political and economic reconstruction 
of Germany with or without Soviet agreement; they would risk 
the division of Germany, and with it probably the division 
of Europe; and American troops would remain in Europe until 
occupation was over. 
This last promise was the most important of all. Until 
this announcement, both Soviet and British leaders had 
operated under the assumption that the United States would 
withdraw its troops from Europe within two years of the end 
of the war, regardless of what settlements had or had not 
been made. This had been firmly stated by Roosevelt and 
never denied by Truman. Now the Americans had committed 
themselves to a long-term and anti-Soviet policy in Germany, 
there could be hope that the United States would take a 
similar view of other areas in Europe, including Greece. It 
would have been possible for the British to have seen 
Byrnes- discussion with Alexander and the new policy` which 
Henderson mentioned to the British Embassy a few weeks later 
as a corollary of the new attitude to German affairs. It 
is more likely that Byrnes and the State Department were 
beginning to favour support of the British in Greece as a 
result of the Joint Chief of Staff paper of late August 
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which had been sent to Byrnes shortly after the Stuttgart 
speech. 
While the strong American attitudes to the German 
problem were undoubtedly part of an increasingly anti-Soviet 
policy, it is questionable as to whether there was, by the 
end of 1946, a decision to initiate an active programme of 
opposition in other areas. The United States was already 
deeply involved in Germany and had to find a method of 
ending this involvement sooner or later. Greece was another 
matter. Only when it was deemed necessary to stop or roll 
back Soviet expansion and the spread of Communism would 
there be a logical reason to do more for Greece than a litle 
help in reconstruction, such as the twenty-five million 
dollar credit. It might be argued that this decision had 
been taken in the new policy` of October, but it is 
difficult to accept this in view of the very minor actions 
this policy involved. 
The British in early 1946 assumed that the Greek 
Government would gradually take over the costs of the Greek 
armed forces, and would somehow be able to begin recon- 
struction of the economy. Much of their sanguine view was 
based on hopes of stable government after the election and 
plebiscite, and, probably, a lack of appreciation of the 
true economic situation. While recognising the need for 
effective armed forces to restore law and order, and to 
provide some deterrent to invasion from the North, they 
could hardly have foreseen the problems raised by the `Third 
Round- of communist-led guerrilla activity, which began in 
mid-year. It was only then that the need for increased 
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expenditure on the armed forces was recognised, and, at that 
point, the scope of the problem was not understood. As late 
as January 1947, the British Joint Planning Staff believed 
that the -bandits-, as they chose to call the EAM, could be 
put down in six months active operations, after which the 
Greek armed forces might be reduced by as much as fifty 
percent. A month later, the Chiefs of Staff felt that the 
back of the bandit opposition could be broken in a period of 
between two and three months. cýi 
Britain continued to accept that the support of the 
Greek armed forces was its own problem during most of 1946. 
Even if the Americans began a programme of reconstruction 
aid, it was extremely doubtful that they would contribute to 
the direct support of the Greek military., ' This view is 
sound in the light of American policy papers of late 1946. 
The principle American objection to involvement in Greece 
was the danger of creating the impression that the United 
States had adopted a provocative policy with regard to the 
Soviet Union and its Balkan puppets". c:. 
Despite several mentions in Foreign Office minutes of 
the desirability of American financial aid for Greece, it is 
'-*'JP(47)5(Fina1), 25 January, DEFE4/1; Alexander's letter, 
27 February, F0371/67032/R2629. 
"British policy and their view of American policy in this 
respect is perhaps best illustrated by Selby-s memorandum 
entitled -Maintenance of the Greek Armed Forces-, 17 
September 1946; and Bevin-s letter to Dalton, 23 Septem- 
ber, F0371/58767/R13693 and R14121. 
For examples, memorandum, 21 October, and State Depart- 
ment telegram, 8 November, FRUS, 1946, VII, 240-245,262- 
263. 
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logical to believe that the British Government would have 
preferred not to call on the United States for major 
support. A direct request to the United States to take over 
British responsibilities in Greece might well result in the 
loss of British influence in a critical area. There was 
probably the additional factor that an appeal for American 
assistance might create the impression that Britain was no 
longer a great force in international relations. t>s 
The British Government appears to have been hoping that 
the United States would provide substantial assistance to 
their efforts to establish their post-war position in 
Greece, without demands for a special position of influence. 
A really substantial post-UNRRA grant, sufficient to rebuild 
the economy so that the Greeks could cope with their own 
problems, seems to have been the idea. The British there- 
fore gave the United States full details on the Greek 
situation, and encouraged the Greeks to approach them 
directly, hoping for generous results from the Porter 
mission. At the same time, they held back from making a 
direct request for aid to the Greeks, especially with regard 
to a definite commitment of support for the Greek armed 
forces. 
While the Americans were aware of the seriousness of 
the Greek economic situation, they did little to help. They 
had been instrumental in the provision of Red Cross aid 
throught the Swedish Government during the occupation, and 
c'-`SSir John Balfour, British Minister in Washington, made a 
statement to this effect concerning a different aspect of 
the Greek problem in his letter to the Foreign Office of 
8 August 1946 (FO371/61003/AN2922). 
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in the relief work of the Military Liaison agency immedia- 
tely after liberation. They were major contributors to the 
resources of UNRRA which continued the relief work until 
early 1947. All of this aid was for the purpose of 
relieving actual suffering, and did nothing to rebuild the 
shattered Greek economy. 
It is true that in June 1945, the State Department 
expressed concern over the Greek economic situation, and 
asked MacVeagh for his recommendations. The Department's 
only idea was to send out industrial experts to improve 
production and efficency. MacVeagh did point out that 
traditional current U. S. policy which was 'restricted to 
general benevolence and trade promotion combined with strict 
non-intervention in internal matters' was ill-adapted to the 
existing world situation. So far as Greece was concerned, 
his suggestions were limited to the idea of supply raw 
materials and fuel through usual channels of trade 
[presumably at normal prices]. He doubted whether 
industrial experts would be of much value. - Early requests 
by the Greeks for aid were met with explanations that the 
shortage of supplies and transport made it difficult to 
help. '-= "` 
MacVeagh"s comment on traditional policy epitomises 
American attitudes towards Greece (and many other European 
17State Department telegram, 2 June, and MacVeagh-s reply, 
7 June, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 221-223. 
~"E3rew-s memorandum of his conversation with Greek Foreign 
Minister Sophianopoulos, 9 July, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 228- 
229. 
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countries) in 1945; it is a reflection of American foreign 
policy since the founding of the Republic. UNRRA aid was a 
'benevolence`; the idea of financial grants to a foreign 
country for its long term development was unheard of. Loans 
granted abroad with the aim of developing commerce were 
trade promotion. Help in establishing economic stability 
for strategic reasons was imperialism. In any case, Greece 
was a British problem. 
Gradually, American policy began to change. The first 
non-UNRRA aid was the $25,000,000 Export-Import Bank credit 
which was the subject of negotiations from July 1945 until 
January 1946. This seems to have been a mixture of 
benevolence and trade promotion, since the State Department 
had expressed its approval of the idea when it was first 
broached, and long before the Americans had perceived a 
Soviet or Communist threat to the Middle East. The 
successive credits for the purchase of surplus property seem 
also to be benevolence, and, in any case, amounted only to 
authority to acquire equipment which might otherwise have 
been destroyed as no longer needed and too expensive to 
return to the United States. 
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While Byrnes- talks with Bevin in April 1946 apparently 
did indicate an American fear of Communism in Greece, they 
did not result in any economic aid. Even when Byrnes took 
note of the military studies of the strategic threat and as 
a result approved a new policy statement, specific help was 
limited to the promise of an economic mission to determine 
Greek needs. What had happened was a change in American 
attitude which meant a definite willingness to assist Greece, 
but only if the means could be found. 
269 
Chapter VIII 
The Decision to Ask for Assistance 
and Its Effects, 
1. The Cabinet Decision to Approach the Americans 
At the beginning of 1947, time was running out for 
Britain, so far as Greece was concerned. It was evident 
that the `bandit- operations would resume in earnest in the 
spring. Greece was going from one threat of economic 
collapse to another. Formal British commitments to support 
the Greek armed forces expired on 31 March, and a decision 
had to be made. 
In late December 1946, the Chiefs of Staff prepared a 
paper stressing the strategic importance of Greece to 
Britain and recommending a reorganisation of the Greek 
forces. On the first of January, they signed a report 
entitled 'Future Policy towards Turkey and Greece`. This 
examined British strategic requirements in the area; the 
role they wished the armed forces of the two countries to 
carry out in peace and war; and how assistance could be 
provided -by us and the Americans to the Greeks and Turks 
and the best method of approaching the Americans-. The 
'A brief and preliminary study of the topics of this and 
the following chapter is contained in Robert Frazier, 
-Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman 
Doctrine, ' Historical Journal, XXIII-3 (September 1984), 
pp. 715-727. 
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Chiefs saw the Greek armed forces as having two functions, 
the maintenance of law and order and that of a limited 
defence against aggression. In the existing situation, it 
was imperative that the `bandits" be destroyed in a spring 
operation. The military leaders therefore wanted approval 
for an increase in strength, plus re-organisation and re- 
equipment of the Greek forces. For this purpose, `American 
assistance was essential-. 
It was thought that American aid might best take the 
form of providing or paying for the cost of petrol and 
rations for the Greek forces, plus 'general financial and 
economic assistance-. Petrol and ration provision would 
relieve the British of about half their expenditure. The 
Chiefs of Staff asked that the Foreign Office obtain the 
approval of the Cabinet as soon as possible for an approach 
to the United States. Bevin submitted a paper on the 
subject to the Cabinet asking for authorisation to approach 
the United States concerning the cost of the Greek armed 
forces after 31 March 1947, with a view to sharing it. It 
was essential to know how much financial, economic and 
military aid the United States might be willing provide 
during the next three years. 
ý2DO(47)1,1 January, and DO(47)2,2 January, CAB131/4; FO 
letter, 11 January and JP(47)5,25 January, FO371/67O32/ 
R1819; CP(47)34,25 January, CAB129/16. While Bevin's 
paper seems clear enough in hindsight, there is a hand- 
written note on the top margin: 'Mr Eastwood. Brief! 
Will you find out, if you can, what is recommended in 
this paper and set it out for the assistance of the P. M. - 
The note is signed 'B', presumably Sir Norman Brook. 
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On 29 January, J. W. Nichols of the Foreign Office 
reported that 'private Treasury sources' had indicated that 
Dalton would probably recommend that '. 
.. 
as it is 
absolutely out of the question for the U. K. to shoulder such 
a burden, we should cut our losses and abandon Greece'. A 
brief was prepared for Bevin"s use in next days Cabinet 
meeting. This included a note that even if the United State 
accepted a large share of the Greek armed forces costs, the 
British Government might have to bridge the gap entirely on 
its own, between 31 March and the earliest date of Con- 
gressional action. -, 
The paper was discussed in Cabinet, where Bevin pro- 
posed raising the strength of the Greek armed forces to 
combat the bandits. He discussed the tong-term future of 
these forces and the general economic situation in Greece 
'with a view to ascertaining what part of the burden they 
[the British] would be willing to bear-. Dalton recommended 
that there should be no financial commitment to Greece after 
31 March. 
The Cabinet agreed that the Greek armed forces should 
be strengthened in order to undertake operations against the 
bandits in the spring and that the Americans should be asked 
to help. The exact implementation was to be considered by a 
committee comprised of officials representing the Foreign 
Office, the Treasury, and the Ministry of Defence. They 
were to examine two matters: 
'"Minutes, 29 January, F0371/67032/R2438. 
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(i) the financial implications of providing 
assistance to the Greek Government to enable their 
armed forces to undertake operations against the 
bandits, and 
(ii) what proposals should be put to the 
United States Government with regard to long term 
financial, economic and military help for Greece. 4 
The new committee met two days later. It found itself 
confused by the Cabinet conclusions. Despite Dalton`s 
recommendation that Greece be abandoned, the committee 
believed that it would be reasonable to assume that no final 
decision one way or another had been taken, and that the 
matter would have to be reconsidered in the light of any 
proposals the Americans might make. Sir David Waley, 
representing the Treasury, thought the Chancellor would 
accept this line. 
The committee thought the Cabinet had agreed in 
principle that the Greek armed forces should be prepared to 
deal with the bandits in the spring, but that no decision 
had been made as to who should pay the costs. The committee 
was unsure as to whether action could be taken to approach 
the Americans without going back to the Cabinet, but 
believed that this could be done, so long as the appropriate 
drafts were approved by the Chancellor and the Minister of 
Defence. 
Before the committee met, the Foreign Office called in 
representatives of the American Embassy and gave them a 
misleading version of what had taken place. It was stated 
that the Cabinet had agreed in principle that Great Britain 
'CM14(47)4,30 January, CAB128/9. 
"Minute, 5 February, F0371/67032/R2439. 
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should provide further assistance to Greece beyond 3 March. 
The Foreign Office, Treasury, and Ministry of Defence would 
work out detailed British proposals which would be discussed 
with the American Government. A problem would arise 
'because financial assistance will end on 31 March and it is 
impossible that long-term proposals can be worked out until 
after [the] Porter report is made. It is essential that 
interim assistance be rendered "in order to stop the rot". -e- 
2. Preparation of the Request 
The first draft of an appeal to Washington was prepared 
by the Foreign office on or before 4 February. It repre- 
sented the position of that department, and presumably that 
of Bevin, in the heated battle between the Foreign Office 
and the Treasury which occurred in the next fortnight. The 
draft took the form of instructions to the Ambassador in 
Washington to present Britain's request to the new Secretary 
of State. General Marshall7 was to be reminded of the 
conversations between Byrnes and Bevin during the Paris 
Conference in April and the Byrnes/Alexander discussions in 
October. He was to be given considerable information on the 
Greek economic situation and the British contributions up to 
March 1947, along with the statement that something between 
'Gallman-s telegram, 31 January, FRUS, 1947, V, 13-14. 
-'George Catlett Marshall (1880-1959), Chief of Staff, U. S. 
Army, 1939-1945; Special Representative of the President 
to China, 1945-1947; Secretary of State, January 1947- 
January 1949; Secretary of Defense, 1950-1951. 
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sixty and seventy million pounds ($240 to $280 million) 
would be needed during the remainder of 1947. 
The most critical points concerned Britain's proposed 
course of action. In view of their existing financial 
situation (of which no details were given), the British 
Government would be justified in providing no further 
expenditure on Greece. Marshall must be made to realise 
that if a joint policy of effective and practical support 
for Greece was to maintained, the U. S. Government `must bear 
the lion's share`. Clearly, the Foreign Office was pro- 
posing a partnership. The instructions did not contemplate 
a complete withdrawal of aid to Greece if the United States 
would provide a significant portion of the support required. 
The draft assumed that the Americans were interested in, or 
even committed to, a joint policy of support for Greece, an 
assumption which is not borne out by American diplomatic 
records. 
The entire draft appears to play down the danger of 
Communism. While it does refer to Byrnes' desire to prevent 
Greece from falling under Soviet influence, the word Com- 
munism is never used, and the bandit problem, while 
mentioned, is treated as a matter which was capable of early 
solution. The real emergency was portrayed as the danger of 
a collapse of the Greek economy. Nothing was said about the 
possibility of a gap arising betwen 31 March and the 
provision of American aid. - 
The first draft (marked 'A- in the upper right-hand 
corner) includes some minor ammendments in Bevin's hand- 
writing and is initialed by him at the end (F0371/67032/R1900). 
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There was also a draft message to Norton, referring to 
the approach to be made to the United States. This stated: 
H. N. G. `. 
.. 
cannot contemplate bearing unaided the futher 
costs of the Greek armed forces. ' A final decision would 
depend on the American reaction. A second draft changed the 
quoted sentence to: 'H. M. G. 
... 
cannot say pending 
discussion with the U. S. G. what contribution if any they 
would make to bearing [the cost of the Greek armed forces]'. 
Both drafts included a statement that the Greek forces were 
to be built up in order to undertake the anti-bandit 
operation in the spring. Norton was instructed to notify 
the Greeks of the contents of the message, unless he had 
serious objections. ' The inclusion of the phrase if any' 
is the first indication that the Foreign Office seriously 
considered complete abandonment of Greece. 
Bevin and the Foreign Office were given some extra 
ammunition (and perhaps some additional worries) with the 
arrival early the next day of a long, but closely argued, 
telegram (No. 285) from Norton, who had been informed of the 
Cabinet discussion. This summarised the situation in Greece 
and pointed out a number of problems. Norton was doubtful 
that American aid would be sufficient even in terms of 
reconstruction assistance. Support to the Greek armed 
forces, even if they were not expanded to deal with the 
bandits, would 'seem an unnecessary luxury to all but the 
best informed of American legislators`. He doubted whether 
American aid could be made available for at least four 
'Ibid., R1900. 
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months. While no clear-cut recommendations were made, there 
was a definite implication that Britain would have to find 
more money for Greece from her own pocket if the country 
were to be saved. Bevin gave instructions that Inverchapel 
should show Marshall as much of the telegram as he thought 
advisable. 10 
On 11 February, Bevin sent a letter to Dalton reviewing 
the Cabinet conclusions of 30 January and the work of the 
committee responsible for further study of the problems. He 
enclosed the draft telegrams to Washington and Athens. In a 
postscript, he stated that he was in general agreement with 
the views in Nortons telegram 285. r x 
On the same day, Dalton addressed a letter to the Prime 
Minister (with a copy to Bevin) entitled -Greece-. Dalton 
began by saying, The muddle about coal [the fuel crisis 
which was bringing the British economy to a temporary stand- 
still] shows what happens through failure to look ahead-. 
He continued by saying that he must now sound a very 
definite warning on Greece. After reviewing expenditure on 
Greece over the years, Dalton said, 
.. 
in my view the 
time has come when we must refuse to enter into further 
commitments [on Greece]. ` Further on he said, 
.. 
we 
must, in my view, refuse to extend our commitments beyond 
31st March. The only fresh commitment which I am willing to 
undertake is that we should supply such equipment as is 
available for attacking bandits, and should ask the Ameri- 
cans to supply the equipment which they have available and 
"Loc. cit. 
x'Loc. cit. 
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we have not. - Curiously, there is no mention of possible 
American assistance other than that of surplus equipment., 
Perhaps more significant is a handwritten note by Levin 
on the top margin of the Foreign Office copy, 'I think Mr 
Dalton is justified. We get no help from the Greeks. The 
whole area must be reviewed. EB'. Bevin wrote to Dalton 
three days later concerning this letter, stating, 'In the 
circumstances, there does not seem to be much between us as 
regards the next step in Greek policy, and I hope that you 
will agree to the draft telegram to Washington immediately 
so that we may lose no further time in making our position 
clear to the United States Government. - 
3. Dalton's Intervention 
Meanwhile Dalton had commented on the draft telegrams. 
In a letter of the 13th, he said, 
.. 
we cannot undertake 
this burden at a time when we know that we shall find it 
most difficult to feed, clothe, and employ our own people 
once we have used up the American and Canadian loans. - 
Dalton enclosed revisions of the proposed messages to 
Washington and Athens, without any further explanation of 
his reasons for amending them. -L 
"Ibid., R2443. 
"Loc. cit. It is probable that this letter was never 
dispatched, since Dalton's letter of 13 February, 
enclosing revisions of the draft telegrams, arrived as it 
was being processed. 
, `'Ibid. 
, 
R2440. 
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While Dalton accepted a great deal of the Foreign 
Office draft to Washington, he made two significant changes: 
F. O. Draft 
The U. S. Government 
will readily understand 
that in their existing 
financial situation H. M. G. 
would not be justified in 
incurring any further ex- 
penditure on Greece 
... 
Treasury Draft 
In the light of the 
grave problem of overseas 
finance which we ourselves 
have to face, H. M. G. have 
decided that they cannot 
undertake any further com- 
mitments [to Greece]. 
Your aim should be to 
make General Marshall rea- 
lise quite clearly that if 
a joint policy of effective 
and practical support is to 
be maintained, the U. S. 
Government must bear the 
lion's share of the burden 
Your aim should be to 
make General Marshall rea- 
lise quite clearly that 
our financial assistance 
to Greece has been all and 
more than all we can 
afford and that we cannot 
undertake any further com- 
mitments. If a policy of 
effective and practical 
support for Greece is to 
be maintained, the U. S. 
Government must now bear 
the financial burden. l. _, 
Dalton eliminated a sentence in the Foreign Office draft 
which read: -On receiving such indications [of American 
intentions to help], H. M. G. would consider how best they 
could contribute to a joint Anglo-U. S. policy of economic 
and military support to Greece. ` 
The draft telegram to Athens was also changed. In 
addition to emphasising that H. M. G. could not undertake any 
further expenditure, Dalton-s version gave firm instructions 
that the Greeks were to be informed that there would be no 
British aid after 31 March, instead of allowing Norton to 
use his judgement on this point. Dalton did include a 
promise to provide two million pounds worth of equipment in 
1 'Ibid, R1900, 
"'Ibid., R2440. 
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order that the spring anti-bandit campaign could be under- 
taken. 
The reaction of the Foreign Office was unhappy. M. S. 
Williams saw the critical point as follows: 
The main difference between the Foreign 
Office and the Treasury is of course that the 
Treasury think we should give no further financial 
help to Greece under any circumstances whatever, 
whereas the Foreign Office think that the final 
decision on this point should only be taken after 
we know what the Americans are prepared to do. 
I should have thought that if we are to have dis- 
cussions with the Americans, as the Cabinet direct 
we should have less chance of securing an adequate 
contribution from them if we adopted an entirely 
negative attitude in regard to the possibility of 
further support from us than if, in the opening 
stages at least, we left the position open. 
Williams recommended that Bevin discuss the matter with 
Dalton on a personal basis in an attempt to persuade the 
Chancellor to agree to send the original drafts. 
C. F. A. Warner, the Assistant Secretary supervising 
the Southern Department, expressed his agreement with 
Williams and added: Our way commits the Chancellor to 
nothing and is mainly a matter of diplomatic tactics on 
which I think the SofS [Bevin] should have the last word, 
He continued: To tell the Greeks that we will do nothing 
before the U. S. have considered what they will do would be 
to precipitate a Greek collapse. -&- Bevin approved these 
ideas and sent a letter to Dalton, incorporating, in more 
tactful phrases, the ideas of Williams and Warner: 'for the 
purposes of negotiation with the Americans, I should be 
reluctant to state categorically during the opening stages 
that we should under no circumstances be prepared to make 
"Minutes, 14 February, Ibid. 
, 
R1900. 
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any further contributions 
. 
He sought an early 
meeting with the Chancellor., " 
4. The Final Decision and the Delivery of the Note 
The only official record of the final decision as to 
the form the approach to the Americans was to take is a 
memorandum drafted or dictated by Bevin. According to this, 
Dalton came to see the Foreign Secretary on the morning of 
18 February and Bevin `dealt with the problem of Greece-. 
Dalton insisted on his own version of the telegrams to 
Athens and Washington, with the idea being to bring the 
Greeks right up against the problem'. According to Bevin's 
memorandum of the conversation, 
He [Dalton] does not object to going to the 
Cabinet again after the discussion in America, 
but I agreed in both instances that we should put 
up a strong telegram to the United States asking 
them what they were going to do and on the other 
hand telling the Greeks that we could not con- 
tinue, for the sole purpose of bringing matters 
to a head. ' 
In other words, Bevin, even though pressed by his staff 
to oppose Dalton`s changes, gave in. His memorandum gives 
no further explanation for his action. The question does 
arise as to what significance should be attached to the 
"15 February, ibid., R2440. 
"Memorandum dated 18 February, ibid., R2443. There is a 
handwritten question mark opposite 'I agree in both 
instances'. It is possible that what was meant was "I 
agreed in both instances with his suggestions that we 
should put up 
... .` 
Bevin's account of this decision 
disagrees with that of Dalton not only in substance, but 
in the time and place of the meeting, the matters dis- 
cussed, and the attitudes of each. These discrepancies 
are examined in detail in Chapter IX, Part 2. 
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phrase 'sole purpose". It is just possible that this means 
that no final decision had been made to abandon Greece, but 
that Bevin had agreed to Dalton's telegrams only as a means 
of putting drastic pressure on the Americans. 
The following day, Foreign Office staff informed the 
American Embassy that conversations between the Treasury and 
the Foreign office concerning Greece had not yet resulted in 
agreement on a document to be sent to the State Department, 
but it was hoped that it would be ready within a week. The 
Embassy reported: 'Due to British financial straits, the 
Treasury is against "pouring any more money down the Greek 
drain, " but the Foreign Office is willing to do so for 
political reasons. The Foreign Office is not sanguine of 
gaining its point. "" This report is at variance with the 
agreement between Bevin and Dalton of the previous day, 
perhaps because Bevin-s capitulation had not yet been 
disseminated to the working level. 
The ultimate versions of the telegrams were prepared in 
accordance with Dalton-s versions. They were finally dis- 
patched in the early hours of the next morning, Thursday, 20 
February- : 21 The general impression of Foreign Office 
attitudes that day is one of attempts to find other sources 
I' i=ebruc%r y 
"'Gallman-s telegram, AFRUS, 1947, V, 26-27. 
:! ="Telegram 1634 to Washington, F0371/67033/R2969; telegram 
384 to Athens, ibid., R2970, boil ; 
-o 
February. 
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of aid and pessimism as to the outcome of the approach to 
the Americans. 
The Washington Embassy had to turn the telegram=' from 
London into an Aide-Memoire to be given to the Americans as 
a record of the remarks Inverchapel would make to Marshall, 
a matter which required considerable re-writing. A number 
of instructions in the telegram had to be deleted, and some 
points had to be re-cast in more diplomatic language. For 
example, the statement in the telegram -the United States 
must bear the burden- was changed to His Majesty's 
Ambassador is instructed to express the earnest hope of His 
Majesty's Government that, if a joint policy of effective 
and practical support for Greece is to be maintained, the 
United States will agree to bear 
... 
the financial burden 
The Embassy, apparently on its own initiative, added a 
sentence as an introduction which was in no way hinted at in 
the telegram: His Majesty's Government are giving most 
earnest and anxious consideration to the important problem 
that on strategic and political grounds Greece and Turkey 
should not be allowed to fall under Soviet influence. - This 
`These are summed up in Williams" minute, -Financial 
Assistance to Greece`, 20 February 1947, F0371/67033/ 
R275. Ideas included appeals to the Dominions for aid to 
Greece, strenuously objected to by Dalton; and large- 
scale international loans (ibid., R2823, R2751, and 
67035/R3442). 
2"There were two telegrams and two Aide-Memoires to be 
prepared, since the British Government added the problem 
of support to Turkey to the appeal for Greece. The 
Turkish aspects of the actions leading to the American 
decision to initiate the major aid programme and the 
Truman Doctrine will not be examined. 
283 
seems at variance with the Foreign Office tendency to play 
down the danger of Communist aggression; it probably 
reflects the Embassy's view of what might be a convincing 
argument for the Americans. 
The conversion of the telegram into the Aide-Memoire 
was an extremely competent piece of work, considering the 
apparent lack of background available to the Embassy on what 
had been taking place in the Foreign Office in the past 
week. Inverchapel was apparently not involved in the re- 
drafting, since he was absent from Washington for most of 
the day.:: 24 
The following morning, ' Friday, 21 February, Inver- 
chapel tried to obtain an appointment with Marshall to 
deliver the message, which was described as urgent. 
Acheson, temporarily in charge of the State Department, 
pointed out that Marshall had left Washington shortly 
before, and that `unless he went to Princeton or North 
Carolina he could not catch General Marshall until Monday 
He was making an official visit to Annapolis, Maryland 
(The (Baltimore) Sun, 21 February 1947). 
2'Despite the statement in Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen 
tried for an appointment that gray afternoon", it seems 
clear that the attempt must have been made in the 
morning. Inverchapel spent the afternoon and evening of 
21 February in Baltimore, where he and Alger Hiss 
received honorary degrees from Johns Hopkins University 
(The (Baltimore) Evening Sun, 21 February 1947>. Adding 
to this the fact that Washington was digging itself out 
from under eight inches of snow -that gray afternoon", it 
seems doubtful that Jones had any first hand knowledge of 
the event. 
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morning'. ", Acheson suggested that the Embassy deliver a 
carbon copy of the message so that the State Department 
could take immediate action. Formal delivery by Inverchapel 
could wait until Monday. Sometime later that day, H. M. 
Sichel, First Secretary of the British Embassy, delivered a 
copy of the Aide Memoire to his appropriate opposite number, 
Loy Henderson, Director of Near East Affairs. '2' 
"Marshall attended a degree ceremony at Columbia Uni- 
versity in New York City that afternoon (New York Times, 
22 February). According to his itinerary, he left 
Washington by railway at 8: 00 on 21 February, and in the 
evening travelled again by train to Princeton, New 
Jersey, where he attended another degree ceremony the 
following day, returning to Washington late on Saturday 
evening (Marshall Papers, file entitled: 'Secretary of 
State, Miscellaneous, Columbia and Princeton Uni- 
versities). The quotation above from Acheson, Present at 
the Creation (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 217, 
implies that Marshall went from Princeton to North 
Carolina for the remainder of the weekend. The itinerary 
cited reflects that Mrs Marshall left their home in North 
Carolina on the evening of 20 February to join her 
husband, and did not intend to return to North Carolina 
on the 23rd; there seems no reason for Marshall to have 
gone there. Acheson-s account must be treated with 
discretion, at least as far as detail is concerned. 
"Despite the apparent unreliability of both Jones and 
Acheson concerning the events of 21-23 February, State 
Department records make it clear that a copy of the Aide- 
Memoire was delivered to Henderson on 21 February (FRUS, 
1947, V, 32). Inverchapel-s meeting with Marshall on 
Monday was an anti-climax. Instead of making an 
impassioned plea to Marsäbll as the telegram from London 
instructed, he seems to have merely waited while Marshall 
read the message and stated that he recognised the 
urgency and importance of the matter. Marshall was 
already aware of the contents of the message and had been 
advised by Henderson to limit his comments to no more 
than this (Henderson's two memoranda, 24 February, Ibid., 
pp. 42-44). 
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5. Norton's Rebuttal 
Shortly before midnight, the Foreign Office received an 
urgent telegram (No. 462) from Athens. Norton was appalled 
by the message of early Thursday instructing him to tell the 
Greeks that aid would be terminated on 31 March. He opened 
with the statement that, upon consultation with the heads of 
the British misssions in Athens, the British General Officer 
Commanding in Greece, and other representatives, 
We are agreed that it is our duty to make 
sure before I inform Greek Government of His 
Majesty's Government's decision, that the latter 
fully understands what will be its direct 
consequences. 
After discussion of the Greek financial position, and 
prediction of the collapse of the Greek Government and 
economy, Norton continued: 
It follows that His Majesty's Government's 
decision is practically certain to cause collapse 
before American help can be given. Thus by stop- 
ping our own financial help so soon after we have 
appealed to the United States Government we shall 
in fact be making American help impossible, 
because it must come too late. 
I venture with all deference to suggest that 
to make this irreparable move without fullest 
consultation with United States Government would 
give them every reason for serious resentment. 
I earnestly trust therefore that it may not 
be too late for this decision to be reconsidered 
and for His Majesty's Government to accept the 
sterling cost of maintenance of the Greek armed 
forces 
... 
at least until the end of June in 
order that the position may be held until American 
help can become effective. 
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I fully realise that the decision has not 
been taken lightly but in view of our own economic 
straits. - 
The Foreign Office appreciation of the situation the 
next morning was written in the light not only of Nortons 
pleas, but of the contents of a letter dated 21 February 
from A. V. Alexander, the Minister of Defence. -2'ý° Alexander 
reported the concern of the Chiefs of Staff at the effect of 
the -Treasury decisions" and made a strong appeal for money 
for the anti-bandit campaign, which meant at least interim 
aid. The Chiefs of Staff estimated that once action began 
in the spring, the back of the bandit operation could be 
broken in two or three months. -- 
After these two documents had been given careful con- 
sideration, Sargent recommended to Bevin that he return to 
Dalton and ask that he agree to a new approach to the United 
States. This would amount to the British providing a sum of 
perhaps six million pounds to the Greeks in order to cover 
the costs of the spring bandit campaign, against an under- 
Nortons telegram, received in London 11: 10 p. m. 
, 
21 
February, F0371/67032/R2524. 
, 
2"«'Curiously, there is no evidence that the Defence Minister 
was ever consulted concerning the draft telegrams to 
Washington, although the special committee recommending 
the action had clearly stated that he should be (supra, 
p. 291). 
`3'Alexander's letter, F0371/67032/R2629. It is suggested 
that the Chiefs of Staff were being misled by some of its 
sources in Greece. In July 1947, the British Charge 
d'Affaires in Athens, in a private letter to a Foreign 
Office official, said, For some considerable time we in 
the Embassy have thought the British Military Mission 
were inclined to be over-optimistic about the prospects 
of the bandit war. " The British Military Attache seems 
to have agreed with the Embassy on this point (Patrick 
Reilly-s letter to G. 0. Wallinger, 31 July, 
F0371/67072/R10767). 
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taking that the money would be repayed from the funds the 
Porter Mission would recommend for Greece. The notification 
to the Greeks should be suspended until this proposal could 
be discussed with the Americans. A letter to Dalton along 
these lines was drafted, but never sent. A note in the file 
dated a week later indicates that Bevin eventually raised 
the matter with the Chancellor and the Minister of Defence, 
probably referring to a meeting on 24 February discussed 
infra.. ý! z 
There was no objection in the Foreign Office to 
Nortons refusal to inform the Greeks of the decision. It 
was only hoped that Inverchapel, in the light of Norton's 
telegram (a copy of which he received on the 22nd), would 
delay his meeting with Marshall. The carbon copy of the 
message was already delivered to the State Department, but 
Inverchapel, apparently acting on his own initiative, asked 
Marshall on the 24th not to reveal the British decision to 
the Greeks. _-ý12 
Thus ended the week. The decision to end all aid to 
Greece within six weeks had been taken. The announcement of 
the decision and the plea for American aid had been made. 
At first glance there was nothing more for the Foreign 
Office to do except wait for the American reply. In 
actuality, there was to be no respite from the Greek 
problem. 
On Sunday, Attlee, having seen Norton's telegram, asked 
for the views of the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of 
"Minutes, 22 February, F0371/67032/R2629. 
Henderson's memorandum, FRUS, 1947, V, 44. 
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the Exchequer. ti, On the 24th (Monday), ' '"" Bevin, Dalton, and 
Alexander met to discuss Norton's telegram. It was decided 
to say nothing to the Greek Government until the American 
intentions became clear and to undertake a review of the 
question of interim aid between 31 March and the date 
American aid became effective. There was no thought now of 
planning for a possible complete refusal by the Americans. 
On the 28th Christopher Warner sent a letter to the Treasury 
saying that it had been decided (apparently at the meeting 
of the 24th) to take the Greek matter back to the Cabinet 
once the American views were known. It stated: 
It would make nonsense of the Cabinet decision 
[to prepare the Greek forces for the anti-bandit 
campaign] and this statement [the reiteration in 
the telegram of 19 February to Athens to build up 
the Greek forces] if we made no effort to bridge 
the gap for a month or two. 
If the Americans are prepared to carry the 
burden, thereafter, should we not infuriate them if 
we refuse to fill the gap in this way? 
I`T0371/67302/R2451. 
The evidence for this meeting is in the draft reply to 
Attlee's enquiry, which bears three different dates. At 
the head of the draft 23 February (obviously wrong from 
content) has been crossed out and replaced by 26 
February. After the drafter's initials at the bottom is 
written 25/2. Since the draft says the meeting was 
'yesterday', and says that the decision is incorporated 
into telegram 1765 of 24 February [which was dispatched 
at 10: 45 p. m., 24 February], it seems logical that the 
meeting was held on the 24th. The actual letter sent 
back to Attlee is dated the 26th, and states that the 
meeting took place on the previous day, but the content 
still refers to the decision of the meeting being 
reflected in the telegram to Washington of the evening of 
the 24th. Draft reply, letter to the Cabinet Office, and 
telegrams, icc. cit. The dating of this meeting becomes 
significant in connection with Dalton's account of his 
meeting with Bevin, discussed Infra, p. 318. 
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There is no need to reply, I only want to save 
time when the American reply is received by putting 
this to you now.:: --" 
In analysing the Foreign Office evidence, it is quite 
clear that none of its personnel involved in the problem of 
Greece, from the Permanent Under Secretary down, considered 
the possibility of stopping all aid. They were fighting a 
losing battle with Dalton. From 30 January they were trying 
to implement a Cabinet decision which was inherently contra- 
dictory, and seemingly impossible if the Americans should 
refuse aid. They had little room to manoevre, and even 
their small amount of diplomatic leverage was taken from 
them by Dalton's insistance on announcing the complete 
cessation of aid without waiting for an American response. 
They made a great effort to encourage Bevin to stand up 
to Dalton, and pressed Bevin to persuade Dalton to reverse 
his view, to no avail. There is a clear impression that the 
Foreign Office staff had only one idea in mind--to preserve 
the Greek Government and economy in the British interest. 
Bevin's own attitude does not emerge so clearly. He appears 
to support his officials, to agree to their proposals, and 
to be of one mind with them. It is only at his meeting with 
Dalton on 18 April that he did not put up a fight. It is 
essential that an explanation be sought to determine what 
actually motivated Bevin in taking the decision to abandon 
Greece and in aquiescing in the transfer to American 
primacy, a matter taken up in the following chapter. 
"Loc. cit. 
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6. The American Reaction 
The American reaction to the British note was 
immediate. 3k> The State Department staff worked throughout 
the weekend to analyse this new development, going to 
considerable trouble to assure themselves that the British 
were entirely sincere in their message. -37 A recommendation was 
prepared for the President to the effect that the United 
States should accept the responsibility for Greece and step 
into the British shoes. This was accepted by Truman five 
days later, and immediate action was taken to obtain the 
support of Congressional leaders. The prospect of success 
was unfavourable, with control of both Houses in the hands 
of the opposition Republicans. 
On 27 February, Truman invited senior members of both 
political parties to the White House to explain the problem 
and to ask for their support. According to Acheson and 
''Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, provides a detailed 
account of'the State Department and White House actions 
from the receipt of the British note up to the passage of 
the enabling legislation. This is supplemented by 
Acheson's memoir, Present at the Creation. There are 
flaws in both accounts, most of which are minor, except 
for the question of Acheson's intervention at the 
Cognressional briefing of 27 February, discussed infra, 
pp. 310-311. Truman's account in his memoirs is brief 
and uninformative. 
"'The American tests for sincerity are discussed in detail 
infra, pp. 325-327. 
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Joseph M. Jones,, 
-, o Marshall made a poor presentation of the 
proposal. It was so ineffective that Acheson was moved to 
intervene with an impassioned speech which emphasised the 
threat of Communist expansion into Asia Minor and Europe if 
Greece were allowed to fall. As a result, Senator Vanden- 
berg="ý, the opposition spokesman on foreign policy, is sup- 
posed to have pledged Republican support for the Admini- 
stration plan, with the proviso that Truman should repeat 
the substance of Acheson's speech to the full Congress. 41-' 
The written record of Marshall's remarks shows that he made 
a lucid and emphatic appeal, and no other participant in the 
meeting mentions Acheson's outburst or Vandenberg's promise, 
but there must have been some contribution from Acheson 
-'Joseph M. Jones (1908- 
_>, 
a publicist and former 
associate editor of Fortune magazine, and Special 
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Affairs in 1947. Jones was responsible for writing the 
Truman Doctrine speech, and was involved in most of the 
internal discussions within the State Department which 
led up to it. He was not in a policy making position. 
: `"Arthur H. Vandenberg, Sr. (1884-1951), U. S. Senator, 
1928-1951; former isolationist; in 1947, majority leader 
(senior Republican member) of the Senate. 
4-°Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 219; Jones, The 
Fifteen Weeks, 139-142. Jones's account is far more 
detailed, but his source for these details is not known. 
There is no evidence that he was present at the meeting. 
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stressing the Communist threat, and some suggestion by 
Vandenberg that it be emphasised to Congress. -l-t 
Joseph Jones, in his account of the events leading up 
to the Truman Doctrine, makes it clear that there was 
unanimity within the State Department and amongst Truman-s 
advisors that idealogy must be made the main issue. In his 
words, there was complete agreement that: 
"The only way we can sell the public on our 
new policy is by emphasizing the necessity of 
holding the line: communism vs. democracy 
should be the major theme. "" 
While the Truman Doctrine speech of 12 March used the 
words communism and Communist only once (to describe the 
leaders of the revolt against the Greek Government), its 
stress on the evils of totalitarianism in Poland, Roumania, 
and Bulgaria made it clear that the main theme of the speech 
was an atttack on communism. It was equally evident that 
Congress, the American press, and public opinion viewed 
it in the same way, whether the doctrine was approved or 
criticised. 4---' There is little doubt that this appeal for 
"Marshall's presentation, FRUS, 1947, V, pp. 60-62. 
Truman (Memoirs, II, 109) fails to mention either Acheson 
or Vandenberg as making any contribution; Senator Tom 
Connally, in My Name Is Tom Connally (New York: Crowell, 
1954), p. 318, fails to mention Acheson, and states that 
Vandenberg made no commitment to support Truman. The 
latter later stated that no member of Congress made any 
commitments at this meeting (The Private Papers of 
Senator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. 
(London: Gollancz, 1953), p. 339). Acheson's 
contribution is also questioned by Forrest C. Pogue, 
George C. Marshall: Statesman 1945-1959 (New York: 
Viking, 1987), pp. 164-165. 
'1The Fifteen Weeks, p. 151. 
Jones, op. cit., pp. 171-198, presents a summary of the 
press, public, and Congressional reaction; a fuller 
analysis is in the unpublished Ph. D. dissertation of 
Bernard Weiner, The Truman Doctrine, ' pp. 150-172. 
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support in a fight against the evils of communism was 
responsible for the speedy passage by a large majority of 
both Houses of Congress of the bill providing for extensive 
aid to Greece. -- It thus marked the beginning of the 
idealogical crusade against the Soviet Union, although the 
intensity of the American confrontation was not fully 
displayed until the proclamation of the doctrine of contain- 
ment in George Kennan-s 'Mr "X" Article- four months 
later. I*r- 
In determining the significance of Greece to the coming 
of the Cold War, an essential question concerns the results 
of the British decision to withdraw. More critical in 
assessing its significance is the problem of whether it had 
a major effect on the break-down of East-West relations. 
Was the Truman Doctrine merely a well-publicised incident in 
a long series of events, or does it mark the turning point 
in post-war international relations, the beginning of the 
Cold War? 
Probably a majority of specialists would agree that the 
Truman Doctrine marked the actual beginning of the Cold 
4"'The Act was passed by the Senate on 22 April by a vote of 
67 to 23; and by the House on 8 May by 287 votes to 107. 
It became law with Truman-s signature on 22 May. 
The Sources of Soviet Conduct, - Foreign Affairs, XXV-4 
<July 1947), pp. 566-582. Kennan was not involved in the 
formulation of the Truman Doctrine speech and disapproved 
of it on a number of grounds (See his Memoirs, 1925-1950, 
(New York, Bantam, 1969), ch. 13), but his objections 
were not made public until long afterward. It was 
generally assumed that the Truman Doctrine was part and 
parcel of the containment policy. 
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War., *"'-'- It was the first time the divergences between East 
and West were tied firmly to ideology, rather than to 
Russian imperialism alone. The spectre of Communism had 
been raised many times before, but it was only in the Truman 
Doctrine that the foreign policy of the United States was 
directed against an ideological movement, rather than being 
based simply on opposition to Soviet expansionism and 
obstructionism. It was assumed without question that EAM 
was directed and controlled supported by the Soviet Union. 
This emphasis on ideology which was to polarise the Cold War 
in inflexible lines, and to prevent, for twenty years or 
more, any productive negotiation between East and West, 
which gave the confrontation its distinctive character. 
-Ideology, the curse of the Cold War-, is not too strong a 
description. 
A second factor was simply that of money. For the 
first time since World War II the United States Congress 
appropriated large sums in peacetime for the specific 
purpose of opposing a foreign power, money which was to be 
used for military as well as civil purposes. This is all 
"Authorities who either subscribe to this view entirely, 
or emphasise the signficant change in American foreign 
policy which it brought about include: R. V. Burks, 
-Truman Doctrine and Greece, ` Balkan Studies, VIII-2 
(1967), pp. 452-456; Averill Harriman, -Leadership in 
World Affairs, ' Foreign Affairs, XXXII-4 (July 1954), pp. 
525-540; Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership (New 
York: Columbia University press, 1981), pp. 301-303; Roy 
Jenkins, Truman (London: Collins, 1986), p. 101; Wilfred 
Knapp, A History of War and Peace (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), p. 109; Kuniholm, Origins of the 
Cold War in the Middle East, pp, 420-421; Walter Lipp- 
mann, Isolation and Alliances (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1952); Harold Macmillan, 437 Parl. Deb., col. 1944,16 
May 1947; and Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 275. 
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the more significant since that Congress was not only 
isolationist, but especially economy-minded, and under the 
control of the anti-Administation political party. The 
President and the administration could make as many policies 
as they liked, but they would have no effect unless the 
resources to implement them were available. 
It is questionable as to whether the Marshall Plan, the 
containment programme, or NATO would have come about without 
the Truman Doctrine; or, for that matter, the Czech coup or 
the Berlin Blockade. This may not be capable of proof, but 
it is difficult to believe that the course of events after 
March 1947 would have been the same without the Truman 
Doctrine. 
Not everyone agrees. The most striking example of an 
alternate view is the article entitled Was the Truman 
Doctrine a Real Turning Point? -, by John L. Gaddis. 47 
Gaddis puts the decision to resist further Soviet expansion 
one year before the Truman Doctrine, that is in February- 
March 1946. He attributes it to political pressures from 
Congress and the public, along with the effect of George 
Kennan's 'long telegram" of 22 February, and believes the 
decision is evident from a series of events which followed. 
These include 'Truman's tacit endorsement' of Churchill's 
Fulton speech on 5 March, 'blunt public opposition to Soviet 
demands on Iran and Turkey', termination of German repara- 
tions shipments, Soviet opposition to the Baruch plan, and 
the growing strength of Byrnes' negotiating tactics at the 
4'Foreign Affairs, LII-2 (January 1974), pp. 386-402. 
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Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in Paris and New York 
and the Paris Peace Conference. 
Gaddis relies to a large extent on the Iranian 
incident, quoting a 1951 statement by George Elsey, a White 
House advisor in 1946, "So far as foreign policy is 
concerned, President Truman 
... 
'blew the whistle on the 
Communists' a year earlier than [February 1947]. At his 
direction, the United States took the lead in March 1946 in 
the United Nations when Iran was first threatened by the 
Soviets. "4e Elsey apparently refered to the refusal of 
Byrnes to allow the Iranian issue to be withdrawn from the 
Security Council deliberations after the Soviets had reached 
a tentative agreement with the Iranians to evacuate their 
troops. This resulted in Gromyko walking out of the 
Security Council. 
Gaddis elsewhere suggests that Byrnes was not attacking 
the Soviets as much as he was using the incident to impress 
on the public that the policy of appeasement had been 
abandoned. He does emphasis the story that Byrnes earlier 
sent a strong note to the Soviets protesting their actions 
in Iran. This has echoes of Truman's statement in his 
memoirs, and in numerous interviews from 1952 onward, that 
he sent Stalin an ultimatum to get his troops out of Iran, 
an allegation which seems completely disproved. Certainly, 
the note Gaddis refers to is far from being an ultimatum. 
Perhaps the best that can be said for the importance of the 
"Gaddas cites this statement from Elsey`s letter to Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., 15 October 1951, George M. Elsey 
papers, Box 104, Harry S. Truman Library. 
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Iranian incident is that Truman's continual references to it 
in later years shows how much of an impression it made on 
him and his staff. 
In suggesting that the real decision was made in early 
1946, Gaddis cites as supporting evidence only the Elsey 
quotation; a reference to his earlier work, The United 
States and the Origins of the Cold War; and three government 
documents. The earlier work posits 'a decisive turning 
point in American foreign policy' in late February and early 
March 1946. This is seen as the result of such factors as 
conditions in Roumania and Bulgaria, the Iranian matter, 
Soviet pressures on Turkey, attacks on Truman's foreign 
policy by Republican legislators (in particular, Senator 
Vandenberg's highly critical speech of 26 February), 
Stalin's election speech of 9 February, the announcement of 
the Canadian atom spy discovery an the 16th, and the Kennan 
`long telegram". 
The first of the three government documents is a Joint 
Chiefs of Staff memorandum, `Basis for the Formulation of a 
U. S. Military Policy, '27 March 1946. It is a study pre- 
pared in September 1945 which was under consideration by 
various governmental committees until well into 1948, with- 
out ever being approved. While it stressed the need for a 
The circumstances of American relationships with Iran in 
this period and rebuttals of Truman-s suggestion of an 
ultimatum to Stalin` are provided in FRUS, 1946, VII, 
331-383, and especially 348-349; and Bruce R. Kuniholm, 
The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, pp. 303- 
335, and especially pp. 320-321. The suggestion that 
Truman placed great emphasis on the incident in later 
years is that of Kuniholm, Ibid., p. 321. 
s°New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 282-315. 
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well-defined military policy, there is no mention of a 
Soviet threat. The second, also a Joint Chiefs of Staff 
memorandum, 'Foreign Policy of the United States, ' 29 March 
1946, does recognise a Soviet threat, but says only, '". 
the adoption of a firm and friendly attitude in our dealings 
with the Soviet Government" is strongly endorsed with, how- 
ever, the emphasis on "firmness". ` 
The third document is a State Department memorandum in 
reply to a Joint Chiefs of Staff request for 'a political 
estimate of Russia and, so far as possible, an outline of 
future United States policy with reference to Russia, and 
any requirement for its implementation on the part of the 
armed forces. ' In this document, entitled, 'Political 
Estimates of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with 
Military Studies, - 1 April 1946, the State Department saw no 
evidence that the Soviet Union desired a major war, but felt 
its expansionist policies might extend beyond the point 
'which Great Britain or the United States could tolerate. ' 
The only recommendation for implementation of the estimate 
was to 'reconstitute our military forces" so that they might 
be prepared to -resist Soviet expansion by force if 
necessary in areas of our own choosing should such action 
prove necessary 
. 
. 
`FS1 None of these contain indica- 
tions of a major change of foreign policy. 
Gaddis sees the Truman Doctrine as significant only in 
that it was the first time special appropriations were 
'3: 'FRUS, 1946, I, 1160-1171. 
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needed to carry the administration's new policy, and there- 
fore the first time the Congress had to be asked to sanction 
the new policy. He suggests that the feeling of partici- 
pants such as Acheson and Jones that the Truman Doctrine 
marked a major change was the result of decisions being made 
quickly, efficiently and decisively", rather than the 
importance of the decisions. k3' The Truman Doctrine, the 
Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Military Assistance Program, in 
his view, were attempts to achieve a largely psychological 
goal, the restoration of faith in democracy among Europeans. 
In Gaddis-s view, this programme might have led to `a multi- 
polar world operating on balance-of-power principles-. It 
was only the North Korean invasion of June 1950 which led to 
a full and seemingly irreversible confrontation with the 
Soviet Union. 
Gaddis-s article is an incisive analysis of American 
foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union from 1945 until 
1950 which counters the generally held view that the United 
States in 194? adopted a rigid and unquestioning policy of 
opposition to the Soviet Union. There is much to be said 
for his insistence that the administration had hopes that 
the policy adopted during 1946 and early 1947 would lead to 
some sort of detente with the Soviet Union, that the clear 
and public proclamation of firm and appropriate action to 
be taken would force the Soviet Union to reconsider further 
In a more recent work, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 56, Gaddis points out that 
the British note forced the United States to 'move beyond 
attempts to discourage Soviet expansion by rhetoric 
alone'. This would appear to make the Truman Doctrine 
some sort of turning point. 
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attempts at expansion. But, the actions taken to implement 
the new American policy were not of the nature to make this 
clear to the Soviets, or to the peoples of the West. If 
Gaddis is correct in his hypothesis concerning Truman"s real 
intentions, he has summed up the Truman Doctrine speech well 
in calling it, along with Kennan-s 'X' article, -excellent 
t: 1 *4 examples of the obfuscatory potential of imprecise prose. 
The resort to the ideological crusade of the Truman 
Doctrine; the division of Europe into two camps by the 
Marshall Plan, if not by the formation of Bizonia and the 
Stuttgart speech; and the `X' article resulted in a firm, if 
possibly erroneous, belief on all sides that battle had been 
joined. Admittedly, the Marshall Plan was offered to the 
Soviet bloc, but on terms which could not be accepted; 
Kennan did make it clear that the `X' article was not meant 
to lead to confrontation, but his explanations came long 
afterward. -* 
One can accept Gaddis's view that there was a turning 
point in early 1946 in American attitudes, but this does not 
vitiate the proposition that the Truman Doctrine was also a 
turning point; one of far greater importance in the develop- 
ment of American foreign relations. It marked the first 
implementation of a policy designed to oppose the expansion 
of Communism backed with Congressional approval and the 
-Harry S. Truman, - in Makers of American Diplomacy, ed. 
Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson (New York: 
Scribners, 1974), II, 203. 
4Kuniholm, op. cit., pp. 420-421, also objects to Gaddis`s 
thesis on the Truman Doctrine, but with a rather 
different analysis than that above. 
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appropriation of funds. It was also the first decision to 
provide military aid to another country in peacetime (other 
than Lend-Lease); as such it must rank at least equally with 
the decision to use military force in peacetime, which is 
the distinguishing feature of the Korean War. 
For that matter, the decision to resist the North 
Korean invasion was a logical corollary of the Truman 
Doctrine, even if the latter had not always been applied. 
Failure to support Chiang Kai-Shek could be excused for a 
number of reasons; a refusal to go to the aid of South Korea 
would have left both the Doctrine and the concept of 
containment in tatters. There was no lengthy period of 
decision making, or of sounding out Congress with regard to 
Korea; Truman simply applied the policy he had adopted long 
ago. 
Gaddis-s doubts as to whether the Truman Doctrine was 
meant as a firm and unyielding commitment to anti-Communism 
are logical, but they do not minimise the effect of the 
British withdrawal of aid to Greece on the development of 
American foreign policy and the Cold War. Whatever quali- 
fications lay behind the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine 
speech did not lessen the full impact of that statement as a 
firm commitment to confrontation with the Soviet Union on an 
idealogical basis backed by military and economic aid. The 
British note of 21 February 1947 was the immediate factor 
which initiated the Cold War, whether it was intended as 
such or not. 
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7. The American Reply and the Problem of Interim Aid 
The eagerly awaited American reply to the British note 
came formally on 1 March, although American journalists had 
the information as early as 27 February. >s Curiously, the 
State Department notified the Greeks before the British. 
The Greek Charge d'Affaires, Paul Economou-Gouras, was 
called to the State Department on 28 February and told that 
Britain was unable to continue aid to Greece, but that 
Truman and Marshall had decided to take steps to provide a 
long-range programme of economic assistance. The Greeks 
were not told at this stage that Britain was stopping all 
financial aid. Henderson, in giving the news to Gouras, 
termed the decision a step unparalleled in American diplo- 
matic history. Gouras immediately cabled Athens, and was 
instructed to get in touch with the British Ambassador in 
Washington. Sir John Balfour, Minister Counsellor of the 
Embassy, told the Greek diplomat (presumably on 1 March) 
that only an exposition of the need for American support had 
E "'--The first report was that of James Reston, "Truman Asks 
Aid to Greece; Britain Unable to Bear Cost, - New York 
Times, 28 February. This was copied by most British 
newspapers, beginning with the Evening Standard of 28 
February. Reston"s story must have come from a Congress- 
man present at a briefing by Truman on the morning of the 
27th (FRUS, 1947, V, 60-62) or from an off-the-record 
press briefing given by Marshall or Acheson that evening 
(ibid., p. 67 and n. 2). 
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been presented to the State Department and that no requst 
had been made to the United States. 
-, 
'r" 
The American haste in talking to the Greeks seems to 
have been designed to ask the Greeks to send a request of 
their own for large-scale aid, probably to avoid any 
assumption by Congress and the public that the Americans 
were bowing to British demands. - Sir John Balfour-s remarks 
are curious, but are perhaps an attempt to avoid a definite 
statement pending instructions from London. Hector McNeil, 
then in New York (and perhaps not au fait with what was 
going on in London), was asked that same day by the press 
about rumours of the British note on Greece. He commented, 
`Britain is in constant communication with the United States 
about our economic commitments in Greece, but has made no 
direct effort to transfer them. ` r- 
Lord Inverchapel was called to Acheson-s office on the 
morning of 1 March and handed the reply. This stated in 
effect that the President had decided to extend aid, both to 
maintain Greek integrity and to develop a sound economy. As 
the Foreign Office had feared from the beginning, it was 
"'Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, pp. 478-481, citing 
records of the Greek Embassy in Washington and the Greek 
Foreign Office. The meeting is mentioned without detail 
in the State Department telegram to Athens, 28 February 
(FRUS, 1947, V, 69). 
'As it was, there were a large number of complaints to the 
effect that Truman-s decision to offer aid was a matter 
of `pulling British chestnuts out of the fire-, including 
some very insulting remarks by isolationist members of 
Congress. The unpublished dissertations by Barbara D. 
McFayden, The Truman Doctrine, - University of Colorado, 
1965, and Bernard Wiener, The Truman Doctrine, - 
Claremont Graduate School, 1967, survey the anti-British 
comments. 
ý7"Dai1y Herald, 1 March 1947. 
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pointed out that Congressional action would require some 
time. The United States trusted that the British Government 
would continue such financial aid as might be necessary to 
prevent a Greek collapse. c-- 
This brought the matter of interim aid to a head in 
London. On'3 March, the problem was taken up by the Defence 
Committee of the Cabinet. While Dalton opposed interim aid, 
particularly on the ground that American Congress would not 
accept the proposal Truman was introducing, it was decided 
to grant the Greeks a loan of two million pounds per month 
for three months (i. e., for April, May, and June). '° Inver- 
chapel announced this decision to the State Department the 
next day. He pointed out that he was instructed to impress 
upon the U. S. Government that it would be impossible to 
incur any further expenditures beyond these loans. It was 
also made clear that the interim aid would cease at the 
moment American aid became effective. tl 
This was not the end of the matter. The British 
Ambassador returned to the State Department on 8 March to 
point out that London had now informed him that the British 
government expected these loans to be repaid by the Ameri- 
cans or by the Greeks from money received from the United 
States. Acheson pointed out that the American attitude to 
this would be unfavourable and that it would be a mistake 
for the British to press this point. He became more 
"Acheson-s memorandum, 1 March, FRUS, 1947, V, 71-73. 
"---'DO(47)6th, 3 March, CAB131/5. 
'"'Acheson's memorandum and British Aide-Memoire, 4 March, 
FRUS, 1947, V, 79-81. 
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definite when Inverchapel saw him again on 14 March. The 
United States administration had no authority to guarantee 
reimbursement of the loans before Congress had decided to 
approve an aid programme to Greece. It would be an 
unnecesary burden to add such a proposal to what was going 
to be a very difficult task of convincing Congress that 
money should be appropriated for Greece. Instead, the 
British should accept this charge. Acheson also asked for 
an assurance that the British Military and Naval Missions 
would remain in Greece. G2 
This attitude was not to save the United States money, 
but part of a general policy with regard to aid to Greece. 
A message of 11 March to the Athens Embassy stated that one 
of the State Department's main aims was to '. 
.. 
make it 
clear to the U. S. public and the rest of the world 
... 
that any aid extended to Greece is in the interest of world 
peace and is not to assist in carrying on any British policy 
in Greece. 
The matter of the three month's interim aid was finally 
settled in London. On-1? March, the American Ambassador- 
Designate (Douglas) and the Charge d'Affairs (Gallman) 
called on Attlee, who was acting as Foreign Secretary while 
Bevin was in Moscow. Attlee stated that he had just been 
informed by Dalton that the interim aid would be extended to 
the Greeks as a British gift. t- 
Acheson's memoranda, 8 and 14 March, FRUS, 1947, V, 105, 
116-117; Washington Embassy telegram 1613,14 March, 
F0371/67035/R3483. 
"Ibid. 
, 
pp. 107-108. 
"'Ibid., pp. 123-124. 
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This left the problem of the retention of the British 
Service Missions in Greece. It was discussed in Cabinet on 
20 March, when it was decided to attempt to persuade the 
United States to pay these costs, or to have them paid by 
the Greeks from American aid money. E' Bevin took the 
problem up with Marshall on 18 March during the Moscow 
Conference, ^ and brought it up again on the 22nd. He 
confirmed that the three-month interim aid would now be 
borne by the British, but stated that there were major 
difficulties in obtaining money for the continued support of 
the missions. Britain had now committed eighteen million 
pounds for interim aid after 31 March, and it would be very 
difficult to go to Parliament for additional money for the 
missions. -- 
Unless Marshall, the source of this report is in error, 
Bevin was either confused, or attempting to deceive. The 
British Government had in all committed nine million pounds 
for interim aid, two million of which was a gift of 
equipment and one million a release of blocked Greek funds, 
leaving only six million pounds to be appropriated by 
Parliament. It is true that the British administration had 
recently been forced to obtain a supplemental appropriation 
'CM30(47), CAB128/9. 
`=' Bevin-s telegram 176,18 March, F0371/67036/R3708. There 
is no mention of this conversation in FRUS, 1947, II or 
V. 
°'Marsha11 s -Notes on a Conversation with Mr Bevin, ' FRUS, 
1945, V, 128-129. No British report of this 
conversation has been found. 
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of nineteen (not eighteen, as Bevin said) pounds for Greece, 
but this was for extra funds committed before 31 March. - 
On 11 April, Marshall, still in Moscow, received a 
letter from Bevin reiterating his hope that the United 
States would permit the Greeks to pay for the missions in 
dollars from American aid money. Marshall asked Acheson for 
advice on how to reply. Acheson pointed out that the 
Greece-Turkey aid bill now in front of Congress had a 
proviso to the effect that no funds could be used by a 
recipient country to make payments of the principle or 
interest on any loan made by a third country. An attempt to 
bring up the matter of the missions would only lead to 
stronger Congressional action to prevent any such use of the 
money. Acheson suggested that the message came not from 
Bevin, but from Dalton, and indicated that he was asking 
Douglas in London to make a vigorous attempt to change the 
Treasury view. Ems. 
Acheson also discussed the matter with the British 
Embassy in Washington, who reported that the Acting Sec- 
retary of State was in a state of high agitation on the 
subject. Marshall wrote a strong letter back to Bevin. 
Douglas in London made representations to McNeil who 
promised to attempt to persuade the Treasury to withdraw the 
request. McNeil did write to Dalton, but the issue had been 
"'Details of the purposes of the £19,000,000 appropriation 
in 431 Par-1. Deb., ccl. 1766,14 March 1947; and The 
Times, 15 March. 
""Marshall's telegram, 11 April, and Acheson-s reply, 12 
April, FRUS, 1947, V, 141-144; Dalton-s letter to McNeil, 
8 April, confirming Acheson's suspicions, 
F0371/67039/R4931, 
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decided a day earlier by Attlee. On 17 April, he wrote a 
one sentence note to Dalton, saying that in view of a 
message from Bevin explaining the views of the American 
Congress, the demand for payment of the missions costs 
should dropped. 7° 
Dalton next day wrote a strong letter to Attlee. While 
he had to accept the decision, he objected vehemently, and 
complained that the Foreign Office did not understand the 
gravity of the situation. Attlee wrote at the bottom of 
this, -Noted. C. R. A. ' On 23 April, Marshall received a 
letter from Bevin saying that the British would continue 
their missions, without payment from the United States. - 
This seems to have ended the arguments over British 
financial contributions to Greece. 
8. The Transfer of Patronage 
In the aide-memoire of 1 March informing the British 
that the American administration intended to assume the 
Greek burden, quite a point was made of demanding assurances 
that the British Government would -continue, to the extent 
of its ability, fully to cooperate in supporting the 
political independence and territorial integrity [of Greece 
"Washington Embassy telegram 2210,12 April, F0371/67040/ 
R4989; telegrams of Douglas and Marshall, 14 and 15 
April, FRUS, 1947, V, 145-146; McNeil's letter to Dalton, 
18 April; Attlee's minute (based on Bevin's telegram 
788), 17 April, PREM8/528. 
''Dalton-s letter, 18 April 1946, PREM8/528; Bevin-s 
letter, FRUS, 1947, V, 148-149. 
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and Turkey]-. This was followed by an even stronger note on 
the same subject from Marshall personally, which added a 
request for joint discussions of the problems of Greece and 
Turkey, as well as problems of common concern in Europe and 
Asia. ' A few days later, the importance of British support 
to the American intervention in Greece was stressed at a 
high level meeting of British and American officials in 
London. The Foreign Office was puzzled by this develop- 
ment and relieved when the American pressure on the matter 
faded away-71- Within a few weeks, the Americans were acting 
as if they intended to proceed without British diplomatic 
assistance. 
Even before 22 May, when Congress passed the bill 
authorising the required aid to Greece, the American 
Ambassador in Athens was applying pressure on the Maximos 
Government to take action against right-wing terrorism and 
the State Department was demanding immediate economic 
reforms. '' From this time on, the American Embassy con- 
tinually made specific suggestions as to how the Greek 
Government should conduct itself in almost every aspect of 
political and economic affairs, while trying to avoid the 
charge of interference. 
In August-September 1947, the Maximos Government 
resigned, to a large extent because of American pressure for 
The two aides-memoire of 1 March, and Gallman's telegram, 
17 March, FRUS, 1947, V, 72-73 and 123-124; F0371/61033/ 
R2820. 
-: MacVeagh's letter to Maximos, 11 April; State Department 
telegram, 16 April; and Athens telegram, 25 April, FRUS, 
1947, V, 142-143,146-147, and 151-152. 
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a coalition representing more fully the two broad streams in 
Greek politics, the republicans and the royalists. In the 
intricate maneouvering towards for the formation of a new 
administration, MacVeagh and Dwight Griswold, the head of 
the new American aid mission, carried out continual dis- 
cussions with every prominent political leader, making it 
clear that the United States was insisting on full coopera- 
tion. In view of the deteriorating civil war situation and 
the implied threat of withdrawal of the newly available 
economic aid, it is not surprising that the Americans 
succeeded where the British had failed. A new coalition 
uniting the two main strands of Greek politics was formed, 
which endured for over two years. 
Direct British involvement in Greek politics ceased 
almost immediately after the Truman Doctrine speech. There 
were no more joint representations to Greek Ministers by the 
British and American Ambassadors which had often occurred in 
the past. When Bevin in late July 1947 tried to explore an 
offer of the Greek Communists of a truce in the civil war, 
he asked that the American Ambassador be instructed to 
accompany his British counterpart in asking the Greek 
Government to consider the proposal. The Americans turned 
Bevin down almost out of hand, on grounds that the KKE offer 
was insincere-7- 
There was a considerable amount of cooperation between 
the British and the Americans an military matters. The 
British Military Mission remained in Greece for the duration 
'State Department telegram, 18 July, and Athens telegram, 
21 July, FRUS, 1947, V, 243-244 and 250-252. 
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of the civil war, and, initially, had full responsibility 
for the training of the Greek Army. Even after the 
Americans had established an extensive military advisory 
force, the British mission continued to assist the Greek 
forces. For this reason, important decisions regarding the 
strength and organisation of the Greek army were usually 
taken in conjunction with the British, or, at least, after 
consultation. 
The question of the retention of British combat troops 
in Greece gave rise to strong, if not violent, disagreement. 
Britain had reduced its force in early 1947 to one brigade 
of about 6,000 men, and had announced to the Americans that 
this formation was to be gradually withdrawn during the 
year. They amounted to a token force whose ostensible 
function, after the plebisicite, was to counterbalance 
Soviet forces in Bulgaria until the peace treaty with that 
country was finally ratified. It was generally accepted 
within and without Greece that their continued presence 
would deter any attempt of the Soviets or their satellites 
to invade Greece in support of the communists. The Ameri- 
cans believed that their retention was essential to a 
successful prosecution of the civil war, although British 
troops were never used against the. guerrillas. 
In August 1947, in the midst of the British converti- 
bility crisis, Bevin suddenly announced that the troops were 
being withdrawn immediately. This led to an argument 
between Bevin and General Marshall which lasted until late 
November, perhaps after Palestine the most serious dispute 
between the two powers in the post-war decade. The motives 
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of neither side are clear, although it would appear that 
Bevin was using the threat of withdrawal in an effort to 
obtain more support for Britain in non-Greek affairs, such 
as interim aid until the Marshall Plan came into effect, or 
an American assumption of the dollar costs of the German 
occupation. Bevin finally gave in, probably having achieved 
his goal, and the British troops remained in Greece until 
early 1950, by which time the civil war was over-7s 
The economic and military aid promised by the Americans 
soon began to arrive in Greece. The amounts of each had to 
be increased constantly, because two years of hard fighting 
by the Greek government forces under American direction were 
required to end the civil war. '" The initial reconstruction 
monies provided by the Truman Doctrine Act were supplemented 
substantially by the Marshall Plan, so that by late 1949 
Greece was well on the way to economic recovery, if not 
relative prosperity. 
This suggests that the American assumption of the Greek 
burden was a major success, at least so far as the effect on 
Greece is concerned. The only counter-argument is that of 
some historians who see the long period of both British and 
American patronage as unwelcome and deleterious intervention 
"This dispute is examined in detail in Robert Frazier, 
The Bevin-Marshall Dispute of August-September 1947 con- 
cerning the Withdrawal of British Troops from Greece', in 
Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, 
ed. Lars Baerentzen, John O. latrides, and Ole L. Smith 
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculum Press, 1987), pp. 249-261. 
'7 The arguments that the end of the civil war was directed 
by Stalin, or was brought about by the Tito-Stalin rift, 
rather than being the result of American aid and advice, 
are not within the scope of this work. 
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in Greek affairs, intervention which resulted in right-wing 
or centre-right domination of Greek politics for a lengthy 
period. In the extreme view, the American intrusion paved the 
way for the Colonel's coup of 1967.7 It must be accepted 
that the Americans did not always make the inculcation of 
full democratic ideals and safeguards their primary concern; 
their actions were motivated almost entirely by the fear of 
the spread of communism. If they did not whole-heartedly 
implement the goals of the Declaration on Liberated Europe 
which first brought them into the affairs of Greece in 1946, 
they did not deliberately foster reaction and semi- 
dictatorship. The alternative to their intervention was 
almost certain economic chaos, the probable victory of EAM, 
and, at best, a Soviet client state. 
The long-term effects of the American presence are 
examined by Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern 
Greece (Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 7; Maurice 
Goldbloom, "United States Policy in Post-War Greece, - in 
Greece under Military Rule, ed. Richard Clogg and George 
Yannopoulos (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972), pp. 228- 
254; John O. Iatrides, -American Attitudes towards 
Greece, ' in Greek American Relations, ed. Theodore A. 
Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides (New York: Pella, 1980), 
pp. 49-73; Keith Legg, Politics in Modern Greece 
(Stanford University Press, 1969), chs. 3 and 9; Lawrence 
Stern, The Wrong Horse (New York: Time Books, 1977); and 
Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, ch. 10. Of the 
above, only Stern and Wittner suggest that the overall 
effect of American influence was harmful. 
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Chapter 9 
British and American Motivations 
1. Why Did Britain Withdraw? 
The British decision to end all financial aid to Greece 
resulted in the Truman Doctrine which in turn led to the 
Marshall Plan and NATO; it may well be considered the 
impulse which began the Cold War. In the words of one 
historian: 
February 21 was thus a historic day. On that 
day, Great Britain, the only remaining power in 
Europe, acknowledged her exhaustion. She had 
fought Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, 
Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolf Hitler of Germany. She 
had preserved the balance of power which protected 
the United States for so long that it seemed almost 
natural for her to continue to do so., 
Whether the delivery of the note marked the complete 
exhaustion of Britain is debatable, but there is little 
doubt that it resulted in a major departure in the course of 
American foreign policy, probably the most significant 
change since the founding of the Republic. At the same 
time, the American acceptance of responsibility for Greece 
represents the culmination of its slowly changing attitudes 
'John Spanier, American Foreign Policy since World War II 
(London: Pall Mall, 1962), p. 29. 
This contradicts some other authorities, notably John L. 
Gaddis, Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point? - 
The validity of the statement will be defended later in 
this chapter. 
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towards that country, and the effective transition from 
British to American patronage. 
It has been generally assumed that the British Govern- 
ment abandoned Greece unwillingly and unexpectedly, only 
because there was no alternative; the great fuel crisis of 
early 1947, along with the approaching exhaustion of the 
American loan, compelled a drastic reduction in external 
expenditure. At the same time, there are suggestions that 
financial exhaustion was not the real reason for the 
, 
uls-ittitin, AU Un P_Xumplº3i 
While the Brussels Treaty was being hatched, 
Bevin was also hatching a rather tricky plan to in- 
volve the United States in defence responsibilites 
in Europe, in the first place in Greece. 
-m 
This implies that Britain, on 21 February 1947, sud- 
denly announced that she was withdrawing aid from Greece, 
not because she could no longer afford it, but in order to 
apply maximum pressure on America to provide active support 
in the defence of the West. A third view, particularly 
evident in American thinking at the time, is that Bevin was 
forced to abandon Greece because of pressure from the left 
wing of the Labour Party. The records of the Foreign Office 
suggest that the withdrawal from Greece was not the result 
of a definite decision taken in an atmosphere of panic or as 
part of a deliberate diplomatic manoeuvre. Instead, it was 
the result of long-term discussions within and amongst 
several government departments, in which strategic factors 
as well as financial necessity influenced the outcome. 
Elisabeth Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe (London; 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971), p. 68. 
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2. The Financial Motive--Dalton"s Evidence 
The majority of authorities accept the financial 
motive, usually basing their views on the evidence of Hugh 
Dalton and accepting it as proof that he forced Bevin to 
agree to withdraw all aid; therefore, financial necessity 
was the only significant factor. Dalton provided two 
versions of his involvement in the matter, that in his diary 
and a section of his memoir published some years later. A 
close examination of these two accounts reveal that neither 
tallies with established facts on a number of points, 
particularly when compared with the evidence of the Foreign 
Office files. 
Dalton described, in dramatic fashion, a meeting at 
which he forced an unwilling, perhaps unwitting, Bevin to 
agree to a withdrawal of all aid from Greece and a 
simultaneous appeal to the Americans to accept the burden. 
Dalton does admit that he himself did not realise the full 
significance of his action at the time, but he gives the 
strong impression that he was responsible both for the idea 
of withdrawing aid, and the decision to approach the 
Americans. - 
Taken at face value, this is indeed strong evidence for 
a purely financial motive. Unfortunately, there are too 
many discrepancies in Dalton-s version to make it of any 
significant value. Dalton did not record his account of 
what had happened until three weeks after the event, when he 
4High Tide and After, pp. 207-208; and his diary entry for 
14 March 1947. 
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In the long run, discrediting the evidence of Dalton-s 
memoir and diary has no effect on the evaluation of Bevin"s 
motives for the withdrawal. It is obvious from the Foreign 
Office files that Dalton was pressing Bevin to abandon 
Greece; these files show how compelling his influence was in 
the final decision to withdraw all aid, not a portion of it. 
Dalton"s two accounts are so confused as to be worthless; 
but the fact that they have been taken by many authorities 
to constitute proof of a financial motive does not weaken 
the probability that this was the major reason for the 
decision. Britain was in a difficult financial position, 
and Dalton was determined to reduce foreign commitments. 
The examination of Dalton-s accounts and their com- 
parison with the official record gives rise to the question 
of why he took such an uncompromising attitude to the 
question of financial aid to Greece. Only a small amount of 
money (and that sterling, not hard currency) could be saved 
by Dalton"s insistence on a complete withdrawal of aid, as 
opposed to making some compromise arrangement of substantial 
reductions. A compromise was the course of action proposed 
by the Foreign office, and approved by the Cabinet in the 30 
January decision. 
It is almost as if Dalton had some fixed idea that aid 
must be withdrawn from Greece, not for reasons of financial 
exigency, but because of irrational dislike of the Greeks. 
His attitude in February 1947 towards aid for Italy, or to 
proposals for post-UNRRA relief in general, seems one of 
cooperation and attempts to do as much as he can; - when it 
°Bevin-s memorandum, 18 February, F0371/67032/R2443. 
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came to Greece he had a closed mind. The following 
statements made by Dalton in the period November 1946 to 
late April 1947 should be considered: 
I am also resisting suggestions from the F. O. 
to spend large sums on Greeks, Turks and Afghans. 
I sent a minute to the P. M. saying that we have 
not got the money for this sort of thing and that 
even if we had, we should not spend it on these 
people. "' 
We should cut our losses and abandon Greece. 
And I would begin at once by cutting off the 
Greeks. 1i 
I Cb 
The Chancellor was willing [to re-examine the 
question of aid to Italy], but he again emphasised 
that he could not go on pouring money into Greece. 12 
I had for a long time been trying to put an 
end to our endless dribble of British taxpayer 
money to the Greeks. - 
We must finish with the Greeks--financially-- 
now! as 
I regard the Greeks as a very poor investment 
for the British taxpayer. ' 
The last two of these were added in ink above the signature 
to letters on interim aid to Greece, as if Dalton felt the 
letters themselves were not strong enough. These seven 
quotations are not proof that Dalton disliked the Greeks, I E. 
but he did seem to single them out for more drastic measures 
"High Tide and After, p. 171, discussing events of 29 
November, italics in the original. 
"Minute, 29 January, F0371/67032/R2438. 
"Memorandum, 11 February, F0371/67032/R2443. 
1'Bevin"s memorandum, 18 February, F0371/67302/R2442. 
'Diary, 14 March 1947. 
"Letter, 8 April, F0371/67039/R4931. 
'sLetter, 18 April, F0371/67040/R5397. 
Kenneth 0. Morgan, Labour People (Oxford; Clarendon 
Press, 1984), p. 127, suggests that Dalton had been 
hostile to the Greeks since the Chanak incident of 1922. 
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than any other one nation when he was trying to reduce 
expenditure. 
Dalton's insistence on the ending of all aid might have 
seriously endangered the entire operation to persuade the 
Americans to take up the task. There was a strong possi- 
bility that the United States would not agree unless the 
burden was shared. While it does not seem to have been 
considered at the time, Dalton's policy could (and, to a 
large extent, did) lead to a loss of all significant British 
influence in Greece. His initial insistence on notifying 
the Greeks that all aid would be cut off before the American 
response was known might well have led to a complete 
collapse of the Greek Government, as Norton forecast. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that Dalton's 
insistence on making the withdrawal complete, rather than 
partial, was a clever move to ensure American acceptance. 
Any partial withdrawal coupled with a request that the 
United States make up the difference could be seen in anti- 
British circles in America as `pulling the British chestnuts 
out of the fire- or as entering into an entangling 
alliance'. Perhaps it was more likely that the Americans 
would give substantial aid only if they did not have to 
share the resulting influence and any glory with the 
British. The lack of any indication that this was in 
Dalton's mind and the statement in his memoirs that he did 
not realise the actual significance of the decision makes 
this idea dubious. The immediate American reaction to the 
note on this point was a set of demands that the British 
pledge themselves to continue, to the extent of its 
ability, fully to cooperate in supporting the political 
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independence and the territorial integrity- of Greece and 
Turkey-.: L7 
3. Other Evidence for the Financial Motive 
The only official explanation for the withdrawal is a 
brief statement in the House of Commons on 17 March 1947, 
after a number of searching questions arising from the 
Truman Doctrine speech and earlier rumours that British aid 
to Greece was to be ended. Hector McNeil, acting for the 
Foreign Office in Bevin-s absence in Moscow, stated, His 
Majesty's Government decided, after full and anxious review, 
that they could not enter into any substantial commitment 
for Greece after 31st March, 
..... 
le 
Lord Inverchapel, who delivered the British message to 
Marshall, seems to have been confused concerning the motiva- 
tion for the withdrawal. On 10 March, prior to the Truman 
Doctrine speech, but well after the general tenor of the 
note on Greece was known, a speech of his included: 
Let me say at once that Britain's domestic 
problems have nothing whatever to do with the 
recent announcement to leave India in 1948, to 
negotiate a new treaty with Egypt, or to set up a 
constituent assembly in Burma. Perhaps they have 
had something slight to do with the need to reduce 
our very heavy commitments in Greece, but not 
nearly as much as has been made out. iti 
17Acheson-s memorandum and two Aides-Memoire, all 1 March, 
FRUS, 1947, V, 72. 
11435 F r1. Deb., col. 16,17 March. 
1'-9Full text in F0371/61000/AN1174; report in New Yorlr 
Times, 11 March, -Gloomy Reports Denied by Briton'. 
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Inverchapel continued by saying that he did not intend 
to go into detail concerning any of these matters; in other 
words, he did not explain what the real reasons were for the 
withdrawal of aid from Greece. While this seems good 
evidence for a non-financial motive, Inverchapel, five days 
after the Truman Doctrine speech, said: 
I am prepared to concede that we have overdone 
all this public expenditure abroad. In fact, we 
have. That is why we have had to come here and ask 
your Government to take over our financial 
responsibilities in Greece and Turkey. 20 
It could be argued that Inverchapel knew when he 
delivered the British note on Greece that the motive was not 
really financial; and that he based his speech of the 10th 
on this knowledge, only to receive instructions from London 
to change the tenor of his public statements. This would 
require a belief that Bevin had some other reason for the 
withdrawal, but failed to provide appropriate instructions 
for Inverchapel with regard to public announcements until 
sometime after 10 March. 2i 
The Foreign Office prepared comments on the matter for 
inclusion in Attlee-s weekly letter to the King, the Royal 
Family then being on a tour of South Africa. It included, 
.. 
owing to our general financial position, we have felt 
that we could not continue to carry the burden 
... 
and 
.. 
our inability to continue the necessary financial 
"Speech, New York Times, 18 March. 
ý-1The Foreign Office analysis of the 10 March speech 
suggests only that the Ambassador was being slightly 
optimistic (F0371/61000/AN1174). 
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support-. 2: ' In the 21 March draft of a letter to be sent to 
the Dominions, the Foreign Office stated: 
In view of our financial difficulties Mr Bevin 
agreed that our policy towards Greece must be so 
conducted towards Greece as to eliminate the burden 
which it has hitherto imposed on the British 
taxpayer.. 
-1 
Finally, Bevin, replying to a strong attack on his 
foreign policy at the Labour Party Conference on 29 May 
1947, stated, `We had to tell the world that we could not 
carry an in Greece any longer. The Chancellor said he had 
reached the end. ---a- 
The public statements of the British participants, 
except for Inverchapel's speech of 10 March, give financial 
necessity as the only reason for the decision. They are in 
every case brief and lacking in detail; and in no case, 
unless perhaps in Inverchapel-s speech of 17 March, do they 
seem to rule out another possibility. They are what one 
might expect if they were concealing the real motivation. 
4. The American Opinion of British Motives 
The Americans did question the sincerity of the British 
note, but pushed their doubts aside. The only explanation 
they had for the withdrawal of aid was the sentence in the 
British note of 21 February, which read, The United States 
Government will readily understand that His Majesty's 
Government, in view of their own situation, finds it 
: 2`Colville"s letter, 13 March 1947, F0371/67035/R3467. 
: 21F0371/67035/R3442. 
Labour Party Conference Report, 1947, p. 179. 
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impossible to grant further financial assistance to Greece. " 
The note did not give any details of the actual financial 
problems of Britain at the time; the `situation- might well 
have been a diplomatic or strategic one rather than 
financial. 
Acheson prepared a memorandum transmitting the British 
note to the President in which he said, -I believe the 
British are entirely sincere in this matter 
... . 
'ý The 
same day the State Department asked the London Embassy to 
comment on the `sincerity and accuracy- of the British 
statements. The Charge d'Affaires replied, `there was no 
no reason to doubt the British sincerity "in the light of 
Britain's over-extended foreign policy and serious financial 
plight, plus political pressure within the Labour party 
.. 
It "ýG A few days later, a senior State Department 
official visiting London confirmed Gallman-s view and told 
Washington that after visiting the Foreign Office and 
believed 
reviewing their telegrams from Greece, he belive the 
seriousness of Britain's own financial situation resulted in 
the failure of Bevin to rally any support whatsoever against 
Dalton in the Cabinet in favour of continuing any financial 
aid to the Greek Army after April 1. '27 
The most detailed analysis of British motives was that 
made by a special committee of the State Department, formed 
to study the problem of aid to Greece and Turkey. Its 
report of 25 February stated: 
The argument might be advanced that the 
British are not entirely sincere in presenting the 
1124 February, FRUS, 1947, V, 44-45. 
26FRUS, 1947, V, 47, n. 7, and 68, n. 3. 
ý7Matthews- telegram, 28 February, ibid., p. 68-69. 
325 
proposals contained in these notes; that the world 
situation will compel them to continue aid to 
Greece and Turkey regardless of what we might or 
might not contribute; and that the notes have been 
pushing the United States to assume the financial 
and other economic burdens which otherwise must be 
borne primarily by Great Britain. It might also 
be suggested that Great Britain has already 
decided to change its basic policies towards the 
Soviet Union and is now planning, instead of con- 
tinuing to try to resist Soviet pressures, to 
endeavor to come to terms with the Soviet Union on 
a basis involving respective spheres of influence 
in various parts of the world, including Europe 
and the Near East, and the conclusion of a close 
military alliance extending perhaps beyond the 
framework of the United Nations. Persons following 
this line of reasoning might further argue that the 
notes have been sent in the belief that the United 
States will refuse to bear what the British Govern- 
ment, in the eyes of the British people and before 
the whole world, in making such a change of policy. 
After examining carefully the notes in the 
light of the present international situation and of 
the economic conditions of Great Britain, we are 
inclined to believe that the British Government is 
really convinced that it is unable any longer to 
expend funds, supplies and manpower in the Near 
East in the future as it has in the past; 
.... 
We feel, however, that if the United States finds 
itself unable to render assistance to an extent 
which promises successfully to resist Soviet 
pressures, the British Government may well find it 
will be compelled to approach the Soviet Government 
in an effort to work out some arrangement which 
would have the effect of at least slowing up the 
Russian advance in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
Such an arrangement would undoubtedly mean wide- 
spread concessions to Russia in one or several 
areas. 
Marshall told the Secretaries of War and navy on 26 
February that he believed the British to be -definitely 
"Undated memorandum, ibid., pp. 48-49. The idea that 
Britain might enter into a close relationship with the 
Soviet Union was not a sudden inspiration of the State 
Department. The same idea was expressed in a memorandum 
of December 1945 (FRUS, 1946, VII, 2-3). Whether the 
Americans realised it or not, the British during the war 
had considered this possibility (Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, 
pp. 117-118; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, V, 3-8). 
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sincere-; he told Truman on the same day, 
... 
we are 
convinced the British Government is sincere'.. -m- 
Representative Walter Judd, during the hearings on the 
bill to implement the Truman Doctrine speech, brought up the 
question of British intentions: 
Judd: 
... 
some people claim that Britain's 
economic situation is not really as serious as had 
been portrayed, and that this action is just 
another attempt to drag the United States into 
helping her secure her interests in the Middle East 
For the record, would you mind saying whether this 
is a trick or whether Britain's economy is really 
in desperate straits? 
Acheson: I think it is no trick at all. I 
think the British are entirely straightforward and 
sincere in what they represent. '-"0 
In other words, the State Department did consider 
British motivation, but rejected any question of sincerity 
out of hand. One suspects a routine standing instruction 
within the Department, -First test any British proposal for 
sincerity, then proceed. - 
The announcement of the British decision was made 
public in Truman`s address to Congress on 12 March. He 
stated that the British Government, which had been helping 
Greece, could give no further financial or economic aid 
after 31 March. He followed by saying that Great Britain 
found itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating 
its commitments in several parts of the world, including 
Greece, although this statement has no basis in the British 
"FRUS, 1947, V. 57,58. 
"U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Hearing-s an H. R. 2616, -Assistance to Greece and 
Turkey. 21 March, p. 50. 
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note of 21 February. Most interpretations of the motives 
for British-withdrawal before the publication of Dalton-s 
memoir derived from this speech. There seems to have 
been little doubt in the minds of the American leaders that 
the decision was based entirely on financial necessity, ) 
although another possibility was considered. 
5. The Influence of the Left Wing of the Labour Party 
This was a view that Bevin was forced to abandon Greece 
because of the opposition of the left wing of the Labour 
Party to British sponsorship of the royalist regime in 
Athens. This idea was advanced by certain senior American 
officials who played a part in the resulting actions. 
In May 1947, Acheson asked the Embassy in London, Are 
we safe in assuming that Bevin is likely to remain in the 
Foreign Office for the remainder of the year? Is Bevin 
making any progress in lining up the Labor back-benchers in 
support of British foreign policy? Is his thinking still 
[sic] influenced by their critical attitudes? ' The Embassy 
reply indicated a firm belief that, while Bevin would be 
sensitive to the feelings of Labour back-benchers, there 
'°Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
Harry S. Truman, -1947, pp. 336-340. 
"Truman-s complete acceptance of the financial motive is 
set forth in his Memoirs, II, 104-105; and Merle Miller, 
Plain Speaking (New York: Berkley, 
-1974), p. 258. Most of the published accounts of members of the American 
Government who were involved confirm this view; for 
example, Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 217; Forrestal Diaries, p. 242; Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 
261; and Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, pp. 78-81. 
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would be no effect on the fundamentals of his policy towards 
the USSR. 
----. 
It has already been noted that the American Charge in 
London on 25 February told the State Department that there 
was no need to doubt British sincerity in light of 
Britain's over-extended foreign position and serious 
financial plight, plus political pressure within the Labour 
Party in the case of Greece. `"' Averell Harriman, American 
Ambassador to Britain during most of 1945, said that the 
Attlee Government was influenced substantially with regard 
to Greece by the pressure from the extreme left, mentioning 
a 'Laski-Zilliacus-Crossman group-. as 
There were doubts within the ranks of the Labour Party 
concerning Churchill's policy towards Greece even before 
the liberation 
, 
but these rarely came to the surface. An 
isolated example is Morrison-s request in Cabinet for an 
assurance that British troops would not be used to restore 
the King to the throne. : BG There were objections in December 
1944 when British troops were in action against EAM in 
Athens. When an amendment to the King's Speech concerning 
government policy in Greece was proposed, twenty-four 
members of the Labour Party voted against the Government and 
118 either abstained or were absent. Bevin's strong speech 
in the House of Commons in support of Churchill's policies, 
-" State Department telegram, 17 May, FRUS, 1947, I, 750- 
751; London telegram, 11 June, NARS 841.20/6-1147 (the 
text printed in FRUS, 1947, I, 751-758, is incomplete). 
"Gallman-s telegram, FRUS, 1947, V, 
-68, n. 3. 
r-Forrestal Diaries, entries for 4 and 8 August, pp. 292- 
293. 
Edens minute, 5 August 1944, F0371/43715/R12086. 
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Spge" 
and his : keck to the Trades Union Congress at the same 
time,: 37 silenced much of the criticism, but opposition 
continued to be expressed, particularly at the Labour Party 
Conferences of 1945 and 1946. It intensified after the 
recall of the King in September 1946, and the spread of 
right-wing terrorism, but it amounted almost entirely to 
criticism of the Greek Government, and seldom of British 
support of Greece. ae 
The left-wing attitude to Greece was part of the more 
general opposition of a segment of the Labour Party to 
Bevin-s foreign policy. The bulk of the party, including 
many who could never be described as left-wing, looked for 
the initiation of a `Socialist foreign policy" with the 
departure of Churchill and Eden, although they were never 
able to establish what this would amount to. In practice, 
those who objected to Bevin-s approach concentrated on 
distrust of the United States as the centre of capitalism; 
hatred of the remnants of Fascism, such as Franco Spain; and 
a dream of a 'third force', that is a unified movement of 
European Socialist parties. Gradually this opposition 
became identified with a loose grouping known as the 'Keep 
Left" movement. There was also a small ultra-left fringe 
which tended to be pro-Soviet. "Keep Left' greatly annoyed 
Bevin in November 1946 with an amendment to the Kings 
"406 Fart. Deb., cols. 1858-1909,6 December; The Times, 
14 December 1944. 
73*%New Statesman, 1944-1946, passim, reflects these left 
wing views, especially the issues of 7 and 28 September, 
and 28 October 1946. See also Eugene J. Meehan, The 
British Left Wing and Foreign Policy (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1960), pp. 52-65 and 71-73. 
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Speech signed by over a hundred Labour M. P. -s, but this was 
the last substantial criticism of the lack of a Socialist 
foreign policy. 
The left wing, except for die-hard extremists, was 
changing its view of foreign policy in the late autumn of 
1946. It was losing its hope of cooperation with the 
Soviets, and turning to a programme of neutrality and 
disarmament. Disengagement was felt necessary if the 
social revolution was to be preserved and maintained; the 
financial drain caused by overseas military expenditure 
could well destroy the chances of an effective socialisation 
of Britain. -a 
There was a parallel change of attitude towards the 
Middle East, which, by implication, included Greece. Two 
articles in the New Statesman in December defended Bevin-s 
foreign policies. In January, in examining Britain's Middle 
East position, it stated, Two solutions are possible. On 
the one hand, we could state frankly to the Americans that 
we are unable to accept the military repsonsibility for the 
protection of Anglo-American interests in this part of the 
In addition to Meehan, cit. supra., the left-wing atti- 
tude to Bevin-s foreign policy in general is disucssed by 
James L. Godfrey, -British Foreign Policy and the Labour 
Party, 1945-1947, ' South Atlantic Qumarterly, XLVII 
(April 1948), pp. 137-151; Leon Epstein, The British 
Labour Left and U. S. Policy, - American Political Science 
Review, XIV-4 (December 1951), pp. 974-975; Michael R. 
Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labours Foreign Policy 
(Stanford University Press, 1969); Leonard Woolf, Foreign 
Policy: The Labour Party's Dilemma (London: Gollancz, 
1947); and Woodrow Wyatt, Into a Dangerous World (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson), pp. 139-149. 
41Contemporary comment includes two articles in the New 
Statesman, 'Reorientations: I. The Munich Analogy, ` 31 
August 1946, and 'II. Vital Interests, ' 7 September. 
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world. ' The alternate solution, which New Statesman 
preferred, was to form an independent Arab bloc. The 
alternate solution seems to have been chosen mainly because 
of doubts that the Americans would take on new commitments 
in addition to those it had assumed in the Pacific. Another 
article argued for disengagement in the Middle East, but 
suggested, without much hope, that it might be possible to 
transfer the burden to the United States. 41 What is 
significant is the stress on the need to protect -Anglo- 
American interests", as well as the danger of precipitate 
action. While New Statesman cannot be taken as representa- 
tive of the entire left wing of the Labour Party, its 
attitude is evidence of the lack of wide-spread pressure in 
February 1947 for a withdrawal from Greece on political 
grounds. 
Tribune, which usually reflected an attitude further to 
the left, took a view on Greece very close to that of New 
Statesman. While constantly criticising Bevin-s general 
foreign policy, Tribune accepted the British presence in 
Greece. From November 1946 until the following February, 
there was no mention of Greece except for coverage of a 
trades union dispute. 4 In early February it paid tribute 
to the value of British troops in Greece as a brake on the 
"Aiden Crawley, The Case for Mr Bevin, - 7 December; 
Raymond Blackburn, -Reply [to Crawley"s article], ` 14 
December; From the Angle of Strategy, - 11 January; and 
Rumours and Realities, " 8 February. 
`"ýA similar lack of reporting of Greek affairs is evident 
in the Dally Herald, which, 'as -Bevin-s Own Paper-, 
relected the more moderate attitudes within the Labour 
Party. Newsprint shortages were probably the cause, 
rather than any deliberate attempt to play down Greece. 
Greek Government's repression of the political left. While 
it regretted that British influence had not been used to 
institute social and economic reforms along with a programme 
of tolerance and political justice, it issued no call for a 
withdrawal of aid or of troops. When there were rumours of 
the British decision in the first days of March 1947, 
Tribune made no effort to welcome the idea. Once the Truman 
Doctrine was announced, its attitude was that Bevin had 
handed over Greece to the United States and, in so doing, 
had lost 'Britain's most valuable bargaining counter vis-a- 
vis American policy in general', by which was meant 
Britain's access to oil. -- 
Michael Foot, one of the leaders of the -Keep Left- 
faction, seems to deny that there was any pressure on Bevin 
from within the party: 
If anyone of this side of the House had got up 
three or four months ago and said that we ought to 
cut down our commitments in Greece and Turkey 
because they were too much for us to bear, we 
should have heard the phrase `degenerate 
intellectuals" once again. Nevertheless, it has 
come to pass and we have suddenly had to make this 
cut in our commitments. º.,. 
The foreign correspondent and political commentator F. 
A. Voigt implied that the only real public pressure to 
withdraw from Greece came from 'Liberals', presumably mem- 
bers of the Liberal Party. While he coupled 'left-wing 
labour` with the pressure for withdrawal, the thrust of his 
argument concerned Liberal feeling. His major piece of 
ýý'Troops without Policy, ' 7 February; 'Athenian Hysteria, - 
7 March; and The Way to the Stars--and Stripes, ' 21 
March. 
"437 Fart. Deb., col. 1799,15 May 1947. 
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evidence was a quotation from the Manchester Guardian of 27 
September 1946, '. 
.. 
if we [that is, Great Britain] 
withdraw from Greece we may be weaker strategically, but we 
shall be stronger morally. --v 
A survey of the national press and political periodi- 
cals for February and early March 1947 fails to reveal any 
hint of pressure from the left wing of the Labour Party for 
withdrawal of aid to Greece. '" Similarly, none of the 
autobiographies, memoirs, or biographies of leading members 
of the party at the time, including those of the left wing, 
mention any body of opinion which was pressing for with- 
drawal. 47 If any left wing pressure on Bevin existed, it 
must have been applied in secret. 
6. Strategic Factors 
Bevin's decision to withdraw all aid from Greece may 
have been the result of one or more external factors. The 
first of these is the question of post-war British strategy 
in the Middle East. While Bevin, at least after mid-1946, 
`"Greece and English Liberals, The Nineteenth Century and 
Afterwards, February 1947, pp. 74-87. 
416, Serials examined include all London dailies, Manchester 
Guardian, Observer, Sunday Times, Reynolds News, Specta- 
tor, and Time and Tide, in addition to Labour Monthly, 
New Statesman, and Tribune. 
47 Autobiographies and memoirs include those of Attlee, 
Daltor;, Morrison, Shinwell, Raymond Blackburn, Woodrow 
Wyatt, Douglas Jay, D. H. Pritt, Francis Williams, and 
George Wigg. Biographies include Williams on Attlee and 
Bevin, Alan Bullock on Sevin, Bernard Donoghue and G. W. 
Jones on Morrison, Michael Foot on Bevan; Ben Pimlott an 
Dalton; Simon Hoggart and David Leigh on Michael Foot; 
and Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams on Denis Healey. 
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had few doubts concerning the strategic importance of the 
Eastern Mediterranean to Britain's long term interests, he 
was by no means supported in this view by the Prime 
Minister. Attlee proposed on more than one occasion to 
abandon the Eastern Mediterranean as the 'lifeline of 
Empire-, and to replace it with a strategy based on the east 
coast of Africa. If such a decision had been taken, there 
would have been good reason to end the commitment to Greece, 
even if the economic position was not compelling. 
Shortly after taking office, Attlee shocked the Chiefs 
of Staff by suggesting that the security of the Middle East 
should be left up to the United Nations. - In the spring of 
1946, Attlee was strongly in favour of leaving Greece and 
Egypt and retreating to a position south of a line between 
Lagos and Kenya, putting, as Dalton described it, 'a wide 
glacis of desert and Arabs between ourselves and the 
Russians. -- Bevin seems to have been of two minds about 
this idea. Lord Strang credited him with a view similar to 
that of Attlee-s: 
... 
Bevin doubted whether the Canal Zone was 
the right place for a base and for a strategic 
reserve; rightly or wrongly his mind moved to the 
wider spaces of Indian Ocean, the east coast of 
Africa, that ancient meeting-place of nations; and 
the word "Mombasa" was often on his lips. -- 
This is echoed by Dalton, who recorded that Bevin at 
that time was very much in favour of the Lagos-Kenya idea, 
wanting to build a railway across Africa, although he was 
still very much interested in the Middle East. Shortly 
a 'Bryant, Triumph in the Vest, p. 383-384. 
-4`-'High Tide and After, p. 105. 
8°Home and Abroad (London: Deutsch, 1955), p. 291. 
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afterward, Bevin pointed out that he did not wish to 
withdraw from the Middle East. The Attlee proposal was also 
opposed by the Chiefs of Staff. The Defence Committee of 
the Cabinet, after considering Attlee's paper and sub- 
missions from Bevin and the Chiefs, decided to continue to 
support a hundred thousand man Greek army and to retain a 
substantial British force in Greece indefinitely. Nothing 
more was heard of the Lagos-Kenya idea for some time. si 
Note has already been taken of the discussions of 
Attlee, McNeil, and the Chiefs of Staff in November 1946 
while Bevin was absent in New York,, and McNeil-s message to 
Bevin intimating that Greek policy was in the melting pot. 
McNeil felt that there was a general attitude in London of 
reluctance to continue any commitments at all to Greece. 32 
According to an informed observer, there were considerable 
rumours in London to the effect that the Kenya-Lagos idea 
was being revived. The Middle East Command was being seen 
as two areas of interest separated by a desert. The Eastern 
Mediterranean area was felt to be valueless, but the Persian 
a 'Dalton, diary entries for 18 February and 22 March 1946. 
Attlee-s views were presented in DO(46)27,2 March; 
Bevin-s in DO(46)40,13 March, both CAB131/2. Bevin"s 
paper was to be discussed on 15 March; the minutes of 
this meeting (DO(46)41) have been withheld. Defence 
Committe-s conclusions are in F0371/58683/R5167. 
Attlee-s proposal is discussed in some detail by 
William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle 
East, pp. 107-109. 
"Supra, pp. 253. 
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Gulf must be defended. Therefore, Suez and Cyprus should be 
abandoned, and, by implication, Greece. 
While no decision was taken in November, Attlee 
reopened the question with a lengthy memorandum reviewing 
the entire Middle East policy in early January 1947. He 
began with an analysis of the current Chiefs of Staff 
appreciation. The service chiefs believed that the United 
Kingdom was not defensible against long-range attack from 
Russia. They believed that strong forces capable of a 
decisive counter-attack should be maintained in the Near 
East to deter such an action. This would also provide 
protection for oil supplies and secure the Mediterranean 
communication route. 
In Attlee"s view, Britain could not support the large 
forces necessary for such a strategy, particularly in view 
of the lack of good bases other than Malta and Cyprus, and 
the extreme weaknesses of the Near Eastern countries such 
as Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt. Without actually 
saying that this policy should be abandoned, and with it 
support of these countries, he expressed strong doubts as to 
its value. His conclusion was: 
Unless we are persuaded that the U. S. S. R. is 
irrevocably committed to a policy of world domi- 
nation and that there is no possibility of her 
alteration, I think that before being committed to 
this strategy we should seek to come to an agree- 
"=Elizabeth Monroe, -British Interests in the Middle East, ' 
Middle East Journal, 11-2 (April 1948), pp. 129-146. 
This article also suggests that there was a firm in- 
tention to abandon the Eastern Mediterranean when the 
attempts to solve the Palestine problem in early February 
1947 failed, but this new policy was reversed with the 
Truman Doctrine speech. The discussion in the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, 29 January (COS(47)16th, DEFE4/1), gives 
weight to this idea. 
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went with the U. S. S. R. after consideration with 
Stalin of all our points of conflict. r; ^  
Copies of this memorandum were sent to the Foreign 
Office and the Chiefs of Staff. The latter-s reply has not 
been located, but Montgomery, by now Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, recorded that he and the other Chiefs 
threatened to resign if Attlee did not accept their advice 
to maintain the British position in the Near and Middle 
East. t>F, 
The Foreign Office prepared a memorandum, which was 
turned into a strong letter to the Prime Minister from 
Bevin. This began by stating that the political arguments 
against Attlee-s proposals seemed overwhelming. It was 
followed by 'What you propose is a reversal of the whole 
policy I have been pursuing in the Middle East, with the 
assent of the Cabinet, since the Government took office. - 
Among other arguments used against Attlee, Bevin suggested 
that a withdrawal of strength from the area would make a 
gift of its manpower and resources, especially oil, to the 
Russians. While admitting that the countries there were 
weak, he felt current British plans for economic development 
of the area would make it prosperous, strong, and a valuable 
market for British goods. He went so far as to tell Attlee, 
"Memorandum, 5 January 1947, F0800/476. 
-'r-Montgomery, Memoirs (London: Collins, 1958) 
, 
pp. 170- 
171. Fuller discussion is provided by R. N. Rosecrance, 
Defence of the Realm, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1968), pp. 51-52; and C. J. Bartlett, The Long 
Retreat (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 14-20. A 
general discussion of British policy towards the Middle 
East and the eastern Mediterranean is contained in 
William Reitzel, The United States in the Mediterranean 
(New Haven: Yale Institute of International Studies, 
1947), especially pp. 24-25. 
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'Your criticisms of the internal regimes of these countries 
may be valid, but you will remember that the same things 
were said about Abyssinia in 1935 and 1936 by those who 
opposed sanctions. ' 
Bevin felt there was no doubt that the Soviets were 
bent on expansion, which they would prefer to achieve by 
infiltration instead of armed intervention. A British 
withdrawal from the Middle East would result in a Soviet 
take-over by such means. His comments included such severe 
remarks as: 
I believe that it would be as idle to place 
reliance on gaining our own security by large-scale 
one-sided concession to Russia as it was with 
Hitler. 
................. A surrender of the type you suggest would only 
encourage the Russian leaders to believe that they 
could get their ends without war and would lead 
them into the same error Hitler made of thinking 
that he could get away with anything by bluff and 
bullying. 
......................... It would be Munich over again, only on a world 
scale, with Greece, Turkey and Persia as the first 
victims in place of Czechoslovakia. 
....................... 
If we speak to Stalin as you propose, he is as 
likely to respect their independence as Hitler was 
to respect Czechoslovakia's and we should get as 
much of Stalins good will as we got of Hitler's 
after Munich. 
There were some comments on the role of the 
Americans: 
The effect on our relations with the United 
States of America would be disastrous. We are to a 
large, extent dependent on them economically, and 
without their help we cannot maintain the standard 
of life of our people. We are hardly less depend- 
ent on them militarily. With great labour, we have 
at last succeeded in persuading them that their 
strategic interests are involved in the 
maintenance of our position in the Middle East. 
If we now withdraw at this moment, I should expect 
them to write us off entirely. 
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In proportion as the Americans realise the 
importance to them of-this area, we can expect 
them to bear a greater part of the burden. 
......................... When we have consolidated our economy, when 
the economic reviv. tal of Europe 
... 
has made 
progress, when it has finally become clear to the 
Russians that they cannot drive a wedge between the 
Americans and ourselves, we shall be in a position 
to negotiate with Stalin from a position of 
strength. There is no hurry. Everything suggests 
that the Russians are now drawing in their horns 
and have no immediate agressive intentions. Let us 
wait until our strength is restored, and let us 
meanwhile, with American help as necessary, hold on 
to essential positions and concentrate on building 
up U. N. O. s-::. 
Attlee immediately discussed this paper and the 
comments of the Chiefs of Staff with Bevin and Alexander, 
with no officials present. According to Bevin-s comments to 
Dixon, it was concluded that the existing policy as set 
forth in Bevin"s letter should be continued; no new with- 
drawals of British troops from the area would be undertaken; 
and the policy with regard to the import of oil should be 
reviewed. Attlee was still not satisfied that overall 
defence plans required continuation of the present Middle 
East policy, so that further discussion would be held with 
, 
the Chiefs of Staff. S7 No report of such discussions has 
been located, but it is evident from later Chiefs of Staff 
-Undated Foreign Office memorandum, and Bevin-s letter to 
Attlee, 9 January, loc. cit. The statement that Britain 
had at last persuaded the United States to recognise 
mutual strategic interests in the Middle East is 
puzzzling, although Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign 
Secretary, p. 316, believes it stems from Byrnes- accept- 
ance in autumn 1946 of the Chiefs of Staff stress on the 
strategic threat, supra, pp. 255-257, citing Henderson"s 
memorandum of 21 October (FRUS, 1946, VIII, 240-245). In 
view of the limited assistance to Britian which Byrnes- 
new policy promised at that time, it is difficult to 
understand why Bevin felt this was a worth-while 
pledge. 
"Minute, 10 January, F0800/476. 
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papers that planning was proceeding in accordance with the 
policy in force prior to Attlee's intervention. 
Even though Attlee withdrew the proposal, his views 
must have made a considerable impression on Bevin, particu- 
larly since he realised that Attlee had agreed to continue 
the existing policy, although unconvinced of its necessity. 
This would have been in the back of Bevin-s mind when he was 
confronted with Dalton's intransigence over continuation of 
some aid to Greece. Had Bevin been convinced that Attlee 
would suuport him over his version of the telegrams to 
Athens and Washington, he might well have taken the matter 
back to the Cabinet, as he had the authority (if not the 
requirement) to do. Certainly, the knowledge that Attlee 
was doubtful about a continued presence in the Middle East 
must have had some effect on his acceptance of Dalton's 
demands instead of making an appeal to higher authority. 
7. The Suggestion that a Plot Was Involved 
The other possible expanation for the decision to 
withdraw is based on the view that Bevin had -hatched a 
tricky plot- in order to force the Americans back into the 
world arena. This view has been accepted by W. N. 
The basic document for that policy was set forth in 
DO(47)l, 1 January 1947, CAB131/4. A detailed account of 
the formulation of defence policy, 1945-1947, including 
the discussions between Attlee, Bevin and the Chiefs of 
Staff, is provided by Julian Lewis, Changing Direction 
(London: Sherwood, 1988), chapter 6. See also Raymond 
Smith, -A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the 
Development of British Soviet Policy, 1945-1947, ' Inter- 
national Affairs, LXIV-4 (Autumn 1988), pp. 631-647. 
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Medlicott, one of the most distinguished British historians 
of the period, as well as by several other authorities. -=-. v 
The circumstantial evidence for such a plot is 
extensive and provides an arguable basis for its acceptance. 
There can be little doubt that Britain, since the end of the 
war felt herself to be almost alone in opposition to the 
Soviet Union. The Americans had been giving every appear- 
ance of retreating into their traditional isolationism, 
especially in the light of their long-standing commitment to 
the withdrawal of occupation forces from Europe by mid-1947. 
Their European policy did seem to be changing during the 
autumn of 1946 with the efforts to establish West Germany, 
and a somewhat stronger attitude towards the Soviet Union, 
r`3Medlicott, British Foreign Policy since Versailles 
(London: Methuen, 1968), p. 280, and Contemporary 
England (London: Longman, 1967), p. 494; Barker, Britain 
in a Divided World, p. 68; Denis Healey, -Power Politics 
and the Labour Party, - in New Fabian Essays, ed. R. H. 
S. Crossman (London: Turnstile Press, 1952) and as 
quoted in Day Before Yesterday, ed. Alan Thompson (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1971), p. 47 (when asked 
by the author in 1979 whether he had had any indica- 
tion of this view from Bevin, Healey replied that he 
could no longer recall the basis of his earlier state- 
ments); Roy Jenkins, British Foreign Policy since 1945, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 5 
(admittedly, by inference>; R. Ben Jones, The Making of 
Contemporary Europe (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1980), 
pp. 24-25; Roy E. Jones, -Reflections upon an Eventful 
Period in Britain's Foreign Relations, ' International 
Relations, 11-8 (October 1961), pp. 529-532; and Richard 
Tames, Ernest Bevin (Aylesbury: Shire, 1974), p. 36. 
Authorities who consider this view a possibility, or who 
provide useful discussion of it, include: Herbert L. 
Feis, From Trust to Terror (London: Blond, 1970), pp, 
187-188; Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy since 
1945, pp. 106-107,186-187; Robert G. Kaiser, Cold 
Winter, Cold War (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), pp. 
175-190; Dexter Perkins, The Diplomacy of a New Age 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1967), p. 37; 
and David Watt, "Withdrawal from Greece, ' in Age of 
Austerity, ed. Philip Sissons and Michael French (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1963), pp. 109-118. 
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but there was no indication of action. The initiatives in 
Germany might only be attempts to end its involvement in 
Europe; the new general attitude was still limited to 
diplomatic pressures and speeches. In this situation, it 
would be understandable that Bevin should attempt to 
galvanise the United States into action. 
The importance of full American support in world 
affairs, coupled with Bevin-s reputation for a special sense 
of timing, constitutes grounds for a belief that the 
decision to withdraw all aid from Greece on short notice was 
a deliberate action designed to force a change in U. S. 
foreign policy. This view would be strengthened if it could 
be shown that Britain's financial difficulties were not 
thought to be as serious as they really were, and that 
therefore the need to cease all aid to Greece was not 
pressing. 
The strongest argument for the hypothesis is the fact 
that it is based on the accounts of Francis Williams, 
Attlee-s press secretary and a close friend and political 
associate of Bevin. These accounts, when published, were 
not contradicted by senior government officials who had been 
involved in the decision, or questioned by political 
observers. Williams set forth his views in two books, the 
biography Ernest Bevin published in 1952, "-4 and the semi- 
autobiography of Attlee, A Prime Minister Remembers, 1961. '"r1 
Ernest Bevin is, strictly speaking, a secondary source, 
although Williams points out that much of its content is 
derived from his personal friendship with Bevin. A Prime 
l'-ILondon: Hutchinson, 1952. 
""London: Heinemann, 1961. 
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Minister Remembers is more difficult to classify. It is 
based on interviews with Attlee, reported in such a way 
that it is often difficult to determine whether one is 
reading Attlee-s statements or Williams` opinions. Attlee's 
authobiography, As It Happened, contains no mention of the 
British decision to withdraw from Greece. «' 
According to Williams, Bevin saw that the best, indeed 
perhaps the only, hope for European security vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union lay in an American realisation and acceptance 
of her international responsibilities. Britain was holding 
the line in far too many places and the Americans in far too 
few. Sevin had to play for time--and to be very careful not 
to frighten America into a new isolationism by precipitate 
action. r1 
It was to this purpose that [Bevin] now bent 
his major energies, knowing that time was short 
and his own resources running out 
.... 
His job 
as he conceived it was to hold on with grim 
patience for the right moment and the right issue. 
He judged that this moment and this issue had 
arrived in Greece in February 1947 
.... 
Now 
Bevin shrewdly assessing in his mind the current 
of American opinion and the cumulative effect upon 
it of Russian policy decided that the time had 
come to force the American administration to a 
major policy decision. 
......................... It was a declaration deliberately designed to 
bring America fully into the defence of Europe. 
If in making it Bevin employed the tactics of shock 
he did so because he saw that only thus was it 
possible to compel a decision on which the fate of 
Europe and perhaps the world depended. 
Judging by its developing consequences T3evin-s 
carefully timed act must thus be seen as one of the 
"-"London: Heinemann, 1954. 
R7ý'Ernest Bevin, p. 263; A Prime Minister Remembers, pp. 
162,169-170,172. 
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most decisive strokes in the history of diplomacy 
.... 
He had achieved his first purpose . --d 
If this explanation of the motives behind the British 
announcement is accepted, the implication is far reaching. 
It expresses a belief that the United States was forced to 
re-enter the world arena by a deliberate, well-planned 
action of the British Government. If it could be proven 
that the British leaders did not feel their financial 
position to be particularly desperate at this point, the 
element of duplicity would be even more definite. The long- 
range implications are even more significant. The American 
administration was only able respond to the British decision 
by preaching a long-term crusade against Communism; by 
adopting the programme known as Containment; in effect, by 
initiating the Cold War. 
This may be an overstatement. It is doubtful that 
Bevin saw the eventual outcome in these terms. Technically, 
he only asked that the United States take over British 
financial responsibilities in Greece and Turkey; was it his 
fault that the Americans response amounted to an anti-Soviet 
crusade? If the real purpose was to force the United States 
to take an active role in opposition to the Soviet Union, 
the British had a responsibility to consider the full 
implications. Surely, they would have remembered the 
crusading attitudes of the United States in both World Wars, 
and the complications caused to British diplomacy by 
Wilson's Fourteen Points and Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter. 
Orme Sargent specifically warned Bevin in mid-1946 of the 
"Ernest Bevan, pp. 263-264. Italics added. 
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`mercurial atttiudes' of the United States in foreign 
affairs which he felt might well precipitate crisis. -- 
If Bevin intended, not just to hand over the Greek and 
Turkish problems, but to -call in the New World in a much 
more genuine sense than Canning had done in 1823'-- to 
redress the balance of the old, they must have known what to 
expect in terms of ideological rigidity. «7 If they were 
forced to bring the United States in because of financial 
exhaustion, then any undesirable American reaction would 
have to be accepted as less dangerous than a Soviet take- 
over in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, if 
Williams' account is acecepted, Bevin was not forced to 
withdraw, but chose to do so for the definite purpose of 
bringing the United States into action. It follows that it 
might not be too far-fetched to consider that the British 
started the Cold Wart 
"'Minute, 6 September, F0371/51609/AN2653. 
IsI6, The phrase is that of Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 9. 
'Immediately after the Truman Doctrine speech, the British 
Ambassador in Washington commented to the Foreign Office, 
The missionary strain in the character of Aftoericans also 
leads many of them to feel that they have now received a 
call to extend to other countries the blessings with 
which the Almighty has endowed their own (F0371/67035/ 
3482). 
'Frankel, British Foreign Policy, pp. 106-107, suggests 
that Britain started the Cold War, although he does not 
connect this idea directly with the withdrawal of aid 
from Greece. Elsewhere in this work, (p. 187), he 
qualifies this view as a possible interpretation. The 
only definite accusation to the effect that the British 
Government started the Cold War appears to be that of J. 
R. Campbell in -Crafty Clem-s Legacy to Labour, - a review 
of Williams- A Prime Minister Remembers (Dzaily Worker, 13 
April 1961). Campbell wrote, 
.. 
it is clear that 
Attlee is entitled to stand alongside Churchill as one of 
the originators of the Cold War. ' 
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8. Premises for a Plot 
The idea that the British were motivated by a desire to 
force the American hand requires the acceptance of several 
premises. These include the view that Britain, since the 
summer of 1945, had been almost alone in opposition to the 
Soviet Union; that the United States had withdrawn from 
international affairs except in carrying out its occu- 
pation responsibilities and its participation in the 
United Nations; that Britain was not, or did not believe 
itself to be, financially exhausted in February 1947; and 
that Bevin made a definite attempt to force the United 
States to become Britain's partner-in-opposition to the 
Soviet Union. 
The first of these premises is that which assumes that 
Britain felt itself to be alone in holding the line against 
the Soviet Union in the first two post-war years. According 
to Williams, Attlee and Bevin saw Britain as almost the sole 
target of Soviet attack. C. M. Woodhouse, in his analysis 
of British foreign relations since the war, puts it even 
stronger in saying, the brunt of the growing tension 
between the Western powers and the Soviet Government had 
been borne by the British', at least well into 1946.1° The 
American Embassy in Moscow noted that Britain was the 
principle target of Soviet propaganda attacks until mid- 
1946, when the United States replaced it. 71 
r, 50A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 161. 
-''British Foreign Policy since the Second World War 
(London: Hutchinson, 1961), p. 16. 
"Telegram, 23 July, FRUS, 1946, VI, 768-771. 
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These views are based on the fact that the Soviets in 
the United Nations seldom criticised the Americans, but 
bitterly complained of the use of British troops in Greece, 
Syria, Iran, and Indonesia; and on the feeling that most 
Soviet diplomatic moves at the time were directed against 
areas of special British interest such as Libya, the Turkish 
Straits, and the Dodecanese Islands. Britain was taking a 
more active role in opposition than the United States. 
Attlee was the first to criticise the Soviet use of the veto 
in the Security Council; Bevin was alleged to have been 
revision 
alone in resisting the Soviet demands for r-autsa of the 
Montreux Convention; Bevin took the lead at the Foreign 
Ministers Conference in the summer of 1946 concerning the 
Danube Commission, the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, and the 
negotiations for an Austrian Peace Treaty. Bevin, some 
months after the Truman Doctrine speech, let it be known to 
the British Embassy in Washington that he `feels no one--and 
certainly no U. S. statesman--has shown as firm and con- 
sistent resistance to Communism as he has, himself'. -72 
The British may well have felt themselves alone in pro- 
tecting the West from the Soviet Union during the war years. 
Roosevelt's insistence on no war-time agreements on post- 
victory settlements and his personal diplomacy frequently 
prevented or negated long-range planning for peace. These 
factors made it necesary for the British to act independ- 
ently or to allow important problems to remain unresolved. 
Pertinent incidents include the failure of the Americans to 
adopt any real policy concerning a German settlement, the 
'Minute, 19 August 1947, F0371/61003/AN2922. 
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fate of Austria, or the governments of Eastern Europe, at 
least until early 1945. There was also the American 
attitude which regarded Eastern and Central Europe as 
basically British responsibilities. The war-time relation- 
ship may well have conditioned British officials, particu- 
larly the Foreign Office, to believe that Britain was 
continuing to bear the anti-Soviet burden alone in 1945 and 
1946. '' 
The Soviet Union did seem to have been directing more 
of its moves against the British than against the Americans, 
perhaps in some attempt to play on British weakness or 
because Britain's interests in the Near and Middle East 
clashed to a greater extent with those of the Soviet Union. 
Byrnes appeared to be making a greater attempt to conciliate 
the Soviets in late 1945, especially with regard to the 
Eastern European peace treaties. The real factors were more 
likely the often-expressed American determination to with- 
draw its troops from the occupation of Germany as soon as 
possible (a policy not reversed until Byrnes- Stuttgart 
speech of September 1946), and the general impression that 
the Americans had once more retreated into isolation, Y- 
7 An American view that the British were carrying the 
greater diplomatic burden in protecting the West during 
and immediately after the war is provided by Philip E. 
Mosely, a senior State Department negotiator on the 
European Advisory Commission and other multi-partite 
bodies during this period ("Hopes and Failures, - in The 
Fate of East Central Europe, ed. Stephen D. Kertesz 
(Notre Dame University Press, 1956) pp. 54-66). 
74Indications that the belief that the United States had 
returned to isolation was accepted in the British Labour 
Party at the time include Dalton, High Tide and 
After, p. 101; Denis Healey, 'Power Politics and the 
Labour Party, - p. 176; and Roy Jenkins, British Foreign 
Policy since 1945, p. 5. 
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which may have given the Soviets reason to believe that they 
had little to fear from the United States. 
Even after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and 
the Marshall Plan, there was some feeling that isolationism 
was still a dominant feature of American political thought. 
Sir John Balfour, Minister in the Washington Embassy, wrote 
to the Foreign Office in August 1947 that, if Britain did 
not cooperate more closely with the United States in 
retaining troops in Greece, there might be another American 
retreat. " 
There are reasons for accepting the belief that the 
United States retreated into isolation after mid-1945. The 
American military forces were demobilised in an unseemly 
hurry. The Congrss showed itself most unwilling to provide 
any more money for foreign aid than was absolutely 
necessary. The American people felt themselves secure with 
the establishment of the United Nations, and with the sole 
possession of the atomic bomb. They were mainly concerned 
with the avoidance of a return to the Depression; with 
progress towards the satisfaction of the post-war demand for 
consumer goods; and with a desire to enjoy the good life 
they had been told they had been fighting for. 
Even so, the United States was playing a significant 
role in international relations in the years 1945 and 1946. 
It was participating in the occupation of Germany and 
Austria; conducting the occupation of Japan almost single- 
handedly; taking a good part in the attempts to arrive at 
yF'FO371/61003/AN2922. 
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peace treaties for all of Europe; and supporting the British 
quite consistently. Its deficiencies, at least from the 
British point of view, were its unwillingness to provide 
massive financial aid abroad; its desire to continue to 
reduce its overseas military strength; and its still rather 
anti-colonialist attitude towards the British. 
Whatever the exact truth is about Britain facing the 
Soviet Union alone, or about an American retreat into 
isolation, there seems a sufficient basis to justify British 
leaders in those days feeling themselves lacking support in 
the face of major difficulties. Britain was faced with a 
long list of involvements; Germany, Austria, Trieste, 
Greece, Palestine, Egypt, Iran, India, Burma. Taking into 
account her financial weakness and manpower shortages in the 
face of external problems and the requirements of Labour's 
massive developments (nationalisation, the social welfare 
system and the National Health Service) at home, there was 
reason for her leaders to feel that Britain, after all the 
sacrifices and losses of the war, had been abandoned by the 
United States. 
The idea of a deliberate scheme to force the Americans 
back into Europe would be strengthened considerably if it 
could be proven that British leaders thought that the 
country was not in financial trouble in late 1946-early 
1947. In hindsight, this idea is difficult to accept, in 
view of the fuel crisis of February 1947, the convertibility 
crisis six months later, and the general deterioration of 
the economy until the implementation of the Marshall Plan. 
One authority does try to prove the opposite view, by 
showing that exports for the last quarter of 1946 were 
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running at 111 percent of their pre-war level, while imports 
were being held at 72.2 percent by the same standard. "'* 
These figures are misleading. They reflect a compari- 
son with 1938, a year in which British external trade was 
relatively poor compared to the general run of the late 
thirties. The figures for level of imports in 1946 is 
artifical, in that many foreign products for which there was 
a demand were still not available, and economic controls 
Not 
prevented the free importation of goods. Mat taken into 
account is invisible income nor military expenditure abroad. 
Invisible income had declined in this period by 166 million 
pounds; overseas military expenditure had increased from 13 
millions in 1938 to 300 millions in 1946. The best figures 
available to the British Government in February 1947 
indicated an overall balance of payments deficit for 1946 of 
450 million pounds. "77 
The problem was compounded by the fact that Britain"s 
exports in 1946 went mainly to the sterling area (or other 
non-dollar areas), while her imports had to come almost 
exclusively from hard currency areas, chiefly the United 
States and Canada. Britain needed to import foodstuffs. 
7 Roy E. Jones, -Reflections on an Eventful Period in 
Britain's Foreign Relations, - p. 529. 
"This is the figure given in Command 7046, Economic Survey 
for 1947, not issued until 21 February, but debated in 
mid-January (Dalton, High Tide and After, pp. 193-198). 
In April, the estimate was reduced to 400 million pounds (Command 7099). Even this was apparently far too high, 
the figure of 298 millions being given by Command 9981 of 1956. 
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machinery, and raw materials which could be purchased only 
with dollars. It was her shortage of dollars, not her 
overall balance of payments position, which was critical. 
In considering the relationship of financial difficulty to 
the question of stopping aid to Greece, it should be 
remembered that almost all the costs of aid to the Greek 
Armed Forces could be met with sterling. - 
There is evidence that British leaders in early 1947 
were optimistic about the financial position. Douglas Jay, 
in an official Labour Party pamphlet, said, -Owing to the 
great success of the export drive, the American and Canadian 
Loans have not been used nearly as quickly as expected. The 
loans should last until spring 1949. '%' Dalton confirms 
that there was such optimisim, even pointing out that The 
Financial Times as late as 10 May 1947 had written that some 
of Dalton-s own Treasury officials were complacent about the 
position. '-10 
7OMore detailed analyses of the actual British financial 
position in early 1947 are provided by Richard Clarke, 
Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), pp. 72-80; Richard N. 
Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1956), pp. 306-312; and J. C. R. Dow, The Management of 
the British Economy, 1945-1960 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1964), pp. 13-29. 
7_"Labour's Plan for 1947, ' Labour Farty Discussion Series, 
No. 13, March 1947, p. 5. Raymond Blackburn, I Am an 
Alcoholic (London: Wingate, 1959), p. 72, in discussing 
Jay's attitude in March 1947 to the coming crisis, does 
suggest that Jay had private doubts as to the real 
position. Jay, in his 1980 autobiography, Change and 
Fortune (London: Hutchinson, 1980), states that in 
writing this pamphlet he was quoting Sir Otto Clarke of 
the Treasury Overseas Finance Department, who in turn was 
relying on information from the Bank of England. Jay 
points out that Dalton was receiving the same advice from 
the Bank. Clarke himself quotes a Treasury estimate of 
October 1946 that the loan might last until spring 1949 
(Anglo-American Economic Collaboration, p. 73). 
-High Tide and After, p. 258. 
353 
Even so, Dalton must take some of the blame for any 
false optimism in higher circles. In a speech of 16 October 
to the -Bankers and Merchants of the City of London-, he 
announced that the current export drive had succeeded 
`beyond expectation", and that the deficit on the overseas 
trading account would be less than anticipated. " As late 
as 2 February 1947, Dalton still sounded very optimistic. 
To quote The Times, -Stating that there would be no 
financial crisis, Mr Dalton 
... 
said that present 
financial controls were quite strong enough to prevent such 
an event. - Dalton himself goes to great pains to claim 
that he at no time shared this optimism, and records that he 
continually warned Attlee and the Cabinet of the true 
positon, beginning in February 1946. -- 
The Foreign Office had a realistic picture of the 
situation. In a circular for all overseas posts drafted in 
January 194?, the problems were presented with emphasis on 
how the external financial postion would affect British 
foreign policy. It was evident that foreign aid would have 
to be reduced. Specifically, there was little prospect for 
more than modest contributions to Greece and Austria, and 
even there our contributions are designed as much to elicit 
"Ibid., p. 163. The entire speech implies general 
optimism concerning the financial position, but Dalton 
elsewhere (p. 220) states that in the same month he 
circulated a -strident- warning on the hard currency 
situation. Dalton was correct in saying that the deficit 
would be less than expected, since his estimate in 
February 1946 was aa £770 million 1946 short-fall 
(-Balance of Payments 1946, " 8 February 1946, CP(46)53, 
CAB129/7>. 
-: z. Higb Tide and After, pp. 220. 
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a larger contribution from the United States as for their 
practical effect by themselves. '-- 
The State Department suspected that the British were 
deliberately exaggerating the seriousness of the foreign 
exchange problem in order to obtain concessions on the 
implementation of the 1946 Loan Agreement. " Bernard 
Baruch, self-appointed advisor to American Presidents and 
Secretaries of State, recounted the same suspicion to 
President Truman in January 1947. E"- 
Perhaps the truth was that the British leaders did not 
really know what the financial position was. Herbert 
Morrison, commenting on Dalton as Chancellor, said: 
... 
there was evidence that he was unaware 
of the financial crisis of 1947 until he was in the 
midst of it. This I put down to the fact that he 
had not ensured that periodical reports on both the 
financial and economic situations were put before 
him, especially as to the dollar situation. -- 
Even if there are grounds for accepting a certain 
degree of unwarranted optimism concerning the financial 
position in early 1947, there is no evidence that Bevin was 
infected. Further, any optimism existing at the turn of the 
year must have been considerably dampened by the Economic 
Survey for 1947, and by the fuel crisis of early February. 
Certainly, financial circles were well aware of the 
situation. 17 
ONO371/62420/UE176. 
''Telegram, 18 January, FRUS, 1947, III, 1-3. 
*2"-Arthur Krock, Memoirs (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 
p. 267. 
Herbert Morrison, (London: O1dhams, 1960), p. 261. 
'"7For example, The Economist, 21 and 28 February 1947, 
printed in The Financial Times, due to fuel-crisis 
restrictions on periodicals. 
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9. Evidence for a Plot 
The difficulty is that there is no documentary evidence 
for the idea of a deliberate plot, except for Williams' 
statements. It rests on the circumstantial evidence, along 
with some complacency concerning the British economic 
situation in February 1947; the fact that there were some 
elements of surprise in the note to the Americans, and the 
incontrovertible fact that the note resulted in the Truman 
Doctrine speech. There is also the curious incident of the 
reaction to Williams' publication of his views in Ernest 
Bevan. Reviewers failed to comment on the revelation of a 
deliberate plot; either this idea was completely acceptable 
or its significance escaped them. These included Hector 
McNeil and Christopher Mayhew, as well as Hugh Trevor-Roper, 
Leonard Woolf, Richard Crossman, and Denis Healey. Amongst 
the journals which took no note of this aspect of Williams' 
book were International Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and the 
Times Literary Supplement. Only the (London) Daily Worker 
called attention to Williams' view and accepted it. ee" 
It is true that there were elements of shock in the 
British note of 21 February, but the surprise was not that 
'''McNeil, Daily Herald, 6 November 1953; Mayhew, Spectator, 
7 November; Woolf, Political Quarterly, XXIV (1953), 116- 
117; Crossman, New Statesman, 8 November 1952; Healey, 
Forward, 22 November; Daily Worker, 6 November. A 
cutting of Trevor-Roper`s review has been found, but 
there is no indication of the periodical in which it was 
printed; its author has been unable to identify it. The 
Sunday Times (9 November) and identical reviews of 6 
November in the Oxford Nail and the Birmingham Gazette 
all noted Williams- contention, but either doubted its 
validity or failed to accept it. Fifty-six reviews were 
examined. 
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the British wanted help in Greece; it was the extremely 
short notice and the fact that the British were withdrawing 
all aid. ".. ""' Williams in 1952 seems to have believed that 
this shock was part of Bevin-s deliberate plan; '° but the 
sequence of events from September 1946 to February 1947 as 
recorded in the official files explains the eventual short 
notice as the result of long drawn-out interdepartmental 
negotiations. 
Williams- view can be accepted if it is believed that 
it is the product of information given him privately by 
-`"Indications of what the shock amounted to are contained 
in Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 217,220-1; 
Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, p. 8; and Margaret 
Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 376. Williams- story of 
Marshall being so shocked that he sent an angry cable to 
Bevin asking if there had been a major change in British 
foreign policy (Ernest Bevin, p. 263) seems based on 
faulty memory; the telegram he describes is almost cer- 
tainly that of 1 August 1947 (FRUS, 1947, V, 273-274) 
concerning the withdrawal of British troops from Greece. 
No telegram from Marshall to Bevin in the month after 
delivery of the note of 21 February which would fit 
Williams- description has been found in British or 
American records, although Bullock, Ernest Bevin: 
Foreign Secretary, p. 370, confirms Williams' claim 
without providing a source, Marshall did send another 
telegram on 1 August to the American Ambassador in 
London, pointing out that the United States had been 
acutely embarrassed in February by the short notice given 
then, and that Bevin must be warned that the American 
Government 'cannot possibly expect to obtain support 
either in public opinion or in Congress for actions 
necessitated by sudden decisions presented to us by the 
British' (ibid., p. 275). Inverchapel made a tactfsul 
suggestion to the Foreign Office that, while the shock 
effect of the note had probably been useful on this 
occasion, it might not be advisable to try such tactics 
again (F0371/67035/R3482). 
--in spite of the fact that he told American newsmen 
shortly after the Truman Doctrine speech that the United 
States had no reason to be shocked because the State 
Department had known for some months that Britain 
intended to abandon Greece in March 1947 (San Francisco 
Chroncicle, 10 April 1947; F0371/67039/R4886 and 
67040/R5084). 
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Bevin. 
-1 Perhaps Bevin, aware in later years of the results 
of the British withdrawal of aid from Greece, gave Williams 
the impression that he had planned it as a stimulus to the 
Americans. It is easier to credit it to an almost pardon- 
able burst of enthusiasm on Williams- part. In 1952, when 
Ernest Bevan was written, the Cold War was in one of its 
greatest periods of tension, that of the Korean War. The 
great heroes of the day were those who were doing most to 
fight Communism, but the leadership and whatever glory was 
attached was American, not British. 
Bevin-s action in 1947 had, to a significant extent, 
been responsible for the Truman Doctrine and the policy of 
contain-went. It may not have seemed to be stretching the 
point too far to see the withdrawal decision not as a 
necessity dictated by financial difficulties or as the 
culmination of an orderly policy-making decision, but as an 
inspired stroke of statesmanship. Doubts as to the validity 
of Williams- statements in 1952 or 1953, so soon after 
Bevin-s death, would have seemed unworthy; and little 
contradictory evidence (such as Dalton-s memoirs) was then 
available. 
There are some indications that Williams was not as 
convinced of this story in later years. In a set of notes 
prepared for a series of interviews with Attlee in 1959, 
Williams includes: `Was the British action in facing the 
"Williams states in the author's notes to Ernest Bevin 
that the book is based -upon many long conversations I 
had with him from 1929 to within a few days of his death 
and of which I kept notes-. Many papers concerned with 
the preparation of Ernest Bevin and Williams- other books 
are preserved in the Francis-Williams papers in Churchill 
College, Cambridge, but there are no notes of con- 
versations with Bevin. 
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U. S. with a fait accompli in the decision to withdraw from 
Greece designed to this end (to create a major change in 
American foreign policy]? -: z Williams- doubts on the point 
seem reflected in the book which resulted from the inter- 
views, wherein Attlee is quoted as saying that the major 
turning point in American policy came with the Berlin 
Airlift of 1948. Greece is treated as a matter of limited 
importance. --'*1 In a book published after the appearance of 
Dalton-s memoirs, in which Attlee, Bevin, and British 
foreign policy are discussed in great detail, Williams makes 
no suggestion that Bevin and Attlee were responsible for the 
Truman Doctrine; a hurried reader might get the impression 
that Churchill was the moving force. `'d 
10. Timing 
After the event, Bevin was given much credit for his 
sense of timing in this matter, both by Williams and his 
followers, and by others as diverse as Lord Strang and 
Michael Foot. "' It could hardly be a good time to deliver 
the note four days before a virulent public attack on 
President Truman by Bevin concerning Palestine. It was 
='=Francis-Williams papers, Box 24. 
='ýA Prime Minister Remembers, p. 172. 
=E4Notbing So Strange (London: Cassell, 1970), p. 246. 
-Strang, Home and Abroad, p. 291; 
Foot, Aneurin Bevan (London, Davis-Poynter, 1973), II, 
89. Others who praise Bevin's timing at this point 
included Barker, Divided Europe, p. 69; David Dilks, 
Retreat from Power (London: Macmillan, 1981), II, 20; 
Frankel, Foreign Policy, p. 187; and David Watt, -With- 
drawal from Greece. - pp. 176-178. 
'4'n"433 Parl. Deb., col. 1909,25 February. Truman (Memoirs, II, 
108,164) and Acheson (Present at the Creation, p. 181) 
comment on the effect of this speech on American decision 
makers. 
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only a few weeks before the Moscow conference of foreign 
ministers, at which it was hoped to achieve a settlement for 
Germany. A strong American response with regard to Greece 
might ruin negotiations.? It has been suggested that Bevin 
saw the appointment of Marshall as Secretary of State as a 
signal of a more receptive American mood, but the official 
files indicate British uncertainty as to Marshall's probable 
attitudes. "O It is true that the American attitude towards 
the Soviet Union was gradually hardening throughout 1946, "" 
and that Byrnes had announced a new policy- towards Greece 
in October. Neither of these seem sufficiently definite to 
justify a British belief that late February 1947 was a 
particularly good time to deliver the bombshell. 
'97Strong views that the Truman Doctrine speech had an adverse 
effect on the Moscow Conference are contained in Arnold 
Toynbee, Introduction to Survey of International Affairs, 
1947-1948, ed. Peter Calvocoressi (London: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1952), pp. 6-7; Gladwyn Jebb, Memoirs 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970), p. 199; and J. 
Wheeler-Bennett and A. Nicholls, Semblance of Peace (New 
York: Norton, 1974), p. 471. On the other hand, none of 
the particiapnts in the conference who have left memoirs 
(Bohlen, Witness to History (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1975); Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the 
Yalu (London: Harrap, 1954); Lucius Dub. Clay, Decision 
in Germany (London: Heinemann, 1950); John Foster 
Dulles, War or Feace (London: Harrap, 1950); Maurice 
Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain (London: Constable, 
1950); Walter Bedell Smith, Moscow Mission (London: 
Heinemann, 1950)) indicate any such effect, except for 
Robert Murphy (Diplomat among Warriors (New York: Pyra- 
mid, 1965), pp. 341-343), which is limited to a slight 
implication. On balance, it would seem that the Truman 
Doctrine speech had little effect, but Bevin could not 
have been certain of this in February. 
`="yBevin's letter to Attlee and resulting papers, PREMB 705. 
The more significant reports of the British Embassy in 
Washington on the changing American attitudes are in 
P0371/51609-51611; they are analysed in depth by Peter 
Boyle, The Foreign Office View of Soviet-American 
Relations, ' Diplomatic History, III-3 (Summer, 1979), pp. 
307-320. 
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If the need to bring the United States back into inter- 
national affairs forced Bevin to this decision, was the need 
so pressing in February 1947 that it required immediate 
action? The future attitude of the United States towards 
international affairs was uncertain, particularly in light 
of Truman-s loss of majority support in Congress in the 
Nov¢. mber 
" ý= 1946 elections. Control of government expenditure 
was now in the hands of the Republicans'under the arch- 
isolationist Robert Taft. The policies of the new Secretary 
of State were still unknown; the forthcoming meeting of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers might well demonstrate 
whether the somewhat stronger American foreign policy was to 
continue, or to be abandoned. Why not wait and see? 
It is far more convincing to consider that Bevin had 
not made up his mind about a full scale approach to the 
Americans until late January 1947, or, alternately, that 
Bevin was gradually forced into it by the worsening situa- 
tion in Greece and the resulting recommendations of the 
Chiefs of Staff. 
There are other reasons suggested for the timing of the 
withdrawal. The Greek civil war was intensifying by January 
1947. The royalist government could not be expected to 
continue for long unless significantly greater amounts of 
foreign aid were supplied. The Greek Government had been 
asking for some time for sufficient additional funds and 
arms to raise the army strength by 30,000 men, and the 
current arrangement for British support of the original 
number expired on 31 March. Extension of the same existing 
level of support would not be sufficient because of the 
increased guerrilla activity. This may be clear in hind- 
sight but it does not seem to have been a factor in British 
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policy making. As pointed out earlier, the Chiefs of Staff 
believed the bandits could be put down in one short sharp 
campaign, and that only a small amount of additional money 
would be needed. 
A more important factor in January 1947 was the great 
fuel crisis. The unusually severe winter weather was 
intensified by the blizzard which began on 25 January and 
continued almost without interruption until 10 March. By 7 
February, electricity to industry was cut off, and major 
restrictions imposed on domestic users. Unemployment rose 
from a rate of two and a half percent to fifteen percent on 
22 February. This alone was a great blow to the export 
drive on which so much depended, and in particular on 
efforts to conserve what remained of the American loan, in 
view of the summer deadline for sterling convertibility. 
There was even the possibility that it would be necessary to 
import coal, which would mean further dollar expenditure. i. a<, 
In the two weeks ending 22 February, when the decision 
to withdraw was made, the outlook was bleak indeed. Dalton 
recorded on 10 February: 
... 
we are landed in a political, as well as a 
fuel crisis. The weekend Press has been full of panic 
fanned by stupid speeches by Shinbad talking of 
-complete disaster- and by Shawcross, who always gets 
his words wrong, prophesying unless we take great care, 
""Alex J. Robertson, The Bleak Midwinter (Manchester 
University Press, 1987), analyses in detail the extent 
and effect of the fuel crisis on economic development. 
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the fall of the Labour Government and the end of 
Socialism in our time-. 1-3. 
This is echoed by a historian of the Labour Government 
who said, That weekend 18-9 February) the Labour Government 
was closer to collapse than it ever had been, or was to be 
during the whole of its first period in office. -"' There 
was even talk of the need to form a coalition government, 
which Attlee had to put down with a speech on 15 
February. 1 °' 
Even Americans were disturbed, not about the imminent 
fall of the Labour Government, but concerning the suffering 
in Britain. Queues of Americans offering aid formed outside 
British consulates in the United States, to an extent not 
seen since Dunkirk. 1,: ý- A quality American newspaper dis- 
played an eight-column headline across its front page, 
"'Dalton, Diaries. 'Shinbad' was Dalton's nickname for 
Shinwell. Shinwell actually said (The Times, 10 Feb- 
ruary), 'If domestic and industrial consumers declined 
to cooperate in this emergency, we should find ourselves 
in the next ten days in a condition of complete dis- 
aster. ` Shawcross, the Attorney-General, was reported as 
saying in a public speech (icc. cit. ), '. 
.. 
if we did 
not overcome the fuel situation and improve coal pro- 
duction the Labour Government would fail, and that would 
be the end of Socialism in our time. ' 
=Ernest Watkins, The Cautious Revolution (London: Secker 
& Warburg, 1951), p. 22. Descriptions of the panic 
amongst members of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
include: Shinwell, I've Lived through It All (London: 
Gollancz, 1973), pp. 194-195; Lord Wigg, George Wigg 
(London: Michael Joseph, 1972), pp. 128-133; and Raymond 
Blackburn, I Am an Alcoholic, pp. 66-68. Other accounts 
are in Medlicott, Contemporary England, pp. 481-483; and 
Mr Micawber's Crisis, ' The Economist, 15 February 1947. 
10*'Manchester Guardian, 17 February. 
"'John Morton, -American Reactions to Britain's Crisis,; 
New Statesman, 8 March; other comment in -British 
Austerity and American Aid, ' Round Table, CXLVII (June 
1947), pp. 258-259. 
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`British Rioters Storm Coal Yards in Crisis-. 1o Truman 
offered to divert coal-carrying ships already at sea to 
British ports, an offer Attlee turned down on grounds that 
the diversion would increase suffering elsewhere. 11" LIFE 
magazine headed an article, The British Crisis: We Cannot 
Watch with Indifference while Our Closest Ally Goes Down' 
and suggested that the United States should use American 
soldiers to replace some of the British troops in Ger- 
many. 107 It might be argued that this American reaction was 
the signal for Bevin to initiate a deliberate plan, but few 
indications of the American sympathy were available in 
Britain by 18 February. 
This period of crisis saw a number of British decisions 
involving the abandonment of long-cherished commitments. On 
14 February the Cabinet decided to refer the Palestine 
problem to the United Nations, in effect announcing the end 
of British responsibility there. On 20 February Attlee 
announced that the British would withdraw from Burma and 
India not later than June 1948. These two decisions, taken 
together with those concerning Greece and Turkey on 18 
February, have been considered as evidence that the British 
Government panicked and gave up a large share of its 
1° Washington Post, 9 February. The supporting story hardly 
lived up to the headline; it related that there were 
several cases of crowds being moved on by police from the 
premises of coal merchants who were unable to sell coal 
reserved for hospitals. 
1O1--State Department telegram, 13 February, FRUS, 1947, III, 
492-493; and Department of State Bulletin, 23 February. 
11-'-124 February 1947. 
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overseas commitments because of the fuel crisis and the 
overall financial situation. - 
Logical as it may seem, these three decisions are 
linked only by coincidence. The announcements of the ending 
of British commitments in South Asia and in Palestine were 
both the result of long-term discussions and negotiations 
which finally came to a conclusion at this time. The fuel 
crisis played no part in either case, nor was immediate 
financial difficulty a factor of significance. The Soviet 
threat was not involved. '4' As Bevin pointed out, -All the 
world is in trouble at once; the troubles do not come one at 
a time. -" What ever the motivation was for the withdrawal 
of aid from Greece, it was not part of a sudden decision to 
abandon the Empire. 
11. The Decision to Withdraw All Financial Aid 
The discussion of further financial aid for the Greeks 
proceeded slowly but definitely from early autumn 1946 until 
January 1947. The only decision which might be ascribed to 
1°'Contemporary analysis along this line includes The New 
Monroe, ' The Economist, 22 March 1947; and Willson 
Woodside, "Alarm in Washington, ' Spectator, 21 March 
1947. The State Department saw a connection between the 
notes on Greece and Turkey and the simultaneous with- 
drawal from Burma, India, and Palestine (Henderson's 
remarks, 24 February, FRUS, 1947, V, pp. 45-47). The 
effect of the fuel crisis on British policy in general is 
the theme of Robert G. Kaiser, Cold Winter, Cold War. 
10 For Palestine, see William Roger Louis, The British 
Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1984), chapter IV-4; and Ritchie Ovendale, The Palestine 
Problem of the British Government, 1947: The Decision to 
Withdraw, - International Affairs, LVI-1 (January 1980), 
pp. 73-93. For India, Nicholas Mansergh, The Transfer of 
Power, 1942-1947, Vol. IX (Mer Majesty's Stationary 
Office, 1980. 
111433 Fart. Deb., Col. 2304. 
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panic was the acceptance of Dalton`s redraft of the tele- 
e! iminQte 
grams to a7. 
-i a any further British participation in the 
support of Greece. Until then, Bevin and the Foreign Office 
assumed that Britain would continue to play an important 
role in Greece. Dalton"s motive in demanding complete 
withdrawal of aid is obscure; he seems more determined to 
punish the Greeks than to save money. Something changed 
Bevin"s mind between 15 and 18 February; this may have been 
a realisation that Greece was simply not worth further 
argument with Dalton, or a some sudden insight as to the 
possible effects of a complete abandonment. 
It is possible that Bevin, in reviewing the problem of 
Greece just before or while speaking to Dalton, began to see 
that a major advantage might result in terms of anti-Soviet 
support if the Americans accepted the challenge. It is 
hardly likely that Bevin could have imagined (as Williams 
implies) that the United States, if it took over the burden 
of Greece, would accompany this action with a return to full 
participation in international affairs. It is more logical 
to think that the most the British could hope for in 
February 1947 was an American assumption of necessary aid to 
Greece. This might mean a slightly greater involvement in 
European affairs, which in turn might lead eventually to the 
sort of partnership Bevin wanted, but it is difficult to see 
that it must necessarily lead to a complete and almost 
immediate change in American foreign policy. 
Perhaps the British in late 1946 and early 1947 were 
convinced that this major change was imminent, based on 
American actions in Germany such as the cessation of 
reparations, Bi-Zonia, and the Stuttgart Speech, as well as 
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increased interest in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. This might 
mean that Sevin felt that a sudden abandonment of Greece 
would provide the issue on which the reversal of policy 
could be implemented. It might equally be the case that he 
saw no reason to interfere with a highly desirable develop- 
ment. 
In view of the limited evidence available, there is no 
way of determining what was actually in Bevin"s mind. 
Strong doubts must be expressed as to whether Bevin really 
considered all the implications of the decision to end all 
aid to Greece. This decision came during an extremely busy 
period, with the problems of Palestine and India, as well as 
the fuel crisis, taking up much of the time of all Cabinet 
ministers. It is far easier to assume that Bevin, in the 
midst of issues which seemed more important, with the 
knowledge that Attlee was not convinced of the strategic 
importance of Greece, and pressed incessantly by Dalton, 
gave in without much thought of long-term effects. 
12. American Motivations 
The American acceptance of responsibility for Greece is 
generally thought to have been based on a perception of the 
major threat arising from the Communist-led revolt which, if 
successful, would result in the creation of another 
satellite and increased Soviet influence in the Mediter- 
ranean. The British decision to withdraw is variously seen 
as the shock action which brought about a realisation of the 
seriousness of the situation, or an excuse to initiate a 
programme which had been planned long before. 
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A large proportion of authorities accept that the 
United States might have remained in semi-isolation for a 
long time, if not permanently, had it not been for the 
British announcement of its withdrawal from Greece. They 
believe that, whatever the reason for the British decision, 
it resulted in an unexpected change in American policy. 
Other authorities see it not as the cause of the change, but 
the justification for its implementation. 
Many of the school of revisionist historians of the 
nineteen sixties and early seventies are positive that 
Truman, in early 1947, was searching for an issue on which 
to challenge the Republican Congress, an issue which would 
allow him to implement a long-held anti-Soviet policy, and, 
at the same time, expand the economy. In an extreme view: 
To obtain the economic and military resources 
tocarry out an active foreign policy, Truman had 
to convince the bulk of the people of the reality 
and magnitude of the Soviet threat. To do that he 
needed a dramatic issue. 
........................ 
While Marshall prepared for Moscow, events in 
Greece rushed forward. Truman would soon have his 
opportunity to swing the Republicans around 
.. [On 20 February] the stage was set. Y" 
Even a more moderate revisionist says: -The preconditions 
for action were present; the package simply awaited the 
proper moment for the opening and the unfolding of the 
policies. On February 21,1947, 
.. 
-112 
1xiStephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (London: Allen 
Lane, 1971), pp. 142,145-146. Joyce Kolko and Gabriel 
Kolko, The Limits of power (New York: Harper and Raw, 
1972) pp. 329-358, set forth a most detailed argument to 
the effect that Truman was waiting for an issue on which 
to embark upon a new foreign policy. 
ýzWalter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War (New 
York, Wiley, 1967), p. 43. 
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Several other historians have taken the view that 
Truman had been waiting until the time was ripe to proclaim 
his doctrine. ix0 These revisionist historians, in their 
efforts to prove that the United States was entirely 
responsible for the Cold War, refuse to consider that any 
other factors were involved. It is surprising to find that 
they do not suggest that Truman secretly incited the British 
to make the announcment of withdrawal. It would be an 
ironic joke if it turned out that Bevin had made a 
deliberate attempt to force Truman-s hand when the President 
was waiting impatiently to find an excuse to take action. 
A more reasonable view is that of Ernest R. May. He 
believes that Truman had come to the conclusion in the 
"'Examples of such historians are Denna F. Fleming, The 
Cold War and Its Origin, pp. 433-476; David Horowitz, 
From Yalta to Vietnam (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), 
pp. 68-69; Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and 
Revolution (London: Paladin, 1970), p. 119; and, 
slightly less definitely, William A. Williams, The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Delta, 1962), 
pp. 268-270. Their evidence is usually a New York Times 
article by Arthur Krock, an elder statesman in the 
foreign policy field. Krock-s article, - "Must" Is the 
Key Word in New Foreign Policy, - 23 March 1947, and its 
use by these historians provides an excellent example of 
their treatment of evidence. Fleming accepts the story 
on the grounds that it must be true since Truman granted 
Krock an exclusive interview on another matter some years 
later. Barnet, apparently basing his account on Fleming, 
makes this into a statement that Krock-s article resulted 
from an interview with Truman, which could hardly have 
occurred because of Truman-s absence in Florida at the 
time. Something specific must have given Krock the idea. 
As late as 18 March, Krock wrote that the administration 
had refused to consider aid to countries threatened by 
Communism; by the 23rd, he said that Truman had had the 
plan for a long time; he reinforced this statment two 
days later (all articles in New York Times). Probably, 
Krock spoke sometime after 17 March to Admiral Leahy, the 
Presidential Chief of Staff, or Clark Clifford, Special 
Assistant to Truman. Both are known to have wanted a 
stronger policy. Robert J. Maddox, The New Left and the 
Origins of the Cold War (Princeton University Press, 1974). 
pp. 58-59, discusses the revisionist view that Truman was 
waiting for an issue. 
369 
autumn of 1946 that large-scale aid should be given to 
Greece and Turkey at some time in the future, if the public 
could be induced through an educational campaign to accept 
the need. This would require some time to accomplish, 
during which the British were expected to continue her 
support, with some small supplemental aid from the United 
States. But, the analysis is based on a document which, 
while suggesting a programme to educate the American people 
in the realities of the situation in the eastern Mediterran- 
ean, says nothing about large-scale aid to Greece or 
Turkey. sia 
Gaddis makes a similar point of an American admini- 
stration intention in early 1947 to educate the public to 
the responsibilities of world leadership", in order to 
undertake a more active foreign policy. 116 In these views, 
the sudden announcement of the complete British withdrawal 
of aid made it necessary for Truman to initiate the 
programme on a crash basis. 
While there is no substantial evidence for a plan to 
bring public opinion to a state in which a major change 
could be made, there is little doubt that Truman and the 
State Department were taking a stronger anti-Soviet view 
during 1946, as discussed in previous chapters. What is not 
clear is whether or not they had any real hope that a 
""'Lessons" of the Past (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1973), pp. 41-42, citing Henderson and Jernegan-s 
memoranda of 21 October 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 893-897. 
These papers are on the subject of Turkey, and parallel 
the two State Department memoranda on Greece of the same 
date, ibid., pp. 240-245, which have been discussed 
supra, p. 258.. 
'"The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 346. 
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situation might arise either through education or a particu- 
lar incident which would enable them to initiate a new plan. 
Truman is supposed to have remarked to a close associate 
that: 
.. * 
he thought it fortunate that the 
British Government had placed the Greek situation 
"on our doorstep" for if they had not, our 
response to Communist expansion would have been 
"too little and too slow". 11 . 
The State Department records and the memoirs of Truman, 
Acheson and Jones concerning the effect of the British note 
fail to show any hesitation on the part of any one concerned 
to recommend that the needed aid for Greece be provided. 
While opposition to the proposal is discussed, there is no 
evidence of it being taken seriously. The problem created 
by the British announcement was that of how to obtain 
Congressional appropriation of the money required. 
Acheson and Joseph Jones certainly give the impression 
that they recognised the need for a new and stronger policy, 
but saw little hope for its adoption. According to Jones, 
-Nothing appeared further removed from the realities of 
American political life at the opening of the year 1947 than 
that the United States would shortly assume the responsibi- 
lites of its power and embark on a vigorous, expensive, and 
sustained course of action. "- 
At the time, Truman attempted to play down the idea of 
a major change of policy. In an interview with newspaper 
editors shortly after the Truman Doctrine speech, he said, 
11"Feis, From Trust to Terror, p. 192, relating a 1966 
conversation with Clark Clifford, to whom Truman is 
quoted as having made the remark. 
11'Fresent at the Creation, pp. 190-216 and passim; The 
Fifteen Weeks, pp, 89-99. 
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-There has been a great deal of speculation as to the why 
and wherefore, and how it came about--to quote one newspaper 
I saw, "so suddenly". It didn't come about so suddenly 
... 
Truman then went on to trace the genesis of the 
Truman Doctrine back to his fierce argument with Molotov in 
April 1945, and created the impression that the general 
deterioration of Soviet-American relations since that time 
made it only a matter of course that he would embark on his 
anti-communist crusade. He implied that the British with- 
drawal from Greece was merely the occasion for its 
introduction. 1*0 
It would seem more likely that Truman, while fully 
aware of a deterioration in Soviet-American relations during 
1946, had not yet prepared himself for an all-out anti- 
Soviet campaign. Except for the still-unresolved question 
of Germany, and perhaps the growing strength of the Com- 
munist parties of France and Italy, the Soviets were not 
posing major problems in late 1946 or early 1947. They were 
still uncooperative, but had made no active threats to East- 
West relations since they had backed down over Iran. They 
had been reasonably cooperative over the peace treaties for 
Italy and Eastern Europe. There was some hope that the 
German problem might be resolved in Moscow in another month. 
Truman-s strong statement to the newspaper editors came 
after the die of the doctrine had been cast, when he was 
engaged in a programme of self-justification. Now that he 
had initiated an all-out campaign of opposition to the 
Soviet Union, he was anxious to build up his image as an 
anti-communist from the beginning, and to protect himself 
"'Public Papers, Truman, 1947, pp. 207-210 (17 April 1947). 
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from charges prevalent in Republican outbursts that he had 
failed to recognise the Soviet danger. To admit that he had 
suddenly come to the realisation of this danger only when 
the British had brought it to his attention, would reflect 
seriously on his knowledge and understanding of inter- 
national problems for the past two years. 
The problems of determining Truman's real attitude 
towards the Soviet Union in 1945 and 1946 is outside the 
scope of this work, but one point can be made. Most of the 
evidence indicating an intention prior to February 1947 to 
initiate a strong and consistent anti-Soviet campaign comes 
from Truman's Memoirs, published in 1955, and statements by 
his close associates written long after 1947, generally in 
the days in which the Cold War was at its most virulent 
point. Even works such as Acheson's and Bohlen's which 
appeared laterxx' must be treated as the apologiae of Cold 
Warriors. 
In actual fact, Truman seems to have regarded the 
period immediately following the delivery of the British 
note as one in which he had to make up his mind on an 
absolutely crucial matter. In his memoirs, he calls this a 
'momentous' decision, and reflects on the effort it 
required.: "U In a cabinet meeting on 7 March, Truman said 
he was faced with a decision more serious than had ever 
confronted any President 
... . 
'ý' The day after the 
Truman Doctrine speech, he wrote to his daughter, No one 
.. 
knew how very tired and worn to a frazzle the Chief 
'-""Present at the Creation, 1969; and Charles E. Bohlen, Witness 
to History. 
' ý20Memoirs, II, 108. 
'. 'Forrestal Diaries, p. 247. 
373 
Executive had become. This terrible decision I had to make 
had been over my head for about six weeks. - 1=': Le 
The fact that Truman and his administration were taking 
a serious view of Soviet actions from February-March 1946 
and beginning to take a strong attitude towards them does 
not mark any real decision. In Lord Bullock's words with 
regard to the Truman Doctrine, The fact that American 
policy for the past twelve months had been moving logically 
towards a decision about the United States' own expanded 
role as a world power did not make it easy for the Americans 
to take that decision when the moment came. -22!: 7: 1
Lloyd Gardner, in analysing Truman's statement to the 
newspaper editors, brings out the confused manner in which 
the assumption of the British burden was presented to 
Congressional leaders on 27 February, and suggests that it 
casts strong doubts on Trumans's awareness of the real 
gravity of the situation before he was faced with the 
British notes. He draws attention to the idea that it was 
only after Acheson interrupted Marshall to deliver an 
apparently unscheduled tirade on the dangers of Soviet 
aggression that a firm policy for support of Greece was 
developed. 1$ 
While there is reason to question the accuracy of 
Jones' and Acheson's accounts of the 27 February meeting on 
which Gardners view is based, the overall impression of 
"; "Letter printed in Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New 
York: Pocket Books, 1974), p. 374. See also another 
portion of this letter, Ibid., p. 398. 
1 Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, p. 370. 
""Architects of Illusion (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1978), pp. 
206-218, based on an analysis of Jones, The Fifteen 
Weeks, pp. 138-142. 
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Jones' full study is one of confusion before delivery of the 
British note as to whether 'there should be a major change of 
direction in foreign policy. Charles P. Kindelberger, then 
a senior State Department official, although not directly 
involved in the Greek problem, recalled, `I had the very 
strong impression from a chance conversation 
... 
on 
February 20th (about), that the Department was in a panic as 
to what to do in Greece. 1=ßs 
At the end of 1946, there was a definite desire in 
administration circles to take a stronger attitude towards 
the Soviet Union, but little hope that such an action would 
be backed by Congress in terms of substantial appropriations 
or by American public opinion. It was fully recognised by 
the State Department that Greece was in danger of falling to 
communist-led rebels, and that American aid was needed, 
regardless of whether the British continued their support. 
While recommendations were made to Marshall just before the 
British note was delivered to the effect that Congress 
should be asked to approve a loan to Greece, 1: 2 there is no 
indication that this would have amounted to more than a 
stop-gap measure, if indeed it could have been obtained. 
Even after receipt of the British note, the only 
recommendation made by the State Department and approved by 
the President was that to try to obtain the specific amounts 
1 'FRUS, 1947, III, 242-243. 
1 6Henderson-s memorandum, FRUS, 1947, V, 29-31. This is 
dated 21 March and Acheson (Present at the Creation, p. 
217) states that it was seen by Marshall on that date, 
and resulted in Marshall's instructions to implement 
before he left his office that day. Since Marshall does 
not seem to have visited the State Department that day 
(supra, p. 285), there is some error in Acheson-s 
account. 
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needed to sustain Greece and Turkey. Nothing was decided in 
terms of initiating a new foreign policy. After the Con- 
gressional briefing where Acheson and Vandenberg apparently 
put the problem in terms of a communist threat, rhetoric and 
idealogy were relied on to win the support of Congress and 
public opinion. This in turn brought about the change in 
foreign policy. No doubt this pleased the State Department, 
and, probably, Truman. 
icfQological 
It is not clear whether either saw the idenlegical 
approach as a means of bringing about this change. There is 
no evidence that the rhetorical language of the Truman 
Doctrine speech was intended to do more than convince a 
reluctant Congress to provide money for Greece and Turkey. 
Gaddis may well be correct in arguing that a rigid anti- 
Soviet policy was not Truman"s objective, but the result of 
his use of the only weapon available to obtain the necessary 
appropriation. It may well have been only when he read the 
New York Times and other influential newspapers and periodi- 
cals that he realised that he had set America on a new 
course in international relations. 
Whether Truman saw such a result as a desirable 
outcome of his method of applying pressure on Congress, or 
even acted deliberately to bring it about, is a question as 
difficult to answer as that of whether Bevin, in giving in 
to Dalton on the complete withdrawal of aid to Greece, saw 
that it might bring about a desirable result, or took the 
action deliberately. Probably, neither realised what the 
long-term consequences of their actions would be. 
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Chapter X 
Conclusions 
1. British Policy with Regard to Greece 
British policy towards Greece during the wartime period 
was based on three factors: the value of the country as a 
centre of resistance to the Germans; the implied promise to 
restore the King and his Government; and the danger of the 
establishment of a pro-Soviet regime after liberation. In 
the early years, the military authorities placed great 
emphasis on the importance of sabotage and intelligence 
operations within Greece, believing these to outweigh the 
political factors the Foreign Office was stressing. By the 
autumn of 1943, with the decision of Quebec to engage in no 
major operations in the Balkans, it was evident that Greece 
would not become a battleground. At the-same time, it 
appeared that EAM-s probable actions might require the use 
of major numbers of troops needed elsewhere, unless Greek 
political problems were solved to the extent that the 
Government could return peacefully. From then on, Wilson 
and Alexander, as well as the Chiefs of Staff, generally 
supported the efforts of the Foreign Office, often in 
opposition to the views of Churchill. 
With the visit of the andarte delegation to Cairo, the 
Foreign Office accepted that the King's return was the key 
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question in Greek politics and the major issue being used by 
EAM to attack the Government-in-Exile. The obvious course 
of action required that the King make a definite promise to 
absent himself from Greece pending a plebiscite and to 
appoint a regency to act in his absence. The first of many 
attempts to obtain the King's agreement to this plan was 
frustrated by Roosevelt, although Churchill and Eden have 
much to answer for. 
Subsequent efforts to achieve this solution were also 
unsucccessful, to a large extent because of Churchill's 
reluctance to apply drastic pressure. As a result, the 
Greek Government entered Athens as an amorphous coalition 
including EAM, with the fundamental question of the King's 
future still unsolved. The fear that the King and a right- 
wing government were being introduced by the British against 
the wishes of the people led to the December civil war and 
the use of British forces to put it down. Only in the midst 
of the fighting was Churchill finally moved to force the 
issue with the King and obtain a firm promise to postpone 
his return and appoint the Regent. As a result, the civil 
war was ended and the coalition government, minus EAM, was 
able to establish itself and begin the task of recon- 
struction. 
While British policy may be regarded as successful in 
that it re-established the Greek Government in Athens, it 
did so only at considerable cost in both Greek and British 
lives. If the civil war had been avoided, the dramatic 
increase in support for the King and the right wing would 
not have occured. The preponderance of the right after 
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January 1945 produced major problems which defied efforts of 
the British Government to solve. Churchill must bear a 
large share of the blame. His refusal to accept that the 
King had no substantial support in Greece, and his unwill- 
ingness to exert significant pressure on him, negated the 
efforts of the Foreign Office and the diplomats to achieve a 
modus vivendi which might have prevented the civil war. It 
was not the result of following a different, but logical 
policy, but a stubborn failure to face facts. 
While Churchill should have recognised the unpopularity 
of the King, the ability and intention of EAM to undertake 
civil war was unclear. His confidence that the presence of 
British troops alone would prevent serious disorder was 
understandable, even though the Chiefs of Staff had warned 
him of their doubts. Perhaps no action on his part could 
have succeeded in obtaining the King's consent until the 
civil war came, but he cannot be excused for failing to take 
more forceful action. Churchills inherent respect for the 
institution of monarchy, and his gratitude for George II's 
loyalty to the British cause, undoubtedly made the task of 
urging an unpalatable decision on the King almost 
impossible. 
Eden's responsibility is more difficult to assess. He 
recommended courses of action which might have achieved the 
desired results. He supported the Kings position rather 
longer than did the Foreign Office or Leeper, and could be 
accused of faint-heartedness in obtaining approval for their 
plans. His knowledge of Churchill's attitudes towards the 
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King may be responsible to a degree, but he must bear some 
of the blame. 
Once the civil war was ended, the British had to decide 
on their relationship with the newly liberated nation. 
Churchill's initial policy of leaving the Greeks to find 
their own way had to be abandoned% in order to prevent 
right-wing excesses. Leeper, with the backing of the 
Foreign Office, and, after August 1945, with that of Bevin, 
used all possible pressures on the Regent and Greek 
political leaders for the formation of broadly based govern- 
ments, rather than accept rightist administrations more 
representative of current feeling. 
Bevin reluctantly gave in to demands by the Regent and 
the centre-left politicians to violate the provisions of the 
Varkiza agreement, by changing the order of the elections 
and plebiscite and by delaying each for lengthy periods, in 
the hope that moderate political elements would regain 
support. When the right won the election, the British still 
pressed for a coalition, but were forced to accept a 
rightist administration and permit the plebiscite to take 
place soon after. The victory of the King all but ended the 
effort to restrain the right, although Norton, with 
American supports was able to secure some diminuation of the 
extremist elements in the government in early 1947. 
While these attempts to restore democracy were going 
on, the British were also trying to ensure that civil 
liberties were protected and the economy revived. Neither 
effort was successful. Right-wing repression, both from 
government agencies and partisan bands continued throughout 
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the period, and was a contributing factor to the resumption 
by EAM of the civil war in mid-1946. The British could do 
little to force observance of civil rights and justice 
except continual protests and assistance in the the training 
of police. Similarly, their contribution to attempts to put 
down the civil war were limited to financial support of the 
Greek Armed Forces, training, and advice. 
The only weapon which could have been effective in 
solving the postwar problems of Greece was financial aid. 
The offer of aid tied to stringent conditions might have 
forced Greek Governments to adopt political policies which 
the British felt necessary, and made them carry out economic 
reforms and reconstruction. The one use of the financial 
weapon, the additional money and the currency commission 
resulting from McNeil's visit in October 1945, had no long 
terms effect, because it was too insubstantial. Withdrawal 
of support of the armed forces would have only led to 
additional right and left wing violence, and, after the 
summer of 1946, to a probable victory of EAM. The British 
simply could not afford the massive increases of financial 
aid which were needed by the autumn of 1946. There were 
strong doubts as to whether they could continue their 
exisiting commitments. 
By the autumn of 1946, Britain had completed much of 
the tasks for which it was responsible. The elections and 
the plebiscite had been carried out. A Greek Government had 
been installed which represented the wishes of the people, 
even if there were doubts as to its desirability. A Greek 
army had been created, equipped, and trained. Admittedly, 
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law and order had not been established completely, and a 
civil war was beginning, but the latter was being regarded 
as a minor 'bandit uprising` which could be put down with a 
little more money. 
At the same time, there were strong doubts concerning 
the strategic importance to Britain of the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean, particularly in the the mind of the Prime Minister, 
While the lengthy examination by the Chiefs of Staff of the 
Greek problem resulted in a Cabinet decision that continued 
suppport was desirable, it was accompanied by a recom- 
mendation that the Americans should be asked to help. This 
was not a decision to abandon Greece, but an attempt to 
obtain some assistance. 
It is logical to infer that the attitude of the Cabinet 
was: We have carried out our responsibilities in Greece. 
There are doubts as to the strategic importance of Greece to 
Britain. We are in financial difficulties due mainly to 
carrying the major burden in the West of the war. Even so, 
we are willing to continue some support to Greece, but it is 
only fair that the United States share the cost. ' This 
cannot be considered a drastic conclusion. 
The critical change was the refusal of Dalton to accept 
the instructions of the Cabinet. His insistence on the 
ending of all aid turned the message to Washington into a 
blackmail threat. Complete withdrawal without American 
acceptance of the burden would have meant the collapse of 
the Greek Government, although it is possible that Bevin and 
Dalton did not accept that this would be the effect, Bevin 
had been warned by his staff of the danger before he finally 
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gave in to Dalton, but he either discounted it or saw 
Dalton`s approach as a better gambit. 
In either case, there is no absolute certainty as to 
what his motive was. If he gave in to Dalton's insistence 
only because he knew he had little hope of an appeal back to 
the Cabinet, he was simply bowing to financial necessity. 
Even if, for the first time, he saw the merits of sudden and 
complete withdrawal of aid, he probably still capitulated 
because he accepted that no more money could be made 
available. While the circumstantial evidence for some sort 
of plot to bring the Americans back into international 
affairs is strong, there is no indication that Bevin had any 
such intention before he finally agreed with Dalton. Only a 
last minute realisation that Dalton-s demand might have that 
effect is compatible with the idea of a deliberate plot. A 
request that the United States make a substantial contribu- 
tion to the support of Greece would hardly force the 
Americans into a radical change of their foreign policy; a 
withdrawal of all aid which would cause a complete Greek 
collapse might. 
The lack of any real evidence that this was in Bevin's 
mind, and his failure to play the ideological card of a 
communist threat to Greece or to emphasise the probability 
of a Greek collapse, makes such a hypothesis untenable. If 
Bevin, in later years, created the impression that this was 
his intention in February 1947, he, or his auditors, were 
confusing results with intentions. Bevin may very well have 
claimed, with full justification, that his actions had 
resulted in the Truman Doctrine and the return of the 
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Americans to Europe; he could only have been rationalising 
if he stated that he had intended this result in giving in 
to Dalton. 
The British Government maintained the Government-in- 
Exile during the war, but were able to restore it to Greece 
at the liberation only by force of British arms. This 
failure was the result of many factors, such as the long- 
standing polarisation of Greek politics; the lack of a 
charismatic Greek leader; the overwhelming unpopularity and 
intransigence of George II; and the ability of the Greek 
Communist Party to establish itself as the major force 
within the occupied country. Had the British been able to 
solve the problem of the restoration of the King, and 
obtained at least token American support for the liberation, 
they might have re-established the Greek Government without 
major incident. Such a conclusion must be qualified; the 
strength of EAM was such that it might have undertaken the 
December 1944 civil war even if the issue of the King no 
longer existed. 
The British put down the civil war and brought about a 
satisfactory arrangement concerning the King and a truce 
with the EAM, a set of accomplishments for which they have 
not received due credit. They were immediately faced with 
the responsibilities of supervising a new government and 
arranging free elections and the settlement of the question 
of the King by the plebiscite. They made major efforts to 
establish political stability and civil peace, and to help 
the devastated country to rebuild its economy. These 
efforts were generally frustrated, on the one hand by the 
The Americans were far from helpful. Not only did they 
insist that Greece was an entirely British problem, but they 
believed that British policies were generally undesirable. 
Their views had some basis in their dislike of the institu- 
tion of monarchy and suspicion of British imperialism, but 
there were more pragmatic reasons. The State Department 
felt that continued support of the King was contrary to the 
desires of the Greek people, and liable to lead to major 
difficulties at liberation. These views were made clear in 
the series of aides-memoire of 1943. The State Department 
took little note of the changes in British thinking after 
the new plan- of November 1943, probably because they 
realised that no definite actionAbeing taken to force the 
King to submit to a plebiscite, or establish a regency. The 
only occasion on which the State Department raised its voice 
in 1944 was with regard to Churchill's percentage agree- 
ments, which violated American policies opposing spheres of 
influence and war-time settlements. 
If the State Department was unhelpful, Roosevelt 
created major difficulties. His intervention at Cairo not 
only prevented the implementation of British plans, but 
encouraged the King to continue his obstructionism for the 
next year. More difficult to judge, but probably more 
critical was Roosevelt's refusal to permit the inclusion of 
even a token number of American combat troops in the 
liberation force, which might have made EAM have second 
thoughts concerning civil war. The final blow was 
Stettinius-s statement concerning British actions, a 
deliberate criticism made without any attempt to understand 
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the situation. A strong message condemming the revolt and 
supporting British efforts to contain it might have brought 
a truce before it went too far. 
Lack of understanding of Greek affairs dominates the 
actions of Roosevelt, Hull, and Stettinius, although their 
only excuse is the pressure of other affairs. MacVeagh 
provided thorough reporting and logical interpretation and 
there were members of the State Department staff who were 
well informed. Kohler and Murray sometimes had a better 
appreciation of the situation and the probable outcome than 
did the British. But little attention was paid to the views 
of the State Department staff; for that matter, Roosevelt 
seldom consulted his Secretaries of State or bothered to 
inform them of his personal diplomacy. 
The United States bears a considerable responsibility 
for the inability of the British to restore the Greek 
Government peacefully, partially for interference, but 
mainly for failure to help, when that help would not have 
been a major burden. Almost exclusively the fault is due to 
the tradition of isolationism. Not only did the United 
States have no specific interests in Greece, but it was 
thought to be to its advantage to remain aloof from foreign 
entanglements outside the Western Hemisphere. Military 
necessity might require her presence in parts of Europe, and 
even involvement in the political affairs of some European 
nations, but this must be limited to the absolute minimum 
and not include any long-term post-war commitments. Roose- 
velt's major objection to American participation in the 
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liberation of Greece was the fear that the United States 
would be involved in a lengthy occupation. 
At Yalta the American attitude began to change. They 
were forced to accept some responsibility for the future of 
`Liberated Europe- if there was to be any acceptable 
solution for Eastern Europe as a whole. The ensuing 
declaration meant that the United States was under a moral 
obligation to assist in re-establishing democracy in 
Greece as well as the rest of Europe. As a result, super- 
vision of the elections and the plebiscite constituted the 
major American involvement in Greece in the first two post- 
war years. The United States did offer a limited amount of 
financial aid in the aftermath of the November 1945 economic 
crisis, attempting to use the credit as a means of encour- 
aging economic reform. Occasionally MacVeagh used his 
personal influence-to good effect to assist the British in 
their attempts to maintain political stability, but he 
usually acted on his own initiative. 
Only after the American Chiefs of Staff recognised the 
strategic importance of Greece to the United States in the 
late summer of 1946 did Byrnes and the State Department 
adopted a more positive attitude. It was now accepted that 
Greece should be"given some support, but there was no action 
taken to obtain the resources necessary to produce a 
significant effect. Indications of the new outlook gave the 
British hope of some aid in the future, although much 
depended on recommendations from the forthcoming Porter 
Mission. There is a strong probability that the Foreign 
388 
Office minute was accurate in terming Byrnes new policy 
'airy words'. 
American policy towards Greece in the post-war years 
remained much the same as before. It was modified in only 
one significant way. Instead of objecting to or criticising 
British actions, the Americans began to appreciate the 
problems the British were facing, and to approve their 
policies. Their attitude was almost always one of coopera- 
tion, even if their assistance was limited. They still 
shied away from British attempts to involve them in joint 
committees and agencies. Until March 1947, their policy was 
to provide advice and encouragement, but to refuse any 
responsibility for the support of Greece. 
While there was talk of a new policy within the State 
Department, and a flurry of enquiries concerning Greek 
needs, along with the organisation of the Porter Mission, 
the outlook was poor. The lack of interest in Greece and 
the return of isolationisut feeling in the United States 
made any major change unlikely. It would require some major 
development to initiate a new policy, and there was litle 
chance that such a policy could be limited to Greece. 
Regradless of what British motivations were, the problem of 
Greece provided that development. 
3. Anglo-American Relations 
The wartime 'Special Relationship' between Britain and 
America did not exist as far as Greece was concerned. 
Churchill desired American support, particularly with regard 
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to the percentage arrangement with Stalin and at the time of 
liberation, although he tried to preclude their interference 
in political matters. Roosevelt at best kept his distance, 
determined to avoid involvement in Greek affairs, and 
frequently critical of British policies. The occasional 
Presidential messages to the King or the Greek Government 
were sometimes useful, but amounted to little in the way of 
support in the long run. His interference with the King in 
Cairo can be dismissed as a temporary aberration. There 
was no common ground between the two leaders and nothing 
which may be regarded as Anglo-American policy. Relations 
between the State Department and Halifax and between the 
Foreign Office and Winant reflected the attitudes of the 
heads of government. The State Department made its opposi- 
tion to British policies abundantly clear. 
At the working level, i. e. 
, 
in Cairo, some form of 
`Special Relationship" did exist. There was an extensive 
exchange of information and discussion between Leeeper and 
MacVeagh. They met almost daily and showed each other a 
large proportion of the messages which passed in and out of 
their Embassies. Each informed his counterpart of his own 
policies and those of his government (in MacVeagh's case, 
when he could determine what these were). Even in the 
difficult days of December 1944, when Leeper was more than 
irritated by what he considered MacVeagh-s overemphasised 
attitude of neutrality, they still maintained close 
relations. 
The post-war situation was little different. Attlee and 
Truman did not continue the Churchill-Roosevelt correspond- 
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ence, and are not known to have ever discussed Greece on a 
personal basis. Bevin and Byrnes were more closely associ- 
ated than Eden and Hull, because the Council of Foreign 
Ministers and the United Nations brought them together so 
frequently, but there was no inclination to work closely 
with each other. MacVeagh and Leeper continued their 
relationship in Athens until Leeper"s departure, and it 
would appear that MacVeagh and Norton operated on similar 
lines. 
The American participation in the mission to observe 
Greek elections was not an effort to assist the British; nor 
was their minor financial aid to Athens in early 1946. They 
supported the British against Soviet complaints in the 
United Nations concerning troops in Greece, but the general 
attitude of the United States was to disassociate itself 
from the British presence there, at least until the late 
autumn of 1946. The overriding issue of winning the war 
which had forged the Churchill-Roosevelt partnership no 
longer existed. It was well into 1946 before a mutual 
perception of a Soviet threat to world peace gave a new 
basis for joint Anglo-American policies. Even this did 
little to establish a special bond between the two nations 
for the next year. 
The Americans must take most of the responsibility; 
their insistence that they had no interests in Greece and 
their dislike of British policies made it impossible to 
develop a closer relationship. For much of the wartime 
period, this may not have worried the British; American 
participation in the supervision of Greek affairs might have 
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led to major problems, especially when it came to putting 
down mutinies or civil wars. 
What Britain wanted from the United States during the 
war was military support and diplomatic backing for their 
policies, not interference. After the war, American in- 
volvement would have been welcome. Substantial aid or 
pressure from the United States would have lessened the 
British burden considerably, and improved the situation for 
the Greeks. Under such circumstances, Britain would have 
been able to withdraw far earlier and with more grace. By 
1945, the only long term value of Greece to Britain was 
strategic, and this proposition was being questioned by 
Attlee. Had the Americans seen themselves as partners with 
Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean, and helped to 
rehabilitate the country politically and economically by 
mid-1946, there might have been no Greek problem. 
4. A Summing Up 
The operation of British and American policies towards 
Greece from 1943 onwards culminated in one critical action, 
the sudden British abandonment of responsibility for the 
future of that country, and the resultant acceptance by the 
Americans of the problems. Two British Governments tried to 
sustain Greece through the war and to restore it to peace 
and stability in the post-war years. Dwindling British 
resources at a time when the Greek economic situation was 
deteriorating and the country faced with what appeared to be 
a Soviet threat, made it impossible to continue with the 
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task. While Britain may be criticised for mistakes of 
judgement, particularly in the war-time years, the American 
policy of non-involvement prevented joint action both at the 
time of liberation and after the war which could have 
brought a satisfactory solution to the problems of Greece. 
The failure of the policies of the two powers created a 
crisis situation in February 1947 when the American admini- 
stration was forced either to permit the descent of Greece 
into anarchy or Communist control, or to take unprecedented 
action in the face of a hostile Congress and an ill-prepared 
public. The decision to support Greece required the 
preaching of an ideological crusade against the Soviet Union 
in the form of the Truman Doctrine, which in turn began the 
real Cold War. 
The Cold War was not the result of defects in American 
and British policies towards Greece, but it was initiated 
because of the crisis situation which the failure of those 
policies brought about. If Bevin in early 1947 had not had 
to ask for American aid in such a form as to threatened the 
complete abandonment of Greece in six weeks time, the Cold 
War might have developed in different ways, or been avoided 
entirely. 
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